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SECTION I:

PHILOSOPHY

THEATRUM MUNDI

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Ernst Bertram is the first exegete who insisted on the importance of the mask theme in Nietzsche's works.[1] Vattimo underlines the unsystematic approach of treating this theme, and also the other themes discussed by Bertram. I prefer the poetical style of Bertram, even though I find it sometimes excessively conciliatory, and that brings a minus in focusing on a certain position concerning his interpretation. Nevertheless, I appreciate the fact that he uses more frequently Nietzsche's works than the exegesis. Probably that's why he has a more literary style that approaches the manner of Nietzsche.

The problem of mask appears at Nietzsche first on *The Birth of Tragedy* and it continues, with other significations, on all his works, especially in *Beyond Good and Evil*, (on Nietzsche's works the theme of mask appears also bound to Wagner's bibliography, which is named actor due to his dual morality).

About the symbolism of evil mask, Nietzsche creates in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the figure of the old wizard, who appears masked.

In the case of wizards' mask, this mask doesn't have only negative connotations; the seduction of mask has also an edifying role. Here it can be

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[1] Ernst Bertram, *Nietzsche. Încercare de mitologie,* Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998

observed the removal of *the mimesis of the mask*. The manifestation of the mask represents the illusion, the only illusion capable to contain the truth. The relation between master and disciple is described by Bertram appealing to the symbolism of mask:

„The one that becomes himself master recognizes that the master, especially through his wisdom and art, makes the mask suitable for him like a beautiful privilege of the oldness. It doesn't concern an oldness that wants to be preserved for her sake, but which must and wants to resist in many people. That is because only the mask has the capacity to give the impression of truth. All that is life calls to life in mask only like a chimera."[2]

In *The Birth of Tragedy* the culture is a dynamic, never completely finished, process, representing „a permanent replacing of deceiving representations". The desire of absolute of these representation, of these values that aspire to continuity with any price, the desire of persistence of a single mask represents the domination of the evil mask, represents the mask that only hides. The evil mask appears in contrast with the mask that accepts to be changed being consciously of its own illusory force.

George Bondor describes this uninterrupted game of masks, this festival named by Nietzsche culture accenting the vulnerability of diverse cultural paradigms:

„The masks of author don't hide a last expression, an approach with excellent underlined appearance. Behind them are just other masks, and all send one to another, in a game lead by one or another. (…) All the genealogic exercises, all the experiences at whom he invites us, stand for the universal dance of masks, a game of the surface with itself in which the pretended gravity, the interiority, the depths of all kind are proven to be derived, second, deceiving. So culture, is not other thing than the walk of these masks, of illusions, of a festival so *putrid*[3], but hence *dazzling* of the world"[4]

These considerations are bound to underline the necessity of mask, in this festival named culture; the mask is the inevitable tool of the performer. The mask is necessary also like a protective mask, like a mask that hides the vulnerability but also the aristocracy of the individual. Here stops the role of the breaker of evil masks, because the respect for mask interferes. The mask is the one that hides the character commanding, therefore, respect, because what it offers UU<u>doesn't represent the innate in the character</u> but <u>the attempt to build a mask</u>.

I consider the perspectivism in this context representing the necessity of permanent conflict between masks. Therefore, the process of

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[2] *Ibidem*, page 149, my translation
[3] the Italics are inserted by me
[4] George Bondor, *Dansul măştilor. Nietzsche şi filosofia interpretării*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 21

interpretation stands for assuming of masks. Foucault sustains that the interpretation moves from *what* to *whom*.

Another deviation of evil mask is represented by tehnicism:

„After all, the classic culture is the expression of «aristocracy», of the strong affirmative wills. Than, becoming a tool, becoming civilization, it comes to be split from its own origins, tearing apart from life itself. It becomes a useless mask, a suit that no one wants to wear. Life itself is completely planed and the man is transformed in a machine."[5]

This critique of tehnicism is taken by Heidegger (from Nietzsche) who makes of it a theoretical achievement under the form of the victory of unauthentic seen as result of hyper civilization from the times of machines. These mutations reflect in Heidegger's works, especially in the critique of unauthentic from *Being and Time*, where the individual takes the way of life of the man suffocated by his social dimension (das man)[6].

I see the unauthentic determined by the evolution of technique also like a mask of culture, a form of evil mask represented by technique. The tehnicism is above all the victory of thinking, from Socrates, continuing with Descartes to Nietzsche, which denounced the character of fake solution for problems appeared due to the exaggerate evolution of civilization.

At Nietzsche the reactive forces are situated in the impossibility to take the mask of active forces, because the powerful active forces occupy already the configuration of power. Taking the mask of active forces, these have the possibility to conserve their existence *reacting subversively, from the shadow*[7]. This is the way that it can be reached the domination of reactive forces (weak forces). The example of Nietzsche for this travestying is the apparition of the philosopher which came for the first time under a borrowed mask, the ascetic. Although the risk is an enormous one – ultimately the philosopher can believe in this mask.

Nietzsche reveals also another aspect of the mask – the respect that the mask can impose. As I sad earlier respect is gained hiding the vulgarity and imposing a necessary distance between people. So, the one who wears the mask is an initiate who hides skillfully his knowledge. The aristocratic spirit is able to wear the mask in order to defend his noble origins. Nietzsche considers the distance between things imposed of the mask in the aphorism 270 from *Beyond Good and Evil*.

The mask is the one that not only protect us from superficiality, but it also confers an indirect social role to the one that wears it in Greek tragedies (or better said confers a social responsibility to the one that wears it due to the models that embodies). The auto suppression of ancient culture that concerned Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* is marked in the theater

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[5] *Ibidem*, p. 155-156 (my translation)
[6] Martin Heidegger, *Fiinţă şi timp,* Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2003
[7] George Bondor, *Op.cit.*, p. 159 (my translation)

representations (in tragedies) also in the limitation of the role of masks. But, for Nietzsche this limitation isn't marked by the victory of truth because tragedies are not the place where the unveiled truth should manifest. The text above marks (by the theme of mask) the border between aristocratic and non aristocratic, because "the aristocratic soul has a deep respect for itself"[8].

Reminiscences of mask which offer dignity, trying to camouflage the individual and so to offer a better man, refined, are conserved in Charles Baudelaire's aesthetics where the make-up as technique that gives the *impression of supernatural* is considered almost as a duty. As make-up at Baudelaire, the mask at Nietzsche doesn't want to seduce, but only to avoid the obscene. In the same way at Jean Baudrillard, the make-up is the one that puts order in the features. The make-up is not a characteristic of the obscene, because this character (the obscene) concerns primarily the necessity of making oneself famous, and the make-up as mask means just the opposite: the individual doesn't want to expose oneself. The figure of dandy at Charles Baudelaire presents the characteristics of the one that knows to ware the make-up-mask, because his aristocracy consists in simplicity, the dandy characters "are the messengers of the necessity, so rare today, to fight and reduce to nothing the triviality"[9].

The supernatural impression represents the aspiration to magic; at its limits (at Baudelaire) it means the erase of limits between human and divine. He offers here the example of powdering the nose, technique that has as purpose the standardization of the color of skin creating the appearance of a statue, implicit of a *superior human being*, even of a *divine creature*.[10] Baudelaire underlines the absence of vulgarity of make up, which represents the victory of artistic beauty upon natural beauty; this option comes from the protest towards art as imitation of nature. Make up is considered a "painting of face"[11] that "doesn't have to be use in the vulgar, concealed purpose of imitate the pure nature and to compete with youthfulness"[12]. Baudelaire sustains that make up as artifice "doesn't make ugliness beautiful and it is only working for beautifulness"[13]. Make up has to be recognized as it is, doesn't have to be a hiding mask, "at contrary, it can reveal itself, if not with fastidiousness, at least with a sort of candour."[14] The make up-mask assures protection of individual and trough him of culture in general, this way it represents a impediment for the democratization of culture (it is known the

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[8] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dincolo de bine şi de rău*, in *Opere complete*, vol. 6, Editura Hestia, Timişoara, 2005, p. 164 (my translation)
[9] Charles Baudelaire, *Curiozități estetice*, Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1971, p. 209 (my translation)
[10] *Ibidem*, p. 215 (my translation)
[11] *Idem*
[12] *Idem*
[13] *Idem*
[14] *Idem*

aversion of Nietzsche concerning utilitarianism, and the dandy is the embodiment of exactly the opposite of any utilitarianism principle).

I consider the use of perfumes in the daily hygiene ritual a potential masking element, here we notice the masking of personal scent and the offering of a standardized odor that corresponds to a sort of consideration towards others (trying, through masks, to offer a non-vulgar scent, in his natural state, but a refined one). The use of perfumes and make-up with all this sort of habits (there are, obviously, more examples) correspond to a preoccupation towards others and that's why, as a symbol, the mask deserves respect.

The power of fake that manifested through mask corresponds to a will to dissimulate that is manifested at every day level through seduction. Art supposed to be seductive for the individual, as Baudrillard intended, not as an arousal of senses but in the sense of a capacity of choice attributed to the subject. Therefore, the attribute of the subject is the act of being seduced by the object (the subject and the object are considered from a postmodern point of view, with all the specifications that appear at Baudrillard).

So, at Nietzsche are two types of masks: the mask that only hides and the mask that hides with the aim of offering something better, more refined, a distinction sign of the noble man. In the last case Nietzsche talks about the respect for mask (even about *respect instinct*) and about the capacity of using the mask not only as a disguise, but more as an exercitation of will. Nevertheless, in both cases, mask appears as an indispensable element.

The mask is mainly a representation of celebration and spectacle, therefore of the canceling of every day life norms, as in the case of Dionysian celebrations. This phenomenon takes to the possibility of the manifestation of the aesthetics: "when the illusions of long tried normality are destroyed, only than, the world of unanticipated opens"[15].

With the understanding of the need of mask, the philosopher reaches to the superiority that comes from understanding the need for illusion. The escape from the chasing for ultimate truths brings the joy generated by the game of masks. Nietzsche, through the acceptance of the game of masks breaks the dichotomy truth-illusion and enters in a game animated by the autonomy of sensible.

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[15] Luc Ferry, *Homo aestheticus. Inventarea gustului în epoca democratică*, Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 209 (my translation)

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LA SPÉCIFICITÉ DES CONCEPTS DES SCIENCES SOCIALES*

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Résumé
　　Au cours des dernières années, dans le domaine des sciences sociales on a conscientisé de plus en plus le paradoxe suivant: bien que les concepts constituent la partie centrale des théories et ont le rôle d'organisateurs théoriques de la recherche, les spécialistes, à peu d'exceptions, leur accordent trop peu d'attention. Toutefois, on a observé que, si nous avons en vue le processus de formation des concepts dans les sciences sociales, l'effort d'imitation des procédés des sciences naturelles a été déjoué systématiquement.
　　Dans ces conditions, il est nécessaire que l'analyse philosophique et épistémologique de la sphère des sciences sociales se concentre sur les instruments spécifiques d'intéligibilité et premièrement sur la spécificité des concepts de ce domaine. On a souligné souvent que dans les sciences sociales existent beaucoup de concepts polymorphes (vagues), et d'autres sont trop sténographiques (sans force de généralisation). Un statut épistémologique spécial semblent avoir les concepts typologiques, mais dans ce domaine aussi il y a des problèmes concernant leur manière de définition et de généralisation.

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En tenant compte de ces situations, notre étude a comme objectif de mettre en évidence le spécifique des concepts des sciences sociales par rapport aux concepts des sciences naturelles. A cette fin, l'analyse vise: a) la situation des constantes (des éléments composants et des relations entre eux), du spécifique de celles-ci dans les systèmes sociaux par rapport aux systèmes physiques ou biologiques; b) la situation de l'universalité (respectivement des principes de l'uniformité et de l'invariance) dans le domaine des phénomènes sociaux, par rapport au domaine des sciences naturelles.

Relativement à la situation des concepts des sciences sociales, au dernier temps on attire de plus en plus l'attention sur un aspect paradoxal: malgré l'importance vitale des concepts, dans leur qualité d'"organisateurs théoriques de la recherche scientifique", les spécialistes en sciences sociales, à peu d'exceptions, leur accorde une attention minime. Parmi ces exceptions, comme on précise dans un ouvrage récent (Goertz, Gary, 2005), se trouve surtout G. Sartori et D. Collier, figures dominantes dans l'activité d'analyse des concepts des sciences sociales.

Or, ainsi que Sartori le remarque, un mauvais langage (ayant de mauvais concepts) signifie de mauvaises idées, et les mauvaises idées ne peuvent conduire qu'à une mauvaise connaissance (Sartori, Giovanni, 1984). Bien que John Stuart Mill attirât l'attention, à son temps, sur le rôle essentiel des concepts dans leur qualité de "nuclée" des théories, dans les sciences sociales on est arrivé à un "chaos conceptuel", à une sorte de "Tour Babel", cadre dans lequel les "manipulations verbales" remplacent souvent la construction et la reconstruction sociales.   Qu'est-ce qu'on peut faire dans une telle situation? La comparaison avec les sciences naturelles s'impose, souvent, spontanément. La précision conceptuelle de la physique classique a constitué et constitue aussi un modèle. D'autre part, ceux qui soutiennent avec fermeté que le modèle représenté par la physique n'est pas compatible avec les sciences sociales sont assez nombreux.

Plus concrètement, si on tient compte des trois types de systèmes essentiels de la réalité, respectivement les systèmes mécaniques, biologiques et sociaux, on peut tirer quelques conclusions (Teune, Henry, 1984, p. 250): dans les systèmes mécaniques, tant les composants que les relations d'entre eux restent constantes (c); dans les systèmes biologiques (ou écologiques), le nombre des composants est variable (?) mais les relations entre eux restent constantes (c); dans les systèmes sociaux, tant les composants (?) que les relations d'entre eux (?) sont variables. Ce qui nous permet de construire le tableau suivant (Biriş, Ioan, 2006, p. 201):

Caractéristiques \ Types de systèmes	Composants constants (ou non)	Relations constantes (ou non)
Mécaniques	c	c
Biologiques	?	c
Sociaux	?	?

(c = constant; ? = variable)

Grâce à cette situation, les systèmes mécaniques présupposent stabilité et équilibre, ce qui permet un haut degré de mathématisation et l'utilisation par excellence des concepts quantitatifs. Les systèmes biologiques sont moins déterminés, leur mathématisation étant plus restreinte, ce qui implique une aire réduite pour les concepts quantitatifs et l'utilisation plus extensive des concepts qualitatifs. Dans le cas des systèmes sociaux, la mathématisation est possible seulement si nous assumons l'hypothèse que soit les composants restent constants pour un certain temps, soit les relations d'entre eux ne changent pas dans un certain intervalle de temps. C'est pourquoi pour les systèmes sociaux prédominent les concepts qualitatifs et ceux quantitatifs peuvent être employés de manière conditionnelle.

Sans doute, les discussions sur la situation des concepts des sciences sociales sont marquées par la controverse centrale de la philosophie des sciences sociales, celle entre les avocats de la "science unifiée" (de Comte, Durkheim et Mill jusqu'à Hempel et Nagel) et les défenseurs d'une "verstehende science sociale" (de Dilthey, Weber et Gadamer jusqu'à Winch, Taylor et autres). Si les premiers soutiennent que le progrès des sciences sociales ne peut pas avoir lieu en l'absence de l'adoption des méthodes et des standards des sciences naturelles, ceux de la deuxième catégorie soulignent que la nature des objets d'étude des sciences sociales ne peut pas adopter la logique des sciences naturelles, car la compréhension ne peut pas être formalisée (voir aussi Apel, Karl-Otto, 1979).

Vis-à-vis de cette dichotomie traditionnelle tranchante, de nos jours le nombre de ceux qui soutiennent la complémentarité des deux types de sciences et des méthodologies utilisées semble être de plus en plus grand. Si l'adoption des méthodes de la physique dans les sciences politiques, économiques et même dans celles humanistes s'est produite avec un certain enthousiasme même du XVIII-e siècle (Renan, Ernest, p. 207), on reconnaît, entre temps, que dans les sciences naturelles aussi on a besoin d'un effort de compréhension et d'interprétation, car, par exemple, la manière dont on fonde et on teste les axiomes de la science naturelle "ne diffère trop" de la manière de fonder et de tester les axiomes éthiques (Einstein, Albert, 1992, p. 291). La reconnaissance d'un monisme méthodologique de la science semble ne plus être un problème aujourd'hui (Trigg, Roger, 1993). De plus,

le fait qu'on parle d'un "monisme ontologique", d'une "unité de la science" relativement à l'objet ne surprend plus. La réalisation d'une "unité de l'objet" est encouragée par les mathématiques structurales, qui incluent, selon Weizsäcker, la théorie de l'information, l'analyse des systèmes, la cybernétique, mais surtout la théorie des jeux, massivement utilisées à présent dans les sciences sociales. Grâce à l'incorporation des mathématiques structurales on peut mieux observer l'unité des sciences physiques avec les sciences de la vie (voir Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich, 1971), et les sciences sociales se retrouvent dans cette unité dans la continuation des sciences de la nature (et non pas en parallèle avec elles).

La thèse de l'unité de la science semble être renforcée aujourd'hui par les résultats de la philosophie de l'esprit, discipline considérée par Searle comme la "philosophie première" de la contemporanéité. On a constaté que les explications physique-naturalistes n'entrent pas obligatoirement en conflit avec celles socio-humaines en termes de motifs et buts (Quine, W. V., Ullian, J. S., 1978), que les positions de Durkheim et Weber ne sont pas contradictoires (Berger, P. L., Luckmann, Th., 1966), car la science sociale actuelle agrée deux types de causalité (physique et mentale). Après s'être constituées les théories des actes de parole, des performatifs et de l'intentionnalité, la science sociale a commencé à conscientiser l'existence d'une ontologie profonde, "invisible", en vertu de laquelle on pourrait expliquer "le passage de la physique de la parole aux actes de parole à sens" (Searle, John R., 1995). Le fait que les états de la conscience ne sont pas tous intentionnels et que les états intentionnels ne sont pas non plus toujours conscients (Searle, John R., 1998, p. 65) exprime l'unité et la complémentarité physique-mental.

Sur la base de cette complémentarité, peut-on parler alors d'une spécificité des sciences sociales, respectivement de leurs concepts? Si on accepte un monisme ontologique et l'un méthodologique, peut-il s'agir de n'importe quel dualisme? Il semble que oui, du moins jusqu'à présent, il reste un *dualisme conceptuel.* En ce sens, le programme de Davidson dans les domaines de la philosophie de l'action et de la philosophie de l'esprit nous montre que, dans les conditions de l'acceptation d'un monisme ontologique et de l'un méthodologique, une réduction explicative ne peut pas pourtant être acceptée. Il faut éviter une réduction conceptuelle, car, même si le mental est supervenient au physique, il ne peut pas être réduit à ce qui est physique.

La spécificité des actions humaines intentionnelles consiste dans le fait que celles-ci ne peuvent pas être provoquées que "par des facteurs mentaux tels que des désirs et des croyances" (Davidson, Donald, 1994, p. 45). Il y a du moins deux raisons pour lesquelles on ne doit pas accepter la réduction conceptuelle: a) le holisme des concepts mentaux, holisme qui manque, dans l'opinion de Davidson, aux concepts du domaine physique; par exemple, un concept mental comme celui de "croyance" ne peut être compris que relativement aux autres, comme ceux de "désir" ou "action"; b)

la dimension normative des concepts mentaux, dimension conformément à laquelle l'arrière-plan des contenus n'est pas un fait d'observation, mais une norme de dissociation, en l'absence de laquelle les contenus mentaux ne peuvent pas être qualifiés (voir Engel, Pascal, 1994a, p. 16-17).

Grâce à ces raisons, les spécialistes des sciences sociales ne devraient pas se laisser séduits par les diverses analogies qui peuvent se faire entre les explications des sciences naturelles et celles du domaine du social. Par exemple, il est facile à établir une analogie entre l'opération d'attribution de nombres pour mesurer la température ou le poids en physique et l'opération semblable d'utilisation des phrases du langage pour identifier les contenus de pensée et les énoncés des diverses personnes. Mais une telle analogie n'est pas complète, nous attire l'attention Davidson, parce que les phrases du langage et les contenus de pensée impliquent un processus d'interprétation (Davidson, Donald, 1994, p. 49).

Les analogies peuvent être décevantes même dans le cas des expressions quantitatives, des concepts exprimés mathématiquement. Un exemple simple peut nous montrer immédiatement cette chose. Entre la loi du Mariotte de la thermodinamique - loi qui nous dit que, à la même température, le produit entre le volume d'un gaz et sa pression reste constant - et la loi économique de la demande de biens en fonction du prix, l'analogie de la représentation des courbes d'évolution est tout à fait frappante, comme on peut voir dans la figure ci-dessous:

P P

VD
La loi Mariotte:La courbe de la demande en fonction
P x V = constantdu prix
(P = la pression; V = le volume)(P = le prix; D = la demande)

Mais ni dans ce cas l'analogie n'est pas complète. Elle s'impose seulement du point de vue formel, par la similitude de la courbe d'évolution, mais dans le contenu elle ne résiste plus. Si dans la loi de Mariotte, par exemple, la croissance de P est d'un certain nombre de fois, cela implique la diminution de V du même nombre de fois, dans la loi de la demande en fonction du prix, l'augmentation de quelques fois ne conduit pas

obligatoirement à la diminution proportionnelle de la demande, mais seulement comme tendance généralement-statistique.

Revenons aux deux causes fondamentales de la non-réductibilité du mental au physique: le holisme du mental et sa dimension normative. Toutes les deux obligent les concepts du mental, des sciences sociales en général, à un certain degré de contextualisation. Cette chose a été ressentie par Max Weber quand il a proposé les concepts typologiques, les idéal-types. Car, soit qu'il s'agit de concepts polymorphes, trop théoriques (comme, par exemple, domination, conflit, intégration, etc.), soit qu'il s'agit de concepts sténographiques, construits le plus souvent ad hoc (loisir, adolescence, etc.), ils ne sont pas compris que par relation aux autres d'un champ mental ou sémantique. Parce que la structure formelle de tels concepts ne ferme pas suffisamment le sens (Passeron, Jean-Claude, 1991, p. 61), ils esquissent plutôt un type générique qui doit être ensuite indexé sur la série des cas individuels. Par exemple, le concept de "féodalisme" des sciences sociales ne peut pas être utilisé comme le concept de "force mécanique" de la physique. Pendant que le dernier n'a pas besoin de contextualisation, le premier ne peut pas être employé que concrètement-historiquement, appliqué à l'Europe médiévale, par exemple, au Japon médiéval ou à la Chine des royaumes, etc.

La dimension normative renforce, à son tour, le caractère contextuel des concepts du mental. La notion de norme, dans la vision de Pascal Engel, comporte au moins trois sens: 1) dans le sens de règle, d'étalon ou principe qui est correctement d'tre suivi; 2) dans le sens descriptif, comme une constatation d'une régularité statistique, d'une moyenne (par exemple, la durée de vie "normale"); 3) dans le sens d'idéal ou idéalisation empirique, fonctionnant aussi descriptivement comme modèle explicatif (Engel, Pascal, 1994b, p. 207). Tous les trois sens normatifs se retrouvent dans les concepts intentionnaux: dans le premier sens, comme une normativité d'inférence, dans le deuxième, comme une norme de rationnalité et dans le troisième comme normes sociales de signification. Les dernières sont relatives à une certaine communauté, sont immanentes à la communauté, c'est pourquoi elles ne peuvent pas être découvertes avant l'interprétation. Voilà pourquoi les concepts et les raisonnements des sciences sociales se caractérisent non tant par la constance et la généralisation, mais plutôt par un "va-et-vient argumentatif entre raisonnement statistique et contextualisation historique" (Passeron, Jean-Claude, 1991, p. 11).

Il y a des raisons pour lesquelles les classifications des concepts seulement en fonction de leur relation avec le dénoté (comme le font, par exemple, Carnap et Achinstein) n'aident presque pas du tout les sciences sociales. Pour Achinstein, par exemple, la science utilise trois catégories de concepts: ceux qui désignent des objets ou des réalités physiques; des concepts plus abstraits, apliquables dans certaines conditions aux objets physiques et les concepts quantitatifs (Achinstein, Peter, 1968). A notre avis, à part la relation avec le dénoté empirique, l'analyse des concepts

scientifiques gagne si on a en vue encore deux coordonnées: la manière d'obtension des concepts et leur fonction théorique. En ce sens, si nous tenons compte des grands linéaments de l'histoire des concepts scientifiques, nous pouvons établir le tableau suivant (Biris, Ioan, 2006, p. 42):

Types de concepts	La manière d'obtension	La fonction théorique	La relation avec le dénoté empirique
Concepts génériques	réflectoire	descriptif-classificatrice	directe
Concepts quantitatifs	constructif-mathématique	explicatif-logique	indirecte
Concepts-images	constructif-hypothétique	euristique-hypothétique	transempirique
Concepts idéal-typiques	constructif-typologique	euristique-typologique	modélatrice

Le premier type de concepts, ceux génériques, aident d'une manière spéciale une démarche qualitative, classificatrice, et ont à la base la logique aristotélicienne. Le deuxième type est promu surtout par la science moderne, par le modèle galiléo-newtonien. Dans le cas des concepts-images, le modèle est plutôt celui morphologique, professé par Goethe dans la recherche des phénomènes "originaux", des phénomènes "prototype". La dernière catégorie, celle des concepts idéal-typiques, d'inspiration weberienne, par sa fonction euristique-typologique et par son action modélatrice en rapport avec l'expérience (ontologiquement, non seulement méthodologiquement), répond probablement de la manière la plus adéquate au domaine de l'intentionnalité. Soit que, sur cette voie, on arrive à des concepts polaires (fréquents dans les sciences sociales), soit à des concepts idéaux, normatifs, ils mettent en évidence la spécificité du mental, de la réalité socio-humaine.

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VALENCES ÉTHIQUES DE LA RATIONNALITÉ COMMUNICATIVE.

DE GADAMER À HABERMAS

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La crise de la modernité approfondit les aliénations et les égarrements d'une raison exercée pour longtemps unilatéralement, déterminant une crise de motivation au niveau de l'initiative humaine et un grave déficit de responsabilité, ayant comme expressions pathologiques la responsabilité anonyme, la solitude du sujet moral, après tout la cvasilégitimation d'une subjectivité de plus en plus dénuée de spiritualité et de moralité, par la même perte de la capacité d'être moral.

Les performances, tout comme les insuccès qui accompagnent le parcours du moderne au postmoderne sollicitent pour cela à la philosophie un surplus de réflexion, d'autoexamination critique, dans le sens de la reconsidération de son potentiel discursif à des exigences d'une pensée conforme au processus irrépressible de la pluralisation de la raison, à son effet pervers, l'idéologie scientifique-technique. La philosophie, comme Heidegger l'anticipe déjà, arrive elle-même dans une situation paradoxale parce que *soit* elle accepte sa fin comme triomphe de l'instauration complètement contrôlée d'un monde scientifique-technique et d'un ordre social adéquat - de cette manière, la fin de la philosophie signifie le debout d'une civilisation mondiale bien-fondée dans la pensée européenne occidentale[1] - *soit* elle assume la mise d'une pensée qui ne soit ni métaphysique ni science, ayant comme charge un caractère préliminaire,

non fondateur, contenant la possibilité du dépassement du modèle technique-scientifique-industriel en tant qu'étalon unique d'habituer de l'homme dans le monde[2].

N'importe comment nous nous situons à l'égard de l'alternative invoquée, on ne peut pas éluder la provocation concernant la dé-dogmatisation de la pensée avec les pratiques consacrées et ainsi la possibilité de commencer à penser autrement par une autoéducation de la pensée, par un exercice inexpérimenté encore ou occulté à cause de l'institutionalisation de la raison et de l'action, à cause de l'excès d'une pensée calculatrice, obsédée par la représentation et la fondation, mais aussi limitée à l'énoncé ou à l'information (dans une telle situation prolifèrent les significations précaires, les compréhensions par distorsion et les mécompréhensions).

