

THE AFFECTIVE DISPOSITION OF DASEIN'S BEING

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Abstract:

Dasein is the central concept of Being and Time. To substantiate Dasein's ontology, Heidegger refers to it in various ways: anxiety (Angst) , fear and care mainly. By his affectual arrangement, Dasein is understood in his own essence, that of being-in-the-world as Being. So, affective disposition is a prerequisite for Dasein's ontological foundation. Since the heideggerian language uses related concepts, it must be followed in their interrelationships. Anxiety as a fundamental affection is associated with fear and care. The boundaries between these affective arrangements are accomplished on several levels: hermeneutical, phenomenological, ontological in the first level; psychological and anthropological, in the second level. The phenomenological and ontological dimensions give Dasein its authenticity. Always in a dynamic of impersonal encompassment and revelation of its Being, Dasein is the core concept of the human ontology in Heidegger. To know Dasein is to know his affective disposition in the above mentioned ways.

Keywords: Dasein, anxiety, fear, care, authenticity, Being.

1. Introduction

Dasein's whole analysis is primarily based on the fact that this being (ontical) is the only one that relates to herself, to her Being (ontological). This analysis focuses on the essence of this being called Dasein in its affective disposition as anxiety. For this purpose, a conceptual analysis of the anxiety in Being and Time is required to establish its defining characteristics and differences in comparison to other affective arrangements, such as fear. Because the heideggerian language has a multitude of meanings, sometimes ambiguities, we have also used the terminological or, more generally, theoretical interpretation in the descriptions.

Heidegger introduces the term of "existence" in the development of this essence that can be known as the Dasein's Being. Existence does not have its traditional,

metaphysical significance here, but rather a kind of subordinate situation for beings, in which the affective disposition of Dasein is introduced in all its determinations.

As he advances in Dasein's analysis, Heidegger shows us a new quality - that of being-in-person, belonging to one person or another. From this quality are extracted both ways of being in the authentic-inauthentic form by which somewhat a primacy is given to the existence of Dasein in comparison with what its essence or Being is.

2. The existential-impersonal structure of Dasein

The essence of consciousness of Dasein or his Being, brings about an ontological interpretation of this being. This interpretation is based on the fact that Dasein is or exists distinct and determined. Starting from this determination of Dasein we must understand his everydayness, which should not be understood as deprivation or alienation. It is an ontical way of presenting Dasein, and this kind of presentation is preliminary to an understanding of the ontological significance of Dasein's Being.

In the way appears in the everydayness, Dasein is lost or seized in the public space of the impersonal "they". We say that Dasein is encompassed by being-in-communion. Authentic-inauthentic determinations now have some added meanings. We refer especially to what is inauthentic. This determination gives a distinct meaning to the moment of being-in-the-world: as an impersonal seizure, Dasein is probed in his own Being, and this is the object of the existential-impersonal analysis in Being and Time.

In the existential-impersonal analysis, we reveal the constituent moments of Dasein, such as worry as care and anxiety. But before proceeding to the existential-impersonal analysis, Heidegger sets out some aspects of Dasein's existence structure or existence. In this way, Dasein's characters are called "existentialia", and the determinations of the Being of beings that are not Dasein constitute the categories (Heidegger 1996, 82). The whole existential analysis of Dasein has as its axiom the moment of being-in-the-world as a priori moment, which is why any anthropological or psychological speculations are removed.

The essence-existence relation is treated in a very special way by Heidegger: the phenomenological interpretation guides us to essence, the theory of Being or ontology, but Dasein's own existence as the only being that relates to itself presupposes its hold as hermeneutic totality. Thereby, we find in Heidegger the hermeneutic ontology developed in different directions, of which the essentials (as Vattimo shows) are those represented by Gadamer and Apel. Vattimo finds the ontological sense of heideggerian hermeneutics in the connection, the identification between Being and language (Vattimo 1993, 113). The relationship between Being and language is indicated by the two aspects of nihilism of heideggerian hermeneutics: Dasein's analysis as a hermeneutical totality and remembrance that metaphysically reveals the forgotten tradition. The moment of being-in-the-world as a nihilist element of the heideggerian hermeneutical theory appears in its triple structure of "existentialia": affective disposition, understanding and speech.

What is meant by the nihilism of the moment of being-in-the-world? Being in the world means that Dasein contacts with all the meanings that represent the world in the context of a referential reality in the state of projection of that being. Or, this totality of meanings is not given by our own time, that is why Dasein is in a relationship of familiarity with the world, which he perceives after a self-precomprehension.

We consider these aspects of heideggerian nihilism to be necessary because the problem of Dasein's affective disposition involves Heidegger's reconsideration of interiority: it is especially those non-object affective situations that have been left aside or assigned to an apparent object. Of course, we can say that Heidegger is a nihilist, because in terms of affective situations such as fear or anxiety, he introduces the "nothing" of existence and "nowhere". This is the role of appearance. Regarding this, Gadamer notes that the issue of affective disposition in Heidegger has aristotelian roots. By affectional arrangement it is not aimed to create a language of "nothing", on the contrary, this is a way of self-clarification of the being called Dasein (Gadamer 1999, 20). In this sense, Gadamer speaks of a hermeneutic of Dasein's faculty or how to be-in-the-world as an object of existential-impersonal analysis in *Being and Time*.

