

VOL.IX (XXVI)
2014

ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DE VEST DIN TIMIȘOARA
SERIA: FILOSOFIE ȘI ȘTIINȚE ALE COMUNICĂRII
ANNALS OF THE WEST UNIVERSITY OF TIMIȘOARA
SERIES: PHILOSOPHY AND COMMUNICATION SCIENCES

Editorial board

Editor-in-chief:
LUCIAN-VASILE SZABO

Executive Editors:
ADRIAN BRICIU, IOAN BUS, IASMINA PETROVICI, CORINA SIRB

Members:
ADINA BAYA, IOAN BIRIȘ, GHEORGHE CLITAN, GEORGINA OANA GABOR, LUCIAN IONICĂ, LAURA MALIȚA, CLAUDIU MESAROȘ, MARIA MICLE, IONEL NARIȚA, ȘTEFANA OANA CIORTEA-NEAMȚIU, ALEXANDRU PETRESCU, T AMARA PETROVA, MARCEL TOLCEA, IOANA VID

Advisory board:
ALEXANDER BAUMGARTEN (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, alexbaum7@web.de)
CORIN BRAGA (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, corinbraga@yahoo.com)
FARKAS KATALIN (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, farkask@ceu.hu)
ALBERTO GONZÁLEZ (Bowling Green State University, Ohio, USA, agonzal@bgsu.edu)
CRISTINA IONESCU (Regina University, Canada)
NOBORU NOTOMI (Keio University, Japan)
NILÜFER PEMBECIOĞLU ÖCEL (Istanbul University, Turkey, nilocel@istanbul.edu.tr)
MILENKO PEROVIĆ (Novi Sad University, Serbia, milenko.perovic@gmail.com)
DORIN POPA (A.I. Cuza University, Iasi, Romania, dpopa@uaic.ro)
ILIE RAD (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, nikolausrambu@yahoo.de)
NICOLAE RÂMBU (A.I. Cuza University, Iasi, Romania, nikolausrambu@yahoo.de)
CĂLIN RUS (Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, calin.rus@ubbcluj)
TON VEEN (Christian University of Ede, Netherlands, tveen@che.nl)

Analele Universitatii de Vest din Timisoara. Seria Filosofie si stiinte ale comunicarii (Online)
ISSN 1844 – 1351
Analele Universitatii de Vest din Timisoara. Seria Filosofie si stiinte ale comunicarii (Print)
ISSN 1842 – 6638

Manuscripts, books and publications proposed for exchange, also submitted papers should be sent to:
fsc.journal@e-uvt.ro

UNIVERSITATEA DE VEST DIN TIMIȘOARA
FACULTATEA DE ȘTIINȚE POLITICE, FILOSOFIE ȘI ȘTIINȚE ALE COMUNICĂRII
DEPARTAMENTUL DE FILOSOFIE ȘI ȘTIINȚE ALE COMUNICĂRII
TIMIȘOARA 300223, BD. VASILE PÂRVAN NR. 4, ROMÂNIA

Contents:

SECTION I: PHILOSOPHY

Dan ZEMAN: Temporal binding in the event analysis	5
Andrei MOLDOVAN: Hans and the ghost in his attic.....	23
Ionuț MLADIN: The affective disposition of Dasein's Being	41

SECTION II: COMMUNICATION STUDIES

Lucian-Vasile SZABO, Iasmina PETROVICI: The importance of newsgathering in communication	48
Georgina Oana GABOR: An alternative history of qualitative and critical approaches to communication.....	60
Simona BADER: Theatre in the Romanian cultural press - between reporting and theatre chronicle	76

***SECTION I:
PHILOSOPHY***

TEMPORAL BINDING IN THE EVENT ANALYSIS

Dan ZEMAN

Universität Wien

danczeman@gmail.com

Abstract: In this paper I investigate a view put forward as an answer to the Binding Argument for meteorological sentences like ‘It is raining’: Cappelen and Hawthorne’s (2007) “Event Analysis”. The view postulates restrictor functions on sets of events as variables harboured by verbs. I take issue with a specific claim of the view, namely that the function maps times to sets of events that take place *at those times*. I provide several examples that challenge that claim. I consider two ways to fix the analysis by making the restrictor function context-sensitive and assess their merits.

Keywords: Event Analysis, Binding Argument, temporal binding, restrictor function, context-sensitivity

Introduction

In this paper I investigate a certain answer to an argument that has prominently featured in the contemporary debate about the semantics of meteorological sentences such as ‘It is raining’ – the Binding Argument. The answer consists in accounting for the bound phenomena that lie at the heart of the Binding Argument by replacing location variables with events variables in the logical form of the target sentences. Such an answer has been provided by Cappelen and Hawthorne (2007). In what follows, I first present the instance of the Binding Argument involving the target sentence ‘It is raining’ that Cappelen and Hawthorne provide an answer to (section 1.) Then we will present Cappelen and Hawthorne’s view, dubbed “the Event Analysis” (section 2) and the way

they handle the relevant binding phenomena. In section 3 I present some problematic cases for their analysis. In section 4 I suggest two ways to implement an obvious modification of the analysis in order to deal with the problematic cases. Section 5 concludes.

1. The Binding Argument

The Binding Argument has been used against views denying that specific target sentences harbour variables for certain parameters in their logical form.¹ The argument starts with the observation that there are bound readings of complex sentences that contain the target sentences in which a certain parameter is bound and concludes, via fairly intuitive syntactic and semantic principles, that the target sentences themselves have a variable for the parameter in question in their logical form. The particular instance of the argument that I will be concerned with in this paper involves locations and meteorological sentences such as ‘It is raining’. This particular instance has played a crucial role in the debate between truth-conditional pragmatics (understood here as a cluster of positions according to which the provision of elements in the content of utterances is done via pragmatic processes that are not required by elements in the logical form of the sentences uttered) and truth-conditional semantics (understood here as a cluster of positions characterized by the claim that “any contextual effect on truth-conditions that is not traceable to an indexical, pronoun, or demonstrative (...) must be traceable to a structural position occupied by a variable” (Stanley 2000, 401)). Thus, Stanley (2000), the chief advocate of truth-conditional semantics, has noted that sentence

- (1) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains

has a reading according to which every time John lights a cigarette at time t , it rains at time t *in the location in which John lights a cigarette*. The location of rain in (1) is thus bound by the

¹ Logical form will be understood in this paper as whatever syntactic structures are the input to semantics. I want to remain totally neutral with respect to what those structures are.

quantifier 'every time John lights a cigarette'. With this reading of (1) in mind, the instance of the Binding Argument against truth-conditional pragmatics about locations could be put as follows:

1. According to truth-conditional pragmatics, there is no variable for the location of rain in the logical form of the sentence 'It is raining'.
2. In (1), binding occurs: the location of rain varies with the values introduced by the quantifier 'every time John lights a cigarette'.
3. There is no binding without a bindable variable in the logical form.
4. Therefore, there is a variable for the location of rain in the logical form of the sentence 'It is raining'.
5. Therefore, truth-conditional pragmatics is mistaken.²

Before moving to the answer to this instance of the argument we are interested in, let me note that, as it stands, the argument is not valid. The reason it is not is that conclusion 4 doesn't follow from premises 1-3, at least not without additional assumptions. At most, what follows from the first three premises is the intermediary conclusion

(IC) Therefore, there is a variable for the location of rain in the logical form of (1).

In order to get conclusion 4, we need a bridging principle relating the sentence 'It is raining' with (1) in such a way as to make sure that the existence of a variable in the logical form of (1) guarantees the existence of a variable of the same type in the logical form of the target sentence. One attempt at providing such a bridging principle is Recanati's (2002). Discussing the instance of the Binding Argument above, Recanati has noted that it is missing an additional premise and has

² This argument is an adaptation of a similar argument given by Recanati (2002, 328-329) involving the sentence 'Everywhere I go, it rains'.

accused Stanley of committing “the binding fallacy”. He submits that the following supplementary premise is what the proponents of the argument need in order for the argument to go through:

(SUP) In (1), the sentence on which the quantifier ‘every time John lights a cigarette’ operates is the very sentence ‘It is raining’ which can also be uttered in isolation.
(Adapted from Recanati 2002, 329)

Recanati speaks about the same *sentence* here, but what he means is really a representation of the sentence at a deeper level than the linguistic surface. For our purposes here, that deeper level can be taken to be the sentence’s logical form. Reformulating Recanati’s suggestion we get the following bridging principle:

(BP) The logical form of the sentence ‘It is raining’ is the same in (1) as when ‘It is raining’ appears in isolation.

Factoring in (IC) and (BP), the above instance of the Binding Argument could be made valid, the argument taking the following form:

1. According to truth-conditional pragmatics, there is no variable for the location of rain in the logical form of the sentence ‘It is raining’.
 2. In (1), binding occurs: the location of rain varies with the values introduced by the quantifier ‘every time John lights a cigarette’.
 3. There is no binding without a bindable variable in the logical form.
- (IC). Therefore, there is a variable for the location of rain in the logical form of (1).
- (BP). The logical form of ‘It is raining’ is the same in (1) as when ‘It is raining’ appears in isolation.

4. Therefore, there is a variable for the location of rain in the logical form of the sentence 'It is raining'.
5. Therefore, truth-conditional pragmatics is mistaken.³

2. Answering the Binding Argument: the "Event Analysis"

A few answers to the instance of the Binding Argument above have been proposed in the literature. For example, Pagin (2005) has proposed to account for binding phenomena such as those exhibited by (1) by replacing quantification over location variables with quantification over contexts in the metalanguage. In a similar vein, Lasersohn (2008) has proposed replacing quantification over location variables with quantification over indices in the metalanguage. On the truth-conditional pragmatic side, Recanati (2002; 2004) has provided an answer by appealing to what could be called "the variadic function approach", in essence consisting in the idea that the location of rain is provided in (1) by optional pragmatic processes and not by a location variable present in the logical form of 'rain'. Finally, closer to the spirit of the truth-conditional semantic view, one way to respond to the argument could be extracted from Elbourne's (2005) work on pronominal anaphora: quantification over situations in the object language rather than

³ Another important issue concerning the Binding Argument is this. One major criticism of the argument has been that it overgenerates variables in the logical form of various sentences that would usually be treated without positing variables. This is a serious and legitimate concern, and I tend to agree with this criticism. However, one way in which the argument could be interpreted is not as a decisive argument for the presence of a variable in the logical form of the target sentences, but as the basis for *an inference to the best explanation* of binding phenomena (this is the third interpretation of the argument mentioned in Stanley (2005)). In other words, whenever we find binding phenomena, there is a *prima facie* case to be made that there is a variable in the logical form of the target sentences. Interpreted this way, the Binding Argument could still be used in specific cases without claiming that all instances of binding need to be explained by postulating variables in the logical form of the target sentences – alternative and equally good explanations of the binding phenomena notwithstanding. This is consistent with saying that, even if postulations of variables across the board to account for binding phenomena is not a good idea, there might be cases in which the postulation of variables is, *prima facie*, the best explanation to be given. The case of location, as far as I can see, is such a case in point: *prima facie*, the binding phenomena involving the location of rain is to be explained by postulating location variables in simple sentences containing the predicate 'rain'. The debate will then be whether in the specific case of 'rain', postulation of a location variable in simple sentences such as 'It is raining' is the best way to explain binding phenomena such as those exhibited by (1), or whether there is an alternative, equally good explanation of the phenomena. Cappelen and Hawthorne's analysis is precisely such an alternative.

over locations. A similar view is that of Cappelen and Hawthorne (2007), who propose to account for binding by replacing quantification over location variables with quantification over events. This is the answer we will be concerned with in what follows.^{4,5}

So, Cappelen and Hawthorne's claim is that the binding phenomena exhibited by sentences such as (1) are better explained by "the Event Analysis".⁶ The Event Analysis consists of the *mélange* of two main ideas: first, the idea that verbs are predicates of events; second, the idea that domain restrictions are associated with certain phrases. The first idea stems from Davidson's (1967) view that has led to the development of "event semantics". To illustrate, for Davidson the sentence

(2) Brutus killed Caesar.

is represented as

(3) There is an event *e* that is a killing of Caesar by Brutus.

The second idea, that domain restrictions are associated with certain phrases, comes from work by von Stechow (1994) and Stanley & Szabo (2000), among others. They argue that quantifier phrases have a variable for domains in their logical form that are responsible for the restricted readings of sentences and could be bound. To exemplify, the sentence

(4) Every student passed the exam.

⁴ For a thorough discussion of all these answers to the Binding Argument, see Zeman (2011) and, more recently, Zeman (2017).

⁵ A more radical approach would be to eschew variables altogether, as in Jacobson's (1999) framework.

⁶ At least better than Stanley's (2000) truth-conditional semantic view, which is their main target.

is represented as

- (5) (Every student)_{*d*} passed the exam.⁷

where *d* is the domain variable. Particular values for *d* give rise to restricted readings for (4) – for example, the reading that every student *in the relevant class* passed the exam.

Cappelen and Hawthorne’s novel idea is that domain restrictions are attached to verbs and thus, that the sets of events that verbs stand for could be restricted in certain ways. Binding by higher quantifiers is taken care of by suitably restricting the sets of events verbs stand for by means of a restrictor function *f*. Now, the particular claim that they make in the case of binding involving temporal quantifiers is that *f* is a function from times to sets of events that take place at the those times plus other conditions pertaining to the type of the parameter bound. For the case of bound locations, as in (1), this additional condition is that the sets of events that constitute the output of function *f* take place not only at the same times quantified over by the quantifier phrase, but also *at the same location*. Let us see how this works by means of some examples. The simple sentence

- (6) Nina is walking her dog.

is represented in their framework as

⁷ There is an internal debate amongst proponents of the view that quantifier phrases host a domain variable in their logical form regarding the exact location of the variable (the noun phrase, as Stanley & Szabo (2000) think, or the quantifier, as von Stechow (1994) does). This issue has no relevance in what follows.

- (7) There is an event e that is a walking of a dog by Nina.

A more complex sentence such as

- (8) Every time Sam goes to the park, Nina is walking her dog.

is represented in the Event Analysis as

- (9) For all times t , if there is an event e_1 that is a going to the park by Sam at t , there is an event e_2 that is a walking $_{f(t)}$ of a dog by Nina.

In (9), t is the time of event e_1 (quantified over), while $f(t)$ is a function from times t to the set of events that take place at t in the park where Sam goes. Walking $_{f(t)}$ is thus the set of events arrived at by intersecting the set of events that take place at t in the park where Sam goes with the set of events of walking – that is, the set of events of walking that take place at t in the park where Sam goes.

Returning to our problematic case, sentence (1) is represented as

- (10) For every time t , if there is an event e_1 that is a lighting of a cigarette by John at t , then there is an event e_2 that is a raining $_{f(t)}$.

In (10), t is the time of the event e_1 (quantified over), while $f(t)$ is a function from times t to the set of events that take place at t in the location where John lights a cigarette. Raining $_{f(t)}$ is thus the set of events arrived at by intersecting the set of events that take place at t in the location where

John lights a cigarette with the sent of events of raining – that is, the set of events of raining that take place at t in the location where John lights a cigarette.

How does this treatment help with blocking the instance of the binding argument presented above? The place to look is premise 3, the principle that there is no binding without a bindable variable in the logical form. In fact, this premise is ambiguous between a reading according to which there is no binding without a bindable variable in the logical form simpliciter, and a reading according to which there is no binding without a bindable variable of the same kind as the bound parameter in the logical form. On the first of this readings premise 3 holds under the Event Analysis; on the second reading, the premise is denied, because according to the view there is no *location* variable in the logical form of (1), but the location of rain is nevertheless bound. Thus means that the intermediary conclusion (IC) cannot be derived, and thus that the argument is blocked.

3. Problematic Cases for the Event Analysis

I might be persuaded that the answer to the Binding Argument given by the Event Analysis works, but for that the view's account of temporal quantification needs to be correct. However, I have doubts that this is indeed so. Suspicions that the view, as stated, doesn't yield the right predictions come from cases in which there is binding, but the time of the second event and the time quantified over by the quantifier are not identical. More precisely: there are cases in which the restrictor function f cannot be a function from times to sets of events that take place at those times (I'm leaving aside the constraint that the two events should also occur at the same place.) In this section I provide several cases that make this point.