La récupération de la richesse perdue ou ratée de la pensée, de ses applications adéquates devient un desideratum obligatoire assumé par la tournure *herméneutique* de la philosophie, par les voix consacrées de Gadamer, Habermas, Ricoeur ou Vattimo. Les rapprochements ou les éloignements des discours herméneutiques - y inclus les positions extrêmes de Foucault ou Derrida - déterminent une modalité spécifique de manifestation du conflit des interprétations, en laquelle leur rivalité implique des différences, des oppositions, chacune parlant d'un lieu dissemblable, ayant certaines préférences régionales mais en même temps exigeant une reconnaissance réciproque ainsi que, précise Ricoeur, "non pas une position étrangère et purement adverse, mais comme élevant à sa façon une révendication légitime"[3]. La dynamique de l'expérience herméneutique n'est pas assurée par la dislocation réciproque des interprétations - une telle option échoue inévitablement en discussions stériles - mais par la complémentarité productive grâce à l'objectif commun concernant la critique et le dépassement de l'instrumentalisation de la pensée, de l'action humaine, prenant en considération le contexte spécial des mondes et des cultures plurielles qui caractérise les sociétés ultra-pluralistes conformes à l'époque postmoderne.

Un tel objectif téméraire de l'herméneutique contemporaine suppose principalement le passage significatif du *logos*-raison au *logos*-conscience commun comme idéal normatif, par le renouvellement de la liaison originaire entre la raison théorique et la raison pratique, à vrai dire ressuscitant la vocation éthique de la philosophie par rapport à la communauté communicative et au potentiel dialogal. Finalement, cette charge, selon Vattimo, représente la direction privilégiée de la conversion de la philosophie herméneutique en éthique comprise comme "éthos, coutume, culture"[4], commençant avec le projet de "réhabilitation" de la philosophie pratique, initié par Gadamer et Habermas.

Le renouvellement de la philosophie pratique, chez Gadamer, est une tâche très complexe de la pensée herméneutique qui ne concerne pas l'entremise simple de la connaissance théorique et pratique mais le rapport

de ses objectifs au but commun, en engageant la dimension entière de la compréhension de soi-même et non seulement *savoir* ou *faire* dans une relation occasionnelle, épisodique. Dans la philosophie pratique se réunissent, en fait, la raison d'agir et la raison pratique avec un ensemble de normes, règles d'action ou de comportement signifiant une action réglée ou normée qui nous oriente vers l'autre, étant une interaction communicative. L'approche herméneutique implique ainsi un concept de raison pratique, comme de praxis qui suppose la compréhension et la communication avec ses valences cognitives et existentielles distinguées mais solidarisées par un *éthos* ayant comme mesure distinctive la raison et l'action responsable. Dans ces circonstances on utilise un concept de raison pratique ayant une double prétention: qu'il mérite d'être appelé raison, mais qu'il garde des caractères irréductibles à la rationnalité scientifique-technique. D'ici la position originale de la raison pratique, réunissant, selon Ricoeur, dans toute manifestationm "un calcul vrais et un désir droit sous une norme - un *logos* - qui à son tour, ne vas pas sans l'initiative et le discernement personnel. C'est tout cela pris ensemble qui forme la raison pratique"[5].

La rationnalité responsable est un tel trait irréductible, présente déjà dans l'esprit grec comme sagesse pratique, *phronesis*, signifiant une autre forme d'utiliser la raison en accord avec un praxis circonscrit entre *savoir* et *faire*. Sous cette hypostase, la raison suppose, pour Gadamer, la juste application des facultés et des connaissances, une application qui se subordonne à des buts collectifs, valables pour tous. L'universalité pratique du concept de raison impose une autre instance supérieure qui est la responsabilité[6]. *Phronesis* représente par conséquent une unité inséparable: la rationnalité consistant en trouver les moyens justes pour le but et la rationnalité en choisissant les buts, dans la préméditation ou le maintien du but même. Le choix du but n'est pas de toute évidence par rapport au choix des moyens parce que, dit Gadamer, intervient chaque fois un certain ensemble d'orientations normatives, acceptées plus ou moins "naturellement" par l'adaptation sociale et l'éducation morale. Ricoeur, à son tour, motive la différence entre la délibération des buts et des moyens même par la distance réflexive, stratégique typique à la rationnalité pratique. Cette différence (distance) ne supprime pas la responsabilité rationnelle mais limite la sphère du choix du but à tout moment et l'aire de l'action dans laquelle survient la justesse de la raison pratique qui domine notre action tout comme la confrontation adéquate des moyens utilisés dans l'action. La sagesse pratique, *phronesis*, garde la rationnalité morale et la responsabilité propre comme des dates intrinsèques, pas extérieures ou accidentelles, en configurant un éthos de la responsabilité conforme à "chaque homme qui prend des décisions libres est responsable pour ses décisions"[7].

L'idée de la philosophie pratique et la notion de praxis ne sont pas récupérées par l'herméneutique philosophique par la voie consacrée de l'opposition à la théorie mais récupérant la distinction aristotélicienne entre *techné* - science qui dirige la capacité de faire et *phronesis* - les

connaissances qui conduisent le praxis ou la connaissance pratique. Cette distinction ne signifie pas séparation mais une mise en ordre, c'est-à-dire l'ordonnance et la subordination de cette techné, de sa capacité (*könen*) de phronesis et son praxis conforme à une situation antérieure ses dépendances d'une science théorique ou de son application (comme science appliquée)[8]. En même temps, la récupération herméneutique de cet héritage aristotélicien suppose l'évaluation de l'action - avant qu'elle soit annexée ou dénaturée par de diverses théories de l'action - comme activité qui comporte une décision morale et un choix préférentiel, délibéré (*proairesis*). Seulement par ce choix délibéré les actions humaines parviennent à la sphère de la moralité et peuvent être qualifiées comme morales ou imorales, responsables ou irresponsables, entrant ainsi dans le domaine d'intérêt des sciences pratiques, de l'éthique ou de la politique.

Au début, la philosophie pratique et l'action ne signifient pas l'application de la théorie à la pratique, mais, particulièrement, ce qui s'élève de l'expérience du praxis à cause de la raison et de la rationnalité mise en elle. Ce sens est développé à la manière spécifique de Gadamer, Habermas et d'autres qui considèrent que la pratique n'est pas purement et simplement une action conforme aux règles ou une application de connaissances, mais elle implique la situation originaire de l'homme dans son environnement naturel et social et implicitement une facticité représentant les plus intimes et profondes convictions, évaluations, habitudes qui constituent ensemble le système de notre vie[9]. La synthèse de cette facticité se trouve dans l'*éthos*, dans l'existence devenue par exercice habitude (coutume) et par *phonesis* la rationnalité responsable, de sorte que l'*éthos* cesse d'être simplement adaptation, conformisme, dressage[10].

Pour la société humaine il est important comment précise-t-elle ses buts, mais aussi important (en un certain moment, même plus important) est l'accord des autres et les moyens trouvés pour l'acceptation des buts confirmés par tous. Cette exigence, reconnue ou pas, attire l'attention sur le fait qu'avant la justification théorique se trouve la présupposition d'un idéal de rationnalité et implicitement de responsabilité pratique, valable pour le comportement et le discours quotidien, tout comme pour le discours à rigueur scientifique (soit dans les sciences de l'esprit, soit dans les sciences de la nature ou de la société). Ce que représente, par exemple, l'idéal de la connaissance objective ou l'éthos de la scientifique s'accomplit par l'idéal de la participation mais dans une telle situation, dit Gadamer, chaque conquête partielle se gagne par participation à la vérité et par communion réciproque, ayant comme support la communauté dialogique[11]. La participation à la vérité par la voie du dialogue ne dépend pas seulement du respect des règles, principes ou normes parce que chaque fois entre en jeu l'être propre, la condition ou la pensée existentielle. Après tout, la rencontre avec l'autre ou avec ce qui est différent - l'intersubjectivité et l'altérité - peut ou non constituer la réalisation du soi-même et en plus, la solidarité profonde avec l'autre. Pour cela, dit Derrida ("le philosophe déconstructeur" situé au-delà de

l'herméneutique) une époque provisoire révolue exige une hyper-éthique et aussi une hyper-politique en impliquant le paradoxe de la possibilité impossible et l'urgence de la responsabilité ayant comme soutien la raison d'être de la croyance dans l'autre (v. Derrida, *La déconstruction de la politique*, trad. en roumain ed. Idea Design &Print, Cluj, 2005, pp. 92-93).

Dans un monde pluraliste de cultures, religions, moeurs et valorisations, les desiderata de la compréhension, de la communication authentique ne tient pas des ambitions de l'herméneutique d'être scientifique ou pratique dans une autre manière, mais des provocations multiples de notre époque dominée par la société de l'opinion publique, de la "société discursive" (Foucault) ou de "la société de la communication généralisée" (Vattimo). Ces dénominations ou qualifications indiquent en réalité les mutations significatives de la pensée et de la pratique postmoderne grâce au nouveau support technique des ordinateurs et des systèmes avec ses effets cumulables: une multitude de théories et de pratiques, de visions et de techniques qui remplacent les anciennes images du monde avec "un monde conçu comme image" (Heidegger) qui en plus devient "image de l'image", générateur de mondes virtuels, fictionnels.

En ce contexte multiforme, exposée aux précarités existentielles et cognitives, la pensée herméneutique, pour Habermas, révendique un nouveau rôle pour la philosophie, celui d'*interprète-médiateur*, ayant comme repère le praxis communicatif quotidien. Ce rôle est assumé par les replis de la philosophie vers le "monde de la vie" comme par les articulations spécifiques du discours, en réunissant l'herméneutique avec la pragmatique. Ainsi sont soulignées les liaisons de la connaissance et de l'action avec la sphère des intérêts (cognitifs, pratiques, émancipateurs) comme les interactions entre le langage, le travail et le pouvoir qui sont propres aux sociétés postindustrielles. La reconnaissances de ces liaisons suppose un modèle communicatif distinct, dans lequel la participation et l'accord des autres ont comme repère, chez Habermas, la rationnalité *communicative, discursive, critique* soutenue spécialement par une fonction nouvelle de la critique impliquant l'examination des procédures conceptuelles et pratiques qui permettent la formation du consensus rationnel; la critique devient le support indispensable, optimal de la production du consensus sur la base d'un débat libre, sans distorsion des interlocuteurs qui possèdent la compétence communicative[12].

Mais la compréhension réciproque, par consensus rationnel, s'obtient difficilement parce que dans la société postindustrielle elle supporte d'une part les pressions du système (l'Etat, l'économie) et les actions stratégiques impliquant un modèle nonparticipatif et d'autre part "le monde de la vie", respectivement l'action communicative périclitée sans cesse par les mécanismes dogmatiques, bureaucratiques et par les tendances agressives du système de "coloniser" "le monde de la vie" mais aussi par la suprématie des intérêts pratiques ou des rationnalités de type économique et administratif. Le contraste entre l'action stratégique (non participative) et

l'action communicative est amplifié de nos jours par la globalisation du monde, du fait que certains Etats (systèmes) sont devenus bénéficiaires mais les autres, la majorité, perdants. Pour Habermas ces circonstances relèvent des limites de certaines ressources (argent, pouvoir), obligeant à la reconnaissance des autres ressources sacrifiées ou dénaturées par la société postindustrielle tel que la solidarité et la participation, la liberté d'être d'accord instituée par le plus fort argument et le flux du dialogue argumentatif "sans distorsion et sans contraintes".

La perspective de Habermas réclame une ré-position du discours philosophique par rapport aux dates de la pratique et de la connaissance contemporaine, l'objectif explicite étant la réalisation d'une théorie de la rationnalité, sans prétentions fondatrices mais qui accorde de l'autorité épistémique à la communauté de ceux qui coopèrent et parlent les uns avec les autres[13]. Par le rôle d'interprète-médiateur, la philosophie actualise *sui-generis* son rapport à la totalité, par une projection inédite réunissant interprétations cognitives, expectations morales, expressions et valeurs spécifiques à une configuration de la praxis communicative quotidienne. La compréhension visée ou reproduite en sens communicatif a une condition en quelque sorte paradoxale parce que, dit Habermas, elle implique un potentiel des fondements qui peuvent être attaqués mais il y a toutefois des fondements qui restent. C'est pour cela que la herméneutique ne peut pas être une doctrine avec des requêtes universalistes, mais seulement un paradigme de recherche pour les sciences sociales (sociologie, anthropologie, psychologie sociale), un rôle spécial revenant aux sciences reconstructives *versus* les sciences compréhensives, les premières comprenant la connaissance préthéorique des sujets qui jugent, actionnent et parlent d'une manière compétente mais aussi les systèmes traditionnels culturels de connaissance, en clarifiant ensemble la base présupposée universelle de rationalité de l'expérience et du jugement, de l'action et de la compréhension linguistique[14]. Selon Habermas, la division des sciences tout comme leur coopération avec la philosophie (par bénéfices réciproques) détermine une compréhension de soi non fondamentaliste et une conscience failibiliste qui exclut en même temps les prétentions de science unitaire ayant comme standard les sciences monologiques de l'expérience et aussi le fondamentalisme d'une philosophie transcendentale obsédée par des fondements ultimes.

Dans cet ensemble critique, l'aspiration de l'herméneutique contemporaine de révigorer la philosophie pratique est convertie, chez Habermas, en projet d'éthique intégré au rationnalisme communicatif, signifiant une théorie de l'éthique à la perspective du discours qui soutient des thèses universalistes très fortes mais qui révendique pour celles-ci un statut faible[15]. Le discours chez Habermas, tout comme le dialogue chez Gadamer, représente la forme originaire de la conciliation humaine aussi bien que la solution sûre pour contrecarrer la crise de légitimation et de motivation aggravée très bien dans la société contemporaine. Prenant en

considération cette situation complexe de nos jours, Habermas nous propose une éthique dans laquelle le discours argumentatif est celui qui fait concurrence à la solution des problèmes pratiques mais seulement par le trajet de l'action communicative au discours comme argumentation. Ainsi la théorie de l'argumentation fonctionne comme une logique informelle lors même que la compréhension des problèmes théoriques ne peut pas être obtenue de manière déductive ou par évidences empiriques. La mise en pratique de la logique de l'argumentation implique nécessairement, selon Habermas, l'introduction d'un principe moral qui, en tant que règle d'argumentation, peut jouer un rôle équivalent au principe d'induction du discours scientifique expérimental[16]. La capacité d'universalisation des maximes morales - comme garantie d'un jugement impartial - signifiera donc une reconnaissance par tous ceux qui sont visés mais aussi une impartialité connectée à l'universalité de la norme contenant l'intérêt de ceux visés et le consentement universel comme reconnaissance intersubjective. Le résultat de ces exigences signifie un principe qui contraint n'importe qui du cercle de ceux visés à adopter, quand ils évaluent leurs propres intérêts, la perspective de tous les autres[17].

L'éthique programmée par Habermas, d'inspiration évidemment kantienne, soutient la capacité de vérité des problèmes pratiques, par recours à la fondation pragmatique, ayant comme repères distincts l'action communicative et en outre la compréhension comme accord obtenu par l'argumentation morale. L'action basée sur la compréhension devient ainsi le liant pour le monde social et l'interaction réglée par normes, en déterminant l'accord dans le monde communicatif par une triple exigence, de vérité, de correction et d'authenticité. L'argumentation morale contribue à l'apaisement par consensus des conflits d'action qui représentent la plupart du temps une "situation d'accord normatif déréglé".

L'éthique de la communication devient implicitement, chez Habermas, une éthique du discours avec un principe fondamental d'universalité "U" comme règle d'argumentation pour les discours pratiques: quelque norme valable doit satisfaire la condition que ses suites et conséquences secondaires qui résultent anticipativement par son respect universel pour satisfaire les intérêts de chaque personne individuelle, peut être acceptée sans contrainte par tous ceux qui sont visés[18]. En même temps, ce principe "U" qui fait la liaison entre la conscience morale et l'action communicative est traduit par un principe fondamental du discours "D": quelque norme valide recevra le consentement de tous ceux visés si ceux-ci peuvent participer à un discours pratique[19].

L'éthique du discours préconisée par Habermas peut être distinguée des autres éthiques (philosophiques ou appliquées) parce qu'elle n'offre pas d'orientations de contenu, mais des procédures avec plusieurs prémisses qui garantissent l'impartialité de la formation/développement de la capacité de jugement moral. Ainsi, le spécifique du discours pratique ne réside pas dans un procédé des norms justificatives mais dans un procédé de vérification

pour les normes admises de manière pratique[20]. Dans le passage du praxis communicatif au discours, l'argumentation implique un changement d'attitude, elle même étant une forme qui reflète l'action communicative, un dérivé de l'action orientée par la compréhension, après tout une attitude réfléchie sur les prémisses universelles du praxis communicatif quotidien (un praxis, dit Habermas, que nous ne pouvons pas <choisir> ainsi comme on peut choisir la marque de la voiture ou les postulats valoriques!).

L'éthique du discours confirme sa validité seulement dans la confrontation (explicite) avec d'autres positions et théories morales consacrées (le scepticisme éthique, le relativisme éthique ou les éthiques morales), par rapport auxquelles elle précise son profit distinct - dans l'ensemble des éthiques cognitives, universalistes, formalistes. Mais, élaborant la sphère de la validité impérative des normes, l'action éthique du discours permet la délimitation du domaine de ce peut être moralement valable et des contenus culturels comme la sélection des problèmes pratiques susceptibles de décision rationnelle. En même temps, l'éthique du discours et la théorie normative trouvent une confirmation indirecte, par d'autres théories consacrées comme, par exemple, la théorie du développement moral de Kohlberg ou de Piaget.

Dans l'éthique du discours il y a une argumentation à laquelle participent de manière coopérante tous ceux visés, parce que, chez Habermas, seulement un processus intersubjectif de compréhension assure un accord réfléchi par lequel "les participants sachent qu'ils sont convaincus en commun de quelque chose". Dans ces conditions, l'universalité de la maxime morale n'est pas un donné a priori, mais un résultat d'une vérification discursive, de la réalisation par coopération de l'argumentation présente et par le poids des arguments au sujet de "ce que chacun veut, sans contradiction, comme loi universelle" ou de ce que tous reconnaissent, par accord, comme norme universelle[21]. Chacun représente - dans le sens pragmatique - une instance ultime de jugement conformément à l'intérêt propre mais aussi d'exposition à la critique des autres, parce que les argumentations morales réclament une solution dialogale, avec un déploiement multiple de procédés ayant des exigences logiques, dialectiques, rhétoriques. Selon ce scénario argumentatif, la responsabilité représente un cas spécial de la capacité de responsabilité désignant l'orientation de l'action en fonction d'un accord rationnel, représenté comme étant universel: ceux qui actionnent moralement sont ceux qui actionnent en comprenant[22]. De cette manière, la liberté de communication, tout comme l'autorité épistémique supposent un consensus par le choix des solutions acceptables du point de vue rationnel de tous les participants à une discussion. L'orientation du paradigme de la conscience à la communication signifie sans doute une extension du kantianisme, selon Habermas, par l'interprétation intersubjective de l'Impératif catégorique (des normes) conformément à une pluralité historique et culturelle, implicitement à une diversité des perspectives pragmatiques.

L'universalité de l'accord motivé rationnel, tout comme l'aplication de l'éthique du discours, respectivement du discours pratique supporte toujours des autolimitations et des limites. L'autolimitation est inévitable à cause de la médiation moralité-moeurs, ou comme dit Habermas, à cause "de l'habitation de la moralité en moeurs". Inévitables sont aussi les limitations à cause des circonstances du contexte historique-social de la raison, des ingérinces des conflits sociaux ou des pressions d'un pouvoir politique. À cause de ces facteurs - qui actionnent plus ou moins perturbateur - la perspective de l'accord motivé rationnel est autoprotégée par une <réserve idéalisante> telle: l'argumentation soit suffisamment ouverte et continue pour suffisamment de temps[23].

Les limitations (et les autolimitations) du discours moral argumentatif deviennent plus compliquées si on considère le *hiatus* conviction et responsabilité, par l'ocultation des différences entre les pratiques manipulatives et celles non-manipulatives ou entre les rôles sociaux et les personnages. Ces discordances sont commentées suggestivement par MacIntyre, qui détermine les personnages comme "incarnation" d'un modèle culturel et moral, comme légitimation morale d'une façon de l'existence sociale[24]. Pour cette raison, les convictions intimes et celles exprimées ou présumées par rôle doivent coïncider, pour motiver la qualité d'agent moral. Mais ces exigences sont périclitées par ce que MacIntyre nomme "la bifurcation du monde social contemporain" dans un domaine de l'organisation (la bureaucratie) et un domaine de la personnalité (l'individualisme) qui, bien qu'adversaires, concourent en même temps à ce que c'est l'indice distinctif de notre époque: l'individualisme bureaucratique.

La conversion de l'éthique de la conviction en éthique de la responsabilité se confronte aujourd'hui avec la multiplication des risques, des distorsions dans un monde de plus en plus globalisé, interconnecté, ce qu'augmente l'importance des mises existentielles, révendiquant une responsabilité sui-generis qui excède la sphère de la proximité et aussi la manière traditionnelle d'aborder les problèmes morales-politiques. La société postmoderne, avec l'expansion de la pluralité des points de vue évaluatives et interprétatives, nous nous a (presque) habitué avec l'idée d'une morale "faible", qui identifie le désaccord avec le pluralisme, pas comme dialogue ordonné de points de vue qui s'intercroisent mais comme "mélange des fragments sans aucun accord ou concordance" (cf. MacIntyre). Une telle application peut produire des périls graves dans l'orientation du développement socio-humain parce qu'il masque la dislocation/substitution de la raison pratique par la raison instrumentale, avec sa forme bureaucratique, en remplaçant, par conséquent, la responsabilité avec l'efficacité mais la relation moyen-but avec un calcul de coûts et bénéfices.

Habermas détermine les avatars de cette situation sur l'accord et sur la compréhension réciproque obtenues dans le praxis communicatif quotidien, puisqu'ils consacrent la scision de deux réalités: l'une des convictions communes, des vérités culturelles partagées et des expectatives réciproques

et une autre réalité conflictuelle, de perturbation ou de distorsion de la communication, soutenant l'incompréhension, l'hypocrisie, la falsité ou l'imposture[25].Pour contrecarrer les effets de cette grave scision, le penseur allemand nous propose l'alternative d'une communication sans contrainte et sans domination tout comme d'un consensus rationnel en tant que critère de la validité des normes, mais aussi de la légitimation des institutions - dans des conditions non-manipulatives, l'accord est possible pour "tous ceux visés". Nous reconnaissons ici le pathos de la réactualisation de l'universalisme kantien dans la philosophie morale et politique, mais en même temps la dénonciation des formes perfides des discours universels et des pseudolégitimations. Ainsi l'accord, tout comme la compréhension intersubjective ont de la chance de réussir seulement dans les conditions symétriques de l'échange réciproque de perspective, en déterminant les structures d'une situation communicative sans perturbations ou sans contraintes d'une instance supérieure.

Le consensus rationnel de "tous ceux visés" est assuré, chez Habermas, par une compétition des arguments, par "la contrainte du meilleur argument", mais qui ne s'exerce pas coercitivement, en impliquant la voie de quelques changements d'attitude motivés rationnellement. À la fin, la communauté dialogale et l'action orientée vers la compréhension, tout comme les exigences de l'éthique du discours - dans un langage trop technicisé, selon Gadamer - supposent une conception spatiale et dialogale, à vrai dire un espace commun de rencontre et de dialogue entre des participants égaux à une conversation face à face, par une utilisation publique de la raison et des règles (connues). L'action communicative se distingue de la sorte du monologisme ou de la solitude morale impliquant une multitude d'orateurs - en commun accord - qui reconnaissent seulement la contrainte du meilleur argument, ayant comme principe régulateur ce que Habermas nomme "situation idéale de conversation", avec des conditions obligatoires: chaque participant doit avoir de chance égale, d'initier et de continuer la communication, de faire des affirmations ou des suggestions, de donner des explications, d'exprimer des attitudes sentimentales et des intentions, mais d'être en même temps responsable de son propre comportement et aussi de demander la responsabilité aux autres[26]. Le rapport à une situation de communication idéale assure ainsi la distinction entre un consensus rationnel, argumenté et un consensus contraint ou trompeur, actionnant comme présupposition assumée réciproquement, mais en même temps comme "anticipation d'une forme de vie".

L'éthique du discours et de l'action communicative conforme au modèle de Habermas offre des suggestions ayant un véritable potentiel explicatif quant à la clarification et à la solution des problèmes morales-politiques de la société contemporaine, confrontée spécialement avec l'alternative de *l'individualisme* - qui soutient la suprématie des options libres, arbitraires des individus et/ou la *bureaucratie* qui limite ces manifestations. Les conséquences de cette alternative deviennent plus nombreuses et plus

importantes, du nihilisme moral à la perte de la capacité d'être moral, mais le danger plus grand ne réside pas dans le refus du code éthique obligatoire ou dans les erreurs du relativisme extrême, mais surtout dans la précarité ontologique de l'human, dénué de substance morale et de responsabilité. L'individualisme bureaucratique peut être limité seulement par une responsabilité des actions humaines, en dissociant, selon Habermas, entre pratiques manipulatives et pratiques non-manipulatives, abordant les maladies de la communication ou de la participation comme manifestations de la disfonctionnalité socio-économique. Ce qui, par exemple, constitue la violence structurale de l'organisation capitaliste - inégalité sociale excessive, discrimination dégradante, appauvrissement et marginalisation - est reproduit dans la communication perturbée par la méfiance réciproque non-contrôlée et finalement par l'interruption de la communication. Dans ces conditions, trouver un langage commun n'est pas réalisable sans une recherche critique, réfléchie qui, chez Habermas, suppose l'alliance entre l'herméneutique et la pragmatique, en situant l'herméneutique et l'éthique dans un contexte pragmatique, ayant comme repère l'action responsable et l'accord motivé rationnel, mais comme leit-motif la conviction que c'est celui qui actionne en comprenant, qui actionne de manière morale. Nous considérons l'affirmation valable mais avec un accent herméneutique, comme le précise Gadamer: ma puissance de jugement trouve toujours ses limites et aussi ses enrichissements par la capacité de juger de l'autre, c'est l'âme de l'herméneutique. Dans une telle ouverture, penser et imaginer signifie quelque chose pour moi seulement dans le dialogue avec le propre soi et les autres, par un dialogue "sans limites" (Gadamer) ou par un discours argumentatif ayant un caractère "interminable" (Habermas).

Le projet de Habermas, dans l'expression de Ricoeur, est une réponse résistant à "la banalisation du texte d'universalisation", à la confusion accidentale ou non-accidentale entre l'universalisation au niveau moral, l'internationalisation au niveau politique et la globalisation au niveau culturel. Il nous propose un débat *sui-generis* des problèmes morales-politiques du monde contemporain, ayant comme particularités: un universalisme sans fondamentalisme, une validité des fondations attaquables, une compréhension de soi comme compréhension réciproque, à vrai dire une manière non-fondamentaliste à la perspective d'une conscience failibiste. Ainsi la conception de Habermas provoque sans doute de diverses réactions, tout d'abord de la part des représentants de l'herméneutique philosophique, Gadamer, Ricoeur ou Vattimo, qui lui reprochent certaines entreprises trop scientistes. D'autre part, d'autres n'admettent pas le radicalisme politique de Habermas, spécialement son projet d'émancipation sociale, respectivement la suprématie de l'intérêt pour l'émancipation en rapport avec l'intérêt cognitif ou pratique. Mais presque tous les commentateurs de Habermas reconnaissent toutefois qu'il pose un diagnostic valable à notre présent, en considérant vraiment le passé et le

futur, par une participation responsable de chacun, ayant comme soutien la réconciliation authentique avec le propre soi mais aussi aves les autres.

Trop scientiste ou trop utopique, Habermas est en réalité un penseur exemplaire, pour comprendre et pour maîtriser les avatars de la société postmoderne, surtout ce parcours difficile de la pseudo-communication ou de la "compréhension systématiquement distordue" - par distorsions qui ne proviennent pas de l'usage comme tel du langage, mais de son rapport avec le travail et le pouvoir - à la communication "sans bornes et sans contraintes" comme idée régulatrice.

En fin de compte, comme le reconnaît Ricoeur, l'assurance théorique de ces exigences révendique à Habermas une méta-herméneutique - pour clarifier les déformations de la compétence communicative - comme critique ou théorie d'importance "qui enveloppe l'art de comprendre, les techniques pour vaincre la mécompréhension et la science explicative des distorsions"[27].

Notes:

1. M. Heidegger, *Despre miza gândirii (Zur Sache dem denkens)*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 114.

2. *Idem*, p. 116. Pour Heidegger, cette tâche préliminaire de la pensée signifie ouverture et dévoilement par recours non seulement à "la lumière de la raison" -conformément à la pratique traditionnelle du développement du discours philosohique - mais "l'ouverture luminatoire de l'être", c'est-à-dire la vérité comme "état dévoilé" dans le sens de l'ouverture de la présence: "*vérité* et *être-vrai* au sens d'être - dévoilé et dévoilement reçoivent le *mode d'être du Dasein*. La vérité en son essence n'est jamais présente - donnée comme une chose, mais elle existe" (v. Heidegger, *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie*, Ed. Gallimard, Paris, 1985, p. 261).