As we can see, the issue of heideggerian nihilism is not simple. Vattimo believes that the meaningless world produces in Dasein the experience of anxiety that is "an uprooting experience" (Vattimo 1995, 58), without foundation. Art is the refuge because artwork proposes a world, but even artistic experience is an instrumental play in which insignificant determinations take place. However, according to Vattimo, the artistic experience as described by Heidegger appears to be more positively charged than anxiety as fear or care.

Returning to the subject of affective disposition, we believe that the preliminary analysis of this approach is to investigate Dasein's existential-impersonal structure as a being-in-the-world in the daily phenomenal dimension of impersonal "they". By capturing Dasein we understand that he is disposed around a world he is concerned with, and not that is lost in the everyday public space of the impersonal "they". As I have already mentioned, Dasein is captured by the being-in-communion, in which he feels inauthenticity in a positive form, which means we can not interpret a more authentic state from which Dasein is to be snatched by the impersonal. The phenomenon of encompassing is part of Dasein's constitution of being-in-the-world, that is, an ontological way of being. By seizing, the moment of being-in-the-world becomes an existential-impersonal mode.

As a feature of Dasein's manifestation in this capture situation in the impersonal "they" we find speech, which is a feature of circumstance, not exclusively influenced from the outside world. In this attachment, Dasein is in a relaxing state of safety, even though in this affectional arrangement he does not have a genuine understanding of what is happening to him. The fact of Dasein's apparent silence in the everydayness is a way of alienating his being, at the opposite end being the inalienable understanding of the moment of being-in-the-world. Alienation as an effect of Dasein's catchment makes him

fall into inauthenticity, being a prisoner in himself. This is a positive, constructive inauthenticity that makes Dasein turn to his own Being. Authentic existence is not an arrangement beyond the everyday existence but an existential-ontological understanding of it.

Heidegger introduces in *Being and Time* the issue of Dasein's inclusion in the impersonal "they" (Heidegger 1996, 172) to open the way of interpreting its own Being, which first appears as a fundamental affective disposition. This is a tendency to interpret Dasein as a whole: the proposed existential analysis is not a deduction from the ontic or empirical level, or a transcendental deduction (Greisch 1994). The phenomenological interpretation of the ontic leads us to the Dasein's Being. This is the state of Dasein's revelation based on affective disposition and understanding. As a first step in determining the structural totality of Dasein's Being, it starts from Dasein's inclusion into impersonal, retreating from himself. Although it is a first point in the analysis of anxiety as a fundamental state of affective disposition, it nevertheless takes us away from what Dasein's structure is in the totality of its Being.

3. Anxiety as an ontological affective disposition

By comprehension, Dasein conceals his authenticity on an ontic-existential stance. But from an ontological point of view, Dasein is as its own state of revelation before himself. Dasein's refuge has ontological relevance from the point of view of a phenomenological interpretation of what this refuge determines. So, Dasein's comprehension opens the way of the revelation state called anxiety. By analyzing the affective disposition of the Dasein's Being, Heidegger tries to reach the state of Dasein's revelation. The state of revelation is thus a correlated feature of the Dasein's Being. If we go back to the ontological level, the analysis of anxiety is met with the analysis of fear, so some clarifications are important.

Dasein is frightened around an inwordingly being, the object of fear. The fact that Dasein is in a refuge by encompassing is a consequence of the manifestation of anxiety, which makes fear possible. The original phenomenon of Dasein's refuge causes anxiety due to the essential way of being-in-the-world. But here is the place for an interrogation: Why does Heidegger, in this existential analysis, give anxiety the role of fundamental affect? This is also a challenge for psychology. Dasein as placed before himself reveals his refuge. Here is the relationship between anxiety and selfness that cause a special kind of refuge, in contrast to impersonal refuge. But it remains to be seen to what extent the impersonal escape from fear is delimited by the escape of Dasein from himself. For this, the fear-anxiety relationship has to be taken into consideration, both as states of affective disposition.

The anxiety as a phenomenon is attributed by Heidegger in *Being and Time* to the character of not being produced by a determined object, whereas fear always presupposes such an object, an inwordingly being (Heidegger 1996, 174). The anxiety

corresponds to the moment of being-in-the-world: the world has no relevance, it is meaningless, most threatening. Even though Heidegger believes that affections must be studied by phenomenology, they must be deprived of their psychological qualities. This is the meaning of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time*.

Liotard finds a middle way: applying the phenomenological method to psychology (Liotard 1991, 79). Thus it is shown that experiences that cause states of consciousness can not be analyzed introspectively, and a reflexive method is needed: it is not enough to know only that we are afraid, but also what is fear in a phenomenal dimension. The phenomenological method applied in psychology opposes the reflection and introspection. Phenomenological reflection describes affective states. The new methodology overrides the traditional inner-outer distinction - the objects determined in the inner subjectivity and the indeterminate ones in the outside - affirming the possibilities of the existing Ego. Furthermore, Lyotard shows that research in the psychology of forms supports the idea that certain stimuli of affective states can not be determined on the basis of the inextricable connection inner-outer. The relation of the subject to the world is such that the subject already establishes certain states of consciousness as affective experiences. Here the object is given by some kind of transcendence set by the Ego, so we find a notion of phenomenology: intentionality.