To ease our way into such cases, consider two examples of sentences that contain temporal expressions that effectively influence the time at which the events quantified over by the temporal quantifier take place. Thus, in sentence

- (11) Every time John does a bad deed, somebody suffers later,

the suffering caused by John's bad deed takes place at a later time than the time of the deed itself. The temporal order could also be reversed: in sentence

(12) Every time John does a bad deed, somebody has hurt him earlier,

the hurting that John has been subjected to takes place before John's bad deed itself. While these examples illustrate the claim made, they are nevertheless not problematic (at least not in principle) for the Event Analysis, given that the semantic effect of the relevant expressions ('later' and 'earlier') will have to be factored into the analysis.⁸

However, the same effect can be achieved with sentences that *don't* contain temporal expressions that effectively influence the time at which the events quantified over by the temporal quantifier take place. The first type of case is the following. Consider sentences (13) and (14):

(13) Every time there is a major solar eruption, Earth's artificial satellites break down.

(14) Every time John gets caught by rain, he drinks a cup of hot tea.

Each of those sentences have a reading according to which the second event takes place at a time that is later than the time of the first event, quantified over by the quantifier phrase. In (13), the breaking down of earth's satellites cannot take place at the same time as the solar eruption, since the effect of the eruption will be manifested on the satellites after a certain period of time. (14) is understood as John drinking a cup of hot tea not at the same time he gets caught by rain, but

⁸ Cappelen and Hawthorne don't actually discuss such sentences, but I credit them with an account of the relevant temporal expressions.

(supposedly) when he gets to a warm place where tea is available. But in both cases the Event Analysis yields a different result. To illustrate, consider its rendering of (13):

- (15) For all times t , if there is an event e_1 that is a major solar eruption at t , then there is an event e_2 that is a breaking down $_{f(t)}$ of Earth's artificial satellites.

In (15), t is the time of the event e_1 (quantified over), while $f(t)$ is a function from times t to the set of events that take place at t . Breaking down $_{f(t)}$ is thus the set of events arrived at by intersecting the set of events that take place at t with the set of events of breaking down – that is, the set of events of breaking down that take place at t . However, as we have seen, this is not the case for the reading of (13) envisaged, so the analysis yields wrong results.

One way for the proponents of the Event Analysis to reply to these cases is to claim that there are special, their special character stemming from the fact that there is a causal/explanatory connection between the two events, e_1 and e_2 . The fact that Earth's satellites break down is caused and (at least partially) explained by the solar eruption. John's drinking of a hot cup of tea is caused and (at least partially) explained by him getting caught by rain. Given that normally an event that causes another takes place earlier than the caused event, and taking into consideration the regularities that come together with causation (the fact that Earth's satellites break down at a very precise interval of time after the solar eruption takes place; the fact that usually people drink tea to avoid the negative effects of being caught by rain), we shouldn't expect that the caused event takes place at the same time as the causing event. But such cases are not among the ones that the analysis is supposed to apply and thus they don't endanger it.

Such an answer would not only drastically limit the analysis' range of application, but it is also unsatisfactory in itself. For the point made by examples such as (13) and (14) could be made by other examples in which no causal/explanatory connection holds between the two events. Consider, for example, sentence (16):

(16) Every time John passes by a black cat, a member of his family gets ill.

Here, no causal/explanatory connection holds between the two events, yet the sentence has a reading according to which the second event takes place later than the first. Again, the analysis yields the wrong result.

A more comprehensive answer from the proponents of the Event Analysis, applicable to (13), (14) and (16) as well, could be the following. It is true that there are readings of various sentences according to which the second event takes place later than the first, but those readings are not licensed by the semantics; instead, they are arrived at by pragmatic processes such as implicatures. Thus, strictly speaking, the truth-conditions of sentences such as (13) and (16) are such that the two events take place at the same time; what the speaker communicates, however, is a different content, to the effect that the second event takes place later than the first. It is thus not incumbent on the Event Analysis – which is a theory dealing with the semantics proper of such sentences – to account for those readings.

This answer would save the Event Analysis provided that for each reading according to which the second event is later than the first there is a reading according to which the two events take place at the same time. But this cannot be the case in general. Consider, for example, the following scenario. John, a ruthless serial killer, has been arrested many times, but never convicted because of lack of decisive evidence. He has been released after each arrest. Sadly, after each release he strikes again: sometimes in the following days, sometimes after months, once even after three years. Sentence (17) could be accurately used in this situation:

(17) Every time John is released, he kills.

(17)'s representation in the Event Analysis is

- (18) For all times t , if there is an event e_1 that is a release of John at t , then there is an event e_2 that is a killing $_{f(t)}$ by John.

In (18), t is the time of the event e_1 (quantified over), while $f(t)$ is a function from times t to the set of events that take place at t . Killing $_{f(t)}$ is thus the set of events arrived at by intersecting the set of events that take place at t with the set of events of killing – that is, the set of events of killing that take place at t . Now, this is not the right result in scenario imagined; but also, the answer proposed above cannot work since (17) doesn't have a reading according to which the two events take place at the same time, because it is not possible for John to be both released and to kill at the same time. Also, there is no causal/explanatory connection between the two events, so the first answer doesn't work either. Thus, the Event Analysis does yield the wrong results, even after considering the two replies above.⁹

I would like to note in passing that there are cases of binding in which the second event takes place *before* the first event, the one quantified over by the quantifier phrase. Consider (19) or (20):

- (19) Every time John organizes a family dinner, he cooks.
(20) Every time John takes a shower, he puts on his swimming suit.

Even without going into details, it is easy to see that the Event Analysis yields the wrong results in these cases too.

⁹ I don't want to claim that only sentence (17) poses the problem mentioned for the Event Analysis. For example, all the other problematic sentences presented above have both interpretations in which a specific, determinate period of time between the two sets of events is intended and interpretation in which an unspecific, indeterminate period of time is intended. I use sentence (17), *as uttered in the context devised*, to be an important counterexample because the interpretation in which there is a specific, determinate period of time between the two sets of events is ruled out by design. To make things more understandable, I take the intended interpretations for all the other examples to be, in contrast to (17), that there is a specific, determinate period of time between the two sets of events.

4. Possible Fixes

I think the examples above raise a legitimate challenge to the Event Analysis as presented by Cappelen and Hawthorne. But there is also a quite natural fix, underlined by the idea that the restriction on the set of events, function f , is contextually determined. In the remainder of this last section, I mention a couple of ways to implement this idea and briefly discuss their merits.

The idea that the restriction function on the set of events is context-sensitive can be implemented in at least two ways. First, the proponents of the Event Analysis could hold that f itself is context-sensitive; that is, to claim it as a function from times to sets of events suitably restricted by context. Under this proposal, f can take different values and thus be a function from times to sets of events that take place at some time after those times (thus accounting for examples like (13), (14) and (16)), a function from times to sets of events that take place before those times (thus accounting for examples like (19) and (20)), or – the initial analysis – a function from times to sets of events that take place precisely at those times (thus accounting for the main example used in the debate, (1)).

This solution seems obvious, and in line with other proposals in the vicinity (e.g., Stanley's (2000)). But while it accounts neatly for the examples mentioned above, it still has problems with (17). Remember, the background story for that sentence was that there is no constant period of time after which the killer strikes again once released. So, there is no contextually-determined function that would be the value of f in this context. The most the defender of the Event Analysis can do in this case is to offer the following gloss: f is the function from times to sets of events that take place *at some time after* those times. To my ears, this sounds too indeterminate, and thus the truth conditions too weak, but it could be argued that it does give the right result in the scenario imagined for (17).

The second way to implement the idea under discussion is to claim not that f itself is context-sensitive, but that a different element in the logical form of the relevant sentences is. Thus, while f is understood simply as a function from times to sets of events, the relation between

them is further restricted by introducing an additional element in the logical form of the relevant sentences. Under this second proposal, (1) for example will be represented as

- (22) For every time t , if there is an event e_1 that is a lighting of a cigarette by John at t , then there is an event e_2 that is a raining $_{f(t)}$ and $R(t, e_2)$,

where R is the relation that holds between t and e_2 such that e_2 takes place at t . Different examples will employ different R relations; thus, for examples like (13), (14) and (16), the relation between t and e_2 is such that e_2 takes place after t , while for examples like (19) and (20) the relation is such that e_2 takes place before t .

Again, this implementation accounts for the examples mentioned, but remains problematic as applied to (17). The reason is the same as before: in the case of (17), there is no determinate relation between t and e_2 that could be the value of R in this context. And, as before, the most the defender of the Event Analysis can do in this case is to offer the following gloss: R is the relation between t and e_2 such that e_2 takes place *at some time after* t . To my ears, this sounds too indeterminate, and thus the truth conditions too weak, but it could be argued that it does give the right result in the scenario imagined for (17).

The current analysis has also another backdrop – namely, that it postulates an additional element in the logical form of the relevant sentences. Where there was a single additional variable (the restrictor function f), now there are two (f and R .) Perhaps this worry can be assuaged by noting that Cappelen and Hawthorne are, in fact, non-committal when it comes to variables in the logical form. Thus, they write:

Some may prefer to think of this as a perspicuous depiction of a structured proposition, but deny that there is any isomorphic syntactic representation at [logical form] (...). Others will go further and endorse [it] as a promising account of the deep logical form, manifest in the language organ. (...) It is obviously beyond the scope of this essay to adjudicate

between these versions of an event-based approach. In particular, then, we make no claim here as to which syntactic proposals should accompany the semantic suggestions that we have made. (Cappelen and Hawthorne 2007, 103-4)

There is nothing wrong with such a non-committal attitude in itself, but in the present context it really takes the edge from Cappelen and Hawthorne's opposition to a more committed view like Stanley, which they take to be their main competitor. Things get additionally muddled given that such an attitude is consistent with a construal of the processes by which the elements that appear in the truth-conditions of the target sentences as pragmatic in Recanati's sense.¹⁰ I won't dwell further on these issues; suffice it to say that the initial analysis proposed by Cappelen and Hawthorne needs to be modified, and that neither of the two implementations of the fix considered is obviously problem-free.

5. Conclusions

In this short paper I investigated a specific view about location binding in examples like (1) – the Event Analysis. After introducing the context in which the analysis has been proposed (that of the Binding Argument, one of the most prominent arguments in the debate over the syntactic and semantic characteristics of meteorological sentences like 'It is raining'), I presented the view in detail and how it deals with the target sentences. A crucial element of the view is the introduction in the logical form of such sentences of a restrictor function on events, f , that replaces binding

¹⁰ It is perhaps interesting to note that Recanati himself has hinted at a truth-conditional pragmatic treatment of 'rain'-sentences involving events rather than locations: "[W]e may think of the pragmatic enrichment at issue in terms of a contextual restriction on the domain of the event quantifier, rather than in terms of an extra conjunct in the scope of that quantifier. (...) [This] analysis straightforwardly applies to the 'rain' case: 'It's raining' literally says that there is a raining event, but may be contextually understood as saying that there is such an event among the events that take place at a certain location. The reference to a place in weather sentences is now construed as a byproduct of the contextual restriction of the event quantifier." (Recanati 2007, 134). Strictly speaking, his view differs from Cappelen and Hawthorne in that the restriction is performed on the domain of the quantifier, and not on the set of events, but a case could be made that result is the same.

over location variables. A central tenet of the view is that the restrictor function f is one from times to sets of events that take place at those times. My main aim in this paper was to challenge that claim by providing examples in which the sets of events in question take place either *after* the times taken as input by the function (examples (13), (14) and (16)) or *before* (examples (19) or (20)). Such examples pointed – decisively, in my opinion – to the need to modify the analysis.

Further, I considered two ways in which an obvious fix to the Event Analysis can be implemented. The fix consisted in making the restrictor function introduced *context-sensitive*. I have shown two ways in which this can be done: one, by making the function f itself context-sensitive; the other by leaving the function context-invariant and introducing an additional element in the logical form that is context sensitive (a relation R between events and times). In the final part of the paper I have assessed the merits of these two ways of fixing the Event Analysis. The evaluation was mostly positive, in that both manage to neatly account for the examples considered – with one exception, sentence (17). This is an example that was set in a special context that blocks the moves afforded by the two implementations. The conclusion of the paper is that ultimately the viability of the Event Analysis depends on whether its treatment of sentences like (17) is ultimately considered satisfactory.

References:

Cappelen, Herman and Hawthorne, John (2007), 'Locations and binding', *Analysis*, 67, pp. 95-105.

Davidson, Donald (1967), 'The logical form of action sentences', in Nicholas Rescher (ed.), *The Logic of Decision and Action*, University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 81-95.

Elbourne, Paul (2005), *Situations and Individuals*, MIT Press.

von Fintel, Kai (1994), *Restrictions on Quantifier Domains*, Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT.

Jacobson, Pauline (1999), 'Towards a Variable-Free Semantics', *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 22, pp. 117-184.

Laserson, Peter (2008), 'Quantification and perspective in relativist semantics', *Philosophical*

Perspectives, 22, pp. 305-337.

Pagin, Peter (2005), 'Compositionality and context', in Georg Preyer and Gerhard Peter (eds.), *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*, Oxford University Press, pp. 303-347.

Recanati, François (2002), 'Unarticulated constituents', *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 25, pp. 299-345.

Recanati, François (2004), *Literal Meaning*, Oxford University Press.

Recanati, François (2007), 'It is raining (somewhere)', *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 30, pp. 123-146.

Stanley, Jason (2000), 'Context and logical form', *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 23, pp. 391-434.

Stanley, Jason (2005), 'Semantics in context', in Georg Preyer and Gerhard Peter (eds.), *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*, Oxford University Press, pp. 221-254.

Stanley, Jason and Szabo, Zoltan (2000), 'On quantifier domain restriction', *Mind and Language*, 15, pp. 219-261.

Zeman, Dan (2011), *The Semantics of implicit content*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Barcelona.

Zeman, Dan (2017), 'The Use of the Binding Argument in the Debate about Location', in Sarah Jane Conrad and Klaus Petrus (eds.), *Meaning, Context and Methodology*, Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 191-211.

HANS AND THE GHOST IN HIS ATTIC

Andrei MOLDOVAN

Universidad de Salamanca

mandreius@usal.es

Abstract:

The Russellian theory of definite descriptions has been heavily criticized on a number of accounts. One of the most popular criticisms of this proposal relies on data from complex sentence that result from embedding definite descriptions in the scope of non-doxastic propositional attitude verbs, such as ‘hopes’ or ‘wonders’. This argument is proposed in Heim (1991) and developed in Kripke (2005), Elbourne (2005; 2013), and Schoubye (2013). Neale (2005) and Kripke (2005) reply that the argument is based on a logical mistake. More recently, Elbourne (2013) offers a rebuttal to this reply. In this paper, I distinguish two arguments against the Russellian theory based on the data mentioned and which have been conflated in the discussion. I call them Argument-P (which focuses on the presuppositional content of sentences containing definite descriptions) and Argument-A (which focuses on the contribution of the description to the asserted content). I further argue that the Neale-Kripke objection only affects Argument-A, but not Argument-P. Next, I argue that Elbourne’s rebuttal fails in the form in which he presents it, and I offer a modified version of Argument-A (called Argument-A*) that is free from the Neale-Kripke objection. I conclude that together Argument-P and Argument-A* offer a strong refutation of the Russellian theory of descriptions, as well as to certain varieties of it.

Keywords: semantics; definite descriptions; Russell; presupposition; non-doxastic propositional attitudes.

1. The argument¹¹

In what follows I discuss an objection to the Russellian theory of definite descriptions (DDs, henceforth). According to this theory, as it is standardly formulated in a language of first order logic with identity an utterance of a sentence of the form ‘The *F* is *G*’ has the following truth-conditions:

$$T \text{ iff } \exists x (Fx \wedge \forall y (Fy \rightarrow x=y) \wedge Gx)$$

The objection discussed here purports to show that the Russellian theory is incorrect, as DDs do not contribute to the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur an existential condition and a uniqueness conditions. This objection was first proposed by Heim (1991, 493–4) and developed by Kripke (2005, 1023), Elbourne (2005, 109–112; 2010; 2013, 150-171), and Schoubye (2013).