3. P. Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique*, II, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1986, p. 362.

4. G. Vattimo, *Etica interpretării (Etica dell'interpretazione)*, Ed. Pontica, Constanța, 2000, p. 145.

5. P. Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

6. H. G. Gadamer, *Elogiul teoriei. Moştenirea Europei (Lob der Theorie. Das Erbe Europas)*, Ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 1999, p. 60.

7. *Ibidem*, p. 206.

8. *Ibidem*, p. 186. Pour le commentaire détaillé de l'actualité herméneutique d'Aristote, respectivement la distinction entre *techné* et *phronesis* v. H. G. Gadamer, *Vérité et méthode*, Ed. du Seiul, Paris, 1976, pp. 153-166.

9. *Ibidem*, p. 60.

10. Dans l'éthique d'Aristote, le raisonnement pratique ne se réduit pas au segment discursif de la *phronesis* parce que, chez Ricoeur (*op. cit.,* p. 247), il implique en même temps les composantes psychologiques, logiques,

axiologiques et en plus le goût ou le coup d'oeil éthique (*phronimos*) qui personnalise la norme, assurant l'initiative et le discernement personnel.

11. H. G. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

12. Giovanna Borradori, *Filosofie într-un timp al terorii. Dialoguri cu Jürgen Habermas şi Jacques Derrida (Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogues with J. Habermas and J. Derrida)*, Ed. Paralela 45, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 114.

13. J. Habermas, *Conştiinţa morală şi acţiunea comunicativă (Moralbewusstsein und Kommunikatives Handeln),* Ed. All, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 23.

14. *Ibidem*, pp. 20-21.

15. *Ibidem*, p. 112.

16. *Ibidem*, p. 65.

17. *Ibidem*, p. 67.

18. *Ibidem*, p. 116.

19. *Ibidem*, p. 117.

20. La détermination procédurale de la morale assure, chez Habermas, une séparation suffisante des structures cognitives des contenus des jugements moraux.

21. J. Habermas, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

22. *Ibidem*. De cette manière, la liberté communicative et l'autorité épistémique supposent également la recherche d'un consensus par le choix des solutions convenables du point de vue rationnel pour tous les participants à la discussion, cf. J. Habermas, *Etica discursului şi problema adevărului (L'Ethique du discours et la question de la vérité)*, Ed. Art, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 23.

23. La position de Habermas visant le caractère ouvert, interminable de toute argumentation est aussi motivée par les confrontations du discours moral contemporain à propos d'une double provocation: l'une concernant la variété et l'incommensurabileté des concepts invoqués *et* un autre concernant l'utilisation assertorique des principes ultimes pour finir le débat moral. Comme le remarque encore MacIntyre, toute l'argumentation morale ou évaluative est et doit être toujours interminable du point de vue rationnel.

24. MacIntyre, *Tratat de morală. După virtute (After Virtue. A study in moral teory)*, Ed. Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 56. Dans ce parcours interviennent des conflits et des détournations à cause de la "bifurcation du monde social contemporain": d'une part, le domaine de l'organisation sociale, où les buts sont vus comme une donnée, sans vérification rationnelle et d'autre part, le domaine de la personne, dans lequel les jugements et les débats sur les valeurs sont des facteurs centraux mais ici il n'y a pas une résolution sociale rationnelle des désaccords; cette "bifurcation" détermine, en définitif, l'internalisation, la représentation intérieure concernant le soi individuel, les rôles et les personnages de la vie sociale.

25. Le but philosophique, chez Habermas, est d'offrir une *reconstruction* des conditions d'une communication productive, au niveau social et individuel; cette approche, comme le remarque G. Borradori (*op. cit.*, p. 82) assure la possibilité de diagnostiquer les maladies de la société en termes de défauts de communication.

26. J. Habermas, *Cunoaştere şi comunicare (Connaissance et communication),* Ed. Politică, Bucureşti, 1983, pp. 455-459. Situation idéale de discussion/discours, pratique manipulatoire ou non-manipulatoire, communication ou pseudo-communication, compréhension ou mécompréhension ne sont pas, pour Habermas, des révendications purement théoriques mais des ripostes à une réalité sociale complexe, à une action humaine de risque multiple. Conformément à ces distorsions - possibles n'importe quand - la solidarité et les exigences en ce qui concerne la norme, la valeur ou la communication sont disloquées, sacrifiées au profit du pouvoir institutionnel (des organisations) et de l'argent (de l'économie de marché). v. Habermas, *Etica discursului...*, ed. cit., p. 44.

27. P. Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action*, ed. cit., p. 360.

THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF GOD

AND "THE NEW EPISTEMOLOGICAL IDEALISM"

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In their efforts to achieve a mutual rapprochement between philosophy and religion, the 20th century representatives of the "new epistemological idealism" had the difficult task to counterbalance the sweeping persuasiveness of positivism and (commonsense) realism, dominant at since the early 1930's, especially in Britain. By then outnumbered and outvoiced, the idealists employed, among the main foundation blocks, critical analyses of the Anselmian ontological argument, Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's immanentism.

The definition Collingwood gave to (commonsense) realism—in his unpublished text "Realism and Idealism"—reads: "[For the realist, t]he object makes no difference to the knowing, so that knowing… is a single absolutely … undifferentiated activity [and is based on the realist's assumption that reality consists in] two radically self-contained worlds: the objective world of things known and the subjective world of cognitive activity"[1] whereas for Collingwood the mind itself is a *compositum* of cognitive activities and their object . The commonsense realism's assumption that things exist "independently of our thought" or "mind" is criticized by the epistemological idealist thinkers—whose voices find an unifying echo in Collingwood's analyses—for its failure to realize that the real condition for such a claim is

the thought itself, so that the things considered as existing "outside our thought" or mind are in fact included in it once we think of them as being "external to our thought". Similarly, the things which are claimed to exist independently of thought cannot otherwise be asserted as existent but by an act of thought.[2]

Collingwood was the inheritor of a powerful British idealist tradition represented, among others, by Francis Herbert Bradley, Thomas Hill Green, or Edward Caird, and was accompanied in the 20th century, by important fellow thinkers such as Henry Jones, Clement Charles Julian Webb, Alfred Ernest Taylor or Michael Foster.

Nowadays, Stephen Toulmin writes, "Collingwood's philosophical arguments speak to us more directly and forcefully than they did to his Oxford contemporaries. The "realist" positions put forward by John Cook Wilson at Oxford, Ernst Mach in Vienna and G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell at Cambridge… turned the philosophical clock back before Kant, and revived the earlier traditions of British empiricism. Collingwood was one of the first philosophers in England to see that this could not be done"[3]. In his *Metaphysics,* he brings an argument in favour of the historical perspective that aims at consolidating the project of revised metaphysics which, its turn, could consolidate (from transcendental-epistemological point of view) the project of revised history[4]. According to Guido Vanhesvijck, this difficult task of rehabilitating metaphysics was directed mainly against Ayer's devastating attack against it:

> Ayer showed the impossibility of metaphysics by indicating that metaphysical propositions are neither empirically verifiable nor analytic. Collingwood reacts by giving a transcendental-epistemological justification of metaphysics… [arguing that] metaphysics—the study of being—is only possible as a description of absolute presuppositions that change historically.[5]

However, Collingwood was aware that unqualified realism is untenable; he rejected Kant's attempt to ground metaphysics on an "ontology of appearances" and on the one and only transcendental subjectivity, for, to him, it seemed impossible to ground a universally valid knowledge only on the cognitive structure of the knowing subject. But, as a consequence, "the question which arises is … whether or not—from the assumption of that fragmented transcendental subjectivity—cognitive relativism will have the last word and eternal validity will have to be denied to philosophical questions".[6]

In relation to the question of truth, the "reformed" (that is, "historical") metaphysician knows that the truth is not to be found on the empirical, verifiable level, nor on that of analysis of concepts. Only through description of historically changing absolute presuppositions the mystery of reality can be spoken of; in this, rationality shows both its possibilities, and its

boundaries; foe pure being cannot be studied independently of thinking. That was Collingwood's objection against the commonsense realism.[7]

On the other hand, as Evandro Agazzi convincingly observed, idealism itself can become naïve when its correct claim that no discrepancy can be assumed between reality and thought is driven to the extreme of claiming total identity between them. Although opposed to commonsense realism, this naivety shares with its adversary a common root consisting in an "epistemological dualism" originating in modern philosophy[8]. According to this view, what we know are our representations, our sensory impressions, our "ideas", not the things as they are in themselves so that we have to look both for a guarantee for the real existence of things and for their accurate representation performed at the level of our internal "ideas". And, Agazzi concludes, the impossibility of solving this problem was clearly emphasized by Kant, who demonstrated that, in fact, "the problem is insoluble because it is a pseudo-problem. Of course, we have neither evidence, nor arguments for claiming that what we actually know are rather our ideas than the things in themselves within our ideas"[9].

Thus, this "fantasy"—in which things are conceived as situated "beyond" appearances and outside our thoughts—compelled philosophers who shared it, "to assume the impossible task of "reaching" the things through the surpassing the very limits of our thought. What Berkeley tried to do has been accomplished by the German classic transcendental Idealism—especially by Fichte and Hegel—and by the "absolute Idealism" of Giovanni Gentile". These efforts led to an ambivalent result: "on the one hand, they brilliantly managed to eliminate any kind of dualism or difference between reality and thought, and, on the other hand, they denied, in a reductionistic manner, any difference between reality and thought, reducing in fact all reality to thought"[10].

This is, arguably, one of the main reasons why the epistemological idealists—whose exponent is roughly considered, in this article, to be Collingwood, who was a close philosophical friend of Gentile, Croce, and De Ruggiero—employed, especially in their analyses of the concept of God, both Kant's transcendentalism and Hegel's immanentism.

Kant's philosophy departs from the idea of the *radical novelty* of critical philosophy: it is not a new version of a philosophy already known, but a different type of philosophy, a different mode of philosophizing. Kant refers repeatedly to what he calls *Revolution der Denkart* (B, XI sqq.) and compares his own theoretical deed to Copernicus" revolution in astronomy. But the "Copernican revolution" in philosophy, made by Kant, is not a mere local modification, but a more profound change which affects the theoretical status of philosophy itself: philosophy ceases to be a *construction* of ideas regarding the transcendent and becomes *critical*, that is, research of the transcendental. The shifting of the focus of investigation from *transcendent* to *transcendental* changes profoundly the philosophical activity and prepares

the new orientations, analytical and metaphilosophical, in contemporary thought.

As early as in his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant undertakes the building of the critical idea through passage from what seemed to be a traditional metaphysical analysis, centred in the concept of *world*, and in the distinction between the *sensible world* and the *intelligible world*, as well as in the analysis of the faculties of knowledge, these two depend upon: *sensibility* and *intellect.* The critical idea is also present here through the assertion that metaphysics, defined in Baumgartian terms as "the philosophy which contains the first principles of employing the pure intellect" needs a *preparatory science* (*scientia propaedeutica*), which—though Kant does not yet use this term—is, ultimately, *the critique* itself.

In his Inaugural Dissertation Kant exhibits this progressive building of the critical idea that reaches a level comparable to that attained by the *Critique of Pure Reason* as regards the theory of sensibility; but, on the other hand, it leaves a number of dogmatic residues present in the theory of intellect which, in the context of his own approach, undertaken in *LOP*, Collingwood signals. For example,

> [Kant's failure to eliminate the] dogmatic residues … of Platonism [is determined by the fact that] he preserved features of the Platonic realism … asserting the objective reality not of concept but of the unknowable transcendental source of the sensory input: things-in-themselves, the noumenal realm.[11]

Collingwood employs Kant's "revised explanation of the nature of the mind"— especially its unity—and its implications in the "recasting of religion", and in a philosophical grounding of God's immanence:

> Kant... comes to the conclusion that… [t]he Platonic theory… could not explain the objective realities which it postulated: it merely told you that they were there. It could not explain how you came to know them: it merely said that you always had known them. But this *dogmatic* treatment of the problems was no solution… Kant conceived the idea of interconnecting the objects of *a priori* knowledge into an organized whole, each member accounted for and deduced from the others: and further, in order to show how mind could know them all, he proposed to show that they were nothing more nor less than the expression of the mind's own nature. The things about which we have *a priori* knowledge are thus… simply the ways in which the mind itself exists and works. If therefore God is pre-eminently subjective—not

> a thing existing independently of our own mind, but the
> organization of that mind itself … [which, according to
> Kant] is not your mind or my mind, but always the mind
> in general, of which the so-called individual mind is only
> an arbitrary separated fragment. Consequently Kant's
> God is not to be equated with the empirical individual:
> you or me … but with mind in general.[12]

What also appears as relevant with respect to the context of Kant's (clarifying) influence upon Collingwood's interpretation of religious experience and its relation with philosophical knowledge—as self-knowledge of the mind—(that is, the relation between theistic transcendentalism and philosophical immanentism, or "epistemological idealism") is the Kantian analysis of the relation between criticism and metaphysics. As Collingwood himself put it, all his effort to articulate the old Platonic transcendentalism with immanentism—as the distinctive sign of the critical and anti-'realist" tendencies of modern philosophy—aims to settle the foundation of a *new*, and more comprehensive, *theology* which should reunite the two unilateral perspectives, thus making them complete each other; for "the real nature of God is no nearer to transcendence alone than it is to immanence alone."[13]

At this point, a small number of general aspects of Kant's philosophy are worth bringing into light, in order to make his influence upon Collingwood more evident. In order to reach this objective I will briefly follow Viorel Colțescu's clarifying interpretation of Kant's view on metaphysics and its implications. This perspective holds that the German philosopher has *rejected* only the traditional, rationalist-dogmatic, metaphysics; at the same time, he acknowledged the great merits of its representatives, especially Leibniz and Wolff. According to Kant, metaphysics as a science of the supersensible is not possible: Due to its *a priori* forms, our knowledge is inevitably confined to phenomena as given in experience[14] without being able to extend itself to the transphenomenal reality, to the thing-in-itself. But the thing-in-itself really exists: in this context, Alois Riehl's inspired sentence "The *Critique of Pure Reason* asserts the metaphysical, but denies metaphysics"[15] can be properly understood.

In other words, the Kantian denial does not regard metaphysics in general, but a *certain* type of metaphysics, namely the dogmatic one. This restriction itself raises the following problem: which is the *other* type of metaphysics Kant could have in mind? Certain formulations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* seem to indicate that the legitimate metaphysics is a *systematisation* of the pure concepts of thought, to which criticism offers only the main joints and the "leading thread."[16] Thus, in the Preface to the first edition, Kant tells us that metaphysics "is nothing but the *inventory*, systematically arranged, of all we possess through pure reason" (A XX). As regards Collingwood, his view seems to me in accordance with this Kantian idea, especially in his range of works starting with "Reason is Faith

Cultivating Itself" (1927), and *Faith and Reason* (1928), and continuing with "The Nature of the Metaphysical Study" (1934), "The Function of Metaphysics in Civilization" (1937-38), and concluding with *An Autobiography* (1939), and *An Essay on Metaphysics* (1940), where he argues—firstly in general, and then by exemplifying and identifying the claimed aspects—that science as knowledge of the parts is grounded on *a priori* principles, that is, on presuppositions which implicitly assume the unity of the world (and hence, of the mind).

In a number of Kantian writings, metaphysics seems to be identified by Kant with criticism itself; and the defending of the latter against the Wolffians' attacks and against the distortions made by Kant's own disciples becomes, during his final creative period, his main preoccupation on which, he believed, even the destiny of metaphysics depended. This idea essentially converges with Collingwood's assertion that philosophy is not only the critical attitude in general, but criticism specifically directed inward; self-criticism is the mark of rationality. "It is true", the English philosopher writes, "that philosophy does not arise *in vacuo:* but its relation to its presuppositions is not dogmatic, but critical."[17]

As Colţescu suggestively points out, the Kantian equation of metaphysics with criticism might be puzzling and could determine one to suspect that the *end* is illegitimately identified with the *means.* Yet, only this context permits the real understanding of the value and significance of one of the most interesting—but also controversial—interpretations of Kantian philosophy of this century, namely Heidegger's, made in his famous book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.*[18] According to Heidegger, the *Critique of Pure Reason* truly proposes a new metaphysics. This novelty is radical and consists in the re-orientation of metaphysics from the transcendent towards the *transcendental.* This re-orientation of philosophical research could, as often happens, be interpreted as an abandonment of metaphysics in favor of the theory of knowledge. Such an understanding is only possible if we preserve the old concept of metaphysics and do not take the change Kant has introduced in this very concept into account. According to Heidegger, the *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with the theory of knowledge.[19] It represents a *grounding of metaphysics* (*Grundlegung der Metaphysik*) and has as its centre the establishment of the possibility of ontology. Thus, the significance of Kant's *a priori* theory is changed by the modern interpreter. According to Heidegger's interpretation, the *a priori* forms of human mind make up a type of knowledge which precedes, conditions, and orientates the empirical knowledge of things. If we call the second form of cognitive modality—whether achieved by science or by common knowledge—*ontic* knowledge, then the first form of knowledge has to be called *ontological* knowledge because it aims at establishing the general structure of being, which is the only structure whose background makes the objects accessible to experience. Obviously, the explicit distinction between ontic and ontological, between being and existent is Heideggerian, not

Kantian. Nonetheless, it helps us to understand Kant in a new light and assimilate his ideas from the perspective of the most vivid contemporary theory.[20]

Thus, according to the Heideggerian interpretation of the *Critique,* Kant's basic idea can be expressed as follows: the basic structures of being cannot be discovered through illusory speculations upon the transcendent, but by investigating the transcendental. Thus the *critical* investigation of the transcendental acquires a *metaphysical* (ontological) sense. The Kantian metaphysics is "hiding" in the interstices of criticism itself. The way towards its discovery is not the investigation of the metaphysical developments as such, but rather a new reading of the critical works themselves, especially the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[21]

These accounts appear to converge with Collingwood's own interpretation of Kant's perspective on transcendental object and its relation with the Kantian conception of God. According to the Oxford don, Kant did not regard God as an object of knowledge because God cannot be circumscribed to the *a priori* forms of sensibility and thus cannot be subsumed to an organizing concept, which means that he cannot be properly, that is, "scientifically", known.[22] And given that, by (his theistic) definition, God exists outside the horizon of the *a priori* forms of sensibility, namely space and time, no concept derived from our phenomenal experience is applicable to him, and therefore God thus conceived should necessarily belong to the realm of the unknown and unknowable—in terms of *Wissennschaft*, as conceived by Kant—noumena. And, precisely because of their agnostic consequences, Collingwood interprets these accounts as indirectly suggesting that for Kant, "the God whose existence we can prove is God immanent in the world of our experience, not a [wholly] transcendent God standing out of all possible relation to human life."[23] This implication of Kant's analysis of knowledge represents a precious opening towards

> [the necessity of] regard[ing]… God as the absolute spiritual reality not outside nor yet behind, but rather in and of the phenomenal world. So the existence of God became equivalent no longer to the empirical reality of a certain person different from you and me, and called God, but to the *unity, significance, and spirituality of the universe.*[24]

Furthermore, in perfect analogy with Kant's account on the relation between common knowledge and philosophical knowledge (that is, criticism), Collingwood suggests that, however precarious its theoretical knowledge would be, religious consciousness contains *in nuce* all basic truths required by human science and practice. This does not mean that it possesses an *explicit knowledge* of these indispensable principles. That is why philosophical research,—designed to *explicate* what the religious

consciousness owns only implicitly—is necessary. Basically, philosophy does not offer religious consciousness something new, brought from without, but only reveals, in a Socratic manner, its own content, its own principles. Therefore, the aims of critical philosophy are rather hermeneutic and explanatory than dogmatic-prescriptive: it interprets and explains the implications of human faith, but does not claim to offer grounding or a behavioral regulator for religious life. Philosophy investigates *the possibility* of religious grounds, that is, *the a priori conditions* they depend upon. To this extent, despite all particularities mentioned above, when applied to religious consciousness philosophy preserves its distinctive character, as *critical philosophy.* As far as we are concerned, these accounts are—*mutatis mutandis*, of course—quite similar to those made by Kant with respect to the relation between philosophy and morality. In his *Essay on Metaphysics,* Collingwood applies these principles to his theory of absolute presuppositions:

> [Metaphysics] arises out of the mere pursuit of knowledge. That pursuit, which we call science, is an attempt to think in a systematic and orderly manner. This involves disentangling the presuppositions which neither stand in need of justification nor can in fact be justified; and a person who made this discovery is already a metaphysician.[25]

Apart from his disagreements with Kant, Collingwood interprets him as an ally in the struggle against what he called "the irrationalist movement of the present day."[26] Just as in Kant's time,

> the tendency [of human thought] is grave… [But it is more serious than the] scepticism of the eighteenth century. That did not express a revolt against the life of scientific thought… [but] only a sense of its difficulty… Metaphysics came under fire in the eighteenth century because people fancied that in a world without metaphysics conditions would be more favorable to the development of science. To-day metaphysics is under fire because in a world without metaphysics conditions will be more favourable to the development of irrationalism.[27]

Another profound analysis made by the philosopher from Königsberg is that which aims at the attainment of the idea of *transcendental liberty,* undertaken in the second Critique. The means through which he grounds this concept is the idea of the autonomy of will. By the analytical-regressive investigation, which commenced from the common consciousness and from

its judgment that only the good will is unconditionally good from a moral point of view, Kant has finally arrived at this supreme point, that is, at transcendental liberty, which is purely intelligible. Liberty is ultimately man's certificate of affiliation to the supersensible, noumenal, world of rational beings. Together with the immortality of the soul and God's existence, liberty is a postulate of practical reason. Thus practical reason re-establishes the reality of liberty, immortality, and divinity, whose existence or non-existence could not be determined by theoretical reason. But practical reason does not re-establish them as *objects of knowledge*, which would make a science devoted to them possible (a revived dogmatic metaphysics), but only as its *postulates*, as ultimate conditions of its own moral exercise.

This conclusion has arguably exercised a great deal of influence upon Collingwood's later thought (especially after *Speculum Mentis*) regarding the relation between theory and practice in general, and between the theoretical and practical sides of religion in particular. Thus, with respect to the general implicit aim of the ontological proof, he asserts that

> [t]he true message of the ontological proof is that the "essence" of … ethics … cannot be separated from a belief in the real existence of God. This, then, is the real meaning of the formula that "the essence of God entails his existence."[28]

Furthermore, even though, according to Collingwood, Kant failed to fully appreciate or develop the implications of the "anthropological turn" in theology implied by his own explanation of *a priori* knowledge, nevertheless his analysis of practical reason suggested the importance of the practical requirements for man's *Weltanschauung*, and has presumably partially inspired Collingwood's idea of cosmos which can be described as an "unconscious projection onto the universe of a true insight into the nature of man's practical life", if we are to resort again to Felser's words.

As regards the *Critique of Judgment,* it proposes a certain solution to the basic problem of the relation between the *ontological* order of the world and the *axiological* order, basically *moral*—which for Kant means *practical*—, of our own life. Kant seems to have significantly helped Collingwood in arguing that mind's awareness of God cannot be understood if it is not regarded as a function of the whole mind or when it is abstracted from the individual's practical relationship to the object of his attention; "for it is in this context that the awareness of the object originally and typically arises… [Thus, t]he intellectual element is inextricably embedded within, and must therefore be regarded as a function of, *praxis*."[29]

Immanence *versus* transcendence

According to Collingwood, Kant's realism and his conception of transcendence was even more radical than Plato's; for whereas Plato had

arbitrarily postulated the reality of unknowable entities (with which human minds are, at some point, directly acquainted) in order to explain our knowledge of appearances, Kant postulated the reality of unknowable transcendental objects in order to do the same. But this doesn't mean that Kant didn't play a crucial role in the construction of a less contradictory *Weltanschauung* embedded in religion; moreover, in Collingwood's view, the only way out from the "common-sense realism" presupposed by the theistic consciousness is "the idealistic conception of the world which was at best adumbrated by Kant and Hegel."[30]

As many of his writings prove, Kant has inspired Collingwood's argument against the realist conception expressed by Anselm, whose Platonism entails a picture of Christianity which, in fact, is not Christian; for

> [t]he Christian God is always conceived by orthodox theology under a double aspect: as the transcendent cause of all things, and as the immanent spirit in all things. Now the Platonic absolute is transcendent, an external reality of which earthly things are not the expressions so much as the copy.[31]

But at this point, says Collingwood, there are two "sides" of interpreters who more or less deliberately ignore either the first "half" of the picture or the second. One of the sides is that of the theologians, whose error consists in their exclusive emphasis on God's transcendence and in their "tendency… to forget the immanent aspect of God's nature;"[32] the other side is that of the modern philosophers, whose "God" is mistakenly claimed as having nothing to do with the "God of Abraham" but being immanently grounded in the conscious recognition of God as a symbol for the unity of the mind. This does not mean, says Collingwood, that "modern philosophy is… irreligious or un-Christian[; for i]t is engaged in expressing a side of Christianity which received too little attention for the first eighteen or nineteen centuries…[That] it is not recognized as religious… can only be… [the consequence of the fact that] the Platonist transcendence in Christianity has begun to warp it away from its own immanentism."[33] What is mostly needed, for the sake of Christian religion, is not its suppression by this philosophy, but its accordance with the philosophical image of a God conceived as the unity, significance, and spirituality of the Universe;[34] for

> [t]he God of Christianity is the absolute, perfect creative spirit: only to be properly conceived under both the categories of transcendence—involving personality and separation from the world—and immanence—involving self-expression and spiritual life in the world's actual phenomenal history: the synthesis of these two categories being effected in the doctrine of incarnation.

> Already it was remarked by Augustine that the doctrine of God transcendent was Platonic, but that the conception of God incarnate was found nowhere but in Christianity.[35]

At this point, one may say that the Christian synthesis attained through the doctrine of incarnation is at bottom (even if only for a minority of genuinely religious people) a matter of revelation and can ignore all philosophical legitimating pursuits. In my opinion, this would be considered by Collingwood a mistake; and what he presumably learns from Kant with respect to this particular matter is, according to Felser, precisely that one cannot talk about revelation apart from the act of receiving—that is, hearing and encountering—and that whatever is revealed is essentially molded by the receiving medium, and cannot be characterized apart from such subjective factors as the beliefs, desires, prejudices, problems, language, etc., of the recipients.[36] In other words, the Kantian demonstration of the active role of the cognitive subject has inspired the English philosopher in his attempt to answer the question whether or not Christianity is compatible with "the new epistemological idealism" arguing that, in principle, Christianity is "capable of representing the truth of God's nature". But this is possible only within the two-sided frame of Christian religion, which will reunite both the view of pure transcendence and that of pure immanence:

> [F]or the idealistic philosopher… Christianity, like all other truths, is a two-sided thing: there must be a truth, and a person fitted to receive it… If God means a finite personal being, outside the world, however good and great, a mere omnipotent creator whose personal life is lived outside the universe he creates, then idealism denies not only that his existence can be proved, but that he exists at all. But if God is the one and absolute creative spirit, the spirit whose life is the life of the world, the spirit that became incarnate in the son of Mary and becomes incarnate again in the Church, the company of all faithful people who endeavor to live the life of the spirit, then I can only say that the whole of philosophy is the proof of his existence. If anything can be proved, his existence can be proved.[37]

And, Collingwood continues, given that man's true nature, mainly his needs, are given the best account by the Christian doctrine, it follows that it is a doctrine made by man for man. Its expressions—often obscure—if not interpreted in a superstitious sense, but "with love and intelligence" can describe the truth of God's nature, the "truer truth" which is nowhere else given to man than in the Christian creeds. And this truth cannot be but

confirmed by the "philosopher's construction of the universe"; but, the Oxford don warns, the truth of the Christian creeds is not a ready-made truth, already given to us: "it is for us to make it true" by truly serving God, that is, by becoming "freethinkers in religion", free followers of truth and reason, where truth must be seen as "an infinite process of thought towards God", not as a starting point, given once for all; for it "is not given, it is lived". Only in this "fullness of life" God is really revealed to us. Otherwise

> [t]he creeds, the philosophies, the proofs of the existence of God, may easily become idols. We can be sure that we are not idolaters only if we are willing to pass through the depths of doubt and despair and infidelity in order to recover, beyond these shadows, the God in whom we hope to believe—in whom we hope to be worthy to believe. The path towards belief, or rather the path which *is* belief, is a path beset by idols which only the most determined effort of thought can overthrow.[38]

From a philosophical point of view, the most faithful and efficient means towards this end is the "new idealism", whose roots were "adumbrated by Kant and Hegel", and which has —just like its utmost end, namely Christianity—"never yet been fully worked out," and will never be.