Returning to the fear-anxiety relationship in Heidegger, we note that anxiety is not a particular change of fear, in fact anxiety itself cause fear. The foundation of fear in anxiety is accomplished by what J. Greisch calls the formal structure of the two affective phenomena. The three constitutive moments of fear - the thing in front of which the fear appear, the feeling of fear, and the something wick stands fear for - have the same temporal structure as the moments of anxiety: the anxiety for ..., that something before anxiety and self-anxiety. From what has been said so far, we conclude that anxiety is a more original phenomenon than fear, therefore its ontological relevance results from *Dasein's* manifestations as authentic and inauthentic.

Heidegger surpasses the phenomenological analysis of anxiety through ontological, even metaphysical determinations: if by anxiety the world becomes empty of significance, then the threatening object is no longer anywhere, it is a manifestation of nothingness. Through this metaphysical nothingness manifests the lack of significance of the world. Annihilated beings have access to something much more original: the world disfigured by the ontic. The “nothing” of existence is a revelation of the moment of being-in-the-world. Thus, we understand the anxiety as a fundamental affective disposition because it is the world ontologically revealed through it. The first constitutive moment of anxiety is the undetermined object, the nothingness, but we also have a teleological momentum of anxiety: anxiety for something. Being comprised, *Dasein* is deprived of self-understanding. The phenomenon of anxiety singularize *Dasein*, which appears as a possible being. Just because it's singularized, *Dasein* goes to his own authenticity of being-in-the-world.

The privilege of anxiety in the affective dispositions is more clearly defined by identifying the constitutive moment of anxiety, “anxiety for ...”, with the “anxiety about ...” (Heidegger 1996, 175). The meeting point of the two moments is Dasein's way of being-in-the-world. As a fundamental affective disposition, anxiety also occurs in those moments of Dasein's Being called the “existentialia”: speaking and understanding. Even though the affective disposition would generally send to certain feelings, in anxiety it's an unfamiliarity that points to Dasein's ontological relationship with nothingness.

Unfamiliarity is synonymous in Heidegger with Dasein's lack of privacy in the process of his engagement in the world, but only by anxiety Dasein is singularized out as an existential-ontological moment of being-in-the-world. Being encompassed in the world, Dasein's affective disposed as anxious aspires to the privacy of public space. In the impersonal, Dasein understands his unfamiliarity as a phenomenon that originates from the existential-ontological level.

Understanding anxiety in terms of Dasein's capture should not be extended too much. As a rule, anxiety is foreign to public sphere, it can be psychologically determined, but only Dasein's ontological understanding as a moment of being-in-the-world, knowledge of affective disposition leads to a complete analysis of the phenomenon. Ontological analysis has priority over psychological analysis. Besides aspects of anxiety-fear relationship, Greisch identifies three problems in the Being and Time anxiety analysis: the relationship between anxiety and body, the difficulty of interpreting anxiety only on the ontic ground, singularization of Dasein through anxiety-ontological revelatory affection. If Heidegger insists in Being and Time on the latter two issues, the first remains suspended. Psychosomatic can not be applied in the analysis of anxiety as an ontological phenomenon.

Liotard shows that the psychology of form is based on the principle of an inner-outer isomorphism: the reflexive description of the experiences is doubled by a causal interpretation of them. So here the phenomenological method does not isolate the body in the name of absolute interiority. There is a contact with the world in the sense that it would have a meaningful reference. If Heidegger has somehow bypassed the issue of the relationship between anxiety and the reactions it causes in the body, the psychology of form seems to solve this problem slipping on the ground of a transcendental conception of significance. But Heidegger considered anxiety as a metaphysical feeling without psychological features; the followers of form psychology would say that this way of putting the problem is an isolation of lived experiences in absolute interiority.

The difference between the two concepts lies in the greater or lesser role given to subjective transcendence. By the distinction between a statement of factual existence and a metaphysical statement of essence, Heidegger sets the moment of being-in-the-world as existential-ontological postulate (Heidegger 1998, 58). The world as a whole has a transcendental character, that is, for its knowledge it is necessary to transcend the beings. The purpose of this transcendence is not to perceive a determined external object, but to reach a world as the totality of the existence of beings.

4. Conclusions

Within certain limits, heideggerian transcendence prepares the existential-ontological interpretation of the whole structure of the Dasein's Being understood as "care". In fact, the general conclusion we finally draw is that by interpreting the anxiety, Heidegger has come to a specific feature of Dasein: care. Anxiety, fear and care are the affective dispositions specific to Dasein's Being. This research was limited to Dasein's affective disposition, less to the anxiety-fear-care relationship, that is why the analysis could be deepened in this direction taking into account the levels already depicted here more or less: hermeneutical, phenomenological, ontological. The psychological level can be included in the phenomenological one.

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