The plan of the paper is the following: first, I present the criticism aimed at the Russellian theory, such as it can be found in the literature. Second, I offer my own reconstruction of it, distinguishing *two* anti-Russellian arguments. I call them Argument-P (which focuses on the presuppositional content of sentences containing definite descriptions) and Argument-A (which focuses on the contribution of the description to the asserted content). Third, I present Neale’s (2005) and Kaplan’s (2005) defense of the Russellian theory, and Elbourne’s (2013) rejection of this defense. I further argue that the Neale-Kripke objection only affects Argument-A, but not Argument-P. Forth, I argue that Elbourne’s attempt to reinforce the argument in order to avoid the Neale-Kaplan objection fails, and that the failure has to do with the fact that he does not distinguish the two anti-Russellian arguments. Fifth, and finally, I present my own reconstruction of the

¹¹ Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the VII Congress of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA 2013), 11-14/09/2013, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain, and at the Eighth International Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 8), 28/08/2014, University of Bucharest, Romania. I wish to thank those present in the audience for their helpful remarks. I also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and helpful comments.

Argument-A that manages to strengthen it and to avoid once and for all the Neale-Kaplan objection.

Let me start with the presentation of the relevant data. Consider the following sentences, where a sentence containing a DD in subject position is embedded in a propositional attitude report. The propositional attitude verbs used are non-doxastic (i.e. they do not express believing, expecting, assuming, knowing, or similar attitudes that involve the endorsement of a claim).

1. Hans wonders whether the ghost in his attic will be quiet tonight. (Elbourne 2010, 2)
2. Hans desires that the ghost in his attic will be quiet tonight.
3. Ponce de Leon hopes the fountain of youth is in Florida. (Elbourne 1990, 27)

The argument could be run for any of these sentences. I focus in what follows on sentence (1), as this is the one most discussed in the literature. Notice that (1) is ambiguous, as the DD may take either wide scope or narrow scope relative to the propositional attitude verb at the level of LF. The scope ambiguity results in two possible readings of the sentence, the *de re* reading, and the *de dicto* reading, respectively. The ambiguity results from raising the quantifier noun phrase ‘the ghost in his attic’ from its initial position in object clause of the attitude verb to the front of the sentence. The existence of the two readings can be proved by calculating the semantic value of the sentences in a compositional framework for natural language semantics, such as the one offered in Heim and Kratzer (1998) and von Stechow and Heim (2011). In the interest of space and accessibility, I skip this discussion, as it requires technical concepts and formal techniques that would take too much space of the paper to introduce. Moreover, the existence of the *de re* – *de dicto* ambiguity of sentences containing DDs in the scope of an intensional operator is generally accepted, and needs no special justification.

A precise analysis of the two readings requires a semantic analysis of the non-doxastic attitude verbs used in the above examples. This is a difficult issue that I do not address. Instead I use a simple analysis on the model of the standard semantics for ‘belief’ (see, for instance, Heim and Kratzer (1998, 306)):

S wonders that p iff $p(w) = T$ for all worlds w compatible with what S wonders.

When one *believes* that p one holds that the actual world is a p-world. That is, the actual world is a doxastically accessible world. Wondering is a more sophisticated propositional attitude. When one wonders whether p one both *disbelieves* that p (does not hold p to be true) *and also aims to know* (or maybe to have justified belief) whether p is the case. The latter component of the equation (i.e., aiming to know) seems to be a second-order propositional attitude, an attitude concerning another attitude. For these reasons, the above semantic value for ‘wonders’ is strictly speaking incorrect. However, it suits the present purposes, as the following discussion of the *de re – de dicto* ambiguity is not affected.

The *de dicto* reading of sentence (1) corresponds to the following truth-conditions (expressed here in a semi-formal language):

$$(1.1) T \text{ iff } \forall w \in W: [\exists x ((Gx \text{ in } w) \wedge \forall y (Gy \rightarrow x=y \text{ in } w) \wedge (Qx \text{ in } w))]$$

Here W is the set of worlds w' compatible with what Hans wonder; G stands for *being a ghost in Hans's attic*¹² and Q stands for *being quiet tonight*. This is the *de dicto* reading of (1), according to which the utterance of the sentence is T iff for all w compatible with what Hans wonders: there is a unique individual x such that x is a ghost in Hans's attic, and x will be quiet tonight in w .

The *de re* reading of (1) corresponds to the following truth-conditions:

$$(1.2) T \text{ iff } [\exists x (Gx \wedge \forall y (Gy \rightarrow x=y)) \wedge \forall w \in W: [Qx \text{ in } w]]$$

This reads as follows: (1) is T iff there is a unique ghost in Hans's attic, and Hans wonders whether it will be quiet tonight.

Now, consider a scenario in (1) is uttered such that by hypothesis the speaker does not believe in ghosts. Therefore, of the two different readings of sentence (1), the one

¹² Sentence (1) introduces certain complications, given the occurrence of ‘his’ in the DD, which is context-dependent and, in particular, anaphoric on ‘Hans’. For this reason, it is more convenient to run the argument on, say, sentence (3). However, I use sentence (1) in what follows, as this is one of the sentences discussed in the relevant literature. I ignore here the complication mentioned, and treat ‘ghost in his attic’ as if it were a simple common noun.

that captures the intuitive truth-conditions cannot be the *de re* reading, for this entails that the speaker commits herself to the existence of ghosts, which in fact she doesn't. That is, (1) can be true and felicitous even if there are no ghosts. So, the disambiguation that captures the intuitive truth-conditions must be the *de dicto* reading.

The next step in the argument is to notice that the Russellian assigns intuitively *incorrect* truth-conditions to (1), on the *de dicto* reading of it. Elbourne makes the following comment: when uttering (1), he writes,

we are not saying that Hans wonders, among other things, whether there is exactly one ghost in his attic; it sounds rather as if Hans is *assuming* that there is exactly one ghost in his attic and *wonders* only whether it will be quiet tonight. (Elbourne 2013, 151)

The Russellian *de dicto* interpretation of (1) fails to capture the intuitive reading. Given that the Russellian the *de re* reading also fails to capture the intuitive truth-conditions, and that (1.1) and (1.2) are the only available hypotheses for a Russellian concerning the logical form of (1), the Russellian theory makes incorrect predictions.

In order to evaluate this argument against the Russellian theory we must carefully identify the relevant data on which it is based. First, notice that Elbourne identifies in the above quote *two* intuitions concerning what the relevant utterance of (1) says or implies in the given scenario:

- i) the utterance of (1) *does not say* Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic and
- ii) the utterance of (1) *says or implies* that Hans assumes that there is a unique ghost in his attic.

Based on these two pieces of data one could build *two* arguments to reject the Russellian theory of DDs: Argument-P (which focuses on a presupposition that (1) carries), and Argument-A (which focuses on the asserted content). Elbourne does not do so explicitly, so the arguments offered below are my own reconstruction.

2. Argument-P

If we look closer at the two pieces of data (i) and (ii), we notice that (i) concerns what the sentence *says* and *does not say*, i.e. the content of the assertion made by uttering the sentence (1). In contrast, Elbourne does specify whether (ii) concerns what is said *or* a felt implication of the utterance of the sentence. However, intuitively (1) does not *say* that Hans assumes (or believes) that there is a unique ghost in his attic, but rather *presupposes* this. Various tests for presuppositions provide evidence for this claim. One of them appeals to the fact that presuppositions project when embedded in certain linguistic contexts.¹³ Thus, embedding (1) in a modal operator we obtain sentence (4), which also carries the implication that Hans assumes (or believes) that there is a unique ghost in his attic. This is to say that the implication projects, which is what we would expect if this is indeed a presupposition.

4. It is possible that Hans wonders whether the ghost in his attic will be quiet tonight.

Second, a presupposition is usually characterized in the literature as a felt implication of an utterance the main characteristic of which is that it is *taken for granted*, or backgrounded (in contrast to at-issue content).¹⁴ Based on this observation von Stechow (2004, 316-7) proposes another test for presuppositions, which makes use of replies of the form ‘Hey, wait a minute, I did not know that ...’. von Stechow notes that it is felicitous to use remarks such as this one in order to point out to the speaker that she has taken for granted something that could not be so taken in the context. But this is not a felicitous remark if followed by a content the speaker has not taken for granted, but is asserting or arguing for. And indeed, we can reply to (1)/(5) with (6), but not with (7). speaker takes for granted, but an implication of the at-issue content.

¹³ A fact noticed by Frege (1982, 40). See also Soames (1980, 554), and Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990, 281).

¹⁴ See also Kadmon (2001, 10) and Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990, 281). Soames (1980, 553) also writes: “to presuppose something is to take it for granted in a way that contrasts with asserting it.”

5. Hans wonders whether the ghost in his attic will be quiet tonight.
6. Hey, wait a minute, I did not know that Hans believes that there is a unique ghost in his attic.
7. #Hey, wait a minute, I did not know that Hans wonders about something.

The ‘Hey, wait a minute’ remark is useful in identifying presuppositions, in as much as they are characterized as contents the speaker takes for granted. This is additional evidence that the implication *that Hans believes that there is a unique ghost in his attic* is a presupposition. On the basis of the evidence just mentioned we can safely conclude that an utterance of (1), when intended *de dicto*, presupposes that Hans believes that there is a unique ghost in his attic. Thus, one could run the following argument against the Russellian theory of DDs (call it ‘Argument-P’):

P1. The utterance of (1) interpreted *de dicto* carries the presupposition that *Hans believes there is a unique ghost in his attic*.

P2. The Russellian analysis of the *de dicto* reading of (1) is (1.1): T iff Hans *wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic and it is quiet tonight*.

P3. The *de dicto* Russellian analysis of (1) does not introduce a *semantic* presupposition (from P2).

P4. Furthermore, there is no *pragmatic* theory of presupposition available (or which the Russellian has offered) that, on top of the semantic Russellian analysis, might account for the data mentioned in P1.

C. The Russellian *de dicto* analysis of (1) is incorrect. (from P1, P3 and P4).

P4 is needed given that the presupposition mentioned in P1 might be *pragmatic*, in the sense that it is not the conventional meaning of the words in the sentence that trigger the presupposition. Intuitions about the implications and presuppositions of utterances of sentences are not to be accounted for exclusively in semantic terms. However, there seems to be no obvious way in which the Russellian could provide a pragmatic account of the data concerning the presupposition of (1). Although it cannot be *proved* that such a

pragmatic account is impossible to provide, no such account is currently available in the literature, as far as I can tell.

Notice that a similar argument could be run against other theories of DDs that introduce no semantic presupposition. For instance, various authors propose to eliminate the uniqueness constraint from the content of sentences containing DDs.¹⁵ As a result, an utterance of a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ is T *iff at least one F is G*.

In general, what Argument-P shows is that a theory of DDs that does not introduce a semantic presupposition of existence and uniqueness is in trouble when it comes to accounting for the data concerning the presupposition of sentences such as (1). In contrast, the Fregean theory introduces a semantic presupposition of existence and uniqueness. Heim and Kratzer (1998, 80) model this presupposition by taking the semantic value of the definite article to be a *partial function* from sets to individuals that is defined only for those sets that have a unique element.

The Fregean theory *per se* does not account for the data concerning the presupposition of sentences such as (1). However, Elbourne shows that there are pragmatic accounts that combine neatly with this theory and do account for such presuppositions. He appeals to Karttunen’s (1974) considerations concerning the projection patterns of presuppositions triggered by expressions embedded in propositional attitude verbs. Karttunen observes that propositional attitude verbs and speech act verbs are “opaque” with respect to the presuppositions of their complements. That is, they do not allow the presuppositions of the embedded sentences to project. However, propositional attitude reports do introduce a presupposition. Consider sentence (8):

8. Silvia stopped smoking.

This introduces the presupposition that Silvia used to smoke. Now, consider sentence (9), which results from embedding (8) in a propositional attitude report.

¹⁵ For instance, Szabó (2000, 30) and Ludlow and Segal (2004, 421).

9. Mary believes that Silvia stopped smoking.

According to Karttunen (1974, 189), (9) presupposes that *Mary believes that Silvia used to smoke*. Also Karttunen (1974, 188) notes that any of the sentences that result by replacing 'believes' in (9) with "*fear, think, want* etc." have the same implication, i.e. that *Mary believes that Silvia used to smoke*.¹⁶ Elbourne combines Karttunen's considerations with the Fregean theory, concluding that together they predict that an utterance of (1) carries the presupposition that *Hans believes that there is a unique ghost in his attic*. He comments:

Following Karttunen, then, we can postulate that the presupposition that there is exactly one ghost in Hans's attic, carried by the sentence embedded in [1]..., contributes to a presupposition carried by the whole sentence to the effect that Hans believes that there is exactly one ghost in his attic. This, again, seems to be in accordance with our intuitions. (Elbourne 2013, 158-159)

So, the Fregean theory can predict the data in (ii) above. But this is not due to the contribution that DDs make to asserted content on this theory, but because the semantic presupposition of existence and uniqueness they introduce.

What could the Russellian do in these circumstances? One option for the Russellian is to concede that DDs introduce a presupposition of existence and uniqueness in order to account for the data. The result is a 'presuppositional Russellian theory', according to which an utterance of a sentence of the form 'The F is G' has the following truth-conditions:

T iff $\exists x (Fx \wedge \forall y (Fy \rightarrow x=y)) . \exists x (Fx \wedge \forall y (Fy \rightarrow x=y) \wedge Gx)$

The convention I use for distinguishing the representation of the semantic presupposition from semantic content is the following: what comes before ' ' is the presupposition (in this

¹⁶ Stalnaker (1988, 156-157) makes similar observations concerning the projection patterns of presuppositions of sentences embedded in belief attributions, which he casts in his own pragmatic framework for discussing presupposition projection. Heim (1992, 184) subscribes to Karttunen's proposal and develops a pragmatic explanation of the projection pattern of such presuppositions.

case, the existence and uniqueness of an F), and what comes after the dot is the representation of the asserted truth-conditional content. Notice that existence and uniqueness is both asserted and presupposed.

As a historical comment, it might be pointed out that this amendment to the Russellian theory is not ad-hoc. According to David Kaplan, Russell held that a speaker could not use a DD properly in communication unless she knows that the DD is uniquely satisfied:

Once we *know* that there is exactly one so-and-so, we can freely use the definite description ‘the so-and-so’ to express propositions that are *about* (in Russell’s italicized way) the denotation of the descriptive phrase. If this is a correct reading of Russell, and I think it is, his notion of knowledge by description is a remarkable anticipation of the presuppositional analysis of definite descriptions, according to which the meaning of a sentence containing a definite description, ‘the so-and-so’, breaks into two parts, one of which is that there is exactly one so-and-so. (Kaplan 2005, 984)

This is not the traditional way in which the Russellian theory of DDs has been understood. Moreover, there are significant complications when it comes to identifying Russell’s exact view of the semantics of DDs, given the complex relation between his conception of thought, language, and what he calls the ‘logical form’ of sentences. I do not discuss them here as they lead us away from the present discussion. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that this version of the Russellian theory does account successfully for the data in (ii), in the same way as Elbourne has shown that the Fregean theory does. Nevertheless, the presuppositional Russellian theory will eventually turn out to be untenable for very different reasons to which I now turn.

3. Argument-A

The other kind of data that Elbourne mentions is (i): the utterance of (1) *does not say* Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic. An argument against the Russellian theory based on (i) could be reconstructed on this basis (call it Argument-A, because it concerns the *asserted* content, rather than what is presupposed). As a consequence, notice that, instead of one, there are Hans arguments against the Russellian theory based on utterances of sentences such as (1): Argument-P and Argument-A. Distinguishing them, as I do here, will prove helpful in the forthcoming discussion.

Consider a scenario in which Hans *believes* that there is ghost in his attic, and, given his plan to spend the night studying, he *wonders whether* the ghost in the attic will be quiet tonight. In the scenario Hans *believes* that (and *does not wonder whether*) there is a unique ghost in his attic. Therefore, relative to this scenario we have:

P1'. It is not the case that Hans *wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic* (in the given scenario).

P2'. The Russellian analysis of the *de dicto* reading of (1): true iff *Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic and it is quiet tonight*.

P3'. The Russellian analysis of the *de dicto* reading of (1) predicts: true only if *Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic*. (from P2')

P4'. So, the Russellian analysis predicts that the *de dicto* reading of the utterance of (1) is false. (from P1' and P3')

P5'. However, the *de dicto* reading of (1) is intuitively true.