In Collingwood's view, the Kantian opening towards this solution was substantially corrected by Hegel; for the Kantian revision of knowledge based on the distinction between the *a priori* and empirical forms of knowledge was still impregnated with "common-sense realism". Hegel denied this distinction and identified the "nature" of mind with the process of its historical development under the form given by the transformation exercised by the progressive self-consciousness of mind upon the forms and content of its experience. As regards the consequences of this general view for religion, Hegel's claim that *der absolute Geist* "makes its own nature" by subjectively realizing itself[39] implies, according to *Collingwood*, that "God, [who is in fact nothing but the nature of mind] is thus conceived as immanent in the world of phenomena."[40] In other words, if viewed exclusively from the perspective suggested by these philosophers "God" turns out to be a figurative way of expressing the philosophical principle of the unity of the mind. And since the rejection of the "common-sense realism" requires the abolition of the ontological distinction between thought and object, that is, between mind and world, it follows that, with the help of Hegel, the "God of the Philosophers" will represent only the symbol for the rational intelligibility, or unity, of the world.

Following Hegel, Collingwood denied the necessity to thought, claimed by Kant, of postulating the existence of an unknowable noumenal realm or transcendental object. As regards the Christian God, Hegel has rejected the

separateness of God postulated by most of the Christian theologians, who mistakenly conceive him only as an "objective God, remaining absolutely separate from the subjective consciousness and thus being an external object, just like the sun, the sky, etc.,"[41] an object of consciousness, possessing the permanent characteristic of being something else, something external. In opposition to this perspective, "the concept of the absolute religion" can be stated in such a way that what really matters "is not this external [object], but religion itself, that is, the unity of this representation which we call God, with the subject."[42] The role of these ideas in determining Collingwood's appeal to philosophical immanentism is obvious, and I will not resort to new quotations from his writings as examples. But he was also committed to a Christianity which already in *LOP* takes the form of his own interpretation of the Christian doctrine, even though the Hegelian pattern appears to be the only source for his "trinitary" interpretation of the history of mind:

> The name God ought never to have been usurped for the purely transcendent deity or absolute pre-Kantian thought. At worst, the metaphysic of the pre-Kantian age deserved the appelation *De Patre:* and by the same title the post-Kantian metaphysics ought to be called *De Spiritu Sancto*. The synthesis of these into a metaphysic *De Filio* is still in the future."[43]

In fact, what Collingwood does at this point is employing his comment on the ontological proof as a means of applying the historicism developed in "Ruskin's Philosophy" to his own religious view. Unfortunately, these efforts did not lead him to a clear solution of the problem. As the concluding remarks of *LOP* suggestively attest, his discussion of immanence does not include clearly implied conclusions ascertaining the true presence of God, as being, in the new religious frame of mind.

Moreover, for the English philosopher, the "transcendent side" of orthodox Christianity, even if is left aside, as an expression of "common-sense realism", is somehow kept in store, and proves itself hardly compatible with the "immanent side". However, in *LOP*, Collingwood implicitly assumes the provisional character of this non-unitary philosophical approach of the religious consciousness; but once such a comprehensive analysis is accomplished, the tension between the contradictory sides can be annihilated and surpassed, and this "philosophical paraphrase of Christianity" will come to an end. Its mere equating of "God" with the symbol of the rationality of mind or experience dramatically mutilates any truly religious consciousness; that is why

> Collingwood explicitly affirms as both possible and desirable that in its new form, religion will be able to

preserve both its essential nature (as worship) and the insights of modern philosophy, while transcending the respective limitations of the standpoints of (pure religious) transcendence and (pure philosophical) immanence.[44]

As for the relevance of Collingwood's analysis for his own reformed, "historical," metaphysics, it is far from being insignificant. Among his reflections involving the ontological argument stand those remarked by Michael J. O'Neil (even if they are not based on unpublished material by Collingwood):

Anselm's proof is essential to Collingwood's historical science of mind… For [him], it is Anselm's proof that clearly expresses th[e] relationship between faith and reason. The two elements of this analysis that must be understood if one is to understand Collingwood's use of the proof are what he means by "the idea of an object that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason" and the "special case of metaphysical thinking."[45]

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[1] Robin G. Collingwood, "Realism and Idealism" (1936), Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Dep. Collingwood 20, p. 26.

[2] See Florin Lobonţ, *Noua metafizică engleză, o regretabilă necunoscută*, Bucureşti, Editura Trei, 2002, p. 155.

[3] Stephen Toulmin, Introduction to *An Autobiography* by R.G. Collingwood", Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, p. xiii.

[4] Ibid*.,* p. xiv.

[5] Guido Vanheeswijck, "Metaphysics as a Historical[ly Based] Discipline: The Relevance of Collingwood's Reformed Metaphysics", unpublished manuscript (undated), Collingwood Archives, Swansea, p. ii.

[6] Ibid., p. iv.

[7] Ibid., vii, viii.

[8] Evandro Agazzi, "Realismul naiv şi antirealismul naiv", Rom. Tr. Rodica Croitoru, in Angela Botez (coord), *Realism i relativism în filosofia ştiinţei contemporane* (Bucureşti: Editura DAR, 1993), p. 35.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Joseph M. Felser, "R.G. Collingwood's Early Philosophy of Religion and Its Development," vol. I-II, PhD diss. (Chicago: University of Chicago, Illinois, 1992) p. 358.

[12] Robin G. Collingwood, "Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God. Written December 1919 for delivery Hilary Term 1920." Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford. Dep. Collingwood 2, pp. 31-2 (hereafter *LOP*).

[13] Ibid., p. 27, italics added.

[14] With respect to this point, Collingwood wrote that "Kant did not deny *a priori* knowledge: but he came to the conclusion that it could not be explained on the basis

of objectivity" (*LOP*, p. 31).

[15] Alois Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus. Geschichte und System,* Band I: Geschichte des philosophischen Kritizismus, 2. Aufl., (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, , 1908), 584.

[16] Viorel Colțescu, *Immanuel Kant* (Timişoara: Tipografia Universităţii de Vest, 1996), p. 118.

[17] *LOP,* 9.

[18] Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann), 1929.

[19] Ibid., p. 25.

[20] Colțescu, *op. cit.,* pp. 119-120.

[21] Colțescu, *op. cit.,* p. 120. I also found very useful and inspiring Colțescu's insightful "Kantian Readings" (Lecturi kantiene) from his book *Filosofia şi istoria ei* (Timişoara: Editura de Vest, 1996), pp. 77-141.

[22] At this point, Collingwood's later remarks made in *The Idea of Nature* seem relevant for my interpretation of his view (including that held in *LOP*) on Kant's implicit ontology as significantly convergent with Heidegger's: "Kant never for a moment thought that the thing in itself was unknowable in the sense in which his critics understand this statement. The words *wissen, Wissenschaft* in Kant have the same kind of special or restricted significance that the word 'science' has in ordinary modern English. Science is not the same as knowledge in general; it is a special kind or form of knowledge whose proper object is nature … Kant has not given us a theory of knowledge in the modern sense of the term … and when he said that we could think the thing in itself though we could not know it he meant that we had knowledge of it but not scientific knowledge." [Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 118]. This idea can arguably be interpreted as convergent with Collingwood's assertion, made in *The Idea of History*, that "Kant's method [implies that] … a category … like causation … can be used and must be used [only] if we are to have Newtonian science." [*The Idea of History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946; reprinted 1993), p. 229], or even with his earlier claim, expressed in *Religion and Philosophy*, that "Kant … had seemed to suggest that the theoretical faculty of the mind—the knowing faculty [which underlies science]—was incapable of arriving at ultimate truth." [R.G. Collingwood, *Religion and Philosophy* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1916), p. 22.] Moreover, it appears that this interpretation can help us to understand that actually Collingwood never ceased to be a(n idealistic, or logical) realist who believed—at least implicitly—in the existence of the perennial objects of philosophical (metaphysical) knowledge, among which God—as both transcendent and immanent, either as symbol or as person—appears to represent the *avant-garde* topic of the whole enterprise.

[23] *LOP,* p. 69.

[24] Ibid., p. 78, italics added.

[25] Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 233.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., pp. 233-4.

[28] *LOP,* p. 15.

[29] Felser, *op. cit.,* p. 339.

[30] *LOP*, p. 96.

[31] Ibid., p. 24

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[32] Ibid., p. 26.
[33] Ibid., p. 27.
[34] Ibid., p. 78.
[35] Ibid., p. 25.
[36] Felser, *op. cit.,* pp. 365-6.
[37] *LOP*, p. 96.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Cf., for example, G.W.F. Hegel, *Prelegeri de filozofie a religiei*, trans. D.D. Roşca (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1995), pp. 406-418.
[40] *LOP*, p. 32.
[41] Hegel, *op. cit.,* p. 407.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., 27.
[44] Felser, *op. cit.,* p. 361.
[45] Michael J. O'Neil, "A Peculiar 'Faith': On R.G. Collingwood's Use of Saint Anselm's Argument", *The Saint Anselm Journal,* 3.2 (2006): 32.

TRADUCTION ET ETRANGETE

Andreea NAGY

Employant une regarde herméneutique, il serait naïf d'insister sur le fait que l'homme est doué du logos, que *via* langage se réalise la compréhension qu'on a du monde et de nous mêmes. En posant la question du sens, l'herméneutique philosophique renvoie à la pluralité des langues pour rendre plus compréhensible l'ouverture vers l'autre. "Le langage est le milieu dans lequel se réalisent l'entente entre les partenaires et l'accord sur la chose même" écrit Gadamer (1996:406). On voit tout d'emblée qu'il ne s'agit pas de percevoir le langage comme un instrument ou comme une ressource de l'individu. Même si, parfois, on se mit en gage dans une conversation, celle-ci reste sur les a posteriori: sans l'avoir on ne peut pas évaluer ou prévoir des résultats. Donc communiquer signifie accepter que le langage a une "vérité propre" qui relie l'homme au monde, qu'il est le lieu (et non une outille) ou se forme le rapport avec les autres et avec soi-même. Mais est qu'on peut comprendre le langage en ignorant la multiplicité des langues? Comment advient le transfère du sens entre les langues? Comment se réalise l'entente entre partenaires qui parle de langues différents? Autrement dit, qu'est-ce que traduire? Le mot traduction vient de Latin *trasfero, transfere, translatum* et signifie transfère ou changement. Dans une large acceptation, traduire signifie transférer le sens d'une langue a l'autre. L'acte de la traduction implique au moins trois acteurs: le texte de départ (source) avec son auteur, le texte d'arrivée (target) avec son lecteur et, déchiré entre le deux, le traducteur comme interprète et médiateur. Dans

la suite nous essayerons de montrer qu'est que la traduction pour H.-G. Gadamer et pour P. Ricoeur, et comment engage-t-elle la liaison avec l'étrangeté.

Il convient de s'arrêter sur le *logos* grec qui permet d'envisager l'échange langagier d'une façon duale: d'une côte le dialogue de "l'âme avec soi-même", la pensée, pour le dire comme Platon, et de l'autre côte le discours qui nécessite l'articulation dans la parole. Pour Gadamer, cette dernière forme de dialogue qui est le discours[1] [soit oral, soit écrit] se fonde sur une base commune entre les participants, sur ce qu'il appelle la "capacité de visualisation" (Anschaulichkeit) du langage. En effet, c'est le langage qui 'voye' en temps que les partenaires du dialogue sont amène l'un vers l'autre. Il s'agit ici du fait que la compréhension ne peut pas être séparée de l'écoute et aussi le deux sont donne par l'immédiateté du langage. Le "entre-nous" que le langage crée implique une sorte de détachement du soi. Les mots qu'on croye comme le notre appartient a l'autre du moment où on les articule pour son entente. "Le mot qui a été prononce n'est plus le mien, mais se trouve livre a l'écoute. Le mot prononcé appartient a celui qui l'écoute". Mais il est évident que pour se comprendre, les interlocuteurs doivent s'exprimer dans la même langue. C'est de l'impossibilité de le faire, que le traducteur reçoit sont tache. Quelle est cette tache aux yeux de Gadamer?

Avant tout chose, l'acte de la traduction présuppose la distance entre ce qui est dit/écrit et la forme dans laquelle c'est délivré a l'écouteur/ lecteur. Gadamer exclue l'idée que la traduction signifie dire la même chose[2] car traduire signifie pour lui interpréter. Pour rendre le sens d'une langue en l'autre, le traducteur doit choisir la meilleure manière sans trahir ce qu'un interlocuteur veut transmettre, il faut trouver le plus représentatif mode de le faire dans un contexte nouveau. Ce contexte nouveau, de sa propre langue s'impose sur le sens initial en se l'appropriant. La "route" entre le texte source et le texte d'arrivée est détermine par l'acte de l'interprétation, dont le traducteur sait que le sépare de l'original. Cette acceptation d'une "conscience douloureuse de la distance" de l'original est indispensable ayant pour but de "franchir l'abime qui sépare les langues" (1996: 408-409). Mais au même temps la difficulté qui advient dans le processus de traduction n'est que une autre face de la difficulté de dévoiler le sens, une face plus acute. Car affronter l'étrangeté n'est seulement une nécessite qui s'impose dans la

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[1] Il faut préciser que Gadamer favorise la conversation comme forme de discours: "La voix humaine n'est pas seulement un cri, mais elle dit quelque chose[...] La liberté véritable de l'homme consiste justement a pouvoir signifier ceci ou cela, prêter l'oreille a ceci ou cela, mais aussi savoir fermer l'oreille. Pour cela fait partie de la puissance d'appel du mot […] Il n'y a pas que les sons mais il y a aussi toute la gestuelle des interlocuteurs qui doit contribuer a former une unicité convaincante. La ou cette unicité fait défaut on ne se comprend pas." (2004:71).
[2] Eco rénvoye à Gadamer et à Ricœur pour présenter la perspective herméneutique sur la traduction

communication entre interlocuteurs qui parle en deux langues différentes. De même manière, pour comprendre un texte l'interprète est mise devant étrangeté, dans une conversation, l'interlocuteur pareille. "Il y a une différence non de nature mais seulement de dégrée entre la tache du traducteur, qui est de "rendre" le texte, et celle de toute herméneutique générale des textes" (1996:409).

Dans la troisième partie du *Verite et Methode* (1960) Gadamer thématise la tournure ontologique de l'herméneutique par la mise en évidence de la connexion entre la compréhension et l'interprétation médiatrice au sein du langage. Il présente ici le processus de la traduction comme situation limite en insistant sur son dimension interprétatif et sur le rôle du traducteur qui doit passer "l'épreuve de l'étranger" pour utiliser les mots de Berman. En revanche, l'étranger que le traducteur-interprète a pour affronter ici est plutôt l'étrangeté au niveau abstrait. On trouve dans le texte *De l'écoute* (2004) une préoccupation plus spécifique pour l'ouverture envers l'autre, "l'étranger" en chair et os. "Comme dans tout dialogue ce qui importe c'est que l'on s'approche l'un de l'autre dans une certain communauté, ou encore que l'on s'explique avec l'autre. Comprendre c'est toujours marcher avec l'autre" (2004 :70). On ne peut pas aller ainsi loin pour dire qu'il s'approche dans cette écriture de l'Autre en sens levinassian mais, sans trop anticiper, on voit ici un pas dans la direction de Ricœur (1996).

Selon Gadamer, même si les interlocuteurs ne sont pas d'accord dans une conversation, ils partent du même désir : s'entendre. En ce concerne la traduction, Gadamer parle dans ce texte de l'importance de l'apprentissage des langues étrangères pour les générations futures, "pour que la coexistence des différences culturelles et des univers langagiers peuvent rendre possible une meilleur compréhension"(1998). Cependant, comme il le reconnait, parler "le plus langue étrangères possible" pour renoncer a la traduction est un desideratum utopique. Il est évidemment préférable avoir la capacité de penser dans la langue de l'autre ou *vice versa* pour se faire compris/e. Aussi, ce qui importe n'est pas de jouer sur l'évident, mais de retenir que la besoin de la traduction n'est pas présente dans ce texte comme une circonstance herméneutique difficile, mais comme *persona non grata*. Mais n'était elle vue ainsi depuis Babel? Est qu'il y a une sorte de besoin de traduction qui nous est indispensable?

Ricœur montre que le "je peux" a une dimension fondamentale dans le dire qui est la"capacité éminente de l'homme capable" (2004:144). Il développe deux perspective de la traduction, d'une cote la paradigme linguistique et de l'autre cote la paradigme ontologique[3]. La première perspective se référait au processus de la traduction comme transfère du sens et a la relation entre langues étrangères, en temps que la deuxième renvoye a l'idée d'une traduction entre le soi et l'autre. On trouve chez Ricœur une similitude avec Gadamer en ce que constitue l'idée de

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[3] Dans la *Préface* a l'édition Anglais, Richard Kearney fait la distinction entre un paradigme linguistique et un paradigme ontologique.

souffrance et de la tension exige par le travail de l'interprète. Il caractérise le travail du traducteur comme engageant une posture intermédiaire car l'interprète doit "servir" "deux maitres" : l'auteur et le lecteur, le soi et l'autre. Pour qu'une traduction soit réussite les connaissances linguistique sont seulement un point du départ, car la véritable «épreuve» se passe si la traduction implique l'ouverture du soi. Le traducteur est presque oblige par son entreprise de modeler sa langue maternelle en la transformant selon le principe que Ricœur appelle «l'hospitalité langagière». La langue s'ouvre a l'étranger (hos-tis) par le travaille aux quelle elle est assujettie par l'interprète.

Toutefois, le même travaille se présent comme une nécessite pour renoncer à l'illusion d'une langue universelle (i.e. Espéranto), au désire d'une traduction totale, la création d'un réplica de l'original. Ricœur propose une regarde sur l'acte de traduire qui joue sur les différences, il faut accepter la diversité, reconnaitre la pouvoir des différences syntactiques et sémantiques qui sépare les langues et qui les donnes leur unicité, leur spécificité. Aussi, il n'est moins important d'avoir la conscience de l'influence culturelle et contextuelle sur une langue, l'interconnexion entre la langue et la culture qui rende impossible la langue universelle, même indésirable. Souhaiter une langue universelle, compréhensible par tous, c'est nier la diversité, ignorer l'autre et paradoxalement, abolir le dialogue. Traduire, c'est donc le transfère du sens entre langues et l'échange de compréhension entre le différent et mêmete.

L'approche du dialogue en termes de capabilité [«je peux» implique je dis] est lie à la thématisassions de l'acte de la traduction qui nous propose aussi une nouvelle regarde sur la lutte pour la reconnaissance. Par opposition a Hobbes et Hegel, Ricœur n'identifie pas la reconnaissance avec une lutte qui présuppose soit une nature humaine mauvaise productrice de la «guerre de tous contre tous», soit une dialectique qui ne donne pas justice ni à l'esclave ni a son maître. Ricœur suggère une compréhension de soi qui implique le passage par l'autre, et pour cela faire, il faut le reconnaitre, i.e. se donner soi-même. Comment est la traduction lie avec l'acte de la reconnaissance ? On a vue que «l'hospitalité langagière» se basse sur l'ouverture vers ce qui ne m'appartient pas, plus précise, ce que m'est aussi inconnue, étrangère. Mais cette ouverture linguistique présuppose aussi le renoncement à soi, sans se perdre totalement en l'autre. Ce renoncement à soi se traduit comme l'acceptation d'une différence, et pour accepter quelque chose il faut, tout d'abord le reconnaitre. Autrement dit, s'ouvrir a l'autre dans le deuxième sens de traduire c'est le reconnaitre, non seulement comme différent mais comme condition de possibilité pour la compréhension de soi-même.

La traduction est ici une forme de reconnaissance qui exige plus que le «marcher avec l'autre» de Gadamer, mais accepter que l'autre se donne et aussi la capacité qu'on se donne. Par rapport à la lutte pour la reconnaissance du multiculturalisme, Ricœur écrit : «l'alternative a l'idée de

lutte dans le procès de la reconnaissance mutuelle est à chercher dans des expériences pacifiées de reconnaissance mutuelle reposant sur des médiations symboliques soustrait tant a l'ordre juridique, qu'a celui des échanges marchands» (2004 :319). Une tel expérience est l'acte de la traduction car s'il ne se produit pas ayant comme référence «les modèles d'états de paix», il échoue. Plus exactement, Ricœur prend comme modèles d'états de paix la «*philia* (au sens aristotélicien), l'*eros* (au sens platonicien), l'*agape* (au sens biblique et post-biblique)» (2004 :319-320). La traduction perçue comme impossibilité a cause de impuissance de rendre toutes les connotations d'un texte ou d'un discours oral dans une autre langue repose sur un oublie des dimensions créatrices du langage qui engage l'amitié, l'amour et le don.

Méfier les traductions selon la formule: *traduttore traditore*, c'est ignorer la puissance de la compréhension qui repose plutôt sur l'interprétation que sur l'identité logique. La traduction échappe la logique d'*A= A* et l'espoir de masquer les différences naturelles entre individus et leur langue par la création des langages universels est aussi un signe de méfiance envers la nature humaine. C'est déconsidérer la possibilité de s'engager dans une «lutte» pour la reconnaissance qui reposera sur l'amitié, l'amour et l'ouverture d'esprit. Bien sûre que la traduction peut être interprète comme un acte de violence, comme trahison et faiblesse par rapport a l'*original* si on parle strictement de traduction au sens linguistique, mais même dans cette situation, une tel interprétation ne fait pas justice à la dimension créative de l'entreprise et repose sur l'idéalisation de l'identité. Comme l'explique très bien Ricœur a la ligne de Berman, une traduction est un lieu de rencontre entre deux partenaires du dialogue qui sont, à son tour, hospitalières vers les différences et les similitudes et le rôle du traducteur est simplement de les guider vers ce lieu.

Pour conclure, il est significative de percevoir la traduction dans les deux sens discutes avant, celui plus particulier, langagier et celui plus général, qui, comment on a vue engage l'interprète que nous sommes dans les relations avec autrui et avec nous-mêmes. Ce deuxième sens est indispensable dans le débat actuel sur la reconnaissance car il offre une solution pour affronter la dispute sur les différences, pour repenser l'égalité, les droits de l'individu et la coexistence pacifique.

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CONSUMPTION AND CONSUMER IN NEW FREE MARKET ECONOMIES FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

ELEMENTS FOR A WEAK PHILOSOPHY OF CONSUMERISM

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The title of this article can mislead because for some it could indicate a sort of effort designed to disclose a deep conceptual background able to shed light upon the way in which we have to understand the consumer behavior in the new market economies from Eastern Europe. Despite this possible perception we want to underline from the very beginning that our paper is strictly limited to few relatively general considerations about the status of consumer in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. These considerations, as it will be so evident, can lately lead to some further developments but in this study we will be strictly limit our commentary to them.

Consumption and consumer in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism

The first general observation that we make about the status of the economies from Eastern Europe after the fall of communism it is linked by their historic condition in opposition with the strong and mature capitalistic economies from the West. After the collapse of communism the most

countries from Eastern Europe were tried to overcome the consequences of communist era by following a capitalist way in order to improve the economics status of their inhabitants which was so badly affected in the last few decades of communism. Of course, every country from the new free area in Eastern Europe did this in its specific way and it would be completely absurd to try to disclose a general pattern of evolution in terms of economic changes. However, it is clear that the fall of communism was brought a general hope of improving the economic status for the citizens of Eastern Europe. And the way in which hope was supposed to become reality consisted, with no exception, in adopting the western capitalist way of economy.

It is not our purpose to uncover the multitude of ways in which these Eastern Europe countries have indeed tried to enter into a capitalist orbit. Anyway, what it is certain is the fact that all of these nations were supposed to deliver for its citizens the capitalist welfare in the mode of consumption society. It is our purpose in this short study to unveil some characteristics of what we believe that is fundamental for the mentality of the individuals from the new capitalist states in Eastern Europe regarding the so called "consumption society".

The first observation which can be made is the fact that the economies from the Eastern Europe, after the collapse of the communism, are very far away, in terms of structural development, from the western economies. It is just the pure fact that in the Eastern part of the old continent there was not enough historic time to accumulate wealth in terms of industrial base and infrastructure in all its senses. The reasons for this situation are multiple but all of them can be reduced to some kind of historical gap, in terms of mentality and economy between the East and the West. However, regardless the way in which we look at these countries it is very obvious that their economies are not self-sufficient in order to satisfy the basic needs for their people and simultaneously to create that specific type of surplus which in the end has made possible the birth of consumption society in the West. Of course, it would be very hard to deny that these Eastern countries did not try to accommodate after the fall of communism with western mentality in terms of consumption and free economy. However, their effort is in vane not because there are not prepare for change but because the difference is simply too big.

The observation that Eastern European countries are simply too far away from the strong western economies could very rapidly lead us to two intermediate conclusions. The first one consist in the idea that Eastern European consumer does not have the feeling that he belongs to a real capitalist economy but more likely the feeling that something very difficult and elaborate must be recuperated in order to really enter in that area. And this because the gap can not be surpassed only through pure will or by implementing in a very fast mode the main frame of the free market economy. This felling is not always recognized but, however, almost every

eastern European citizen, after a short visit in western part of the continent, is very quickly able to realize the huge disparity between his country and the western world. And from this is very easy to experience the feeling described by us a little bit earlier.

The second intermediate conclusion is linked with the first one and it consists in the idea that the Eastern European consumer does not have the conscience that his consumption style is a proper and authentic capitalization of a historical economic surplus. The new consumer from Eastern Europe is not the typical western consumer but much more likely is a sort of hybrid between the western standard consumer and the new type of citizen recently liberated from communism in the East of the old continent. Of course, it would be very hard to deny that even in this situation the eastern consumer does not have the core of the western consumer mentality, at least he is trying to get it, but anyway, it is still far away from the genuine consumer mentality of the western world. For the consumer from the new free market economies of Europe it just the beginning of a stage trough which the western world had already passed after the World War II.

Following the above idea it is worth to notice that the difference regarding mentality between western countries in general and the countries recently emerged from communism era is also a very pregnant one when we talk about consumption and the capitalist frame of thinking in general. We believe that a significant majority of economic annalists and commentators have not underlined enough this subject and this is maybe the principal reason for what any attempt to understand the new Eastern European free market economies it could not be a proper one as long we are ignoring mentality. For example, the standard Eastern European citizen does not have the same mentality and attitude about consumption society and consumerism in general as his homologue from the West. The citizen from Eastern European new free market economies does not have the conscience that his consumption is a natural fruit which was made possible after a whole road of stages regarding structural development of the economy. For a western citizen it is almost every time very clear the fact that his standard of life was achieved during a historical accumulation of health and the whole set of goods that consumption society is making available on the market for him was also a result of a very long time of hard work within a solid and healthy capitalist economy. Even if this situation is not always present in an explicit form within the mind of western consumers it always can be easily disclosed.

In the opposition with this is the situation of consumer from the East of Europe. For him, the wealth of capitalism was come too late and even so it has very specific drawbacks for him. First, this wealth is not available to such large scale as it is in western part of the old continent. In the West the continuous economic development, along at least one and a half century, has produced in the end an acceptable standard of living for a vast majority of citizens even if this, as we know, it is not available for all. However, in the Eastern Europe it would be pure and simply much to more to even expect

this. The difference is a historical one and it can not be surpassed in a decade or two with all economic and political measures that are already been taken. And this is true, of course, when it we talk about prices as well. For the Eastern European citizen the prices are often much more higher than for his western counterpart and for this is also responsible the historical gap between these two parts of the continent. This is obvious but we think that another conclusion can be derived from this: it would be always possible that peoples from the new free market economies from the Eastern Europe to consider the capitalist society as a more unjust and cruel society than it would be the case. This risk is indeed a very serious one because it could not have only a negative impact upon the way in which the Eastern European countries will be integrated in EU community at the economical level but even at the cultural level as well.

Another major difference between Eastern European new type of consumer and his counterpart from the West is referring to the basic perspective which stands at the base of the consumption activity of general goods and services from the market. If for a western consumer the everyday consumption, based upon good quality merchandise and affordable prices had become from a very long time ago something very natural for the new consumer from the East part of Europe this is not the case. A significant part of goods are still considered to be, for an Eastern European consumer, a distinct type of luxury and this is happening because he was not accustomed with welfare state for almost everyone. This situation is also a source of psychological and maybe serious cultural difference between both of them and it could of course affect the way in which Eastern European countries would deal with their economic growth in the future and, most important, the ways in which countries will function at the strict economic level together with the capitalist countries from the West in a united Europe.

Consumption society in the Eastern Europe
after the collapse of communism – a new type of poverty

After drawing some short considerations about the general situation of the consumer in the new free market economies from the Eastern Europe after 1990 let us see now, in a very brief manner, of what consumption society we can talk about in these countries. We do not want to enter in a detailed conceptual frame but only to uncover the general status, from our point of view, of these so called consumption societies. And we believe that all can be reduced to this general observation: the new free market economies from the Eastern Europe are just not having the fundamental tools and resources to compete with the strong Western economies. We are not thinking here to human or natural resources but to infrastructure of economy and the capital. This is the fundamental reason why these Eastern European economies had become in time, in a natural mode we might say, nothing more than a huge place in which the West is coming to sale its

goods and services. Everything, in the terms of a pure capitalist perspective stands against these countries and the gap between East and West part of Europe will increase not because in the East will not be improved the general standard of life for its citizens but because this improvement will not come as a result of their own national efforts. This improvement will be constructed upon loans after loans and a long series of technological imports from the West. There is just not enough historical time for the Eastern European countries in order to build up their economies in a healthy independent way able to self sustain a serious capitalist economy. This brings in the scene the new face of poverty for the East, a one in which BMW, McDonald's; Coke or Boeing will be, of course present but will never function in the way they do in their mother economies. The new face of poverty for the Eastern Europeans means nothing else but the fact that those economies are not matures enough in order to be able to function independent from the West. In the moment when loans with money from the West will be stopped these economies will just stop to function. And this not because an economical or financial crisis is not something quite natural but because these Eastern European economies would never be capable to get out from the crisis by their own forces. And the main reason for this is the fact that capital, the serious money we mean, is only available in the West because only there it has enough power to move the real economy further. And, to end up the chain, this is why because in the West *they have indeed a real economy*, which was build in a wealthy capitalist way during relatively long historical stages, and *only this real economy* is the reason because their money really means something serious after all. And here the circle ends.

As a brief conclusion the new form of poverty for the Eastern European, and this could be seen as a strange form of paradox, has nothing to do with its enormous natural and human resources but with its huge gap, in terms of the absence of the main frame of a capitalistic society. In short, in the Eastern Europe the consumption society is been build with loans not with money which are naturally generated from a strong capitalist economy. We are building "our" economies in the East with *their* money, with the money from the West. We are actually living our life on depths and deficits and there are no signs that we will be able soon to change this dramatic situation. We are not talking here about the depths and deficits which are natural for a capitalist economy but about the depths that we, as Eastern European citizens, so desperately need in order to function, at a lowest level, the basic economic mechanism and to avoid national bankruptcy[1].

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[1] It is very interesting the manner in which Joseph Stiglitz have argued that it would be indicate that "countries with a positive trade balance should stream part of their surplus to the International Monetary Fund" because in this way it "can then stimulate the economy in developing countries or prevent economy from collapsing in Eastern Europe" ("Government Stimulus Plans are not enough" – interview with Joseph Stiglitz in Der Spiegel, 04.01.2009). Of course, the idea is a proper one in terms of a healthy economic thinking but it is no joy for the developing countries to

**Consumerism for nowadays Eastern European
consumer – Elements for a weak philosophy of consumption**

After these short observations what could be possibly said about the main frame of mentality through which Eastern European consumer understands his present economic condition? We think that this issue can be reduced to a general answer, an answer which demands a comparison with mentality of western type of consumer.

Firstly, we strongly believe that in no way could be possible to talk about a real existence of such a thing as is the "consumption", in his pure western acceptance, in nowadays countries from Eastern European. The consumer within these economies is nothing more but a poor profiteer of the western abundance. Of course, he might have the illusion that his life was improved after the collapse of communism due to his country economical efforts but this is just a mental toy for some. In reality the Eastern European consumer is totally dependent from the strong westerns economies in terms of know how, technology and capital. The consumption in the Eastern Europe from today is nothing more but a desperate effort to benefit from the opulence of the West in terms of rapid economic expansion through westerns loans and technological imports.

Secondly, about the Eastern European consumer, after all that we said until this point, we also believe that he is no capable, in objective terms, to understand the fact that the wealth of western economies is something which was achieved during a relatively long period of time. This could be maybe the fundamental reason why in the East of Europe from today it is so predominant the mentality of getting reach as quickly as it is possible and without any serious effort in terms of real economical activity. The Eastern European consumer was finding himself already in under the mirage of welfare society and he is no aware about the work and effort which are responsible in the West of achieving this standard. Maybe the idea of Jean Baudrillard that a consumption society is totally obscuring the effort which was made in order to build it is much truer for nowadays Eastern European consumer[2]. With all his poverty the Eastern European consumer is already in a historical position which enables him to get an instant access to a type of wealth already constructed and accumulated. As a sort of a cynical paradox it could be very possible that even this situation which is obscuring the effort

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realize once again how fragile are their economies and how deeply dependent from the West are them.

[2] Baudrillard, Jean – The consumer society: Myths and Structures, SAGE Publications Inc., 1998. His idea of obscuring the efforts that stands beyond the abundance of consumption society, an operation of hiding which consumption society is making it possible, could be applied even to a standard consumer from nowadays Eastern European countries because he is in no way aware of those historical efforts. Of course, in a such context Baudrillard`s idea must be gradated.

to have the capacity of making from the Eastern European consumer a pure consumer from a pure consumption society. The things here a more complicate but as a paradox our idea, we think, is a realistic one.

So, these are the main two characteristics, in our view, of the nowadays Eastern European consumer. The total dependence, in terms of medium and long time periods, from the strong and healthy western economies and the ignorance regarding the whole set of historical efforts which were hardly made by the western world in order to obtain its abundance and wealth from today. We do not say that these two characteristics could stop the integration of Eastern Europe in western mentality of consumption[3]. We just underline that these two coordinates in terms of mentality could make the effort of integration much more difficult than it have to be.

As a brief conclusion in terms of identifying a possible philosophy of consumption for the Eastern European consumer we might say the following things. Firstly, the absence of a western mentality about capitalism and consumption, a one which it should be consolidated during historical stages of developments, enables the Eastern European citizen to be completely unaware about internal mechanisms, at any level, of a pure capitalist economy. So, it is just impossible to talk about a thing such that would be "philosophy of consumption" for the recently emerged from the communism countries from Eastern Europe after 1990.

Secondly, if we want, after all, to talk about some "philosophy" of consumerism in nowadays Eastern European countries we could say that it would be a very shallow one and totally adapted to some sort of a "contextual pragmatism" which, beyond some point, is almost completely incomprehensible for the average citizen from the East.

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[3] Hill, Steven – Europe`s Promise. Why the European Way Is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age, University of California Press, 2009, pp. 22 – 28. Here the author talks about so called "social capitalist Europe", a type of capitalism which can be seen as moderate one in terms of social protection and equal access to wealth and resources. After entering in EU it is clear that new Eastern European countries are strong candidates for this type of capitalism, with its specific consumption society, because, however, there are no any other way in the future for them. And for achieving this status it is just does not matter the ignorance of Eastern European citizen regarding the efforts which was made in the West during historical stages to obtain in the end a consumption society as long as for the Eastern European citizen there are no choice but integration under the political will of the West with all its consequences for the individuals.

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"FICTION" AND "MODEL" IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

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It is a certainty that contemporary epistemology still brings into focus of heated debates concerning the specific nature of scientific discourse the role played by imaginary constructs. The Anglo-Saxon epistemology especially needs an update on the scientific imaginary model, therefore resorting to the tools of semantics, pragmatics or philosophical hermeneutics[1]. M. Black, Mary B. Hesse, Tarski, Searle, Davidson, Lakoff, Suppes, Toulmin, Redhead are just a few authors dealing with the epistemological issue of the consistency of imaginary constructs in the area of scientific discourse. The topic of the scientific imaginary has been approached from different angles. In the current course of the philosophy of science, the core theme is determined by several attempts to identify a universal criterion for delimiting the scientific imaginary which would, thus, ensure its legitimacy in the area of scientific discourse. Therefore, apart from some efforts in contemporary philosophy of science to regard the scientific discovery more like an aesthetic experience or to reunite the areas of scientific knowledge on the grounds of reasoning by analogy, emphasis tends to be focused on cognitive relevance of imaginary constructs, perceived as transdisciplinary mechanisms at the junction of different areas of discourse.

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[1] Related to this observation, see the paper by Newton Da Costa and Steven French, *Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003

In the following survey two distinct modalities of legitimating the role of the imaginary in the scientific knowledge- the one sustained by Hans Vaihinger and the one that belongs to Max Black and Mary B.Hesse- are submitted to critical approach, in order to highlight certain theoretical similarities, essential to contemporary epistemology.

I. Obviously, H. Vaihinger has produced one of the first attempts at systematic approach of the role of the Imaginary in the scientific knowledge. His work *Philosophie des Als Ob* (1911, translated into English as *The Philosophy of As If*, 1924) is usually appreciated as playing an important part in the contemporary epistemology's endeavors[2] to recover the scientific imaginary.

The imaginary or fictional aspect of scientific knowledge is approach by the German philosopher from the point of view of mental structures as being a product of the logical functions, an aspect of the "reasoning capacities"[3] and not a product of intuition as one may be tempted to believe. Since the concept of model was not broadly used in contemporary science, Vaihinger named models "schematic fictions". He distinguishes two types of imaginary constructs: "half-fictions" and "authentic fictions". The first type of fictions oppose/contradict given reality without contradicting themselves (for instance the artificial categories) and in this case we speak only of a "material deviation" whereas the "authentic fictions" are contradictory in relation with reality as well as with themselves, to the extent where they do not correspond to the logical principles of identity and contradiction (for instance, the concept of atom). Stating that cognitive processes and constructs must be considered from the point of view of their intentional function, the author will arrive at proclaiming the pragmatic status of fictions.

Scientific fictions assume this aspect because their use is almost each and every time doubled by the certainty of the fact that fictional idea, fictional presupposition "is not really valid"[4].

Vaihinger insists on that the object of the scientific endeavor is to build up ideas which respond to the types of scientific reality hence eliminating any

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[2] Recent authors have been exploring the implications of Vaihinger's philosophy on fiction: Wolfgang Iser, *The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan, *Joseph Conrad and the Modern Temper* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Jaqueline Vaught Brogan, *A Theory of Language* (Princeton University Press, 1986); Adena Rosmarin, *The Power of Genre* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). One of the most interesting applications of Vaihinger's concepts is most certainly that presented within the work of the American psychologist James Hillman – *Healing Fiction* (1994) – where the author state that in the description of certain psychological conditions (neurosis and madness for instance) fictional constructs are used (psychological fiction) which represent literalization tendencies rather than "see through our meanings" (HF, p. 110)
[3] Vaihinger, H., *Filozofia lui „Ca şi cum",* Bucureşti, Editura Nemira, 2001, p.60
[4] *Ibidem*, p.148

subjective representation and, as such, any argument which would tend exclusively towards the psychological level. If however within scientific practice we can find numerous imaginary constructs that do not correspond to reality, this is due to their strictly methodological and practical nature. In relation with this aspect of the scientific imaginary, M. I. Spariosu notes that fictions are "provisional methods"[5], and are abandoned as much as and while the sought for objectives are achieved, or in case that other more precise methods are discovered.

It is worth noting that Vaihinger uses the phrase "artificial deviation" on the one hand when he refers to the in-appearance deliberately false nature of the fictions as related to reality, and on the other hand in order to distinguish the fictions from the scientific hypotheses. Whereas the hypotheses have a degree of probability which regards their truth value, which can be verified or confirmed by subsequent experience, the fictions do not need to be subject to such confirmation. As they are false – the fictions are used in scientific knowledge only on account of their practical aspect. They are justifiable to the extent where they prove efficient and serve the purpose of achieving scientific objectives.

The above mentioned distinction is doubled by another: the one between "rules of reasoning" and "artifices of reasoning". "Rules of reasoning" represent the entirety of general logical rules out of which deduction and induction play a very important part. "Artifices" on the other hand contradict usual logical rules because although they are always auxiliary logical constructs, they possess an ambiguous, almost mysterious aspect as well as the capacity to overcome certain difficulties of the scientific endeavor. The fact that scientific fictions are deliberately false constructs which act "as if" they were true and are not simple errors of judgment make us distinguish them from the fictional constructs specific to artistic or mythic-religious representations, in spite of their mutual psychological origin – the imaginative capacity – and in spite f their practical value.

In order to avoid certain criticism that could be directed to this theoretical perspective, we must mention that Vaihinger does not reduce the function of fictions to the mere pragmatic necessity. At least in the case of one of the numerous types of fiction in the sciences' field, namely the "heuristic fictions", the cognitive relevance comes first. As their denomination indicates, they play an important part in the cognitive endeavor, as they allow for solving of certain scientific problems (for instance the Cartesian hypothesis of the vortex, or Newton's laws of gravity).

Naturally, Vaihinger's concept about utility of the scientific fictions must be placed on the background of his thought's central view: the relativist philosophy of "as if", which rejects any absolute idea or judgment, both in natural sciences and in metaphysics. Vaihinger himself calls his philosophical orientation, Neo-Kantian in origins, "positivistic idealism" or

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[5] Spăriosu, M.I., *Resurecţia lui Dionysos. Jocul şi dimensiunea estetică în discursul filosofic şi ştiinţific modern*, Bucureşti, Editura Univers, 1997, p.240

"idealist positivism" and he warns that it must be separated from the skeptical currents and from the agnostic ones[6]. In a famous paper related to the philosophy of Als Ob, M. I. Spariosu notes that Vaihinger intended to "reconcile German Idealism with various manners of scientific Empiricism and Positivism which impose themselves at the end of the 19th century"[7], a stand that was subsequently shared by numerous philosophers of science and scientists: Plank, Bohr, Einstein, Louis de Broglie, Schroedinger and Heisenberg. The concepts of the German philosopher about the scientific fictions' specifics must not be under posed, as he himself states[8], to the pragmatic theory of the truth, although, after a detailed analysis, certain similarities between them could be detected. Anyway, even if a fiction proves useful in scientific research, "the logical tact" and "the taste" within the scientific community will finally decide on its practical value. From a methodological point of view, the fiction generally understood as a product of the imaginative faculty is applied in the field of exact sciences as well as that of the ethical-political sciences and it is lacking entirely from the field of historical or descriptive sciences. Establishing of causal links, an endeavor specific to the descriptive sciences, assumes rather application of the inductive research methods.

The fictional methodology is to be found to some extent or other in all the exact sciences. Vaihinger identifies a number of scientific fictions in variation with their structural complexity: "artificial classification", "abstractive (neglective) fictions", "schematic fictions", "paradigmatic fictions", "utopia fictions", "type-fictions", "symbolic (or analogical) fictions", "personifying fictions", "summative fictions", "heuristic fictions". They can be met in sciences such as mathematics (the void space, the point, the line, the surface, the infinitesimal), physics (the fix line, the force lines in Maxwell, the fictive average, the Alfa corpus, the gravity center), mathematical physics and quantum mechanics especially (the concept of atom, the subatomic particle, the infinite, "the physical image of the world" in Planck etc) chemistry, biology.

II. M. Black and Mary B. Hesse tried to enlarge the field of debate over the scientific imaginary, opposing especially the rhetorical prejudice, its being considered something separate from or opposite to reality or to the truth. By means of a comparative analysis related to the cognitive metaphor and to the scientific model the two authors will discuss a more subtle concept of the scientific imaginary, which exceeds limits of the trope as such, placing itself in a much larger theoretical background than the linguistics' and the semantics'; what they tried to maintain is that beyond the literal meaning, the

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[6] Vaihinger, H., *Op.cit.*, p.11
[7] *Ibidem*, p.237
[8] See Arbib, M.A., Hesse, M.B., „Language, metaphor and a new epistemology", in *The construction of reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York, 1990, p.147-161

metaphorical sentence, as species of the imaginary may impose/require a cognitive function.

Metaphorical constructs in the field of science are the best example to prove the possibility of metaphor, in general, to exceed the semantics' area, with the focus falling on their cognitive relevance. The idea of a functional similarity between metaphor and the scientific model proved to be especially fruitful in this respect. As they approach the matter of the reference within the metaphorical sentences, in context of the "heuristics' logics", Max Black and Mary B. Hesse state that a model is used most of the times in the genesis of scientific theories as a heuristic instrument of re-description[9] to the aspects of the various levels of scientific reality. Both Black and Hesse will admit that, in what concerns the reference to reality, the model plays a similar part in the context of scientific knowledge to that of the metaphor within the poetic language. Scientific explanations often resort to metaphorical re-descriptions of the targeted field, as the theoretical models presuppose the sense of an isomorphism which allows connection between the real aspect and the imaginary aspect they comprise. Black will try to delineate the epistemological dimension of scientific imagination from the psychological dimension, by suggesting a theory of the models in which the criterion of hierarchy is given by their capacity to enhance scientific knowledge[10]. Applying a perspective of existential interpretation[11], Black distinguishes between "scaled models", "analogous models" and "theoretical models". At the inferior level of the hierarchy there are the "scaled models" (simulations, schematics, miniatures of some physical processes); their function is similar to that of the iconic signs. These models imply their referent on basis of an asymmetrical relationship; they imitate or partly reproduce certain pertinent characteristics of the original:

"They want to show what the object is like (how it looks) and the way in which it functions (how it works)"[12].

The interpretation conventions of these models presuppose just knowledge of the partial identity of the pertinent characteristics. Upon the second level "analogous models" are situated; for instance, hydraulic models of the economical systems, computers' electrical circuits, which resemble the original due to a structural isomorphism, as their representation assumes a higher degree of abstractness, specific to the imaginary medium term. The

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[9] "To make good use of a model, we usually need an intuitive grasp…of its capacities, but so long as we can freely draw inferences from the model, its picturability is of no importance"; Black, M., *Models and Metaphor: Studies in language and philosophy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1962, p. 232-233

[10] Arbib, M.A., Hesse, M.B., „Language, metaphor and a new epistemology", în *The construction of reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge-New York, 1990, p.147-161

[11] Ricoeur, P., *Metafora vie*, Bucureşti, Editura Univers, 1984, p.371

[12] *Ibidem*, p.372

interpretation of these partially concrete, partially abstract models imposes in addition to the first category of models the knowledge of translation codes of the isomorphic aspects from a structural relations' system into another. At the upper level of the hierarchy Black places the theoretical models which re-describe the scientific field by means of/within metaphorical sentences (for instance the metaphor of the clock universe in the contemporary science, the representation of the electrical field with Maxwell in variation with an incomprehensible imaginary fluid, the computer universe in Steve Wolfram). As P. Ricoeur notes, in this case, interpretation is based on knowledge of the meanings opened at the very intuition's level.

Trying to express the specific characteristics of the theoretical model in comparison to that of the metaphorical constructs in the field of philosophy the French hermeneutist warns in Vaihinger's manner that scientific imagination cannot be reduced to some "psychology of invention", as it is actually a cognitive process with specific epistemological principles. If the first types of models reconstruct more or less an original field of research, the theoretical model on the other hand target the role of the scientific imaginary in its heuristic description or re-description. In other words, the first two categories of model have a mimetic function, where reconstruction equals exemplification, and the theoretical models have a cognitive function, as re-description means explanation of the field. This very function assures, in the end, the possibility to distinguish scientific models from the linguistic metaphors[13].

Both Black and Hesse tried through the rationale of the theoretical models to sketch some answer to the problem of theories' genesis, initiated by the hypothetical-deductive model in science. In Hesse's view, the hypothetical-deductive model in scientific knowledge must be added the perspective of the scientific explanation to offer a "metaphorical description about the field of *the explanandum*". The possibility of the imaginary constructs is thereby supported, especially that of the metaphorical constructs, to refer not only to pre-existing entities but also and more to entities whose occurrence becomes possible under the very influence of the imagination's process.

R. Rorty will submit to acid criticism the idea that metaphor may have a cognitive function. As he takes over an objection previously put together by

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[13] „Scientific models are prototype, philosophically speaking, for imaginative creations or schemas based on natural language and experience, but they go beyond it by metaphorical extension to construct symbolic worlds that may or may not adequately represent certain aspects of the empirical world. These symbolic worlds all share with scientific models the function of describing and re-describing the world; and for all of them it is inappropriate to ask for literal truth as direct correspondence with the world. Symbolic worlds differ from scientific models, however, in that it is not their function to represent the state of the natural environment for purposes of prediction and control"; Arbib, M.A., Hesse, M.B., *Op.Cit.*, p.161

D. Davidson[14], Rorty maintains that metaphors cannot claim to offer an "image of the world" or to encode certain activities or social practices, but maybe just to make such operations possible by becoming action models. In other words, the metaphorical constructs can express only a literal significance.

Both Rorty and Davidson do nothing but create a different reduction: the scientific discovery regarded, in the contemporary Sciences' philosophy as "aesthetic experience". As they are not the result of a cognitive endeavor, the imaginary constructs, metaphors especially, are transformed into mere expressions of our desire to express more, means that we have at our disposal when we are making a conviction effort, whether the context is scientific or philosophical, to accept a new scientific paradigm or a new mode of philosophical reflection.

Taking into account the specific characteristics of scientific practices, Isabelle Stengers tries to reinstate the cognitive value of the models. As she distinguishes between theory as a result of judgment and model as a result of fiction, the author maintains that models must be regarded as fictional endeavors which target not elimination of their "rivals" but follow up and explanation of the consequences[15] Furthermore, the large development over the last decades of the information technology reveals importance of the scientific models, especially that of the mathematical models, as fictional instruments, and its application by the new sophists (the researchers who use such instruments) imposes that description, explanation and fiction should communicate with one another, including on an experiential level, and not only theoretically.

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[14] See Rorty, R., *Unfamiliar Noises: Hesse and Davidson on Metaphor* in *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge&New York, 1991, pp. 162-163

[15] Stengers, I., *Inventarea ştiinţelor moderne*, Iaşi, Editura Polirom, 2001, p.142

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ON WITTGENSTEIN AND THE IMAGINARY NUMBER

A QUASI-CONVENTIONAL AND MATHEMATICAL APORIA[1]

OF THIS PLURI-LEMATIC NUMBER

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In *Philosophical investigations*[2], Part II, Chapter X, where we especially find remarks on the phrase **"I believe ..."**, Ludwig Wittgenstein insists on the imaginary number in the following paragraph:

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[1] Philosophical term of Greek origin which means: no way out (from: α-πορεία) or entangling, disorientation, bewilderment (from: άπο-ρέω, άπο-ρία);

[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Second (bilingual) edition (original / English) 1958, translated by G. E. M. Ascombe, Blackwell Publishers Ltd 108 Cowley Road Oxford OX4 1JF UK;

So it *looks* as if the assertion "I believe" were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis "I believe"!

Similarly: the statement "I believe it's going to rain" has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, "It's going to rain", but the meaning of "I believed then that it was going to rain", is not like that of "It did rain then".

"But surely 'I believed' must tell of just the same thing in the past as 'I believe' in the present!"—Surely $\sqrt{-1}$ must mean just the same in relation to -1, as $\sqrt{1}$ means in relation to 1! This means nothing at all.

Wittgenstein's additional references about "$\sqrt{-1}$" could be found also in works like *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*[3] (*Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik*). In those comments or remarks, which don't have a limit being only ascertaining or critical on this irrational number (which is still used in various natural sciences such as phisics, statistics etc.), can easily capture how Wittgenstein seems to approach this interesting number, which is like an **aporia** to what could be named **mystique** (par excellence).

But before presenting this "lemmatic plurality" of the "$\sqrt{-1}$" posibilities ("plurality" which in part seems to be strange for the current understanding of mathematics), I will try to present briefly, a sort of "historiography" of this "$\sqrt{-1}$". Therefore square root of a negative number is represented as mathematical conventionalism by the letter "*i*". Thus the several centuries research for the most effective methods to solve equations with an increasing degree of difficulty, in Italy Bologna, dissatisfied Rafael Bombelli (1526 - 1572), with the mathematical demonstrations from **Ars magna** written by the great encyclopedic scholar, Hieronymus Cardanus (Gerolamo Cardano, from 1501 to 1576), so he writes **L'Algebra**, his important work written during two decades, in which it is shown:

> *...that we can not avoid the square roots of negative numbers. But that requires a mental leap. After all, what is the square root of -1 ? Obviously, no normal number (real) multiplied by itself does not -1, given that even multiplying a negative number with itself gives a positive result. However cubic equation solution sometimes produces as intermediate step, a square root of a negative number, even if the end result was a real number. Cardano, who was intrigued by these "sophistic" numbers concluded that they were "so subtle, that were unnecessary, and they had to use in computing, said that one is "ignoring the*

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[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Third Edition, Basil Blackwell Oxford, 1978, Reprinted 1989, 1994, 1998, 2001or *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, Werkausgabe Band 6*, Herausgegeben von G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees, G. H. von Wright, Suhrkamp; PART/*Teil* V, 5, pag. 261, 262;

mental torture". Bombelli, on the other hand, had the inspiration to understand that these new numbers, which he called "plus from minus", was a necessary vehicle that can cross the abyss of the cubic equation (expressed in real numbers) and the final solutions (which were all real numbers). In other words, although both the beginning and end involving real numbers, the solution must cross the new world of numbers "imaginary". Square root of -1 was noted with them in 1777 by the great Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler. The numbers of new lands revealed by Bombelli's work are also now complex numbers - they are sums of real numbers (all normal numbers) and imaginary numbers (which include square roots of negative numbers).[4]

Among the essential contributions to mathematics concerning this number I mention those of: Johann Bernoulli (1667 - 1748), Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777 - 1855), who made a chart of complex numbers in two dimensions (where one axis stands for imaginary numbers and the other for real numbers) and Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann, who starting from the Gaussian diagram, succeeds in projecting a sphere that is polarized 0 and ∞, with the "equator" in: 1, –1, *i* and –*i*.

A quite confusing effect, I would say, is the following example: in order to discover the interference of light the calculus implied using operations with complex numbers, which then produced the theoretical acceptance of plurality of worlds and multiple dimensions. These problems have triggered empirical scientific horizons of contemporary physics that seem to dissolve ever more in a "meta-physical nebula".

Unlike the Bombelli's version and subsequent consequences of this choice of representation of "√–1" untill now, I propose the experiment a "Mathematical **aporia**" respectively an alternative approach which functions on the same basic algebric rules, arranged maybe in an other order.

This alternative, as it will be shown, is distinct from the original version of representation of "√–1", because the premises are slightly different. Thus if it seems that Bombelli invents, improvises something, in order to improve the general problems imposed by certain ecuations, in this case, in this case, interfering somehow the "qualitic's quantic"[5] or the "*calculus* of *hermenaios*"[6], from a mathematical analysis to a mathematical dialectic within philosophical

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[4] English translation of the version published in Romanian from Mario Livio, *Ecuaţia care n-a putut fi rezolvată*, Bucure ti, Editura Humanitas, 2007;
Ch. 3 *Never Forget This in the Midst of Your Equations*, p. 94, 95;
[5] The binomial: quāntitās↔quantitās (in latin);
[6] Allusion to stone mythologies from various cultures where the stone means: God, faith, safety, foundation (cornerstone), **precision**, oracular, **interpretation**, destiny etc., in this case is about Roman and Greek culture;

hermeneutics, I will endeavor to show the **mystique** of this alternative imaginary number, just like "inequalities" Śiva and "his Dance (Play)".

So what are we talking about here? ... First of all we know that Bombelli was quite inspired using the neutral role of number 1. That is why multiplying this number helps to remove the negativity from the root of a negative number, which is known as universal mathematical formalism, represented as:

$$\sqrt{-a} = \sqrt{-1}a = (\sqrt{a})(\sqrt{-1}); \text{ iar } \sqrt{-1} = i => i^2 = -1;$$

thus we have the following equivalences:

$$i = \sqrt{-1}; \ i^2 = -1; \ i^3 = -i; \ i^4 = 1; \ i^5 = i \ \text{ etc.}$$

So without getting into other details on the complex numbers, what I propose does not follow this algoritm. Firstly, the starting point will be the rule of multiplication of signs. As it is well known:

$$+ \ + = +;$$
$$- \ - = +;$$
$$- \ + = - \ ;$$
$$+ \ - = - \ ;$$

From here one can easily deduce that:

$$+^2 = + \ ;$$
$$-^2 = + \ ;$$
$$-^3 = - \ ;$$

It follows that: $\sqrt{+} = (+ \ V \ -)$ and $\sqrt[3]{-} = -$. Thus it appears that, in the present case, we can distinguish two kinds of +: i. e. that which we might call conventional maximum (absolute), from which we could draw only one other + and the minimum (atomic), from which we can draw only one − . Due to this new agreement on the negative sign we notice that it is the most basic up to now. This sign is the "imparity" (especially on its exponents) and asymmetric par excellence, to the "structure" plus.