C'. Therefore, the Russellian *de dicto* analysis of (1) is incorrect. (from P4' and P5')

I come back to discuss the details of this argument after I introduce an objection and I propose a reformulation of the argument with the purpose of avoiding this objection.

4. The Neale-Kaplan objection

Several authors have objected to Heim's (1991) (and later, Elbourne's 2005; 2013) attempt to reject the Russellian theory based on the data in (i) and (ii). The rebuttal consists in

claiming that the argument is based on a logical mistake. For instance, Stephen Neale writes:

The following objection to Russell's theory (which one hears with alarming frequency) involves a logical mistake: On Russell's account, 'the author of Waverley is present' is equivalent to 'exactly one thing authored Waverley and that person is present'; so if George IV wonders (and asks) whether the author of Waverley was present, he wonders (and asks) whether exactly one person authored Waverley and that person is present'; but (the objection goes), the analysis is incorrect because George IV is not wondering (or asking) whether exactly one person authored Waverley! The mistake is this: 'George IV wonders whether p and q' does not entail 'George IV wonders whether p'. (Neale 2005, 846)

Indeed, sentences expressing propositional attitudes do not support entailments of this kind. Kaplan (2005, 985) uses the following examples to illustrate the mistake, in this case, that of inferring (11) from (10).

10. Diogenes wished to know whether there were honest men.

11. Diogenes wished to know whether there were men.

Kaplan's example shows that, for two sentences p and q such that p entails q, it is not the case that 'Silvia W that/whether p' entails 'Silvia W that/whether q', where 'W' expresses a non-doxastic propositional attitude verb. As a general rule, this inference is not valid. Moreover, it shows this for the particular case in which p and q are existential quantifier sentences, as are sentences containing DD on the Russellian analysis. So, the inference from (12) to (13), when read *de dicto*, is invalid:

12. Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic and it will be quiet tonight.

13. Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic.

And indeed, Argument-A, as I reconstructed it above, does commit this logical mistake in inferring P3' from P2'.

Now, it is important to notice that the Neale-Kaplan objection does not affect the discussion of the data from (ii). That is, it affects the argument concerning the asserted content (i.e. Argument-A), but it leaves untouched the force of the argument to the effect that DDs introduce a presupposition of existence (i.e. Argument-P). The latter is sufficient to reject the Russellian theory of DDs, as we have seen. Neither Neale nor Kaplan seem to be aware of this, as they do not distinguish the two arguments.

In reply to the Neale-Kaplan objection Elbourne (2013) proposes a reformulation of the initial argument (still not distinguishing Argument-A and Argument-P). Consider the following sentences:

14. I am unsure whether there is a ghost in my attic.
15. I am wondering whether there is an entity such that it is a ghost in my attic and nothing else is a ghost in my attic and it is being noisy.
16. I am wondering whether the ghost in my attic is being noisy.

Consider Hans's utterance of (14). As Elbourne (2013, 155) notes, "Native speakers judge that Hans's propositional attitudes are consistent if he continues with [15] above, but inconsistent if he continues with [16]." So, the utterances of (15) and the *de dicto* reading of (16) cannot have the same truth-conditions. But on the Russellian theory, they do have the same truth-conditions. Therefore, the Russellian analysis fails.

However, Elbourne's attempt to reformulate the Hans argument so as to avoid the Neale-Kaplan objection fails. That is because, once more, Elbourne fails to distinguish the two arguments, Argument-A and Argument-P. The two need to be separated, as they concern different dimensions of meaning. Argument-A is about asserted content, and it is to this argument that the Neale-Kaplan objection applies. Argument-P aims to support the conclusion that DDs introduce a presupposition of existence, and is not affected by the Neale-Kaplan objection. But if this Argument-P goes through – and it does so, independently of the Neale-Kaplan objection – then an utterance of (16), on its *de dicto* reading, presupposes that *I believe that there is a unique ghost in my attic*. This presupposition is inconsistent with the asserted content of an utterance of (14). This

explains why (14) and (16) are inconsistent, while (14) and (15) are not! So, the facts that Elbourne draws our attention to are not relevant to the evaluation of Argument-A at all. Elbourne's argument based on the inconsistency judgements does not manage to refute the Neale-Kaplan objection to Argument-A, or to offer independent support for the conclusion of the argument. Given that the objection manages to cut the support that Argument-A offers to its conclusion, the question becomes whether the argument could be restored so as to avoid the Neale-Kaplan objection.¹⁷

I propose in what follows an argument based on different inconsistency judgements, which is able to support the conclusion of Argument-A without committing the logical mistake that Neale and Kaplan identify. Consider a speaker who utters (17) and then goes on to utter (18), or alternatively, (19).

17. Hans believes that there is a unique ghost in his attic.

18. Hans wonders whether the ghost in his attic will be quiet tonight.

19. Hans wonders whether there is a unique ghost in his attic and it is quiet tonight.

Uttering (17) and then (19) is intuitively inconsistent. In particular, if (17) is judged to be true, (19) cannot be judged true. However, uttering (17) and then (18) does not trigger an intuition of inconsistency. But notice that this difference cannot be explained by appealing to presuppositions. If (18) indeed introduces the presupposition that *Hans believes there is a unique ghost in his attic*, this presupposition is satisfied in the context, given that (17) is already part of the common ground of the conversation when (18) or (19) are uttered. So it must be that the difference between (18) and (19) concerns the asserted content. This is an important point, one which marks the difference between Elbourne's argument

¹⁷ In discussing the Neale-Kaplan objection, Schoubye (2013, 511) relies on Elbourne's argument from inconsistency judgements. But this reply does not prove satisfactory in itself, as I have argued. Schoubye (2013, 512) also writes that "even if we assume that propositional attitude verbs are not closed under classical consequence, this cannot explain why the *truth conditions* predicted by Russell's analysis for sentences such as [(1)] are intuitively incorrect." That is, the Russellian analysis of the asserted content of (1) is intuitively incorrect independently of the invalidity of the inference that Neale and Kaplan reject. But Neale's and Kaplan's point is precisely that the intuitive judgement in question relies implicitly on making the invalid inference from 'Hans desires there to be a ghost in his attic and it to be quiet tonight' to 'Hans desires there to be a ghost in his attic.'

based on inconsistency judgements and mine: uttering (19) after (17) triggers an inconsistency judgment that cannot be explained if we attend merely to the presuppositional effects of (18). Instead, this shows that the asserted contents of (18) and (19) cannot be the same. Given that the truth-conditions of (19) are the same as the Russellian *de dicto* truth-conditions of (18), the truth-conditions of (18) are *not* the Russellian *de dicto* ones. Hence, the Russellian theory fails to provide the correct analysis of the asserted content of sentences such as (18). This is the same conclusion that Argument-A was aimed to support, but failed to do so. But this new argument (call it Argument-A*) supports the conclusion without committing the fallacy Neale and Kaplan draw our attention to. Step by step, Argument-A* could be formulated as follows:

P1'': The sequence of sentences (17) + (18) is consistent, but (17) + (19) is not.

P2'': (19) does not carry a presupposition that could explain the inconsistency of (17) + (19).

P3'': Therefore, the asserted content of (19) explains the inconsistency with (17).
(from P2'')

P4'': On the Russellian *de dicto* analysis of (18), (18) and (19) have the same asserted content.

P5'': The presuppositions of (18), if any, are satisfied in the context by hypothesis.

P6'': Therefore, (17) + (18) must also be inconsistent. (from P3'', P4'' and P5'')

P7'': But it is not.

P8'': Therefore, (18) and (19) do not have the same asserted content. (from P6'' and P7'')

C'': Therefore, the Russellian analysis of (18) is incorrect. (from P4'' and P8'')

The conclusion of Argument-A*, in general terms, is the following: utterances of sentences of the form 'The F is G' *do not* have the following truth-conditions (where Ω is the

presupposition that such sentences carry, if any):¹⁸

$$\Omega. \exists x (Fx \wedge \forall y (Fy \rightarrow x=y) \wedge Gx)$$

The same argument proves that the presuppositional Russellian theory (i.e. the Russellian theory modified by introducing a semantic presupposition of existence and uniqueness) is untenable. In fact, no theory that takes DDs to contribute to the asserted content an existential quantifier is adequate for the data considered. Of course, this is merely a negative result, but it does pave the way for other candidates, such as the Fregean theory of DDs, which takes existence and uniqueness to be presupposed but not asserted. As a result, the Fregean theory is immune to arguments of the form of Argument-P and Argument-A* drawn from data such as (i) and (ii).

References

- Chierchia, Gennaro and McConnell-Ginet, Sally (1990), *Meaning and Grammar*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Elbourne, Paul (2010), 'The existence entailments of definite descriptions'. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 1–10.
- Elbourne, Paul (2013), *Definite Descriptions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Fintel, Kai von (2004), 'Would you believe it? The King of France is back! (Presuppositions and truth-value intuitions)', in: Reimer, Marga and Bezuidenhout, Anna (Eds.), *Descriptions and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–341.
- Fintel, Kai von and Heim, Irene (2011), *Intensional Semantics*, retrieved from <http://web.mit.edu/fintel/fintel-heim-intensional.pdf>.

¹⁸ While finishing this paper I realized that Schoubye (2013, 514-515) uses a similar example to make the same point, a few pages after his discussion of the Heim-Elbourne argument. However, I am confident that the discussion is advanced by the present analysis, at least in as much as it distinguishes Argument-P and Argument-A, and clarifies the dialectics of the debate.

- Frege, Gottlob (1984), 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', in: *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, C, 25–50. Trans.: On Sense and Meaning. In: McGuinness, Brian (Ed.). *Frege: collected works*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 157–177. 'A
- Heim, Irene (1991), 'Artikel und Definitheit', in: von Stechow, Arnim and Wunderlich, Dieter (Eds.). *Handbuch der Semantik*. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 478-535.
- Heim, Irene (1992), 'Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs', *Journal of Semantics*, vol. 9, pp. 183–22.
- Heim, Irene and Kratzer, Angelika (1998), *Semantics in Generative Grammar*. Blackwell Textbooks in Linguistics, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kadmon, Nirit (2001), *Formal Pragmatics: Semantics, Pragmatics, Presupposition, and Focus*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Kaplan, David (2005), 'Reading 'On Denoting' on its Centenary', *Mind*, vol. 114, pp. 934–1003.
- Karttunen, Lauri (1974), 'Presuppositions and Linguistic Context', *Theoretical Linguistics* 1, pp. 181–194.
- Kripke, Saul (2005), 'Russell's Notion of Scope', *Mind*, vol. 114, pp. 1005–1037.
- Ludlow, Peter and Segal, Gabriel (2004), 'On a unitary semantical analysis for definite and indefinite descriptions', in: Reimer, Marga and Bezuidenhout, Anna (Eds.). *Descriptions and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 420-436.
- Neale, Stephen (1990), *Descriptions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Neale, Stephen (2005), 'A Century Later', *Mind*, vol. 114, pp. 809-871.
- Schoubye, Anders (2013), 'Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics of Descriptions', *Noûs* vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 496-533.
- Soames, Scott (1989), 'Presupposition', in: Gabbay, Dov and Guenther, Franz (Eds.). *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*. Dordrecht: Reidel, vol. IV, pp. 553–616.
- Stalnaker, Robert (1999), 'Belief attribution and context', in: Grimm, Robert H. and Merrill, Daniel D. (Eds.). *Contents of Thought*. Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1988, pp. 140–156. Reprinted in: Stalnaker, Robert. (1999), *Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality*

in Speech and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150-166.

Szabó, Zoltan G. (2000), 'Descriptions and uniqueness', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 101, no. 1, pp. 29-57.

THE AFFECTIVE DISPOSITION OF DASEIN'S BEING

Ionuț MLADIN

West University of Timisoara

imladin@gmail.com

Abstract:

Dasein is the central concept of Being and Time. To substantiate Dasein's ontology, Heidegger refers to it in various ways: anxiety (Angst) , fear and care mainly. By his affectual arrangement, Dasein is understood in his own essence, that of being-in-the-world as Being. So, affective disposition is a prerequisite for Dasein's ontological foundation. Since the heideggerian language uses related concepts, it must be followed in their interrelationships. Anxiety as a fundamental affection is associated with fear and care. The boundaries between these affective arrangements are accomplished on several levels: hermeneutical, phenomenological, ontological in the first level; psychological and anthropological, in the second level. The phenomenological and ontological dimensions give Dasein its authenticity. Always in a dynamic of impersonal encompassment and revelation of its Being, Dasein is the core concept of the human ontology in Heidegger. To know Dasein is to know his affective disposition in the above mentioned ways.

Keywords: Dasein, anxiety, fear, care, authenticity, Being.

1. Introduction

Dasein's whole analysis is primarily based on the fact that this being (ontical) is the only one that relates to herself, to her Being (ontological). This analysis focuses on the essence of this being called Dasein in its affective disposition as anxiety. For this purpose, a conceptual analysis of the anxiety in Being and Time is required to establish its defining characteristics and differences in comparison to other affective arrangements, such as fear. Because the heideggerian language has a multitude of meanings, sometimes ambiguities, we have also used the terminological or, more generally, theoretical interpretation in the descriptions.

Heidegger introduces the term of "existence" in the development of this essence that can be known as the Dasein's Being. Existence does not have its traditional,

metaphysical significance here, but rather a kind of subordinate situation for beings, in which the affective disposition of Dasein is introduced in all its determinations.

As he advances in Dasein's analysis, Heidegger shows us a new quality - that of being-in-person, belonging to one person or another. From this quality are extracted both ways of being in the authentic-inauthentic form by which somewhat a primacy is given to the existence of Dasein in comparison with what its essence or Being is.

2. The existential-impersonal structure of Dasein

The essence of consciousness of Dasein or his Being, brings about an ontological interpretation of this being. This interpretation is based on the fact that Dasein is or exists distinct and determined. Starting from this determination of Dasein we must understand his everydayness, which should not be understood as deprivation or alienation. It is an ontical way of presenting Dasein, and this kind of presentation is preliminary to an understanding of the ontological significance of Dasein's Being.

In the way appears in the everydayness, Dasein is lost or seized in the public space of the impersonal "they". We say that Dasein is encompassed by being-in-communion. Authentic-inauthentic determinations now have some added meanings. We refer especially to what is inauthentic. This determination gives a distinct meaning to the moment of being-in-the-world: as an impersonal seizure, Dasein is probed in his own Being, and this is the object of the existential-impersonal analysis in Being and Time.

In the existential-impersonal analysis, we reveal the constituent moments of Dasein, such as worry as care and anxiety. But before proceeding to the existential-impersonal analysis, Heidegger sets out some aspects of Dasein's existence structure or existence. In this way, Dasein's characters are called "existentialia", and the determinations of the Being of beings that are not Dasein constitute the categories (Heidegger 1996, 82). The whole existential analysis of Dasein has as its axiom the moment of being-in-the-world as a priori moment, which is why any anthropological or psychological speculations are removed.

The essence-existence relation is treated in a very special way by Heidegger: the phenomenological interpretation guides us to essence, the theory of Being or ontology, but Dasein's own existence as the only being that relates to itself presupposes its hold as hermeneutic totality. Thereby, we find in Heidegger the hermeneutic ontology developed in different directions, of which the essentials (as Vattimo shows) are those represented by Gadamer and Apel. Vattimo finds the ontological sense of heideggerian hermeneutics in the connection, the identification between Being and language (Vattimo 1993, 113). The relationship between Being and language is indicated by the two aspects of nihilism of heideggerian hermeneutics: Dasein's analysis as a hermeneutical totality and remembrance that metaphysically reveals the forgotten tradition. The moment of being-in-the-world as a nihilist element of the heideggerian hermeneutical theory appears in its triple structure of "existentialia": affective disposition, understanding and speech.

What is meant by the nihilism of the moment of being-in-the-world? Being in the world means that Dasein contacts with all the meanings that represent the world in the context of a referential reality in the state of projection of that being. Or, this totality of meanings is not given by our own time, that is why Dasein is in a relationship of familiarity with the world, which he perceives after a self-precomprehension.