In such a state of things let us notice what surprises could be brought by $\sqrt{-}$, bearing in mind that − it is the imparity par excellence. Therefore in this case we have $^P\sqrt{-1}$, i. e. root (which is "parity" of order, i.e. even order) of something that is exponentially (for self-consistency) only to the "imparity"(or odd numbers). The next step in this approach would be:

$$^P\sqrt{-^1} = \sqrt{-^3} = \sqrt{- \ -^2} = -\sqrt{-} = -\sqrt{- \ -^2} = +\sqrt{-} = +\sqrt{- \ -^2} = - \ +\sqrt{-} = -\sqrt{-} \ \dots \text{ and so on;}$$

Then we could continue their equivalents:

$$(\sqrt{-})^2 = - \; ;$$
$$(\sqrt{-})^3 = -\sqrt{-} \; (\text{i.e.} \; \sqrt{-});$$
$$(\sqrt{-})^4 = + \; ;$$
$$(\sqrt{-})^5 = +\sqrt{-} \; (\text{i.e.} \; \sqrt{-});$$
$$(\sqrt{-})^6 = - \; ;$$

etc.

As it can be noticed, there are at least two or three new signs, due to the distinction of two types of + and as well two more subtle signs.

The first one would be:

$$\sqrt{-} = {}^{P}\sqrt{-}{}^{I} = \sqrt{-}^3 = -\sqrt{-} = +\sqrt{-} = \pm\sqrt{-},$$

more accurately represented as:

$$-^{+(max.)}\sqrt{-}$$

or simply by:

$$(-^+)\sqrt{-}$$

That is why $-^+$ would be generated as part of $\sqrt{-}$, which even if indispensable it can be independent too. Therefore the immanent, the inherent, the quasi-transcendental, the sublime: $\sqrt{-}$, is in relation with $-^+$, as is the god Śiwa with **<<its divine dance (game)>>**, which **creates**, **recreates** and **destroys** worlds. The dance of **distraction** and **distruction**. So far, through the perspective of this mathematical **aporia** (or even **apo-rhema**[7]), we are aware of five signs: $\sqrt{-}$; $-^+$; $-$; $+^{(max.)}$ şi $+^{(min.)}$.

In order to avoid some misunderstandings and without getting into inexhaustible details, it is necessary to present some consequences related to the new formalism approached. For instance for + , any sort of exponents it might have (+; −; $-^+$), it would still remain +; and − exponential to itself remains the same −, and so on; it is generally said that the sets of signs multiply trans- quantumly , along some more and more incommensurable fields.

If we associate to those signs the real number 1, which is null in the case of multiplications, it will not modify anything for this mathematical **aporia**, but if smaller or higher numbers than this "*(Un)Null*"[8], are being used, other amazing aspects will be noticed, even more different from the understanding of the "imaginary numbers" known so far.

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[7] Intentionally these terms are made to look like other terms from Greek, which are the consacrated terms: **theory** and **theorem**. So I want to evoke the nuances of empirical predominance of one of the terms (in the **aporia** like in **theory**) or the other epistemic absolutization (in the **aporhema** as in **theorem**);

[8] That is simultaneously *null* and *non-null*;

Therefore, I ask you to notice the asymmetry, which seems to remind us of its similarity to "Möbius band (strip)". We take, for instance $\sqrt{-1048576}$, which is in fact $\sqrt{-(2^{20})}$, in order to follow the algorithms of the removal from the radical, of this negative number:

$\sqrt{-1,048,576} = \sqrt{[-1,024(-^2 1,024)]} = -32\sqrt{-1,024} = -32\sqrt{[-32(-^2 32)]} = (-5.6568..)(-32)\sqrt{-32}$ = = $181.019336\sqrt{-32} = 181.019336\sqrt{[-5.656...(-^2 5.656...)]} = \ldots\ldots$ so on and so forth,

as it is highlighted through this example this extraction is never consumed, so that what comes from under the radical, will tend squarely more and more to 1,024, and what it remains perpetually under the radical is exactly the *perfect infinitesimal*. This one sqarely misses for the number that tends to 1,024, so that if these two parts multiply with themselves they will have as a result 1,024. This sqarely *perfect infinitesimal* would tend to the limit constituted by incommensurable number 1.(0)1. In other words, using the given example, what comes from under the radical, could be called the "*progressum ad* 1,024" number, and the number which remains under the radical could be "*regressum ab* 1,024". Algebraically, it can be represented in the following way:

$$\sqrt{-n} =$$
$$= \sqrt{[(\sqrt{-n})(\sqrt{-^2 n})]} =$$
$$= -(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n}) [\sqrt{(\sqrt{-n})}] =$$
$$= -(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n}) \{\sqrt{}\sqrt{[(\sqrt{-n})(\sqrt{-^2 n})]}\} =$$
$$= -(\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{n}) -(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n}) [\sqrt{}\sqrt{(\sqrt{-n})}] =$$
$$= -[(\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{n}) -(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})] [\sqrt{}\sqrt{(\sqrt{-n})}] =$$
$$= +[(\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})] [\sqrt{}\sqrt{(\sqrt{-n})}] =$$
$$= +[(\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})] \{\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{[(\sqrt{-n})(\sqrt{-^2 n})]}\} =$$
$$= -[(\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})(\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})(\sqrt{}\sqrt{n})] [\sqrt{}\sqrt{}\sqrt{(\sqrt{-n})}] =$$
$$\text{etc.}$$

Finally having the relation:

$$\sqrt{-n} =$$
$$= [-n^{(2^\wedge-\infty)}] \cdot\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\cdot [-n^{(2^\wedge-2)}] \, (\sqrt{\{-n^{[2^\wedge(-\infty+1)]}\}}) =$$
$$= \{-^{+}n\char`^[(2^{(\infty-1)} - 2^0)/ 2^\infty]\} \{-n\char`^[(2^0/2^1)^\infty]\}.$$

Trough these relations, we can easily observe the bizarre aspects of this number, which is simultaneously quasi-quantitas and quasi-qualitas. That is why I used different aspects for the representation of these algebraic expressions, in order to distinguish the numeric part which sublimes itself continuously (the gray part) from the one which de-sublimes continuously (the black part), i.e. *regressum – ab,* from *progressum ad.*

In this work, I try to limit myself only to the roughest part, without developing baffling consequences, involved by this distinction compared to the current understanding, held by contemporary mathematicians.

Before presenting the multiple similarities of this **aporia**, using different concepts from various domains, disciplines etc., I will make one last comparative parallel between Bombelli´s equivalences of the imaginary number and the equivalences of this new theory, mathematically possible, in order to emphasize the difference between them:

$$i = \sqrt{-1};$$

$i^2 = -1;$	$(\sqrt{-1})^2 = -1;$
$i^3 = -i;$	$(\sqrt{-1})^3 = \sqrt{-1};$
$i^4 = +1;$	$(\sqrt{-1})^4 = +1 ;$
$i^5 = +i;$	$(\sqrt{-1})^5 = \sqrt{-1};$
$i^6 = -1;$	$(\sqrt{-1})^6 = -1;$

etc.

On this occasion, we clarify the fact that according to the new mathematical conventions, we cannot speak of *–i or +i,* but rather of a *number-sign* fusion, that acts simultaneously as a sort of vortex of new "signs" and new "numbers", acute relativized between one another, like a sort of *foam*, *cloud* or *field* of inter-convertibility, that produces signs-numbers, respectively quantities-qualities. This is why ($\sqrt{-1}$) is at least one new "number" with a new "sign", which generates spontaneously another new "sign-number".

This mathematical *hybris, ($\sqrt{-1}$),* is like the legendary *Chimera*, representing the interaction, fluctuation, between at least three (perpetually unstable) "numbers" , which would be as a sort of "geodesic", for this *vortex*. These numbers would be: ($\underline{\sqrt{-n}}$), *regressum - ab* ($\underline{\sqrt{-n}}$) and *progressum – ad* ($\underline{\sqrt{-n}}$).

This true *coincidentia oppositorum,* or *contraria sunt complementa,* acts spectrally and interferentially within the dynamism towards its maxims and minimums, so as it seems to be the fundamental mathematic of a

"holotropic absolute relativism". It seems that $(\sqrt{-1})$, not only does it mill the absurd in its dynamics but also exorcises it, in and from its "contents" even *quantifying* it, because what it can be called here calculability seems to turn into calculation-lability. Besides the fact that all the antagonisms, dualities would be osmotic within the field of $(\sqrt{-1})$, the same thing happens with the relation between the logical disjunction and conjunction.

Before reaching a conclusion, I would also like to speculate and reflect upon other similarities, quite fascinating ones as well. Therefore this algebraic abstraction is a sort of a "multidimensional transcendentalization", for the signs and numbers which interact with $\sqrt{-1}$ from the exterior and it appears to "relatively tautologies" the logical "trinomial" as well as the language one: *analogy-vexation-contradiction.* $\sqrt{-1}$ also presents itself as being syllogistic, circular, elliptical, reminding us of: "Nietzsche's wheel" (or the eternal come-back to itself), hermeneutical circle, "the circle of faith" etc.; so being perpetually dynamic even by its "fluctuating symmetry" similar to, for instance the "symmetry breaking" in the sub-atomic physics. Other analogies would be with:

- Albert Einstein's formula ($E = mc^2$);
- Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty;
- the holographic principle, with the asymmetry between the matter and antimatter from the universe (taking into account that the matter has a time direction past➔future and the antimatter has the direction future➔past);
- the two laws of thermodynamics (the one of energy conservation and the other of impairment (sublimation or entropy) of the energy;
- the relative parallel between the photon (which has the mass conventionally ≈ 0,the density ≈ 0 and the time $\approx \infty$) and the singularity of a black-hole (with the mass $\approx \infty$, the density $\approx \infty$, and the time ≈ 0).

Without mentioning other technical and theoretical similarities, I would like to evoke the analogies with the *Upanişadik* Hindu doctrine, of *„neti neti"* [the logical anti-disjunction ($\swarrow$),   respectively antagonisms' in-equation: *neither… nor…*) or that of, as Vişņu – Śiwa – Brahmā, with the pre-Columbian myth (mayaş) of the **Ollin** "energy" or with the Tao (Dao) doctrine, which is based on the dynamic symmetrical antagonism of duality of the unit Yin and Yang. We could find many more cases of similitude parallel to this relation, but I limited myself to only few examples to help an easier understanding of what I propose you:

$$E=mc^2 \approx AUM\text{-Trimurti} \approx Tao \approx Ollin \approx$$
$$\approx (\sqrt{-1}) = [(-+1)(\sqrt{-1})] = \{-+n\hat{}[(2(\infty - 1) - 20)/ 2\infty]\} \{-n\hat{}[(20/21)\infty]\} \approx ... \text{ etc.}$$

In conclusion I will return to the question put by Wittgenstein, but not before assuring you that here I do not try to demonstrate a theory (although demonstration is just a *vehicle of expression*, specific to the domain to which

it belongs to), in the mathematics, especially that, as I said before, there are too many consequences of this proposed **aporia**; and regarding the multiple comparisons that I made appropriate, I am trying not to reduce anything to anything, but to notice *accidentally* , some relative parallels.

Before re-interpreting Wittgenstein´s sayings, quoted at the beginning of this paper, concerning the connection (still a bit disjunctive) between *faith* and √–1, I want to integrate "trinomial geodesy", of the "stone": *Chipha – Hermenaios – Calculus*, meaning the "Stone Jewish faith" – "the stone of sighting roads (interpretation)" of the Greeks – and the "calculation stone" of the Romans, because all of these are likely to coincide with Wittgenstein's remarks, at least in part.

Therefore, if and only if we review Wittgenstein´s quote, from the beginning of this work, correlating it with the things said so far about this various approach of √–1, logically, we will treat the sentence (expression) in the following way:

"I belive it's going to rain" ≈ "It's going to rain"
and
"I belived then that it was going to rain" ≠ "It did rain then"

Which, shows us that a *present possibility*, is opened for a future *necessity* (because in the future anything is possible, it is not given as necessity), but a possibility in the past, has no longer a relevance, as long as the fact has already happened as a necessary given from a further past, this being said, at least in logical terms of Ockhamist origin, we can notice a remarkable coincidence with the "**and-**asymmetry" of √–1, from the following logical-mathematical expressions:

$$(\sqrt{1}) \approx (1);$$
$$\text{but}$$
$$(\sqrt{-1}) \neq (-1);$$

In conclusion: $(\sqrt{-1})$, is not either –*i*, or +*i*, but it is only $[(-{}^{+}1)(\sqrt{-1})]$, according to this new perspective, still quite problematic, in order to generate numerous, even endless inquires ... And ***this***, I doubt, it might ***means nothing at all*** !!! ...

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SECTION II:

COMMUNICATION SCIENCES

METAPHOR IN ADVERTISING

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One of the most frequently encountered topics within the theoretical debate surrounding the advertising discourse is the use of metaphor, both at the textual and especially the visual level of advertising communication. Researchers agree on the fact that metaphor is the most commonly used figure of speech within the advertising discourse. Nevertheless, I. Richards[1] contradicts the notion that metaphor is a purely stylistic device that requires from the individuals a special rhetorical skill set. He observes that people frequently use metaphors in their daily conversations and thus advances the conclusion that "metaphor is an omnipresent principle in language". Furthermore, he argues that a metaphor is the result of the simultaneous interaction between two thoughts and that this interaction can vary from *congruence* to *dissonance*.

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[1] Ivor Armstrong Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York. OUP. Lecture V., pp. 89-112. p. 89, 1936 apud Marga E. van Gent-Petter, *THE OMNIPRESENCE OF METAPHOR AS A TOOL FOR COMMUNICATION PURPOSES, Analele UVT Vol. III, 2008*

We therefore believe that the recurrent use of metaphor in advertising communication doesn't anymore serve the purpose of generating the surprise of the consumer public but responds to an existential need for the alternance of realities, for hyper-realities. Furthermore, as we will try to argue, it is mainly due to this double metaphorization of the advertising discourse that it can be understood by such diverse masses, managing to bridge socio-cultural gaps.

By integrating metaphor in his communication, the individual is aware of the violation of linguistic conventions. If the use of words generally serves the purpose of interaction, transmitting meaning and receiving feedback, this is achieved through transmitting one of the meanings attributed by the dictionary. But a metaphor bypasses this convention by suggesting a hyper-reality in which the meanings are inverted. Therefore, the individual is aware of the contravention with the linguistic conventions. Take for example this slogan for the *Johnson & Johnson* band aids, "Say hello to your child's new bodyguards", accompanied by a picture of band aids decorated with cartoon characters. The violation consists in this case in a neutral deviation of meaning, culminating with changing the meaning of the word bodyguard.

Starting with the research of George Lakoff, contemporary cognitive linguistic theory considers metaphor as "omnipresent in day to day life", arguing that "our ordinary conceptual system [...] is fundamentally metaphorical in its nature"[2]. Consequently, literary-stylistic metaphors are only a subset of the metaphors used in day to day speech, a stylistically special case of literary works rooted though in the omnipresent metaphors of everyday's life. Lakoff considers that these metaphors can be classified into categories such as structural metaphors, orientational metaphors and ontological metaphors. The examples used by the author highlight the way in which a metaphor like "ARGUMENT IS WAR" can trigger a real "bombardment" on the vocabulary of those who interact.

ARGUMENT IS WAR
 Your claims are *indefensible*.
 He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
His criticisms were *right on target*.
 I *demolished* his argument.
 I've never *won* an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, *shoot*! If you use that *strategy*, he'll *wipe you out*.
He *shot down* all of my arguments[3]

Examples of structural metaphors like "argument is war", "love is a journey", and the famous "religion is opium for the masses", are instances of day to day speech illustrating the fact that we don't just talk about certain topics in a metaphorical way but we play the part defined by the metaphor, creating an entire discourse according to its stage direction; we don't just talk

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[2] George Lakoff, M. Johnson , M*etaphors we Live by,* ed*.* Chicago University Press, 2003, p. 39
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 104

about argument comparing it to war, but we act as such, integrating into our conversations (arguments) a whole set of words related to war, immersing ourselves in the world described by the war metaphor as it was real. Thus, the concept is metaphorically structured, action is metaphorically structured and, consequently, language is metaphorically structured, leading to a metaphorically structured attitude on the part of the individuals. "The essence of metaphor is under-standing and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another." [4] Let us analyze the relationship between the terms.

(A) <u>ARGUMENT</u> is (B) <u>WAR</u>

In metaphorical structures as the one above, the first term (A) is the target domain and the second term (B) is the source domain. (A) will represent the more abstract concept, metaphorically linked to a more concrete one (B), mapping the important traits from B applicable to A, based on experience. We can therefore state that the recurrence of metaphor in advertising and the fact that it is still such a popular advertising technique is supported by two essential reasons; first of all, as we have shown and will try to illustrate further using popular slogans in advertising communication, a metaphorical familiarity with the everyday language. On the other hand, to reiterate the line of reasoning presented above, the use of metaphor in advertising communication responds to an existential need of the public for the alternance of realities in which it desires to loose and discover itself! Following this direction a corresponding advertising slogan can be attributed to each of Lakoff's examples of orientational and ontological metaphors.

Lakoff exemplifies orientational metaphors using the expression "happy is up, sad is down". With reference to the same attribute of assigning value, accenting progress and an upward movement, advertising's repertoire offers slogans as fascinating from a metaphorical perspective and accompanied by a brand attitude and vocabulary closely resembling inter-personal communication. The LG slogan for instance suggests a textual association between technological evolution (their area of activity being the production of household appliances) and an orientation towards the quality of life. With LG, *life's good*.

On the other hand, Philips, another household brand, communicates the same improvement in the quality of life by exaggerating the message of progress, *Let's make things better*, and let's not forget, *Bigger is better.*

For the ontological metaphors, from the examples that Lakoff offers we can note *Time is money* and *Life is a journey*. If we analyze briefly a metaphor like *time is money* we will invariably refer to time as a limit of resources, as a valuable good, operating in our explanation with metaphorical constructs. The metaphorical status of these constructs is given by our attempts to conceptualize time using our quotidian experience with money, goods and limited resources. In addition to this, for the human-being, such a perspective is not a necessary model of conceptualizing time, which means that metaphor is culturally linked with us and that it emerges in well

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[4] *idem*

established contexts, since there are cultures in which none of the above metaphors designates a reference to time. Due to the hyper-real dimension promised through its discourse, advertising is abundant in ontological metaphors. When a telecommunication company refers to the future through its own brand name that references the color orange (the color of well-being and tolerance) but also the solar fruit, the orange it becomes the expression for the aspiration to achieve more and the confidence in an assumed promise: *The future is orange.* On the other hand, the image of a walnut, accompanied by the slogan *Insurance is a walnut* and the comment:

Like a precious treasure, the walnut is hidden in its shell. It forms a solid armor which protects the fruit as you would protect yourself with a helmet. We offer our clients a symbolic helmet, which protects you from the impact of incidents and unforeseen circumstances, adapted to your personal situation and insurance needs, clearly induces the feeling of metaphorization of the message. With regard to the advertising discourse, the accompanying texts indicate the different aspects mapped from the source domain (the walnut) onto the target domain (insurance). The walnut is a metaphorical representation of the company's clients, in need of protection, and the nutshell suggests the protective attitude of the company.

From the perspective of Daniel Berlyne, like an aesthetic object, a rhetorical device, such as metaphor, offers a means to make what is known, unknown and the natural, unnatural[5]. The deviation is, in this case, a way to create what the researchers of the society of consumption call contextual dissonance. Thus, rhetoric dissonance could explain the way in which certain types of textual structures, metaphors for example, can produce displacements of meaning in advertising texts.

It has been concluded however that, although textual metaphors are very useful for advertising strategies, their results, difficult to quantify, may vary as far as to produce effects contrary to those predicted. To prevent this kind of outcomes, the whole context should be taken into account. It is important to recognize that a certain figurative expression may deviate to a varying extent and thus be more or less dissonant in relation to reality.

This applies corollary at two distinct levels: that of each individual in particular (especially the emergence of rhyme and metaphor, for example) and of the target audience (some dates, such as word groups or anagrams going as far as alliteration - the repetition of the same sound or group of sounds in words that succeed themselves). But, every time we compare rhetorical figures and their varying degrees of deviation we are operating with reference to the hypothetical medium associated to them.

Furthermore if the deviation is lower than a certain degree it could mean that we are no longer dealing with a rhetorical figure. This can occur, for example, in the case of metaphors which have became static or conventional (the sports car that "embraces the road" in the BMW commercials or the floor than shines from the Pronto ads) or lost their emotional impact thus falling into

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[5] Daniel E.Berlyne, *Aesthetics and Psychobiology*, New York: Appleton, 1971

banality. So, because the deviation of meaning is often temporary what was once a rhetorical figure doesn't necessarily retain this status, fact proven by the many metaphors that have passed into everyday language. The above examples, along with the toy bodyguard serve as a memento for the fact that the rhetorical structure resides and functions in a complex network of signs and socio-cultural meanings[6].

From a figurative-aesthetic perspective, rhetorical figures often lead to what Roland Barthes called "the pleasure of the text" - a reward that comes from an intelligent processing of an arrangement of signs. This arrangement, in turns, corresponds to Daniel Berlyne's argument which, based on his experimental research in the field of aesthetics, states that the dissonance (deviation) can generate the pleasant feeling of inspiration and even profound understanding. The rewards of meaning deviation suggest thus that the figurative language of advertising, by comparison to literary language, should produce a more positive attitude; advertising texts are liked and remembered more easily.

Besides invoking metaphors, the advertising discourse seems free of any constraints, and because due to the absence of the true-false criteria, it can exaggerate with its use of subjectivity, lyricism, expressiveness, metaphors. Even if, at a discursive level we are dealing only with the text-image couple, the broad spectrum of organizational forms of the persuasive advertising discourse is based mainly on the great availability/flexibility of each component to express its contents in diverse forms. Even when the lexical level is concerned, the advertising discourse seems not to be bound by any rules. Its openness toward increasingly more varied categories of terms, its propensity towards polysemy, insinuation and reading between the lines make advertising a contemporary discourse of great originality and dynamism. Moreover, that which linguists call deviations from the rules of language (meta-plastic or onomatopoeic changes of words) have come to be seen as distinctive traits of this kind of discourse. The adding of sounds (*Mirindaaaaa!, Bamuchaaa!*), using onomatopoeic formations (*Galina Blanca, bul-bul!,* Hei Psst Cichi Cichi, Kltz Pmz Aahh!), replacing sounds or mixing words (*Méganemaipomenit* = *Mégane* + *nemaipomenit* - catchphrase in the romanian commercial for Renault Megane, a mix between the name of the product and the word *nemaipomenit* – en. amazing), are commonplace techniques for generating the advertising characteristic fervent discourse.

From a pragmatic perspective, advertising texts are more evocative than explicit; they don't communicate raw information but a meaning and rarely talk about a direct benefit. Most often the text is generated as a fusion between a benefit, an offered value and a sensory fact or promise highlighted. A slogan like *Sans parfum, la peau est muette* (Without perfume the skin is mute) creates an entire synesthesic symbolism, especially if the

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[6] Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reade*r, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979

text is accompanied by a visual dimension that opens the perspectives of interpretation, the accommodation to the product being facilitated once we familiarize ourselves with it on a sensory level.

Revisiting Lakoff's perspective, based on the fundamental idea that metaphors are conceptual rather than purely linguistic phenomena, it has been stated that they mustn't be and indeed are not limited to verbal expressions. Metaphors can be expressed visually through images, either static, as in the case of magazine adverts or billboards, or moving, as with commercials and movies. These expression modes can be combined with all of the five senses (sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste etc.) in order to render possible the construction and interpretation of metaphors in a pictorial or even a multimodal manner.

Following Lakoff's explanation of the linguistic context created by the use of metaphor in everyday language, we might argue that advertising slogans function from a contemporary standpoint as trans-cultural metaphors. If, as we have shown, the rhetorical structure of metaphors resides and functions in a complex network of signs and socio-cultural meanings, advertising slogans manage to convey concepts and ideas regardless of social and cultural barriers, liberalizing the meanings through the use of metaphor as a guide. We often use in our everyday language advertising slogans as metaphors to aid us in getting through an idea to our communication partners; familiar to a large audience, their integration in our interactions facilitates the understanding of the communicated contents, so much so that if we wish to express courage, we can easily achieve this by resorting to the Nike slogan - *Just do it!*.

Of image and other daemons

Noteworthy for this discussion is the strong link between the text and the advertising image as a metaphor generator. The advertising discourse initially presents itself as an unstable, hybrid structure in which the balancing of text and images is made in an uncontrollable manner. Second most influential for the consumers, though extremely visible in everyday language, the linguistic signifier emerges within the advertising discourse as several textual constructs: logo, slogan, body text, each serving the advertising discourse by simple way of the fact that any advertising argumentation begins with its visibility.

From the typography layout within the page, designed to grab the attention, to the aesthetic construction of the logo, intended to create/increase brand memorability, the pragmatic characteristic of most of advertising texts is its sustainability, with the attention directed towards the visual-figurative whole. This indicates that even the construction of the advertising text abides by the outline of the visual and the visual metaphor which generates new meanings: specific typefaces for the logo and slogan, specific colors and textures for the letters, different orientation of text within the page, all of these draw attention on the importance of advertising visual rhetoric, as we will try to show.

"Weather we like it or not, each of us experiences at the present time a crack within the representation of the world and so, its reality. The split

between action and interaction, presence and media-presence, existence and TV-existence "[7].

The image thus becomes the opportunity to talk about multiple realities, not in terms of copying the reality, of mimesis, but especially from the perspective of the image's ability to infer the relationships which we establish with the give world. Furthermore, theorists regard the image today as renouncing its quality of being a representation *of something*, of referencing to something clear, in favor of a more important role; today it accompanies the human existence, the world, bordering on confusion. If Baudrillard's theory of a reality coefficient directly proportional to the supply of imaginary which provides it with its specific quality is true, then we can begin to understand why the visual and iconic are becoming means of adding transparency to the world through metaphor. The relationship between the world and its images is not based on mirroring but in *identification* as hyper-reality. "Hyper-realism is not surrealism but a vision that targets seduction through visibility. You are offered more!" [8]

Continuing the discussion on the representational nature of visual communication, Ernst Gombrich[9] regards the contemporary world as one of maximum accessibility and of visual signs. The social qualities and values are transmitting through symbols and these latter ones as metaphors, function not by altering the meaning but attributing certain additional traits. From the moment of it production, the limitations of the photographic image are compensated by the moment in which it is interpreted. On one hand we are dealing with the *universality* of the visual message and on the other with the free individual interpretation of it. All we can know is the way in which the interaction between representation, the represented object and the receiver-subject produces.

The same premise underlies Roland Barthes'[10] "Rhetoric of the image", where two levels of image analysis, simultaneously perceived by the human eye, are presented: *the denotative level*, which is purely "theoretical" for image analysis, as it is hard to conceive an image without connotations. When referring to the "fashion system", Barthes identifies a specific language of combinations between colors and dimensions, which provides the subject with an additional meaning through the way in which it is presented. On the other hand Barthes describes *the symbolic level*, of connotation - at which the reading of the visual image varies according to the receiver and the codes which he associates with the message. The latter, emerges at the interpretation level, where the perceptive intelligence of the subject activates according to the socio-cultural meanings. The denotative layer plays a very important part as it represents the foundation for the connotative dimension.

[7] Paul Virilio, *La Vitesse deliberation*, ed. Galilée, Paris 1999 p. 59
[8] Jean Baudrillard, *De la Seduction*, ed. Galilee, Paris, 1979
[9] Ernst Hans Gombrich, *Art and illusion; a study in the psychology of pictorial representation*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1960 65Roland Barthes, "Rhetorique de l'image", in *Communications*, n. 4, 1964
[10] Roland Barthes, "Rhetorique de l'image", in *Communications*, n. 4, 1964

As Charles Forceville[11] has shown, we designate as visual metaphor a combination of two heterogeneous visual entities that involves a change in their meaning, one through the other. From the multiplicity of metaphor types discussed by the author, we will pause to analyze *the hybrid metaphor* and *the multimodal metaphor*, as two of the most recurrent in print advertising.

The hybrid metaphor (see **Error! Reference source not found.**) is perceived as an object or *gestalt* formed by two entities seen as pertaining to different domains, incompatible and unable to form a whole. Regarded by the specialists as the quintessence of visual metaphor, this hybrid depends on understanding one of the parts in terms of

Figure 1

the other and originates, as Forceville argues, from the surrealist painting movement.

Such visual metaphors are often present in advertising posters and prints, where the visual effect is instantaneous, their purpose being to suggest the product without explicitly presenting it, to insinuate one of the product's traits or the alternative space proposed by the brand image (brand's imaginative ways of creating realities). Of importance is that the resulting metaphor creates the feeling of a coherent context, totally new, created through the simultaneous transformation of one term into the other, "contrary to the laws of physics". The example shown above in **Error! Reference source not found.** (an ad to Melville's famous book *Moby Dick*) only comes to support the arguments presented.

Figure 2

On the other hand, in one of his later lectures[12] (2002), Forceville discusses the *integrated metaphor* as being that construct which passes on to another by means of resemblance even without an integrating context. (See *Figure 2*).

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[11] Charles Forceville, *Pictorial Metaphor in Advertising*,ed. Routledge 1996
[12] http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/cyber/cforcevilleout.pdf   22.iul.2009 22:36

With this observation, we attach to the advertising metaphor a new dimension which we need to further explain. Theorists agree that the advertising mechanism functions on the foundation of the relationship between emotions and perceptions, appealing to primordial reactions through the visual stimulus, very much alike to the way we *read* a photographic work. Visual stimulation has the power to associate form and content in a convincing manner. The iconic status is implicit and the images communicate meaning, as Barthes proved, through the use of connotations and the capacity to be intentional. In his work *Visual Persuasion. The Role of Images in Advertising*, Paul Messaris[13] sees the absence of syntax, the combining and associative capacity not limited to causality or analogy, as one of the main traits of visual syntax in the advertising image.

Naturally, one of the necessary conditions for constructing a metaphor is a certain resemblance or similarity between the two visual concepts that generate it (the target and source concept). On the other hand, the similarity between two phenomena, regardless of the way in which it was established mustn't be seen as a sufficient condition for generating a metaphor. The famous all purpose Swiss army knife isn't a metaphor but simply a multifunctional object. Therefore, a necessity for constructing a metaphor is the ability to distinguish between the traits of the two concepts, as well as the transferability of at least one trait from the source towards the target, without distorting the message that needs to be communicated. Or, in other words, only in this way can the image of a book with tentacles be linked to the work of Herman Melville.

Considering this premise, Forceville shows that in the case of representations in which the concepts that need to be communicated are presented as moving images as opposed to static images, the opportunity to create visual metaphors grows exponentially. This is due to the fact that with moving images (TV commercials, for example) it is nearly impossible to extract a simultaneous scene in which both elements are presented.

If in the case of print the target and the source have to be represented or suggested simultaneously, within commercials, they succeed one another, the pictorial metaphor being the sum of frames that parade in front of the audience's eyes.

With the conceptualization of such a visual construct, the discussion opens towards the *multimodal metaphor* (see *Figure 3*) which comprises in its construction text, image, movement and a time succession. Here too, the focus is on the visual, which is highlighted though by the

Figure 1

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[13] Paul Messaris, *Visual Persuasion. The Role of Images in Advertising*, ed. Sage, 1997 p.19

textual, the non-verbal (given by the movement) and the passing of time.

If, at the beginning of this part we advanced the image as preceding the text in terms of the importance attributed in perceiving advertising metaphor, with the multiplication of mass-media (especially video), the text can become illuminating for the perception of advertising metaphor by the public. To the same extent, a visual metaphor acts to reveal aspects concealed by the textual metaphor, accenting mainly the cultural-contextual particularity that can be deduced from the image.

The **open source** character [14] of advertising metaphor is conducive to the discovery of the world as a mesh of interpretations, irreducible to a certain unit that, like the internet, lacks any stable foundation due to the fact that it can always be improved. Because of the versatility of trans-culturally comprehensible meanings, advertising metaphor becomes a genuine global metaphor, interpreted with every instance of itself, within the sight of every individual engaged in perceiving its message.

Thus, without yet drawing a conclusion, we see as imperative for the future theoretical undertakings a research of the premises that have led to the transformation of advertising from an industry associated with a certain type of economy (that targeted specific social contexts), into something closely linked with the structure, organization and functioning of society, into a societal institution[15] indifferent to the change of context through the versatility of its metaphors. And this change of advertising into a societal institution doesn't refer only to its ability to mirror and contribute to a social order, but furthermore, advertising is given the role of re-producing a social order, with reference here to its certain mediating quality through which cultural insertion, into processes and products unrelated to the specific context, is possible. The effect of culture on the advertising receptacle intensifies once again the need for a practical perspective from which, advertising's effect on contemporary society, have to be observed.

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[14] **Open source** describes the practice of producing and developing certain finite products by permitting access of final users to act freely on the production or development process. Some specialists define "open source" as a philosophical concept, others as a pragmatic methodology of the 21st century. Frequently utilized in the development of software, many believe it is a concept strictly related to this field. There are though examples of such applications of the concept in the fields of medicine, education, culture and so on. Online source: www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.ro.html 17.11.09, 15:2

[15] The term belongs to Joseph Miles Holden, proposed in his work "Advertising: A Synthetic Approach" published in *The SAGE Handbook of Media Studies.* no. 9, Ed. Sage Publications, 2004
http://www.sage-ereference.com/hdbk_mediastudy/Article_n23.html

"CONSUME OR DIE":

MEDIA, NECROPHOBIA AND HYPERCONSUMERISM

IN DON DELILLO'S *WHITE NOISE*

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Abstract

Consumption and death are two overwhelming presences in the work of Don DeLillo, one of the most appreciated contemporary American novelists. The current paper attempts to regard both issues from the perspective of their built-in connection, developing in the overarching frame of the media-saturated society. To "consume or die" is "the mandate of our culture," as one of the characters in the novel Underworld *observes—an exclusivist dualism that characterizes life in the postmodern era, as pictured by Don DeLillo[1]. In his best known novel,* White Noise, *the pathological fear of dying and ensuing hypochondria of characters Babette and Jack Gladney can be regarded as a mark of the society they live in, which is ruled by an incessant drive for consumption. The following paragraphs aim to explore the development of necrophobia in the context of hyperconsumerism and media abundance, drawing on ideas and concepts theorized by several thinkers who show concern for these topics, with a focus on Jean Baudrillard.*

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[1] Don DeLillo, *Underworld*, Scribner, New York, 1997, p. 287.

In his characterization of postmodern society, Fredric Jameson contends that all areas of life have become integrated into commodity production, and into "the frantic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover."[2] In other words, it is an environment celebrating the large-scale commodification of both objects and humans, of which the central characters in Don DeLillo's novel *White Noise,* the Gladneys, seem to be up-to-date representatives. Made up of children Heinrich, Denise, Steffie and Wilder, who each are the result of a different marriage, as well as Jack and Babette, who are fulfilling the role of parents though they do not have any children together, the Gladney family is far from the archetypal image of the American nuclear family. Moreover, it stands as evidence for the fact that in postmodern times domestic relations themselves have become "commodified," allowing for marriages, children, love affairs and all their consequent emotional baggage to be consumed with the same incessant appetite that characterizes supermarket shopping.

The sheer mechanism that makes consumer society possible is based, as Baudrillard[3] argues, on a perpetual renewal of commodities—a term that, as discussed above, does not refer solely to commercial products, but to all areas of life, from cultural expression to social relationships—and hence on a constant pressure for their replacement. All goods have "wastage built into them" and are condemned to transience, because no commodity is produced for "its use-value or its possible durability, but rather with an eye to its death."[4] This "perpetual calculated 'suicide'" of commodities and the constant pressure for the shortening of their life cycles makes death a symbolic concept defining consumer society and consequently its members. Jack and Babette's obsession with dying can be seen as the result of the unavoidable demise of everything around them—from expired consumer products to failed marriages.

A number of key scenes in *White Noise* take place in the supermarket that—along with the larger-dimensioned Mall—functions as a postmodern agora, a place where Jack and his family not only meet their commercial needs, but also their relational ones. In the words of character Murray Siskind, with whom they seem to meet every time they go shopping, it is a place that "recharges us spiritually, it prepares us, it's a gateway or a pathway" and it is "full of psychic data […] concealed in symbolism, hidden by veils of mystery and layers of cultural material."[5] The experience of shopping at Mid-Village Mall represents a gratifying manifestation of Jack and his family's desire to acquire and possess things, whether needed or

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[2] Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.* Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1991, p. 4.

[3] Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures,* Sage, London, 1998.

[4] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 47.

[5] Don DeLillo, *White Noise,* Penguin Books, New York, 1986, p.16.

not, to express choices for certain products instead of others, to enjoy the omnipresent abundance of goods, food and equally enchanted people, to celebrate their search for "well-being," thus uniting into consumerist bliss:

> "Babette and the kids followed me into the elevator, into the shops set along the tiers, through the emporiums and department stores, puzzled but excited by my desire to buy. When I could not decide between two shirts they encouraged me to buy both. When I said I was hungry, they fed me pretzels, beer, souvlaki. The two girls scouted ahead, spotting things they thought I might want or need, running back to get me, to clutch my arms, plead with me to follow. They were my guides to endless well-being. People swarmed through the boutiques and gourmet shops. Organ music rose from the great court. We smelled chocolate, popcorn, cologne; we smelled rugs and furs, hanging salamis and deathly vinyl. My family gloried in the event. I was one of them, shopping, at last. They gave me advice, badgered clerks on my behalf. I kept seeing myself unexpectedly in some reflecting surface. We moved from store to store, rejecting not only items in certain departments, not only entire departments but whole stores, mammoth corporations that did not strike our fancy for one reason or another. There was always another store, three floors, eight floors, basement full of cheese graters and paring knives."[6]

The shopping experience leads to the formation of crowds brought together by a unifying urge to spend money, purchase and own goods. The Mall represents only one of the instances that facilitate this kind of popular unity; several others are present throughout the novel: the evacuation center, the tourist attraction of "The Most Photographed Barn in America" or the supermarket. The intrinsic connection between joint masses of people and death is reflected upon in Jack's speech during one of his lectures on Hitler studies. Coming together in crowds is regarded by him as meant to "keep out death," as a form of protection against a danger that threatens all and is easier to confront in a group. He thinks "crowds came to form a shield against their own dying" and "to break from the crowd is to risk death as an individual, to face dying alone."[7] Although these conclusions apply to the case of the Nazi assemblies he is referring to, they can easily be transferred to those whose purpose is not the dissemination of totalitarian ideology but consumption, considering the common link with death that both share.

As the emblematic activity of consumer society, shopping loses its utilitarian purpose and becomes instead an experience directed entirely toward self-fulfillment, as Jack confesses: "I shopped with reckless abandon. I shopped for immediate needs and distant contingencies. I shopped for its

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[6] DeLillo, 1986, p. 37
[7] DeLillo, 1986, p. 33.

own sake, looking and touching, inspecting merchandise I had no intention of buying, then buying it. […] I began to grow in value and self-regard. I filled myself out, found new aspects of myself, located a person I'd forgotten existed. Brightness settled around me." The Mall is described as a luminous, heavenly setting, with its gardens and promenades, cheery bells chiming and escalators humming, as well as the all-encompassing "human buzz of some vivid and happy transaction."[8] It is the place that invites to complete relaxation and celebration of hedonistic desires, facilitating a deep satisfaction and self-fulfillment. In the words of Baudrillard, the Mall reveals itself as "the geometrical locus of abundance" and represents "the manifest presence of surplus, the magical, definitive negation of scarcity, the maternal, luxurious sense of being already in the Land of Cockaigne" or in the mythical "Valleys of Canaan."[9] Inducing happiness is possible through what Baudrillard considers "magical thinking" or the "belief in the omnipotence of signs," a quasi-religious invocation of the gods of "Well-being" and "Bliss," but only at a superficial level, because "affluence is, in effect, merely the accumulation of the signs of happiness."[10] Like in the case of the frenzied search for Dylar, a drug meant to annihilate fear of death, not the actual cause of death, the Mall provides a frame in which the signs of happiness are able to trigger a temporary sense of liberation.

The "reckless abandon" made possible in this setting, the unleashed desire to consume things in large amounts, without having a particular need for them, to frantically spend and acquire, grants shopping a narcotic value. The euphoric atmosphere of the Mall is symbolically rendered as similar to that of a psychotropic drug, with a power to induce vast degrees of pleasure and elevate its consumers into a higher state of consciousness, locating new parts of their own selves and enjoying an overwhelming sense of "brightness." However, as in the case of a narcotic experience, the induced exhilaration lasts for only a limited time and the post-euphoric tendency is one of saturation and seclusion: "We drove home in silence. We went to our respective rooms, wishing to be alone."[11]

The presentation of shopping as an addictive practice and of consumers as caught up in their search for the euphoria of spending appears throughout *White Noise,* affecting characters in different ways. As a key symbol in the age ruled by consumption, the supermarket is the ultimate place of reassurance for consumers, bringing a soothing routine to their lives. For this reason, a change in how the shelves are arranged triggers "agitation and panic in the aisles, dismay in the faces of older shoppers."[12] The immensity of the Mid-Village Mall also causes confusion and dread for the Treadwell brothers, who get lost in its "vastness and strangeness" and are

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[8] DeLillo, 1986, p. 38.
[9] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 27.
[10] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 32.
[11] DeLillo, 1986, p. 38.
[12] DeLillo, 1986, p. 148.

only found after four days of search, "alive but shaken in an abandoned cookie shack."[13] The incapacity to adapt to the ever-changing dynamics of consumer products seems to be lethal, for Gladys Treadwell actually dies of "lingering dread" following the day spent lost in the Mall, or in other words, from an "overdose" of consumer environment.

The quasi-religious qualities of the shopping experience in large department stores are explained by Baudrillard as due to the Western consumer's unadulterated "faith in consumption" and in his "natural right to abundance."[14] It is the same belief that turns Friday-night televised tragedies into an element of reassurance for Jack's middle-class family, a belief that society is built in such a way that only some social categories can become victims of natural cataclysms and other misfortunes, while others can afford their safety and stuffed supermarket bags. Thus, shopping and watching news items that are equally "anodyne" and "miraculous" serve as primal forms of exercising the "religion" of consumption, as sources for the creation of the consumer's "magical thinking" and mythology. Both offer "signs accredited with the guarantee of the real" and end up generating "the denial of the real on the basis of an avid and repeated apprehending of its signs."[15]

Television's power to induce a strong and typified perception about reality, as well as the eventual infiltration of this perception into life outside the screen, is part of the medium's sheer driving mechanism, as Theodore Adorno also contends. According to the Frankfurt School philosopher, following the long-term consumption of televised productions, "empirical life becomes infused with a kind of meaning that virtually excludes adequate experience." Hence, television plays a major part in the shaping of expectations and social behavior of the audiences by introducing stereotypes or working clichés that viewers perceive as eligible not only to on-screen scenarios, but also to life outside the television set.[16] For example, trained by the news media to permanently expect tragedy to occur, Gladney automatically enters a state of panic when confronted with information about "the airborne toxic event," despite the lack of any clear data about the harmful effects of exposure to the spilled chemical.

Jack and Babette's obsessive fear of dying can also be regarded as an appropriation of a media framing technique, granting death the ultimate value of newsworthiness and hence including various events that lead to it as an omnipresent part of news reports. Whether it is homicides, genocides or natural tragedies resulting in massive loss of life that television features, they all play the mantra of dying on a variety of voices, whose echo in the life of Jack's family seems to be critical. Both he and Babette confess a paralyzing dread when thinking about death: "I'm terribly afraid. I'm afraid all the time.

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[13] DeLillo, 1986, p. 26.
[14] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 33.
[15] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 34-35.
[16] Theodor Adorno, *The Culture Industry. Selected Essays on Mass Culture.* Routledge, New York, 1991, p. 169-170.

[…] I've been afraid for more than half my life. […] I wake up sweating. I break out in killer sweats."[17] This anxiety ends up dominating their life to such an extent, that they both wind up doing desperate acts in an attempt at its annihilation. Babette enters an experimental program for Dylar, a drug that is supposedly meant to alleviate her necrophobic fears, taking the risk of developing a daunting set of side effects. When the program is deemed unsuccessful and suspended, she resorts to a promiscuous strategy to continue receiving the drug. In his own search for obliterating his fear of dying, Jack also gets caught up in an expectedly brutal context, ending up with an attempt to kill Willie Mink, Babette's supplier of Dylar.

The cultivation of an "irrational dread of dying" and its ensuing "diminished vitality and self-direction in life" are regarded by George Gerbner[18] as a result of the symbolic function of death in prime time media. Starting from the fact that news represents a selection of events from an otherwise endless stream of daily occurrences, Gerbner observes that "a narrative is invented to convey some meaning about the selected facts as interpreted in a previously learned framework of knowledge." This strategy works because television is the "universal story-teller of modern society," generally used by audiences for this purpose and without too much questioning or disbelief. It is in this narrative frame of daily news that death and the contexts that lead to it are used as a means of typing and confirming the stereotypes previously put forward by the media. Death here is always framed as a "sign of fatal flaw or ineptitude, a punishment for sins or mark of a tragedy," and its customary use has the aim to remind viewers "the risks of life" and to cultivate "anxiety and dependence for those who are depicted as most at risk." According to Gerbner, death in the news cultivates "insecurity, anxiety, fear of the 'mean world' out there, and dependence on some strong protector," thus resembling the "bread and circuses" strategy used by the Roman Empire to keep populations quiet and under control. He concludes that "the symbolic function of death in the world of television is […] embedded in its structure of violence, which is essentially a show of force, the ritualistic demonstration of power." [19]

The fact that in *White Noise* Babette seems to be more affected by exposure to a media environment permeated by death, developing a paralyzing fright in connection with her finitude, is also explainable through the research conducted by Gerbner. His analysis of the designated victims and aggressors presented typically in prime time shows that women and minorities involved in violence are prevalently presented as most vulnerable[20]. The researcher sees death on television as "a violent

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[17] DeLillo, 1986, p. 89.
[18] George Gerbner, "Death in Prime Time: Notes on the Symbolic Functions of Dying in the Mass Media" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* vol. 447, Jan. 1980
[19] Gerbner, 1980, p. 66.
[20] Gerbner, 1980, p. 67.

retribution for weaknesses, sin, or other flaw in character or status," but also "part of the social typing and control functions of centralized cultural production." Empirical findings of his work show that heavy media users develop a "heightened sense of danger, insecurity and mistrust" or what he calls "the 'mean world' syndrome." Jack's own development of a pathological fear of dying and the nature of its consequent manifestations can also be regarded in connection with Gerbner's cultivation theory. The fact that his own dread of dying triggers an attempt to kill Willie Mink can be explained by the fact that, as Gerbner's empirical research shows, males are prevalently portrayed as aggressors rather than victims in prime time news, or in Murray Siskind's phrasing—"killers" rather than "diers." As "theorized" in one of the conversations between Murray and Jack, "men have tried throughout history to cure themselves of death by killing others."[21] Murray's own glorifying admiration for killing a person "in direct confrontation," for how "the dier passively succumbs" whereas "the killer lives on," gains "life-credit" and accumulates strength "like a favor from gods," represents a vision infused with the cinematic portrayal of dramatic dying. His view can easily be identified as part of a media-constructed scenario of dying, where carefully selected actors perform a conveniently prolonged act of death, both on Hollywood dramas and in prime time news.

Starting from his consumerist profile and his uncured necrophobia, Jack Gladney can be seen, in Gilles Lipovetsky's terms, as a true "homo consumericus" (no doubt an extension of the "homo oeconomicus" analyzed by Baudrillard starting from concepts theorized by economists such as J. M. Keynes and T. Veblen). This is evident not only in connection with his material life, but also with his cultural and emotional existence[22]. To be more precise, he is a third-order type of "homo consumericus," showing a constant concern for the quality of his life and health, and allowing for the consumerist attitude to infiltrate into every aspect of his existence, including relationships with family, religion, politics and culture. He is the "hyperconsumer," interested in a lot more than just material well-being, seeking internal harmony and personal fulfillment. As a person continually interested in the issue of personal contentment, the hyperconsumer becomes more and more keen on finding this "asset" ready-made and thus becomes the designated customer of what Lipovetsky calls the "drugstores of happiness."[23] According to the French philosopher, the fact that hedonism coexists with anxiety and insecurity leads to a characterization of the society of hyperconsumerism as one of "paradoxical happiness," in which the search for individual pleasure attracts the opposite outcome.

The addictive use of Dylar for the alleviation of a paralyzing anxiety regarding death can be seen from the perspective of what Lipovetsky

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[21] DeLillo, 1986, p. 132.
[22] Gilles Lipovetsky, *Fericirea paradoxală. Eseu asupra societăţii de hiperconsum,* Polirom, Iaşi, 2007.
[23] Lipovetsky, 2007, p. 7-12 (My translation).

theorizes as the "medicalization" of consumption[24] driven by an obsessive concern for one's health. "Homo consumericus" turns more and more into "homo sanitas"—a person who not only is prone to large-scale consumption of medicines, but also of press articles or television shows on health-related issues. The TV and radio's omnipresent voices in *White Noise* often fill this need in particular. From how to "sit half lotus and think about our spines" to "getting mixed messages about my sexuality" or all about "excesses of salt, phosphorous, magnesium," media is an unremitting resource of data regarding people's physical or emotional well-being[25]. The recurrent discussions in the Gladney family on such issues, including whether Babette should chew gum or not, what are the causes for her memory loss, or what is the latest medical advice her daughter Denise found in the "Physician's Desk Reference," serve as evidence for the identification of the Gladneys as hyperconsumers deeply preoccupied with healthiness. Their perpetual concern for adopting ways of eating and living that would limit the possibility of contracting any diseases is consequent to the advent of a "religion of health,"[26] in the name of which people should constantly research and evaluate the risks posed by the products they consume, regularly consult with medical practitioners, correct their living habits and try to postpone the effects of ageing for as long as possible.

Finding and preserving health and happiness are regarded as duties by hyperconsumers, which explains the attractive aura of a drug that would facilitate both, albeit superficially, only from an apparent perspective. As Baudrillard believes:

> "[…] consumerist man [*l'hommeconsommateur*] regards enjoyment as an obligation; he sees himself as an enjoyment and satisfaction business. He sees it as his duty to be happy, loving, adulating/adulated, charming/charmed, participative, euphoric and dynamic. This is the principle of maximizing existence by multiplying contacts and relationships, by intense use of signs and objects, by systematic exploitation of all the potentialities of enjoyment."[27]

With its capacity to annihilate fear of death, though obviously not eradicating the cause of death as such, Dylar is precisely the type of drug that would be found in the "drugstores of happiness." A "psychopharmaceutical" pill, meant to interact with the human cortex, Dylar is "not just a powerful tranquilizer," but one that "interacts with neurotransmitters in the brain that are related to the fear of death."[28] The use of such psychotropic medicines can be interpreted, according to

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[24] Lipovetsky, 2007, p. 43-45 (My translation).
[25] DeLillo, 1986, p. 7, 90, 106.
[26] Lipovetsky, 2007, p. 45 (My translation).
[27] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 81
[28] DeLillo, 1986, p. 90

Lipovetsky[29], as reflecting the feebleness of "homo consumericus," but also as his attempt to obliterate the effects of a disease by evading pain as much as possible, constantly in a consumerist search for a ready-made cure. Dylar is the perfect medicine for healthy hypochondriacs, which explains why both Babette and Jack would go to any extent to be able to have it. Thus, they eventually become responsible for actions that would otherwise seem unlikely for them. Babette's conceding to have sex in exchange for Dylar, as well as Jack's premeditated shooting of Willie Mink in a remote motel room reminds more of the actions of a couple of illegal drug addicts than of those of a committed mother and a university professor, as Jack describes both. DeLillo's turn toward a drug-driven conflict seems to suggest the hidden magnitude of the contemporary consumers' addiction to happiness and health, as well as the frailty of their seemingly well-established lives from this perspective.

The scene in which, while anxiously searching for the bottle of Dylar, Jack goes through the family's garbage is particularly relevant for a discussion about the downside that comes from the "fullness of being" generated by consumerism. A downside that reminds of the illusory nature of the sense of security insured by "stuffed supermarket bags", thus confirming how consumption "offers no real protection to anyone".[30] Not even to Dimitrios Cotsakis, a lector candidate for the Elvis-studies department at College-on-the-Hill, an "enormous man" who nevertheless gets "lots without trace" in Malibu, or to Heinrich's friend Orest Mercator, a "big" boy who trains persistently to sit in a cage full of poisonous snakes, but is bitten in the first four minutes there. Being a man of "substantial height, big hands, big feet" cannot annihilate the seriousness of Jack's exposure to toxic gas—although it only lasted two and a half minutes.

This contradiction between having a capacity for heavy consumption and yet being vulnerable can be analyzed along the lines of Lipovetsky's "paradoxical happiness," resulting from the coexistence of personal fulfillment and angst. The antithetical association can be read in the scene where Jack, while inspecting a pile of garbage produced by his family, acknowledges "the dark underside of consumer consciousness," the generally invisible result of countless trips to the supermarket[31]. Faced with the full stench of the garbage bags, "the horrible clotted mass of hair, soap, ear swabs, crushed roaches, flip-top rings, sterile pads smeared with pus and bacon fat, strands of frayed dental floss, fragments of ballpoint refills, toothpicks still displaying bits of impaled food," he cannot help but feel disconnected from it, and wonder whether all this filthy "shapeless mass" can actually be the result of the gratifying shopping sprees his family have been

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[29] Lipovetsky, 2007, p. 253 (My translation).
[30] Stacey Olster, "White Noise" in J. Duvall (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Don DeLillo,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 88.
[31] DeLillo, 1986, p. 117.

engaging in: "Was this ours? Did it belong to us? Had we created it?"[32]As Baudrillard observes, waste is viewed as a type of "instinctual dysfunction" because it compromises "survival conditions by irrational practice." However, the French philosopher thinks societies have always been involved in producing more than needed and implicitly wasting because this leads for both the individual and society at large to feel "not merely that they exist, but that they are alive."[33] Therefore, the consumer is involved in a conflicting relationship with the idea of waste. On the one hand, he interprets it as a dysfunctional characteristic of consumer society and tends to hide it, separate himself from it. On the other hand, waste represents a sign of affluence in a culture in which exemplary figures are no longer those of self-made men or historical personalities, but rather the "great wastrels"—movie and sports stars, that are marveled at not because of what they have produced, but because of their ability to consume a large variety of products, from clothing to travels in exotic parts of the world[34].

The tendency toward separation from the unpleasantness of garbage and the desire to make it an invisible part of consumer society also appears in *Underworld.* Main character Nick Shay defines his role in fulfilling this desire to make waste disappear, his job in the business of "waste handlers, waste traders, cosmologists of waste."[35] Nick's duty is to "entomb contaminated waste," bury it "in subterranean salt beds," thus easing the consumer's mind and consciousness, facilitating his disconnection from the repulsive and guilt-inducing result of living in the era of hyperconsumerism. Whereas he handles waste "with a sense of reverence and dread" because "it is necessary to respect what we discard," Jack does so with a feeling of intrusion, feeling like a "household spy" discovering concealed and private aspects of the garbage producers, "clues to secret yearnings, humiliating flaws […], fetishes, addictions […], solitary acts, behavioral ruts."[36] With its eclectic combination of consumed products with often unidentifiable use and worn-out traces from the lives of their consumers, garbage does not manage to become the source where Jack can find the means to alleviate his necrophobia. On the contrary, it becomes a mark of the toxic residues produced by consumer society, the symbolic cause of the disease that might lead to his own death.

The vicious circle of consumerism in which Jack finds himself, searching for a cure to his pathological illness in the same environment that might have generated this illness in the first place, is labeled by Baudrillard as one in which economic growth and individual affluence are determined by the cultivation of insecurity and the consequent spending of money meant to annihilate it. Waste in consumer society becomes itself a sign of prosperity

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[32] DeLillo, 1986, p. 117.
[33] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 44.
[34] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 46-47.
[35] DeLillo, 1997, p. 88.
[36] DeLillo, 1997, p. 117.

and eventually leads to economic growth due to all the resources mobilized for its handling. Analogously, Jack's illness is also eventually profitable, because it implies an increase in the consumption of medications and healthcare services, according to Baudrillard. Furthermore, this medical spending, that also includes "psychopharmaceuticals" such as Dylar, is meant to help "cope with dysfunctions rather than increase positive satisfaction" and it is a natural part of an increased standard of living[37]. Hence, it is directed towards treating the signs of the disease, rather than the disease as such.