We consider these aspects of heideggerian nihilism to be necessary because the problem of Dasein's affective disposition involves Heidegger's reconsideration of interiority: it is especially those non-object affective situations that have been left aside or assigned to an apparent object. Of course, we can say that Heidegger is a nihilist, because in terms of affective situations such as fear or anxiety, he introduces the "nothing" of existence and "nowhere". This is the role of appearance. Regarding this, Gadamer notes that the issue of affective disposition in Heidegger has aristotelian roots. By affectional arrangement it is not aimed to create a language of "nothing", on the contrary, this is a way of self-clarification of the being called Dasein (Gadamer 1999, 20). In this sense, Gadamer speaks of a hermeneutic of Dasein's faculty or how to be-in-the-world as an object of existential-impersonal analysis in *Being and Time*.

As we can see, the issue of heideggerian nihilism is not simple. Vattimo believes that the meaningless world produces in Dasein the experience of anxiety that is "an uprooting experience" (Vattimo 1995, 58), without foundation. Art is the refuge because artwork proposes a world, but even artistic experience is an instrumental play in which insignificant determinations take place. However, according to Vattimo, the artistic experience as described by Heidegger appears to be more positively charged than anxiety as fear or care.

Returning to the subject of affective disposition, we believe that the preliminary analysis of this approach is to investigate Dasein's existential-impersonal structure as a being-in-the-world in the daily phenomenal dimension of impersonal "they". By capturing Dasein we understand that he is disposed around a world he is concerned with, and not that is lost in the everyday public space of the impersonal "they". As I have already mentioned, Dasein is captured by the being-in-communion, in which he feels inauthenticity in a positive form, which means we can not interpret a more authentic state from which Dasein is to be snatched by the impersonal. The phenomenon of encompassing is part of Dasein's constitution of being-in-the-world, that is, an ontological way of being. By seizing, the moment of being-in-the-world becomes an existential-impersonal mode.

As a feature of Dasein's manifestation in this capture situation in the impersonal "they" we find speech, which is a feature of circumstance, not exclusively influenced from the outside world. In this attachment, Dasein is in a relaxing state of safety, even though in this affectional arrangement he does not have a genuine understanding of what is happening to him. The fact of Dasein's apparent silence in the everydayness is a way of alienating his being, at the opposite end being the inalienable understanding of the moment of being-in-the-world. Alienation as an effect of Dasein's catchment makes him

fall into inauthenticity, being a prisoner in himself. This is a positive, constructive inauthenticity that makes Dasein turn to his own Being. Authentic existence is not an arrangement beyond the everyday existence but an existential-ontological understanding of it.

Heidegger introduces in *Being and Time* the issue of Dasein's inclusion in the impersonal "they" (Heidegger 1996, 172) to open the way of interpreting its own Being, which first appears as a fundamental affective disposition. This is a tendency to interpret Dasein as a whole: the proposed existential analysis is not a deduction from the ontic or empirical level, or a transcendental deduction (Greisch 1994). The phenomenological interpretation of the ontic leads us to the Dasein's Being. This is the state of Dasein's revelation based on affective disposition and understanding. As a first step in determining the structural totality of Dasein's Being, it starts from Dasein's inclusion into impersonal, retreating from himself. Although it is a first point in the analysis of anxiety as a fundamental state of affective disposition, it nevertheless takes us away from what Dasein's structure is in the totality of its Being.

3. Anxiety as an ontological affective disposition

By comprehension, Dasein conceals his authenticity on an ontic-existential stance. But from an ontological point of view, Dasein is as its own state of revelation before himself. Dasein's refuge has ontological relevance from the point of view of a phenomenological interpretation of what this refuge determines. So, Dasein's comprehension opens the way of the revelation state called anxiety. By analyzing the affective disposition of the Dasein's Being, Heidegger tries to reach the state of Dasein's revelation. The state of revelation is thus a correlated feature of the Dasein's Being. If we go back to the ontological level, the analysis of anxiety is met with the analysis of fear, so some clarifications are important.

Dasein is frightened around an inwordingly being, the object of fear. The fact that Dasein is in a refuge by encompassing is a consequence of the manifestation of anxiety, which makes fear possible. The original phenomenon of Dasein's refuge causes anxiety due to the essential way of being-in-the-world. But here is the place for an interrogation: Why does Heidegger, in this existential analysis, give anxiety the role of fundamental affect? This is also a challenge for psychology. Dasein as placed before himself reveals his refuge. Here is the relationship between anxiety and selfness that cause a special kind of refuge, in contrast to impersonal refuge. But it remains to be seen to what extent the impersonal escape from fear is delimited by the escape of Dasein from himself. For this, the fear-anxiety relationship has to be taken into consideration, both as states of affective disposition.

The anxiety as a phenomenon is attributed by Heidegger in *Being and Time* to the character of not being produced by a determined object, whereas fear always presupposes such an object, an inwordingly being (Heidegger 1996, 174). The anxiety

corresponds to the moment of being-in-the-world: the world has no relevance, it is meaningless, most threatening. Even though Heidegger believes that affections must be studied by phenomenology, they must be deprived of their psychological qualities. This is the meaning of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time*.

Liotard finds a middle way: applying the phenomenological method to psychology (Liotard 1991, 79). Thus it is shown that experiences that cause states of consciousness can not be analyzed introspectively, and a reflexive method is needed: it is not enough to know only that we are afraid, but also what is fear in a phenomenal dimension. The phenomenological method applied in psychology opposes the reflection and introspection. Phenomenological reflection describes affective states. The new methodology overrides the traditional inner-outer distinction - the objects determined in the inner subjectivity and the indeterminate ones in the outside - affirming the possibilities of the existing Ego. Furthermore, Lyotard shows that research in the psychology of forms supports the idea that certain stimuli of affective states can not be determined on the basis of the inextricable connection inner-outer. The relation of the subject to the world is such that the subject already establishes certain states of consciousness as affective experiences. Here the object is given by some kind of transcendence set by the Ego, so we find a notion of phenomenology: intentionality.

Returning to the fear-anxiety relationship in Heidegger, we note that anxiety is not a particular change of fear, in fact anxiety itself cause fear. The foundation of fear in anxiety is accomplished by what J. Greisch calls the formal structure of the two affective phenomena. The three constitutive moments of fear - the thing in front of which the fear appear, the feeling of fear, and the something wick stands fear for - have the same temporal structure as the moments of anxiety: the anxiety for ..., that something before anxiety and self-anxiety. From what has been said so far, we conclude that anxiety is a more original phenomenon than fear, therefore its ontological relevance results from *Dasein's* manifestations as authentic and inauthentic.

Heidegger surpasses the phenomenological analysis of anxiety through ontological, even metaphysical determinations: if by anxiety the world becomes empty of significance, then the threatening object is no longer anywhere, it is a manifestation of nothingness. Through this metaphysical nothingness manifests the lack of significance of the world. Annihilated beings have access to something much more original: the world disfigured by the ontic. The “nothing” of existence is a revelation of the moment of being-in-the-world. Thus, we understand the anxiety as a fundamental affective disposition because it is the world ontologically revealed through it. The first constitutive moment of anxiety is the undetermined object, the nothingness, but we also have a teleological momentum of anxiety: anxiety for something. Being comprised, *Dasein* is deprived of self-understanding. The phenomenon of anxiety singularize *Dasein*, which appears as a possible being. Just because it's singularized, *Dasein* goes to his own authenticity of being-in-the-world.

The privilege of anxiety in the affective dispositions is more clearly defined by identifying the constitutive moment of anxiety, “anxiety for ...”, with the “anxiety about ...” (Heidegger 1996, 175). The meeting point of the two moments is Dasein's way of being-in-the-world. As a fundamental affective disposition, anxiety also occurs in those moments of Dasein's Being called the “existentialia”: speaking and understanding. Even though the affective disposition would generally send to certain feelings, in anxiety it's an unfamiliarity that points to Dasein's ontological relationship with nothingness.

Unfamiliarity is synonymous in Heidegger with Dasein's lack of privacy in the process of his engagement in the world, but only by anxiety Dasein is singularized out as an existential-ontological moment of being-in-the-world. Being encompassed in the world, Dasein's affective disposed as anxious aspires to the privacy of public space. In the impersonal, Dasein understands his unfamiliarity as a phenomenon that originates from the existential-ontological level.

Understanding anxiety in terms of Dasein's capture should not be extended too much. As a rule, anxiety is foreign to public sphere, it can be psychologically determined, but only Dasein's ontological understanding as a moment of being-in-the-world, knowledge of affective disposition leads to a complete analysis of the phenomenon. Ontological analysis has priority over psychological analysis. Besides aspects of anxiety-fear relationship, Greisch identifies three problems in the Being and Time anxiety analysis: the relationship between anxiety and body, the difficulty of interpreting anxiety only on the ontic ground, singularization of Dasein through anxiety-ontological revelatory affection. If Heidegger insists in Being and Time on the latter two issues, the first remains suspended. Psychosomatic can not be applied in the analysis of anxiety as an ontological phenomenon.

Liotard shows that the psychology of form is based on the principle of an inner-outer isomorphism: the reflexive description of the experiences is doubled by a causal interpretation of them. So here the phenomenological method does not isolate the body in the name of absolute interiority. There is a contact with the world in the sense that it would have a meaningful reference. If Heidegger has somehow bypassed the issue of the relationship between anxiety and the reactions it causes in the body, the psychology of form seems to solve this problem slipping on the ground of a transcendental conception of significance. But Heidegger considered anxiety as a metaphysical feeling without psychological features; the followers of form psychology would say that this way of putting the problem is an isolation of lived experiences in absolute interiority.

The difference between the two concepts lies in the greater or lesser role given to subjective transcendence. By the distinction between a statement of factual existence and a metaphysical statement of essence, Heidegger sets the moment of being-in-the-world as existential-ontological postulate (Heidegger 1998, 58). The world as a whole has a transcendental character, that is, for its knowledge it is necessary to transcend the beings. The purpose of this transcendence is not to perceive a determined external object, but to reach a world as the totality of the existence of beings.

4. Conclusions

Within certain limits, heideggerian transcendence prepares the existential-ontological interpretation of the whole structure of the Dasein's Being understood as "care". In fact, the general conclusion we finally draw is that by interpreting the anxiety, Heidegger has come to a specific feature of Dasein: care. Anxiety, fear and care are the affective dispositions specific to Dasein's Being. This research was limited to Dasein's affective disposition, less to the anxiety-fear-care relationship, that is why the analysis could be deepened in this direction taking into account the levels already depicted here more or less: hermeneutical, phenomenological, ontological. The psychological level can be included in the phenomenological one.

References:

- Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1999), *Heidegger și grecii*, Cluj, Editura Biblioteca Apostrof.
- Greisch, Jean (1994) 'Le probleme d'un intégralité originelle de la totalité structurale du Dasein', in *Ontologie et temporalité*, Paris, Puf, pp. 229-236.
- Heidegger, Martin (1996) *Being and Time*, Albany, State University of New York Press.
- Heidegger, Martin (1998) *Repere pe drumul gândirii*, București, Editura Politică.
- Liotard, Jean-François (1991) *Phenomenology*, Albany, State University of New York Press.
- Vattimo, Gianni (1993) *Sfârșitul modernității*, Constanța, Editura Pontica.
- Vattimo, Gianni (1995) *Societatea transparentă*, Constanța, Editura Pontica.

***SECTION II:
COMMUNICATION STUDIES***

THE IMPORTANCE OF NEWSGATHERING IN COMMUNICATION

Lucian-Vasile SZABO

Iasmina PETROVICI

West University of Timisoara

vasile.szabo@e-uvt.ro

iasmina.petrovici@e-uvt.ro

Abstract:

The aim of this study is to provide a few working tools when proceeding in newsgathering in communication sciences field (journalism, public relations, advertising). In our writing we shall approach key concepts, relevant information, documentation features, methods, techniques and procedures, as well as some elements of interaction with sources. Concurrently, an analysis will be carried out on the selection and structuring of information in communication products, making them easier to receive by an increasingly more demanding and heterogeneous audience. Newsgathering or documentation, as it is otherwise known in the media, is a specific activity, especially at the beginning of the communication process. Data collection can be carried out throughout the exchange of information. Virtual communication facilitates interaction and interactivity. The current communication sphere is particularly vast, a great variety of information and pseudo-information, events and pseudo-events trying to capture our attention. Users find increasingly harder to select what is valuable, what represents useful data in the existential and professional field. This study attempts to bring some clarification in the field.

Keywords: newsgathering, media, news, communication, public relations

1. About significance

Essential information rarely finds its own way to the communications professional. Most of the times they have to look it up themselves. In this context, it is not only important to develop the ability to collect data, but also to analyse and retain what is valuable content. Especially during this period of communication explosion, we require the development and training of analytical skills. As early as 1990, before the Internet surfing era, Alvin Tofler warned of these difficulties for communication and information

professionals: "Finding the right informative detail, accurately analysing it and delivering it at the right time to the right customer, results in much heavier problems than the actual collection "(1995, 224). The author refers here to the broad scope of communication, and information analysis is a specific action, closely related to the collection. The process of finding the significant element was also a concern for Mircea Eliade. The great historian of religions and writer was also a journalist, writing for longer periods of time for generalist publications. By 1937, he distinguished between the mundane everyday happenings and the really relevant content. He thus faces a great dilemma, which we cannot explain: "And then there is another question: do we always choose and transform out one of a million facts, into the significant fact - or is it the fact itself, qualitatively distinct from the millions of facts that surpasses and conquers?" (Eliade 1990, 172). The quality of news material is identified in the English-language with the term *Newsworthiness*. The invested interest in what happened and the proximity of the event are the main elements that make a newspaper product come into the audience's attention (Popescu 203, 161). Information collecting that results in effective communication is an essential process in all types of communication. As Newsom and Carrell (2004, 202) state: "Getting the information your organization or client wants in order to have news sources, that might present some interest, is a strategic task."

Concerns about human communication focus on a central idea, that of media coverage. The media coverage process is constructed on two key elements: the media and the public. In communication, information becomes public, intentionally or not, through technical equipment (electronic, computerized). There may be unmediated public communication, such as, for example public gatherings (political or other), as there may be technologically mediated links between people that are not public (telephone conversations or e-mails). It all stems from the need to know, to know the world and the others, to "stay in the know," Yves-F states. Le Coadic (2004, 8). In recent years, many studies have focused on identifying common elements and those that separate the two major areas of communication: mass media and social media. There is research that believes that social media platforms can be used efficiently by professional journalists (Brandtzaeg & Chaparro Domínguez, 2018). The danger of losing the identity of the two areas is one that cannot be neglected.

Communication is such a vast field, that a scientist like Umberto Eco felt the need to operate a constraint, to demarcate an area of *significance*. By defining the process, Eco imposes the condition "to request an interpretive response from the recipient" (2008, 22). It is not necessary that this response is sent to the emitter and it does not even have to be formulated accurately. It may be just an impression, an emotion, that is, a sign that the receiver has recorded a message, even superficially. In this context, communication, in Eco's work means "the passing of a signal (which does not necessarily mean a sign) from a source (via a transmitter, through a channel) to a destination. In a

process that takes place between two machines, the signal has no power to signify: it can only determine the recipient under the *species stimuli*. In this case, there is no meaning, but there is a transfer of information" Eco (2008, 22).

2. Communicating, communications and telecommunications

Public communication cannot be separated from the communications and telecommunications sector. The history of mankind is also a history of technical innovations, capable of facilitating communication. The roads and the vehicles traveling on them meant not only the improved mobility of people, animals and goods, but also information. For thousands of years, travel via land and water has been the main way of communicating and communication. The inventions of the printing press and the increase in the number of printed copies have made written works easier to access. After 1800, the technical progress is accelerated, which would revolutionise many sectors of human activity, including the exchange of information. Editors and publishers (media organizations) would benefit from the innovation called telegraph, and then would be equipped with a telephone. The media is now taking steps towards radio and television. Telecommunications were widely used in civilian and military life.

The global information system has allowed, after 1994, when the Internet had united the world, a higher degree of interference and networking and thus diversifying communication possibilities. In the broad field covered by communications and information sciences, contents are transmitted, that is to say, in elements of public interest. Contents can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) information (news); 2) educational (instructive) data; 3) entertainment (Briggs and Burke 2005, 173-239). The public communication sphere is diverse, but in order to provide focus, we shall mention here five areas of manifestation: 1) mass media; 2) public relations; 3) advertising 4) propaganda, 5) databases. Media communication is performed by processing information gathered from different sources and presented to audiences in the form of specific products. Public relations are concern with the management of information about organizations and products, with the specific aim to increase their efficiency and to distinguish a positive image. In the field of advertising, data is used to determine consumers to purchase products and services. Propaganda constructs messages to support the spread of certain ideas or the downfall of others. Managing databases means making information available to those interested and offering elements to satisfy the need to get inform, access training and entertainment. The transmission and exchange of information, as well as the reception of certain content and consumption of entertainment represent professional communication acts, and this is the spot where specialists intercede.

3. What we mean by information, methods and techniques

Information can be identified as being a fragment of the world capable of raising interest, representing a novelty. The insignificant is irrelevant, and the communication process is only possible when the transmitted data has a certain degree of relevance, even if the degree is low. Thus, in a more elaborate definition, information means meaningful content that can be expressed and transmitted through a code and a means from one person to another or to an audience. It is a functional definition because the semantic area of information is particularly wide. In order to have good communication, in addition to new content, it is important that the information is understood and deciphered (Floridi 2011). It is an issue that arises a lot of problems in practice, especially when someone's life is at stake or important institutions are at risk. There is another term of operation, that is, *data* (which is identical in the singular and plural form). There is a long debate about the identity and content of the two terms, information and data. There seem to be three more distinguished meanings: 1) the two terms are synonyms; 2) data represents elements of the information; 3) information is structured data (Floridi 2010, 20-21).

Information gathering is done through *methods*, *techniques* and *procedures*. Defining each term is somewhat of a difficult task because both normative work (dictionaries) and proposed positions by various researchers tend to induce a state of confusion. This seems to be generated by the synonymy (sometimes outright) between the terms, but also by the lack of a preoccupation for establishing a reference framework. The method can be considered as technique and procedure, as each of the relationship terms can be found in the other. Sometimes other semantic terms are introduced, such as manner, means and way. In the acceptance of this paper, there are important differences to be made between the three concepts, considering that they are operating in a structured system, which involves a hierarchy and a well-defined field of action. There are differences between fields and researchers regarding the number of methods or techniques, as well as the structure outline. Thus, De Ketele and Roegiers, in a dense and specialized volume; presenting the word methodology in the title, award methods with an important role, considering techniques rather as procedures (*démarches*) (Ketele and Roegiers 2009, 118). Other research technique specialists, term that allows us to think about a wider (and more complicated) process when compared to that of collecting information, will, at a later moment, revisit and admit: "In public relations, however, research techniques are also used to collect data and information" (Wilcox, Ault and Agee, 1997, 124).

By *method* we mean a structured system of techniques and procedures engaged to achieve a goal. Because the activity of collecting information in communication sciences is carried out as a process, *method* can be understood as the set of actions performed for finding, attaining, absorbing and capitalizing on the information.

Technique represents a specific way of working to achieve a goal. A method can be supported by one or more techniques, used crosswise, successively or concurrently. In

this approach, techniques are subsidiary to the method, from the theoretical possibilities offered by the method, the communication specialist utilises the technique (or techniques) that yield the best possible result.

Procedure designates the practical tools available to the user in the actual information gathering activity. A technique has several working procedures, used together or separately, depending on the specifics of the communication situation.

4. Sources and resources

Sources refer to people holding information or documentation elements that contain information. *Human sources* are represented by natural persons, individuals and collectives, organizations, institutions, commercial companies, known as legal entities. *Documentation sources* can be material (physically existing in print) or virtual (electronic databases). We also distinguish between the sources with which the communications specialist (journalist or relationalist) works and sources of information for the public (audience). The communicator collects data for his own professional (ready to publish) products. Their further dissemination to the targeted people (audiences) transforms the supplying organization into a source of information in the public sphere (Szabo 1999, 12). Sources will be analysed in detail in another chapter of this paper.

In this context, it is important to mention the *means* (resources) needed in the information gathering process. The methods (with their subsequent components, techniques and procedures) are part of the cultural and scientific repository at the user's disposal (the communication specialist), acquired during the training process and applied in various specific activities. Furthermore, means may be identified in accordance with the general management rules of any human activity, alongside financial resources, the time budget, the staffing needs, and the appropriate equipment for the information gathering operation. In this context, we notice that the information gathering activity is a process, structured as a specific professional activity, within the framework of certain professional organisations, which entail an adequate bureaucratic and economic-financial model to function.

5. Searching and collecting

Most information is searched by specialists, which implies an active involvement, using resources and luck in some degree. However, there are sometimes instances when important data easily reaches the communicator. Stakeholders have a vested interest in conveying information, even it being to denounce a suspect, illegal, immoral or extraordinary situation. The process of collecting information in the field of communication is elaborated and is comprised out of distinct stages. First, the need for information is identified. It is established that a certain audience is interested in certain data, that now needs to be procured. At the next step, the source is identified, which

means the search for information. We can identify situations where data providers come to offer them by themselves, such initiatives are being encouraged. The retrieved data are subjected to a first analysis and synthesis and are recorded on different means. Subsequently, at the office (which may also be a virtual one) the information will be processed in a set form that will get broadcast or made available to users.

However, news gathering cannot be regarded as a superficial operation, as if the data were available somewhere, in very close proximity, in a database, waiting for the communicator. The main problem of good information, really relevant, in the sphere of public communication is that it is not easy to come by. Searching proves to be an essential activity, even if sometimes it does happen that exceptional things are quickly discovered. It depends on flair, luck, but then again, we find that these elements do not show up every time. Sometimes, one must be assertive and work intensively and carefully. The information is to be published and the publication is done in the form of specific communication products (Szabo 2014). In many cases, the data that is to be published or broadcast alters the lives of some people, so they will be reluctant to provide details. It is thus paramount that withholdings are diminished, this being the only way to offer good information.

Some researchers distinguish between the information received and the information researched (Agnès 2011, 67). It is a technical differentiation, which attempts to separate between what reaches the journalist from an exterior initiative and what he or she looks for out of own initiative. In reality, the two processes are complementary and integrated. The communication process between the publishing company employee and their sources is dynamic and much more complex now than in the past. Until the invention of the fax machine, but especially the invention and use of electronic mail, and thus before 1980, the means of individuals and institutions to transmit information to the media were limited to letter writing and telephone calls. In the former case, communication was deficient, for it took a long time for a letter to reach the editorial office. As far as the phone is concerned, it was not widely available, with a small number of posts. At the beginning of the twentieth century, some publications engaged the phenomenon of transmitting telegrams by reporters from different places, the mechanism were adapted to the one practiced by detectives. However, the current phenomenon, especially present in mass media, when communicators cease to travel in search of information and are satisfied with what they receive from outside sources, must be avoided. This leads to a concept notion - the passive journalist, evoking a dangerous situation for professionals (O'Neill and O'Connor 2008).

6. Looking for significance

The last decades had witnessed the phenomenon of interdependence, whereby institutions, even ones more discrete in the past, have begun to seek journalists'

attention. At the beginning of the third millennium, there was an intensification in flooding editorial offices with various information, an aggregate sometimes difficult to control and capitalize, the main channel to information traffic being electronic mail. However, a small amount of data is used in the editorial process, many of the messages find themselves in garbage bins, or remaining forever buried in the electronic mailboxes of the editors or journalists. The phenomenon does have an explanation: the information received by the editors is favourable towards the issuers (institutions and organisations). Only low-performing journalists can be content with such products often developed by public relations offices or spokespersons. An interesting relationship is thus created, that of identifying, structuring and publishing relevant information for the public through their negotiation process between specialists, journalists and relationalists. Their activities may be congruent or divergent, as a press release cannot (perhaps only exceptionally) be a quality journalistic product.

The really relevant information is quite rarely discovered through the initiative of certain people in the organization. It can be used to build the context, but the reporter will focus on two other directions: 1) identifying relevant information beyond what is officially communicated on the subject by means of press release, verbal spokesperson statement or chairperson of the institution; 2) searching for relevant topics for the public in other spheres than the institutionalized messages. However, the involvement of the two sides cannot be avoided. However potent a reporter discovered subject may be, it cannot be dealt with, it cannot be disclosed, without considering the opinion of those involved in the story and of the competent institutions. You will never read a corruption related press release by a relationist about the institution they are employed by. They will react (often by denying) when inquired by the press. In the cases where sufficient echo is drummed up in the public sphere, the opinion of lawyers or even representatives of legal institutions will be needed. We thus note that it is not enough for a public relations specialist to send a message to an editorial organization. A skilled and scrupulous journalist will always insist on details, some of which may be uncomfortable. On the other hand, a press worker will also have to ask for details, often difficult for the subject of the piece of news, but interesting for the general public. The relationist will strive to reveal as little as possible and minimize the impact, while the journalist will strive to find as many details as impactful and maximize the effect. The information positioned between the two and shared by both in often times the same, but it is valued differently.

It is important to understand the gathering of information in the wider context of documentation to achieve communication content. The activities during the documenting process are structured according to the purpose and characteristics of the final product. In these cases, we distinguish between informative or factual materials and opinion or analysis. In the first case, when communication refers to the factual, an event, a significant element of reality, the basic information is the information gathered

on the spot of the happening. In the case of opinion materials, the authors rarely do field work. They gather their information from the existing communication content, where the information has already been processed. They can pull their sources from mass media, but also from other public sources, such as reports, sentences, and decisions taken by various organizations, or even opinions and analyses taken or made by other commentators. We use the term *factual* to denote the concrete elements of reality, that is, the facts *that* get publicized and not *how* they are publicized. The term is not deprived of a certain amount of imprecision, as Daniela Zeca-Buzura points out, referring to associated media phenomena (2009, 47-50).

Thus, a new selection of information is coined, which is processed in a higher register, the one where informed opinion is endorsed, and the new content of communication is written by journalists with great experience, editorialists or people with notoriety in the public sphere. Of course, the danger of introducing a higher dose of subjectivism increases and the emergence of unilateral approaches is possible. Thus, we see that the original information, which speaks of a significant occurrence in its raw data, can experience multiple developments on the communication route (Szabo 2014). Depending on the options and necessities, based on motivations that cannot be considered wrong from their starting point, good or bad, the same set of data can be structured in content that becomes contradictory or even opposable. These changeable features are part of the elements capable of structuring human communication in a sometimes surprising and even disconcerting diversity.

The extremely diverse technical means currently available to communicators cannot replace the sense of news and the need to seek it out. In this context, that of mediated communication, information is regarded as news. In the professional jargon, the two terms are regarded as synonyms: to supply a piece of news means to provide information with impact for a certain audience (Rosca 2004, 109-110). However, from the information in the primary stage to the elaborated news, as a good communication product, there is a certain distance to be travelled. On this communication route one or more communication specialists are placed with well-defined roles in completing the media product. Clarifications are necessary because there is information gathering and exchange in other contexts that do not represent mediated communication. There are researchers who talk about information management in the general context of information philosophy, a field of study that has been developing rapidly in recent years: "In contemporary life, some of the most important decisions that people have to make are about managing information the collection, organization, distribution, and evaluation of information "(Fallis and Whitcomb 2009).

7. Information analysis

Evaluation is a process taking place under certain rules aimed to determine the relevance of the information. The operation takes place on several levels, with multiple control gates: 1) pre-publishing evaluation, when the focus is on the data itself; 2) post-public sphere broadcast analysis, where research focuses on the finished product. It is obvious that in the first stage, on the route from source to the communicator and publisher, control over the information is significant, even if not total, since various elements (sometimes significant ones) may not have reached the communication specialist (reporter, editor, relationalist). However, they are the decisive force over what and how they will publish. On the link from the media to the public, the interventions of the people who collected and disseminated the information are hard to make, the publishable content has its own public adventure.

The understanding of the analysis process is facilitated by taking into account other implications, investigating the process of news production and communication content. There is a long tradition of research on receiving messages from the public, with essential contributions from the whole sphere of social sciences (sociology, psychology, law), but also from the humanist area (literature, art, cultural studies or history). Political sciences are mainly interested, in the past decades, in receiving process elements, participating in the discussion about persuasion, propaganda and manipulation. There are numerous studies of the philosophy of communication, including logics, and there are almost no textbooks on these disciplines that do not highlight the effects of message broadcasting. However, the effect analysis should not neglect what goes on prior publication and what is the criterion that has led to the structuring of a message in its public presentation format. In conclusion, information is analysed: 1) by a communicator before being made public; 2) by receptors (most non-professionals) after being broadcast.

Of course, it is very important what we know as public, as actors in the public sphere. We are the consumers, the message recipients. However, these contents are structured in a specific manner by professional communicators. An analysis process is needed both on how the public evaluates and exploits the information, and on the process by which the communicator collects and selects the data. For a communication specialist, this non-public stage of the media broadcast is essential because a communicator is able to control almost entirely. As two American researchers point out, it is necessary to shift our attention from the communication product to the elaboration process: "Often no meaningful distinction exists between the study of news as knowledge, which focuses on how news contributes to the social construction of reality, and the study of the epistemology of journalism, which deals with how journalists know what they know "(Ettema and Glasser, 1985). How (where from) does a communicator know what he knows? This is a fundamental question in the communication sciences.

8. People, messages, actions

Who is the entity that collects information? Common sense dictates: everyone! We differentiate, however, between the general public ability to engage and the specific, professional activity of communicating. Professional communicators belong to several categories. They can be journalists, relationalists, advertisers. But we accept that most people make communication products. A first type of professionalization occurs in the pre-school system, where little children are accustomed to a particular discipline, they draw or are involved in games, a ludic approach in which they receive information and acquire certain behaviours. In school, students gather information by observing, listening, reading and seeing the world around, watching TV or computer communication products. By working on themes and their projects, they are already accustomed to the basic forms of professional communication. These skills are continuously developing, being customized afterwards to communication situations at the workplace, public and family life sphere. It is obvious that everyone communicates; most of the people have professional knowledge, although the specialists in the field are but a few. These mentions are necessary because if, on the one hand, in the specialized communication only the journalists write reports, the relationists write broadcast statements, the prosecutors write indictments, the judges sentences, and the security services write reports, on the other hand, we all communicate through messages (paper, e-mail or social media), or are in the position to edit and process requests, invitations, minutes, memos and sometimes intervene in debates by commenting on the journalistic content on various media platforms. Citizen-Journalism is a constant everyday challenge, sometimes tending to erase the flexible borders between communication professionals and non-professionals.

We obviously collect, analyse and interpret information about people and the events of their lives, that is, everything that affects them and, above all, interests them. This interest is a common one, not necessarily a scientific one. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between information gathering as is practiced in the communications sciences and other fields, such as ethnography in social sciences or in the specific field of information services. The techniques are the same in all areas, as per principle, but differ by focusing on one or the other, for efficiency or by using customized procedures. Ethnography refers to the study of human communities in everyday life, in common day to day activities and the religion or culture specific activities, that is to say, spiritual life. Ethnography is based on interviewing and observation techniques. Both are also used in communication sciences. Ethnography facilitates the collection of common, repeatable data that unites the community to undergo research. Integrating features are pursued (McGranahan 2014).

The data collected in communications sciences, in the practical work of journalists, of relationalists or other specialists in this area results in that which is not pertaining to the common sphere, i.e. the exceptional, the accidents, the important administrative and

political decisions, the security or health challenges, the natural (earthquakes) or provoked acts (terrorist attacks). In the case of threats, security service officers also use the observation and interview technique, alongside others, which can be interceptions and communication surveillance (including Internet traffic). One inkling of potentially dangerous information is enough to engage the system. Agents can directly visit the headquarters of organizations to investigate suspicious activities and people. In some cases, they work undercover. They openly participate in public activities, enrol in courses under the cover of being a student, and enrol in smokers, revolutionaries, farmers, drug addicts, anonymous alcoholics associations or others alike. Here they observe the respective communities and detects potential security risks. Sometimes they engage in friendly conversations with suspicious individuals, directing these individuals towards issues of interest, taking care not to blow their cover or cause too much suspicion. All of these call for good communication skills.