The commodification of aesthetic production as theorized by Jameson seems to be particularly relevant in how DeLillo presents the educational industry in *White Noise.* The rush for increasing production in all domains applies to education as well, since Jack reflects at one point that "there is a teacher for every person" and "everyone I know is either a teacher or a student."[38] He teaches "Hitler studies," Babette has a class on "correct posture" and Murray is a visiting lecturer on "living icons."

DeLillo's obviously ironical standpoint in presenting education in the age of consumerism is further explored in conversations of professors at College-on-the-Hill who question each other on issues ranging from, "Where were you when James Dean died?" to "Did you ever brush your teeth with your finger?"[39] The shift of academic concerns to minor events and trivial data is perhaps best illustrated in the description of the lecture co-hosted by Murray and Jack, dealing with a comparative look at Adolf Hitler's and Elvis Presley's relationships with their mothers, spoken with the ceremonial pretentiousness of a highly important matter and gathering a considerable crowd of students. In fact, Jack's entire career as head of the Hitler Studies department speaks about the orientation of university subjects toward topics that have a strong image potential. His course on "Advanced Nazism" lays an emphasis on visual aspects such as "parades, rallies and uniforms" and is based on background footage of "propaganda films, scenes shot at party congresses, outtakes from mystical epics featuring parades of gymnasts and mountaineers," edited in an "impressionistic" manner[40] (thanks to documentaries such as those of Leni Riefenstahl, as DeLillo seems to imply). Similarly, Murray teaches a class on "the cinema of car crashes," which consists of watching "hundreds of crash sequences"—"Cars with cars. Cars with trucks. Trucks with buses. Motorcycles with cars. Cars with helicopters. Trucks with trucks. My students think these movies are prophetic."[41] Though obviously overemphasized for an ironical effect, this visionary quality of on-screen accidents is also observed by Baudrillard, who associates it with the production of waste in consumer society and defines it as a "spectacular

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[37] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 41.
[38] DeLillo, 1986, p. 24.
[39] DeLillo, 1986, p. 30-31.
[40] DeLillo, 1986, p. 10.
[41] DeLillo, 1986, p. 98.

collective sacrifice of sheet-metal, machinery and human lives." He thinks "the Accident" is "that gigantic 'happening', the finest offered by consumer society, through which society affords itself in the ritual destruction of materials and life the proof of its excessive affluence."[42]

Jack's role as a university lector is also built on an image of himself wearing "an academic gown and dark glasses day and night," as well as being called "J.A.K. Gladney"—a name and appearance that he adopted early in his career with the purpose of being "taken seriously as a Hitler innovator" and that now he wears "like a borrowed suit."[43] This orientation toward visible appearance rather than substance, together with the general elevation of irrelevant details to the level of academic subjects, represent a clear result of the commodification of education and DeLillo's ironies in connection with it reveal his implicit criticism toward the degradation of culture in the age of hyperconsumerism.

To conclude, the world reproduced in *White Noise* is one in which all areas of life, whether material or spiritual, are undergoing an intensive process of commodification. From family life to education, and from consumer products to healthcare, every aspect of this media-saturated universe seems to stand under a constant pressure for perpetual renewal, targeting the hyperconsumer's ever-growing hedonism and desire to acquire and possess novel-seeming assets. However, in the same environment that is driven by the fulfillment of pleasure and wellbeing, necrophobia plays a paradoxically central role. As works by Baudrillard and other theorists concerned with consumer society show, death should be regarded as an element integrated in postmodern identity, as a symbol of the imminent disappearance that permits a constant renewal, meant to shift forward the continuous cycle of consumerism.

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[42] Baudrillard, 1998, p. 49.
[43] DeLillo, 1986, p. 7.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS DISASTER AS A PARTICULAR SYMBOL OF POWER

MODERN KREMLIN AND NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

KURSK TRAGEDY

THE CULT OF SACRIFICE AND THE OLD SPIRIT OF MOTHER RUSSIA

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The loss of a nuclear armed and powered submarine, the supreme weapon in human history, in the summer of 2000 by the Russian Fleet was not only one of the biggest tragedies in the modern military era but also a very bad sign for a country who desperately tried to maintain its position as a military and political superpower. And, unfortunately for Russia, that tragedy was only one in a long list of accidents and disasters, a list which can be tracked down in time at least to the moment of the loss of K 129 in April 1968 during some naval exercises in Northern Pacific. Almost every time when this type of tragedy occur the Russian authorities were unprepared to have a proper reaction in front of the media and the general public and because of this almost every time, at least after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian officials did not succeed to deliver anything else but huge public relations disasters. Following this idea we may say now that in this article we will try to make a short analysis regarding some general issues about crisis management in present days Russia. And in order to do this we will follow two major coordinates. In the first place we will briefly focus upon one particular crisis situation in order to see how Russian officials and authorities were involved in crisis management of the disaster.

SSGN Kursk K – 141 an Oscar II class nuclear powered submarine of the Russian Navy

Secondly, based upon the type of disclosure which we already mention we will attempt to draw a short but systematic view about general mode of reaction which Russian officials usually use in order to deal with media requests when this type of crisis appears. Here we will not follow necessarily the standard line of approach used by western specialists in Public Relations or in Mass Communication in general but a deeper line of analysis which emphasis some historical or even cultural aspects regarding Russia. We will do so in order to get a better understanding of Russian high ranking authorities' reactions in times of serious crisis for the Army or for the people in general. The reason because we will follow this approach is a very simple one, al least at a first look. This can be resumed as it follows: the way in which Russian highest authorities react in front of public when serious crisis do appear is very strong linked, we think, with a very strong cultural and historical background of the Russian people. This does not mean that in order to understand how Public Relations or Mass Communication in general function in today Russia is absolutely imperative to take into considerations some cultural issues. This implies only the fact that for understanding how

Russian officials do react in public at the moments of crisis can be useful to go deeper into Russian cultural tradition.

K – 141. The face of Cold Peace beneath the waves

The tragedy of the Russian nuclear powered submarine in the summer of 2000 in the Barents Sea had become already a mile stone in almost all attempts to understand the way in which Kremlin consider to deal with crisis situations in front of the media in general. Many western specialists in PR or Mass Communication take this tragedy as an almost perfect example of a total Public Relations disaster. But first let us get a picture about the supreme weapon that we are talking about.

Russian SSGN Oscar II class nuclear attack submarine

As it is known in the summer of 2000 a Russian Oscar II class nuclear powered submarine, as it is designated by NATO naval intelligence community, was lost by the Northern Fleet during its the first major naval military exercises in the Barents Sea after years and years of pause. The pure technical details are here apparently almost completely useless. However, it is important to mention that the Russian Oscar II type nuclear powered submarine has been build with a very specific purpose and this purpose may have its own significance in order to understand the Russian

official and public reaction after the tragedy. In short, Oscar II class was build and commissioned after 1990 and its only major purpose is to directly engage an American naval group with its nuclear Nimitz class heavy carrier as the leader ship. A single Oscar II class submarine is fully capable, at least in theory, to destroy not only a Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier but the entire naval group which protect the carrier. This is why an Oscar II class can be seen as the pride of nowadays Russian tactical deterrence submarine fleet. In the present days for Russia only Oscar II class is comparable with its American counterpart as is the nuclear Los Angeles class fast attack submarine or, more recently, the highly capable Virginia class multipurpose submarine. And the technical data of Oscar II class will always confirm this.

Commissioned in January 1995 (December 1994 by different sources) Kursk is the 10th Oscar II nuclear class attack submarine and it was designed by well known Russian scientist and engineer Igor Dimitriyevich Spasskiy. Kursk was build at Severodvinsk shipyard and was assigned as the hull number 141. Kursk (K 141) represents the best that Russian naval military industry was capable to offer in the last decade of 20th century. With 16,400 tons displacement when is submerged (13,400 tons at surface), K 141 measures 154 meters from prow to stern and is capable to reach 32 knots submerged (59, 26 Km/h) and 16 knots (29, 63 Km/h) at surface. Its propulsion system (two nuclear reactors VM – 5PWR / 380 Mw) is feeding two cooled water high pressurized steam turbines (GT3A, 98,000hp) which finally transfer power to two spinner of high endurance with low cavitation effect and low speed profile. The tremendous amounts of power available from its two nuclear reactors made the Oscar II class a fast attack submarine fully capable to track and hunt down the US navy surface battle groups and this is one of the main reason why United States Navy see the Oscar II class as the only foreign submarine fully capable to destroy its major surface battle groups.

Another major advantage of Oscar II class is not only its cutting edge technical specifications about propulsion but its latest armament systems. An Oscar II is equipped with latest models of Russian nuclear AS missiles and high power torpedoes but also with highly sophisticated tools of countermeasures for underwater warfare. Its doubled hull offer increased buoyancy but also a better chance to survive after an attack with conventional high power torpedoes. Also the Oscar II class is believed to be equipped with high tech stealth technology in order to successfully evade the American SOSUS system. But, ultimately, what brings fear to the western world is its supreme destruction capability. Armed with 24 Chelomei SS–N–19 Granat P-500/700 3M345 missiles (a much better version of SS–N–12 with lower trajectory) each of them capable to carry 500 Kt nuclear warheads, the Oscar II class is fully capable to obliterate any American naval battle group and, if it is needed, any American major metropolis in less than 20 minutes with the condition, of course, to be positioned in reaching target area. A single Oscar II class is carrying a total of 12 000 Kt TNT equivalent in

its nuclear warheads. Let us remember that the first bomb from Hiroshima had the power of only 17 Kt TNT. This particular type of missile system is the main weapon in the entire Russian arsenal capable to pose a real threat for the mighty United States Navy's battle groups. Developed by Chelomei Design Bureau from 1969 on, under different codes during its program, the SS–N–19 ASM entered in service in 1983 and after that was deployed on Oscar I / II class attack submarines. The SS–N–19 is powered by a solid propellant boost motor and a turbojet engine. It can reach a maximum 2, 5 Mach cruise speed and its maximum range is about 550 Km. With a smaller warhead it can achieve 625 Km. It is very interesting to notice that SS–N–19 is not guided by a GPS type system but by an inertial navigation system (INS) with command updates. In its final stage active infrared radar is guiding the missile to a specific target. The ASM SS–N–19 can be armed with a 500 Kiloton nuclear warhead but also with high explosive 750 Kg warhead. It is believed that Russia was developed after 2000 even a better version for ASM SS–N–19 equipped with thermo baric warhead which make this missile more terrifying for the standard of a tactical naval fight and more efficient in destroying ships because thermo baric weapon does not use nuclear loads. The nuclear warheads are not only embedded in the AS intermediate range missile system but also in its high power low range ASM system. Oscar II class is equipped with two types of the latest ASM missile such as SS-N-15 (inertial flight 24 Nm and 200Kt nuclear warhead) and SS-N-16 (inertial flight 64 Nm and 200 Kt nuclear warheads). Also Oscar II is equipped with highly efficient wire guided torpedoes (533 mm and 650 mm) and ASM high power mines.

These highly efficient nuclear AS missiles were the main reason why NATO and especially the United States Navy had so much to worry about. Of course, and the others types of Russian submarines are armed with nuclear warheads but for the western world only the Oscar II was seen at that moment as the most potent Russian nuclear submarine in the last decade of 20th century. In fact, in the matter of submarine warfare during the last decade of 20th century, only the Oscar II class submarines were able, in few times, to put United States Navy in the state of high combat readiness. For example, as it was reported, in July 1997, an Oscar II class Russian submarine K 442 *Chelyabinsk* shadowed several US aircraft carriers off Washington state coast. Also, another very serious incident was recorded on February 28, 1999 when an Oscar class was closely monitoring a NATO naval exercise off coast of Norway. After 1995 there were others several incidents of this type between Russian Fleet and United States Navy but the pinnacle was achieved in October 1999 when an Oscar II class, deployed from the Russian Far East, arrived in waters of San Diego. Reliable sources indicate that the Russian sub spent an entire week following USS John C. Stennis and the amphibious landing ship USS Essex. This was indeed very

serious because monitoring for a whole week (!) a brand new US nuclear aircraft carrier is not a game[1].

It is clear that for Russia the Oscar II class was suppose to play the fundamental role in the new policy of nuclear deterrence after the end of Cold War. After 1991 it was very clear that the long range deterrence patrols with boomers like those from Typhoon class was no longer a viable option for a country which entered so fast and so deep in military and political decline. And this because those long range deterrence patrols with Typhoon class ballistic nuclear submarines was becoming too expensive for a country which already started to have major financial difficulties. And, we must mention here that for the Russia the poor maintenance of its nuclear submarines in the post soviet era, due to lack of founds, had also a dramatic environmental effect[2]. After the collapse of USSR the poor economic situation in Russia had a very serious impact upon ex-soviet nuclear submarines deterrence fleet and the Oscar II class can be seen as a desperate initiative to bring Russia's deterrence capabilities back on high seas. Also it can be seen as an effort trough which Russia was tried to adapt its deterrence policy to the new political climate brought between United States and Russia after signing SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty in 1991. This because Oscar II class is not a boomer designed for a long range underwater deterrence patrols, like it was the case with Typhoon class, but a shooter, armed with nuclear warheads and ready for total tactical naval engagement with United States from beneath the waves. For the Russians the Oscar II class type of attack submarine is second to none within their nuclear submarine force, comparable only with the US Navy Los Angeles class nuclear submarine, and is clear that the loss of that particular sub in August 2000 was a major blow for a military power which still was working very hard in order to regain its past glory and strength.

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[1] www.fas.org online resource (Project 949A Antey / Oscar II)
[2] Clay, Rebecca – "Cold War Hot Nukes" in Environmental Health Perspectives Journal, Volume 109, Issue 4, National Institute of Environmental Health Studies, 2002, Gale Group.

*One of 18 Ohio class nuclear submarines from the United States Navy
submarine deterrence fleet*

On the other hand, following this strictly military perspective, it is also clear why those military exercises were closely watched by NATO. Of course, we will never see a high ranking NATO official saying on television that the alliance is closely monitoring any Russian military exercise. It would be completely absurd to expect this kind of position from any NATO high official. But also it would be totally unrealistic for a military analyst to believe the other way. Any Russian significant military exercise is strictly watched, by any mean possible, not only by NATO but by any serious military and political power on the planet which has the interest in doing this. It is just the pure logic of military warfare and it is nothing special in doing this. The reason because western nations could not ignore Russians maneuvers in the Barents Sea during the summer of 2000 was very simple: NATO had in that summer for the first time after the collapse of USSR the chance to see at first hand a Russian naval application at large scale. And the opportunity to see the condition of Russian naval tactics and equipment after all those years of inactivity could not be missed by NATO and especially by the United States. For the first time in years Russia has commissioned at sea, in a major integrated naval application, its highly capable Oscar II class nuclear submarine. This is why it is so hard to believe that the Occident was suffered in those days by some "lack of information" about it. Even more, it is completely realistic to assume that western governments knew much more than the general opinion was tempted to believe and it is very possible that even now many details are still highly classified and secured in SCIF areas.

The disaster and the Public Relations failure

Now we will try to disclose the general type of approach by the Russian authorities which has been widely used in front of the media and in front of the Russian and international public opinion in general after the sinking of Kursk.

As a first observation we think that even for an outsider it is clear that the way in which the loss of Kursk was treated by the Russian authorities is strongly linked with a general frame of approach that was so evident almost every time when a tragedy occurred. It seems that a general clumsiness is always present in the way in which the Russian authorities understand to react during crisis situations. And the clumsiness that we are talking about includes disinformation, manipulation and disrespect for the public. All of these were present during the Kursk crisis such as the reaction of Russian authorities can not be seen as an exception.

Regarding the Kursk tragedy we may say that the first general characteristic is the pure fact that there was absolutely no consistent reaction in front of the general public opinion from the Russian authorities. This is very true at least in the first phase of the public reaction which immediately occurred after the disaster. The Navy had done then what it always did. No professional approach was adopted regarding the PR perspective. Only brief and stupid positions were adopted for the press and for the general public. As it was observed "once real disaster struck the Kursk, the navy's chain of command, led by Admiral Kuroyedov, misinformed not only the public (hardly extraordinary in Russia), but the supreme Commander in Chief, Putin himself. Putin was reportedly told that the Russian navy had all necessary means for rescuing survivors and that no foreign aid was necessary"[3]. In other words, the Russian high-ranking military officials did not only misinform the public opinion but they also misinformed even the internal structures of military chain. In terms of PR theory this means that even the so called "internal public" was misinformed and this shows us once again not only the PR failure but that very poor way of approach by the Russian military establishment in general.

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[3] Anne C. Aldis, Roger N. McDermott – *Russian Military Reform 1992 – 2002*, Frank Cass, London, 2003, online edition on www.questia.com, p. 176.

The Kursk wreck after its raising

Maybe the worst episode in the Kursk drama, in terms of PR management, was consumed in the day when high ranking Northern Fleet officials decided to meet the press, the internal public of Russian military establishment and the relatives of the crew trapped beneath the surface in a public meeting, all together. This moment can be indeed called a total PR disaster. On the one side there was the pain and the grief of the relatives and of the public intern and international opinion, together with the legitimate questions from the press and, on the other side were the clumsiness of Russian admirals and high ranking elite of the Russian military establishment. Maybe there is no another so bad example in the entire history of such a deep irresponsibility and negligence at all levels (political, social, military and psychological) from the Russian military authorities. Anybody could understand that is not a quite good idea to bring together, in a public press conference, the relatives of the crew, the journalists and the military. Even so, the Russian's authorities did not hesitate in doing this and what was followed it is well known. We think that that massive dose of irresponsibility and clumsiness from PR perspective could not be reduced only to the lack of training in PR management when major crisis appears. As we will further see this kind of public reaction from Russian military establishment could be easy linked not with the pure style in PR management of the Russian Army but even with something much deeper, something which can be tracked down in Russian history and in the Russian's people soul. We will follow this line a little bit later during this study.

Beyond the evident PR disaster regarding the Kursk tragedy we think that it could be disclosed another line of approach, a one which not necessarily implies the analysis of the PR technical reasons for the failure. And this line, which of course is very closely linked with the first coordinate described above, can be resumed to this: the refusal of any western help by the Russian authorities at least in the first phases of the tragedy. We think that this position, a political one above all, has nothing to do with the PR theory regarding the mass communication techniques during major crisis. The refusal was a categorical political decision and, as kind of paradox, only the later acceptance of help can be regarded has a clumsy maneuver to salvage something from a broken public image.

Briefly, the message sent by refusal of any foreign help was supposed to transmit a very strong symbol: Russia does not need help in this type of tragedy because Russia is still a superpower able do deal with the problems of its own supreme arsenal of nuclear ballistic submarines *even if this could led to a global disaster*. From a strictly political perspective we do not believe that this attitude was wrong. In fact, a superpower must always be ready to sustain its image regardless the price in terms of human lifes. But, even if this position could be justified from a political point of view we must admit that Kremlin could perform much more professional in terms of PR techniques when the decision to refuse, in the first stage, any foreign help was taken. We think so because, we underline this, we do not believe that the refusal in itself was a mistake. Any major political and military power has the right to protect its image even if this means the supreme sacrifice for some of its own people. The real issue from the PR perspective in this tragedy, at least in the stage of refusing help from the outside, was the way in which this decision was promoted by Russian officials in media in general.

But beside this type of clumsiness in promoting a proper public message about the refusal it is useful to remember the general atmosphere in which the Russian high military ranking officials were experienced in the final stage of Cold War and in the first years after its so called end. There is no doubt that the old history of cat and mouse game between nuclear hunter killer submarines of both superpowers during the Cold War was in the summer of 2000 yet to recent in the mind of Russian naval authorities in order to be put it away and to try to have a different public discourse about the Kursk tragedy. Also, from a strictly military point of view, there is no doubt about the practices of both sides regarding the submarine warfare. For NATO the North East part of the Atlantic was always a very hot zone for its Los Angeles class nuclear hunter submarines which always were so deeply involved in the intelligence gathering work regarding the Russian's naval capabilities. We can accept the fact that United States did not send too often during the Cold War its supreme deterrence force of Ohio class nuclear submarines in that area of the North Atlantic but it would be completely stupid to believe that American Los Angeles class and the British Vanguard class submarines were not deployed *continuously* in that sector. These

because that sector is the only corridor for the Russian submarines to enter in the Atlantic after were commissioned on see from Zapadnaia Litsa base. So, patrolling and intelligence gathering activities were an ordinary job for western submarines in that area during Cold War. And we should have absolutely no doubt that in the summer of 2000 submarines units of NATO countries were deployed in that area patrolling the waters where the Russian Northern Fleet had come out in the open sea to make its military exercises. Only a child would be able to believe that such an opportunity for intelligence gathering have not been properly used by NATO and especially by the United States Navy. And the Russians were fully aware about this situation. Maybe even this kind of pressure had its own role in the way in which Russia reacted after the tragedy occurred.

USS Toledo SSN 769 – US Navy Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarine
As it was reported in August 2000 US Navy had deployed at least two Los Angeles class submarines in the Barents Sea, most likely, for intelligence gathering about the Russian naval exercise. Those two submarines were USS Memphis SSN 691 and USS Toledo SSN 769 and both of them apparently quickly returned to some European ports after the tragedy. Speculations had been made about a possible implication of the US Navy in the sinking of Kursk but none of them was ever officially confirmed by the United States.

The cult of sacrifice and the old spirit of Mother Russia

In the opposition with the most western commentators regarding the Kursk tragedy we do not think that Russia was wrong about its general

message. And we must underline that this perspective does not necessary refer only to the core of the political message but also to some parts of PR frame regardless of its obvious failure in terms of western approach. We simply think that is necessary, from a very distinct point of view, to draw a clear line between the strictly PR failure and, on the other hand, the *political and military symbolism* of Russian attitude during the Kursk drama. Let us summarize our point of view.

In order to do this let us remember the main frame of facts. Kursk sank on August 12, 2000 but Russia officially asked for foreign help only on the 16th of August 2000. President Putin returned on Moscow from Socchi on August 18 and only on the 22nd of August he met the families of the Kursk`s crew[4]. Of course, for the western mentality, this attitude during a crisis of such proportions could not be interpreted in any other way but a total PR disaster. We can accept, at least to a point, the refusal of foreign help but we can not accept the fact that the highest Russian authorities were waited so long until the meeting with the families of those brave submariners. In this point, we think, lies the key which can help us understand the Russian attitude when this kind of drama occurs. It seems that there is indeed something deep in the Russian collective soul, something which is responsible for the easiness of acceptance the individual sufferance, the sacrifice and the silent approval of the cruelty and brutality from the authorities during crisis situations. And it would be a complete mistake to believe that this type of attitude from the authorities was something specific only to the communist period or in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In short, the clumsiness of PR perspective, to say the least, and the rigidity of military structures are both things which could be explicable in a country like post-communist Russia but anyone can feel that something much deeper lies beyond this two things. The cult of individual sacrifice, the acceptance of personal sufferance, the tradition of obeying to any kind of authorities without questioning too much is something which can be easy tracked down along Russia's history and it could never ignored by any attempt to understand the nowadays Russian way of approach in problems regarding mass communication when tragedies occur[5]. The acceptance of sufferance at the level of individual was very visible in the way in which Kremlin treated the crew of the Kursk. It is almost something that you can feel without any conceptual frame that for Kremlin the faith of those 118 sailors was no priority and the only concern was to preserve the status of the Navy in front of internal public opinion. This is something which is not a bad thing in itself but surely is not good in terms of image. Beyond this disastrous approach we can detect the old spirit and the ancient Russian tradition of self

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[4] Simmons, Gregory – "Russian crisis management communications and media management under Putin" in <u>Arbetsrapporter Working Papers</u> No. 85, January 2005, ISSN 1103 – 3541.
[5] Rancour-Laferriere, Daniel – "Slave soul of Russia. Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering", New York and London, New York University Press, 1995, p. 244.

sacrifice for the collective purposes regardless the content of these purposes. The crew of K – 141 was condemned from the moment when the submarine was grounded at bottom of Barents Sea. We think that everybody who was capable to understand what was going on was also able to understand this. The entire scenario with public tears for the Media and the "political will" to raise the Kursk were nothing else but pure hypocrisy from a bunch of people who always knew how the things really are in the submarine service of the Russian Navy.

But, if the acceptance of individual sacrifice is something deeply placed in the soul of historical Russia the particular situation of Kursk tragedy is able to uncover something more. The abandonment of the crew, because here there could be no doubts, was not only a form through which that cult of sacrifice can be illustrated but also a very strong and particular message of power. If the cult of personal sufferance is deeply incorporated in the people's mind of historical Russia this is much more evident in the military structures[6]. We have enough evidences, especially from the World War II, when the soldiers of Red Army have done indeed things which for a western army are pure and simply unthinkable. Therefore, we believe that the Russian Navy approach during the Kursk drama was more than an exercise of image. It was simply something which the Russians are use to do in a natural manner in profound accord with their perception about the personal sufferance, especially in the army.

So, we strongly believe that such a type of tragedies can not be judged through a western mentality. It is completely wrong to assume that in that particular case of the Kursk, but also in others cases like this which Russia had indeed enough after the collapse of the Soviet Union, things can be properly understood only through the basic conceptual frame of the PR approach specific to western mentality.

Briefly, in conclusion, we may summarize our point of view, regarding the way in which the Kursk drama was treated by Russia, in these terms: on one hand we have the evident total failure from the PR perspective. This is true in such an obvious mode that does not need further explanations. But, on the other hand, there is the great tradition of the Russia's military, the tradition of self sacrifice for a collective purpose. This is something which hardly can be conceptualized; it is just a reality which either you are able to feel it either you are just not aware of it. These two conclusions may ultimately lead us to this: the PR failure in the Kursk tragedy simultaneously translate a form of tradition which is so specific to the Russian deep collective mentality but also a very specific message of power. This kind of message, we believe, was always very easy to detect and exploit by the West, because it always was so obvious for a trained eye. This is the main

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[6] Even today there are still many unknown things about the loss of *Kursk* but regardless this situation it is very obvious that Russian style of approach in dealing with these tragedies could be always understood independently from the content of the situation.

reason why very often the western intelligence communities were able to properly anticipate the Russia's reaction, in terms of human cost, almost in every political, economical and military crisis situation during Cold War and after. Let us remember, for example, the war in Afghanistan, where Russia stayed involved ten years even it was very soon evident, after the beginning of war in 1979, that the price in human lives for the Russian armed forces it gone be very high or, closer in time, the nuclear disaster from 1986 at Chernobyl in Ukraine when Russia also had very easy used its own people in order to clean the mess in a such a manner which would instantly horripilate any western citizen.

Vladimir Putin at Kursk memorial monument

Crews on eternal patrol – tribute to Russia's and United States sailors who lost their lives on duty beneath the waves

During Cold War both superpower were involved in a silent war beneath the waves. Long range deterrence patrols or special missions for intelligence gathering were common things during those years. Unfortunately, the accidents were inevitable. As it is known, now even by the general public, United States had lost at least two cutting edge nuclear submarines during Cold War era, USS Thresher SSN – 593 in 1963 and USS Scorpion SSN – 589 in 1968. Russia had also its part in this chapter with the loss of K – 129 in 1968 and K – 278 in 1989. These two tragedies are relatively known by the general opinion but, of course, the list of them is

not so short neither for Russia or United States. Beyond any discussion about the causes of these tragedies a fact is clear: without the sacrifice of those crews the Cold War could turn hot. Mutual deterrence was indeed the supreme psychological weapon during Cold War and the sacrifice of those sailors who were commissioned aboard nuclear submarines of both sides must never be forgotten. Those sailors are never really died in the hearts of the relatives from home. They are still in mission, beneath the waves; they are gone, *forever*, on eternal patrol. Even now, as you read this, crews and submarines of the main military superpowers are on classified long range submarine patrols, deep, deep down into the ocean, silently protecting the peace. We must honor them because their sacrifice was not in vane: the balance of terror was functioning between Russia and America during Cold War thanks to them and their courage and thus the nuclear mutual annihilation was avoided. And let us remember once again that these efforts are going on even today regardless of what White House and Kremlin are saying to the general public[7]. At any given moment at least one American Ohio ballistic nuclear class submarine is hiding deep into the cold and dark ocean, totally cut from the world above, in a constant state of nuclear attack readiness. Lonely, silent, and powerful… always ready for *the ultimate strike*.

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[7] There are studies of global security which indicate that Russia has reduced its nuclear submarine deterrence patrols after the loss of *Kursk* in summer of 2000 but it is very hard to believe that Kremlin was abandoned these types of ultimate military missions.

USS Nebraska SSBN 739 still above the continental shelf preparing to dive for a standard long range nuclear deterrence patrol of 90 – 120 days during the last decade of the 20th century

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