References:

- Agnès, Yves (2011) *Introducere în jurnalism*, Iași, Polirom.
- Brandtzaeg, Petter Bae & Chaparro Domínguez, María Ángeles (2018), 'Gap in Networked Publics? A Comparison of Younger and Older Journalists' Newsgathering Practices on Social Media', *Nordicom Review*, 39: 1, pp. 1-15.
- Briggs, Asa and Burke, Peter (2005) *Mass-media. O istorie socială*, Iași, Polirom.
- De Ketele, Jean-Marie and Roegiers, Xavier (2009) *Méthodologie du recueil d'informations*, Bruxelles, De Boeck Université.
- Eco, Umberto (2008) *O teorie a semioticii*, București, Trei.
- Eliade, Mircea (1990) „Faptul”, în *Fragmentarium*, Deva, Destin.
- Ettema, James S. and Glasser, Theodore L. (1985) 'On the Epistemology of Investigative Journalism', *Communication*, 8, 183-206.
- Fallis, Don and Whitcomb, Dennis (2009) 'Epistemic Values and Information Management', *The Information Society*, 25, 2009, pp. 175–189.
- Floridi, Luciano (2010) *Information: A very short introduction*, Oxford University Press.
- Floridi, Luciano (2011) 'Semantic Information and the Correctness Theory of Truth', *Erkenn*, 74, 147–175.
- Le Coadic, Yves-F. (2004) *Știința informării*, București, Sigma.
- McGranahan, Carole (2014) 'What is Ethnography? Teaching Ethnographic Sensibilities without Fieldwork', *Teaching Anthropology*, 4, 23- 36.
- Newsom, Doug și Carrell, Bob (2004) *Redactarea materialelor de relații publice*, Iași, Polirom.
- O'Neill, Deirdre and O'Connor, Catherine (2008) 'The Passive Journalist: how sources dominate local news', *Journalism Practice*, 2:3, 487-500.
- Popescu, Cristian Florin (2003) *Manual de jurnalism*, vol. 1, București, Tritonic.

- Roșca, Luminița (2004) *Producția textului jurnalistic*, Iași, Polirom.
- Szabo, Lucian-Vasile (1999) *Libertate și comunicare în lumea presei (Freedom and Communication in the Press World)*. Timișoara, Amarcord.
- Szabo, Lucian-Vasile (2014) 'Information Gathering, Social Media and New Media Ethics', in Patricia-Luciana Runcan and Georgeta Rață (eds.), *Applied Social Psychology*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 121-130.
- Toffler, Alvin (1995) *Power Shift: Puterea în mișcare*, București, Antet.
- Wilcox, Denis L., Ault, Philip H. and Agee, Warren K. (1997) *Public relations. Strategies and tactics*, New York, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.
- Zeca-Buzura, Daniela (2009) *Veridic. Virtual. Ludic. Efectul de real al televiziunii*, Iași, Polirom.

AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF QUALITATIVE AND CRITICAL APPROACHES TO COMMUNICATION

Georgina Oana GABOR
West University of Timișoara
georgina.gabor@e-uvt.ro

Abstract:

The academic community everywhere should pay attention to the appearance, in the discursive space delineated by communication studies, of the remarkable innovative intervention of the “ethnic” (rhetorical) critics comprised in the edited book of Al González, Marsha Houston, and Victoria Chen, *Our voices*. The anthology changes the face of qualitative and critical inquiry in communication studies, by negotiating, with the academic public everywhere, the possibility of a viable alternative, which offers legitimation and shelter to those who, for one reason or another have found themselves in the shadow, at the margins, in the insignificant corners of academic culture. The interest of the editors of *Our voices* in each one of us, those who choose to respond to their interpellation with our own texts, far from resonating with the older interest of the imperialist subject in the colonized object, seems, on the contrary, to invite us to the table of negotiations, to propose that we commence our existence, as ethnic scholars do, within our texts, whose meanings should (inter)mediate communication between our cultures from democratically equivalent positions, for the sake of cultural innovation, but also for the sake of a configuration of a universal profile of the discipline, whose symbolic borders are, no doubt, large enough to shelter every human effort to understand the complex phenomenon of communication.

Keywords: qualitative and critical inquiry, ethnic scholars

Around the end of 2013, I was discussing with Professor González from Bowling Green State University, Ohio, former chair of my doctoral committee, some issues related to the best articulation of the current ways to legitimize humanistic, interpretive, or, in methodological terms, qualitative and critical orientations within the larger context of inquiry in the field of communication studies. At that date, I very much needed, as in all crucial moments of my “bumpy” journey through this epistemological labyrinth of the field in question, his advice in that respect, as I was scheduled to make a public presentation, with a “preamble” role to the imminent publication of the *Politics within*

Parentheses, (Gabor, 2014) in the context of the monthly conferences hosted by the Institute for Social and Political Research. Professor Ioan Biriș created this institute under the aegis of the Faculty of Political Science, Philosophy, and Communication Studies in 2005, but it has “produced” only since 2013, when Professor Florin Lobont became its director. Dr. González was extremely receptive to my request and sent me an email with a summary of the “hard arguments” that any representative of qualitative approaches to communication phenomena carries around, fresh in their minds, like so many “aces in the sleeve,” just in case, who knows, someone in some corner of the world still wonders: “Why use qualitative and critical methods in the study of communication?”

As an aside, those arguments reached my ears countless times, to saturation, during the four years I spent in the United States at the beginning of the third millennium. Every time I met some “communication studies scholar” – and there were many – the way in which they “identified” themselves, professionally speaking, referred precisely to the theoretical-methodological option that framed both their research and their teaching approaches. In one of the first courses that I took, in the fall of 1999, Professor Lynda Dixon hosted, one or two at a time in each of our weekly classes, the representatives of the entire academic community working for the School of Communication Studies that we all attended, whether we were “international” students or Americans. These meetings, which took place in the context of the Introduction to Communication Studies class, offered us, the newcomers, the School’s Master’s or doctoral students, a first sense of the dynamics of the field of study of which we had engaged ourselves. Invariably, the professors from Bowling Green State University identified themselves through their methodological orientation, just as in social interactions, some gays and lesbians first – and, often, last – refer to their sexual identity as a *prima facie* attribute of their “total” identity.

That fact intrigued me, at that time, to such extent that, very early, I tried to “escape scot-free,” as much as possible, from that trivium. But I did not take a stand right away. I did, well-behaved, my homework, especially throughout my first year, when I was accumulating credits for my Master of Arts degree, a necessary step in the procurement of the doctorate. In other words, I frequented specialized courses on both types of approach which, like any self-respecting university, Bowling Green State University impartially offered to the future experts in the field of communication studies: Qualitative Research Methods, but also Quantitative Research Methods (for which, in the curriculum, a mandatory class in Statistics was a prerequisite). Later, the (macro-)orientations became more diverse, such that I could and did opt for subsequent classes within the frame of one or the other perspective. For instance, the class in Rhetorical Criticism – a separate course in the curricular offer that I chose without hesitation in the spring of 2000, once I got that “first sense” of the dispute with historical tradition, defining for the field in the study of which I had engaged myself – constituted, to me personally, the moment when,

for the first time since I had begun studying in the States, I had the feeling that I was “on the right track” in my search for my own epistemological and methodological identity.

Coming back to the legitimizing arguments for qualitative and critical orientations, especially as regards research in the area of interculturality – an academic area where Dr. González holds a totally privileged status, as he has contributed through inestimable efforts to the delineation of a profile of the discipline of an exemplary representativity as regards the appropriation of the discursive space by a multitude of “voices,” extant in a perfect, democratic harmony – Dr. González, thus, let me know at the moment of our conversation at the end of 2013 that, ten years after I had left the United States, the humanistic and social-scientific approaches to the study of communication had declared an armistice! They reached this armistice on the basis of the common-sense observation that a dynamic and vigorous field is more valuable than one that is fragmentary, divided by sterile polemics, all tributary to one type of theoretical and methodological dogmatism or another.

Al González was reflecting, extremely trenchantly, on the margins of that issue, stating clearly and upfront that anyone who reckoned that human symbolic interaction could be studied on the basis of a single research paradigm had stopped reflecting on the authentic meaning of inquiry. To believe, González understood, that qualitative and critical approaches rely to a larger extent on the subjective judgment of the researcher than on quantitative perspectives is as false as regarding the latter as free from the “burden” of rhetorical, persuasive argumentation. In fact, Al González confessed, things were way more complex. The most thorny problem, the most burning issue of the era we live in, the problem of (inter)cultural difference, requires an arsenal of methodologies as complete as possible, through the help of which we may gain, gradually and not without difficulties, access to its understanding. Only by bringing together the contributions that emerge from the various types of theoretical and methodological approaches may we hope, González believed, to understand the complex world that we live in. Alternative voices raise in support of this statement, Dr. González added, while drawing my attention to the fact that, at that date, academic publications such as that of Judith Martin and Tom Nakayama’s (1999) might be brought up that offered “dialectical models” of inquiry, by corroborating the results of qualitative, critical, and quantitative approaches, to balanced extents. Instead of continuing the old “struggle for legitimation,” these models could draw together, in constructive ways, the objectives that the various methodological approaches to the complex phenomenon of communication seek to achieve.

Most certainly, a hero of the ascension of qualitative and critical orientations in intercultural communication inquiry, Dr. González did not hesitate to remind me of only a few of the qualities of the orientation that he has given body and soul to throughout his career: he referred to the ethical-moral mandate that completes the portrait of those who aspire to an analysis of an interpretive type of human communication. Of course, González appreciated, social-scientific researchers identify themselves as well in relation

to certain ethical structures, but these present a limitation to the scope of research that the scientist can imagine and construct. The primary values, within such contexts, are predictability, control, and detachment, and not at all ethical-moral values, which must, necessarily, be part of secondary importance. Therefore, Dr. González argued, qualitative and critical methods are premised on social participation and involvement, as they promote and make themselves the ambassadors of a certain “relational praxis,” according to which the researcher talks *with a certain community/culture*, while giving up the old practice, with scientific claims, of the discourse *about that community or culture*.

Ultimately, Al González prompted me to be alert to and discourage any type of “weird reactions” of my audience at the Institute’s conference by saying, simply, that in the United States of America, the two antagonist types of approach to the complex phenomenon of communication could coexist and do, in fact, coexist, something that, for him, constituted the supreme argument – understandably, as all theoretical and methodological histories of the field attest to this. Fortunately, my public at that time was neither hostile, nor urgently pressed to seek a precipitous resolution of the issue. On the contrary. The questions that ended the presentation helped me to explain why a privileged place should be conferred on qualitative research methods, next to the quantitative, in the research economy of communication studies, and why that position should be reflected, as soon as possible, in the Romanian curriculum, the script *par excellence* with the help of which we legitimize and document, here as elsewhere, our didactic experiences: in other words, the documents with the role of a theoretical and methodological map – of the caliber of any theoretical and methodological history – of the field we serve throughout our academic efforts. Until Dr. González’s ultimate argument acquires, in our Romanian academic culture, the *prima facie* understanding that the one who forwarded it credits it with, let us commence, together, this theoretical and methodological alternative journey through what constitutes the spinney of the documents that attest to my own *academic experience* on communication studies territory, contextualized, in its initial moment, by the American culture. My working premise is that the “beginning” is everywhere, that every text that has personally interpellated me, ever, is “just as good a beginning” for this trip as any other. Therefore, let us start right here.

In the introduction to the fourth edition of *Our voices: Essays in culture, ethnicity, and communication*, Dr. González explains why this publication, unique in the American academic culture, sustains the breach of qualitative and critical research in the field of communication studies, to the detriment, of course, of other options. To Al González, whose theoretical and methodological legacy I have benefited from and which I ventured, very early in my career, to transform into a “vision” of my own, communication means “an ongoing process of reconstructing the meanings of the symbols through social interaction.” (Gonzalez, Houston, & Chen, 2004, p. 6). Thus, as González appreciates, by citing Carbaugh, “[I]f one wants to understand the action persons do, from their point of

view, one should *listen to the terms* they use to discuss it.” (Carbaugh, 1988; my italics). By gaining access to the symbols that people use in their social interactions, we get both the privileged key, and the access route towards the meanings that human beings share with their fellows, in the context of certain communities, to the configuration to which those symbols themselves contribute.

In an attempt to offer “an alternative for those interested in learning something about culture, ethnicity, and communication,” (González et al., p. 2) by way of *listening* to the various perspectives that “ethnic scholars” – a term that designates the non-dominant (from a social-cultural point of view) communities within the United States – manage to articulate, in the context that *Our voices* offers, on the basis, exclusively, of their own cultural experiences and in the unique terms in which they describe and interpret those experiences themselves, the three editors commence from the premise that the very complex process of communication may be accessed, from an epistemological standpoint, on the basis of those individual descriptions and interpretations of culture, while the individual becomes the point of access towards an understanding of the cultural community, in its whole, which those individuals represent and whose epistemological contour they articulate, thus, through their own “voices.”

The purposes that *Our voices* serves are meant to legitimize these presuppositions of inquiry. By registering the “communication styles and practices of cultural groups, from these writers’ points of view” (González et al., p. 2), *Our voices* intends to explore the complex relation between communication and culture, through a welcome balancing of the weight of “voices” within the academic space, such that the dominant voice, articulated in “privileged form[s] of scientific inquiry” (González et al., p. 3) and which conveys, rather the unfamiliarity of the scholars who articulate it “with the specific practices that lend significance to the general cultural categories or dimensions that are created,” (González et al., p. 3) stops supplying the unique perspective which can legitimize academic inquiry in general. Thus, the editors attest that another objective that *Our voices* pursues is to invite *human experience* onto the stage of inquiry, while legitimizing it as such, as a foundation and an access point in understanding and studying (cultural) communication. Consequently, a third objective is being implicitly attained: as long as (academic) research recuperates human experience as its foundation, the *ongoing interest* in the complex phenomenon of communication becomes a necessary effect in this new “logic of inquiry,” while the concept itself of “scientific/academic inquiry” gains access to new locations within the discursive space, as it changes its meaning so as to integrate, rather than silence, exclude, or make such expressions illegitimate. Ultimately, the book sets out to illustrate, as concretely as possible, the vast variety of perspectives from which, at the beginning of the third millennium whose gates we are chosen to open with our own steps, the phenomenon – of an overwhelming complexity – of human communication can and must be regarded.

Al González is among those scholars in communication studies who have a true “gift” concerning the synchronizing of their own agendas – in this case, coordinating theory and practice. Moreover, oftentimes, as in a veritable *mise-en-abyme* of meanings, his writings leave the impression that the two levels coincide, while (self-)referring to one another, a phenomenon whose explanation resides in that “relational praxis” that he talked about, as I noted at the beginning of this essay, and which means nothing but a practical-theoretical outcome of those exposed in a theoretical-practical manner in the introduction to *Our voices*. To illustrate the above, I chose to refer to a publication of Dr. González from the very book he and his two colleagues, Marsha Houston and Victoria Chen, edited. My purpose, in the following analysis, is to propose a first meaning for the concept of *cultural mediation*, a meaning which Dr. González himself indulges in his study. Then, according to an older habit, I balance the respective meaning with my own definition of cultural mediation, which is specific, in particular, to academic culture everywhere, while attempting, in this way to delineate the profile of a cultural practice whose confessor I portray myself to be, by self-textualizing my own discursive experience on communication studies’ territory. This is a field whose flexible and relaxed borders, as Griffin (1997) characterized them at the end of his incursion through its theoretical and methodological history, *may be thought over, on the basis of their symbolic character*, according to the exigencies and interests of those who wish to find shelter and legitimation within their context. I am the first to believe that such project is of major desirability. Moreover, without holding “expert knowledge” in this respect, I intuit that my pages speak on behalf of a community that, even if it does not yet exist, will acquire a profile and an identity because of my effort of *(re)construction of the symbolic borders of communication studies* beyond (or on this side of?) the academic cultural space of the United States. Here is, therefore, the reason that I am selecting, out of the numerous texts that might document my academic experience, those which interpellated me not necessarily from the perspective of the knowledge they offer as regards the American profile of communication studies, but, more importantly, in their quality as “cultural guides” with a major heuristic value in my own searches for identity through the labyrinths of all kinds of texts (academic, in particular).

To me, one such “cultural guide” has been and still is the *tejana* singer Selena Quintanilla-Pérez, who lived between 1971 and 1995 and whose existential journey and cultural memory have been appropriated, from an academic perspective as well, by contributions such as that of Dr. González, to which I will refer in the following. The article “Remembering Selena” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004), published in the fourth edition of *Our voices*, the edition I work with, is written in collaboration with Jennifer L. Willis-Rivera from Southern Illinois State University. The study begins with a ‘Prelude/Postlude,’ which we should understand by looking at the etymological history of the terms, as an anticipating engagement with a ludic episode, but which, paradoxically, may be also conceived as a final moment of a game with/of cultural meanings. Let us see what kind of

play or game the two researchers talk about and via what symbolic means they choose to describe and interpret it. In other words, in the terms that the editor of *Our voices* himself used, in the introduction, let us step into the “academic game” the two scholars propose, in order to gain access to the cultural meanings that only this choice can lead us to. Throughout this journey, let us *carefully listen* to the unique terms, the words that the authors use to document their own cultural experiences. Thus, we will get a sense of the community, *as a whole*, on behalf of which the authors speak and whose symbolic borders they articulate, while defining them in the very process of this articulation and, of course, while inviting the readers to identification.

The Prelude/Postlude invites us on the stage of the Convention Center Arena in San Antonio, Texas, where, on the night of March 2, 1991, the winners and the nominees of the eleventh edition of the Annual Tejano Music Awards, which took place the previous evening, perform to raise funds for a noble cause. Al González and Jennifer Willis-Rivera are there, as they let us know through the personal story whereby they invite us along to the musical event. The story does not say much, in its first episode: we find out that artists such as Mazz, Shelly Lares, and Adalberto appear on stage, “an act for every generation” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 56), yet, even though the music is excellent, it does not manage to make the two determined to get closer to the stage. The cultural barrier they experience, like a wall, gets between the two and the cultural act of participation which such a musical event invites: “Our Midwestern accents alienate us from many *tejanos* from the valley” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004). Yet, confess the two, someone manages to get them up onto the stage, someone manages to bring together everyone at that concert. This is Selena Quintanilla, whom the authors describe in vivid terms through a story that transcends the limits delineated with italic characters by the critics themselves at the beginning of their study:

As she performs her set, she gives little waves to people close to the stage. She seems to delight in her newly choreographed motions; her voice seems to rejoice in her newly learned Spanish [...] During the instrumental portions of the songs, Selena engages in small talk with those who come up to the microphone. Through all of this, Selena is laughing and smiling. She makes the interactions part of the music rather than a distraction from it. (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004)

The story, thus, seems to continue, even when according to most it should have ended its mission: if, indeed, a personal story may constitute, since Aristotle, the best way to announce the topic, as well as to capture an audience’s attention and benevolence, in most of our discursive undertakings, when it comes to academic research we find ourselves compelled to *not* continue, as much as possible, in the same manner, in the same tone. As Al González clearly states in the same introduction to *Our voices*: “The pressure is great to put aside our cultural selves in order to gain scholarly credibility” (González et al., p. 4). Still, the critic adds a few pages later, “if human experiences are

indeed characterized by storytelling and the creation of meanings” (González et al., p. 4), then it is the right moment, which *Our voices* celebrates, to redefine intercultural communication inquiry itself so that ethnic scholars are able to “create their own agenda and contribute to a truly polyphonic cultural melody” (González et al., p. 4). Here is the theoretical credo practically conveyed within the two scholars’ academic writing. The impulse towards storytelling, proper to human beings, gains access, from the marginal location where the efforts towards “scientificity” of the old contributors to the development of communication studies pushed it, to a central, privileged position in academic writing. González and Willis-Rivera have a personal story to tell us, which does not restrict, from their perspective, our – the public’s – possibilities of epistemologically relating to the communication phenomenon that they bring to our attention that way. On the contrary. The “wager” of the critics is that *it is precisely in this way* that we may gain access to the *particular*, culturally determined meanings, in the terms in which they invite us to do it, *terms by which the authors feel well represented* and which allow us to know them as *persons engaged in the academic act of inquiry*, focused on their objects of interest.

If the lively image of Selena at the concert in San Antonio remains “the best memory” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 56) of the *tejana* artist in the minds of the two critics, very soon this image will have to survive, as such, in collision with the numerous alternative images that mass media, invariably, appropriate and broadcast (and Selena’s case was no different) in the case of a tragedy. On March 31, 1995, TV stations in the United States broadcast, live, images from in front of a Days Inn in Corpus Christi, Texas – images that caught Yolanda Saldívar, the artist’s accountant, in her own car, speaking over the phone with police negotiators, a conversation followed by the arrest of Saldívar for the murder of Selena Quintanilla-Pérez. In the same evening, record the critics, CNN and the Spanish network Univision broadcast a variety of commemorative shows in honor of Selena because – ironically, in González’s and Willis-Rivera’s view – Selena “achieved far greater fame in death than in life” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 56), despite her artistic career and her career as a designer with her own boutique. The months that followed her death brought Selena to the forefront of American pop culture, through publications with a commemorative character, such as *People* and *Newstyle* reviews.

In the following pages, González and Willis-Rivera speak, at the same time, in stories that overlap and intersect, both of the social-cultural context that hosts and *transforms* as an outcome of the tragic event of the death of the artist, and of their “own journey to the place where Selena lived and died” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57), a journey which, as we expect, changes, to the same revealing extent, the identities of the travelers themselves. The trip from San Antonio to Corpus Christi, a drive on the freeway, touched initially by rain and ending with the sun on the sky, brings them unexpectedly to a Days Inn – perhaps the one in which the tragic event took place. The

two discover, one at a time, the insignia of the memory of Selena, kept alive in her hometown thanks to the sustained efforts of her fans, whose inscriptions on the walls of the town or on commemorative posters, worn with the passage of time, featuring photos of the artist, describe in moving words the love that they all feel for the *tejano* singer who won their hearts. During their drive through the streets of the town, the two critics discover the street and then the houses of the Quintanilla family, “a bit out of place in the neighborhood” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58), but insufficiently impressive from the standpoint of the affluence they could have conveyed: “This was no Hollywood,” remark the two. Eventually, González and Willis-Rivera arrive at Selena’s gravestone, a black marble stone in the form of a human face on which, in white, the artist’s name is carved. Above the stone, there are two angels, one with a red crucifix wrapped around its neck and the other holding a white carnation. The most impressive thing is the young *mesquite* that is planted behind the singer’s grave: “On every surface of this tree, on every branch, were carved and written messages to Selena [...] It was on this living part of her memorial where the grief of her fans poured out” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 59). On their return in town, González and Willis-Rivera find the artist’s boutique as well, a small, modest store with Selena’s name inscribed on the neon sign above: “The walls inside were covered with pictures of Selena, gold records, newspaper and magazine stories, and Coke advertisements featuring Selena. A magazine article hung on one wall: ‘Haven’t heard of Selena? If not, you will’” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 60).

Beyond the narrative parameters of the journey itself of the critics Al González and Jennifer Willis-Rivera to the “center” of their academic interest, which, according to their own methodological exigencies, must become *a part of their concrete life experience* in order to become legitimate as such, the two relate, in the space which is textually delineated by the recurrent episodes of the narrative *per se*, the story of the legacy that Selena Quintanilla left both to American pop culture and to the American social-cultural (macro-)context that hosted her efforts at artistic expression. Ironically, only the “events after Selena’s death, the mourning, the remembrances [...] revealed the extent of her border sensibility” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57) remark the critics. The purpose of the two is to argue, by comparing the way in which the artist’s contribution has been retrieved from the dominant perspective of Anglo-American mass media to the manner in which the *mestizos* appropriate Selena’s music as part of their life experience, the thesis according to which “cultural borders are symbolically recognized and negotiated” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57). Moreover, González and Willis-Rivera notice, the symbolic negotiation that Selena initiated continues, putting its mark on American popular culture.

What does *mestizo/mestiza* mean, anyway? What does *tejano/tejano* mean, for that matter? What cultural borders do the two critics talk about? What is the relevance of the thesis that they set out to illustrate, and to whom is it significant and revealing? Who benefits from the results of such analysis? Who in their right would make it, and who

should go through it, by reading it? I ask myself, naturally, all these questions and many others, when I run into terms of the kind I listed, which, chosen, in full awareness, by the authors, whose effort at (academic) expression I am just going through – because they communicate to me, right? what every “ethnic scholar” who contributes to the compilation of the *Our voices* volume “feels is most significant to share about his or her culture” (González et al., 2004, p. 7) – are the unique terms that confer meaning, first in the eyes of the two critics, to their own effort to describe and interpret the experience which, only in those terms, they wish to share with an (academic) community. Who may be a part of that community?

González and Willis-Rivera bring to our attention, very early in the context of the theoretical story that the text relates, the descriptions of the Chicana poet and essayist Gloria Anzaldúa of the “border experience” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 56) of those who live at the frontier between the United States and Mexico, expressing “the consciousness [...] of living between cultures” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 56). Herself a *mestiza*, “with a mix of Spanish and Native American blood” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 56), Anzaldúa is familiar with an understanding of cultures “in a pluralistic mode – nothing is thrust out, the good, the bad, and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned” (Anzaldúa, 1987).

According to González and Willis-Rivera, Selena “offers a case study of the pluralistic mode that Anzaldúa attributes to the contemporary Chicana” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57). To illustrate the statement above, the two critics introduce two essential terms into their discourse: *mediation* and *innovation*. The borderline between the United States and Mexico means more than a territorial marker that, in its conventionalism, even though it benefits from international recognition, does not manage to give an account of the concrete life experience of those who, on the “fringe” delineated by this marker, “struggle against poverty, environmental neglect, and political exploitation as well as for justice, self-worth, and social respect” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57). Those who live along the borderline, on that “fringe,” have been compelled to “find ways to accommodate multiple (and often conflicting) histories, cultural identities, and social practices” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57). Thus, to the extent “Anglo and Mexican values and references intermingle” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57), the margin, the border, or the fringe becomes the privileged place for cultural mediation and innovation: “Mediation occurs when the preferences of two or more cultures are reconciled; innovation results when the preferences of those cultures are transcended” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57). Thus, González and Willis-Rivera suggest a binary of operational terms that we may use to work our way through this brake of intermingled stories. Because, thanks to the defining effort of the two critics, the statement according to which the *tejano* artist Selena Quintanilla-Pérez inherits a musical tradition that conveys “a border creation that reveals a *particular historical moment*” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57) becomes intelligible. If, overlapping with the legal

borders, “a symbolic place exists where diverse meanings come together through imposition, by invitation, or by accident” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57), only those who have the life experience of those cultural meanings, the people on the fringe, the people who live along the borderline (the border people), interpellated by the symbolic space whereby they carry their existence, “often question those meanings and *remold them into new interpretations* that fit into their border world” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57).

The two critics claim that *tejano* music is an example of such border innovation. The sound of *ranchera* is “a rich mixture of cultural influences: Spanish (guitar and violins), Mexican (trumpet and emotional vocal delivery), country and western, and pop” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57), a “dramatic, at times hyperbolic, never merely pretty” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57) sound. Thus, the unique sound of Selena, “a symbolic integrating of Aztec empires, Spanish/Arabic conquest, Mexican devotion, and Anglo colonization” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57) *integrates and, at the same time, transcends* the general effort of *tejano* music to “avoid capitulation to any one influence” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57). Moreover, the *grito*, a cry conveyed in *tejano* songs of love or sorrow, “is as much an expression of defiance as one of solidarity with the singer’s pain” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 57), which those who listened to Selena, even through mass media – as myself, who did not have the opportunity to encounter her while she was still alive, despite the closeness in age between us – remember first of all things. I still keep in mind and have not given up meditating on the moment when, on a stage that was literally assaulted by fans, whose excitement in participating in Selena’s concert became violent and dangerous to everyone (there were around 100,000 people in the audience), Selena leveled everyone’s emotions with such a *grito*, which she improvised as a prelude to her well-known song “Como la flor,” but also with her finger on her lips, in the gesture that generally appeases children. Here we have a child, a wonderful young woman who teaches us, from beyond the grave where she ended up way too early, “something about communication” (as Al González puts it in his introduction) with her own life, with her own innovative expressiveness.

After noting Jose E. Limon’s premise – “while their [*tejanos*] hold and sense of anything that could be called *Mexican* is tenuous and flat, they do not conversely think of themselves as *Americans* in any ideological sense” (Limon, 1994) – the two critics point out the subtle manner in which, far from meaning a “problem” (to solve), this “ever available opportunity for improvisation and creation” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58) of the young *mestizos* allows them – and Selena was an exemplary case of this, as well – a continuous reinvention of the cultural self, with major impact upon the symbolic borders along which these innovative manifestations take place. Nothing illustrates this “border identity [...] full of unexpected linguistic creation” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58) more eloquently than the pronunciation of the name of the *tejano* artist in three different ways, as González and Willis-Rivera appreciate. The events around the

death of the artist discursively “reclaimed her” under the name which, in its various pronunciations by one cultural group or another, creates itself a space of negotiation and innovation in relation to linguistic borders. The community in the north of Mexico and Univision pronounced her name in “correct Spanish” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58), but, as the artist was rather considered *tejano* than Mexican, another (unique) form of pronunciation of Selena’s name also came to be used that represented this. At the same time, the Anglo media named Selena by pronouncing her name in yet another, third way, thus proving “their unfamiliarity with *tejano* music, language, and culture” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58).

If, while she was still alive, the cultural community that was familiarized with Selena’s expressiveness was limited to the Mexican-American groups in the south of Texas, the carriers of *tejano* culture, the “sensationalism” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58) of the artist’s death radically changed things, such that Selena gained, *post mortem*, access to a new public. In the face of the tragic event, the Anglo media confronted an image for which it owned no adequate discursive means of appropriation, as it had neither sufficient background nor history in that respect. Therefore, it made several gaffes, from the standpoint of the *tejano* community, which reclaims Selena as its “label.” Thus, by calling Selena a “Mexican Madonna,” an inadequate, simplistic reading, even though “visually accurate” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58) as Selena chose to wear flashy costumes and bustiers on stage, the Anglo media associated her, on the basis of that reductionist reading of (the artistic act of) Selena, with the images “reserved for Madonna” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58): of promiscuity, opportunism, and lack of respect. This portrait, though, as the authors point out, stands in visible contrast to the one through which those in her own culture appropriate her, who associate her with radically different values: to the latter, Selena remains *la Reina de la Musica Tejana* – and it should be mentioned that *mi Reina* is the appellation, *par excellence*, by which *mestizos* refer affectionately to their own mothers, girlfriends, or daughters. Consequently, the two critics remark that the descriptions, at a linguistic level, of (the music of) Selena that proliferated around the time right after her death, coming from different cultural communities, attest to the “broadening of the spaces for negotiation along the symbolic border” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 58), a consequence of the artist’s death, an event that interpellated an entire nation.

Thus, communities which, up to that point, had remained invisible “suddenly shed their cloaks of obscurity as they gathered to write, parade, grieve, sing, and perform [...] throughout the country”(González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, pp. 58-59) in honor of Selena, while inhabiting, thus, the newly created discursive space with expressive forms that would make room, along the extant cultural borderlines, for those who *chose to respond with their own descriptions and interpretations to the tragic event*. Therefore, the cultural memory that Selena left behind, manifest in the expressive actions that took place not only in her hometown, but all over the United States, facilitated the transgression and

reconfiguration of the cultural borders between Anglos and *mestizos*, while bringing the two communities closer to each other, by means of the unmediated access of all to the discursive space that Selena created along the cultural borders which hosted her artistic act. González and Willis-Rivera note the fact that this cultural legacy of Selena *has no end*, once a larger and larger Anglo public encounters, for the first time, the Spanish language and once the *tejano* music transforms, gradually, in the eyes of the dominant culture, from an obscure manifestation, whose place of expression (Mexican restaurants) remains a limiting option, into something different: “a person, a place, an event” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 59). The voice of an isolated culture speaks to a national audience, the two critics attest, and the *tejano* music becomes the cultural bond, *par excellence*, which facilitates that effect.

Peña, whom González and Willis-Rivera cite in their study, refers explicitly to “the pedagogical aspects of music-centered events in the *tejano* community” (Peña, 1985), while considering them “a special sort of rhetorical play form [...] that both defined symbolically what a *tejano* was and prescribed how he or she should behave culturally” (Peña, 1985). Thus, Selena herself constituted and still represents an educational model for many *tejanos*, such that, in this way as well, her message becomes stronger and stronger, while accessing portions of public that “were once inaccessible” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 59). Consequently, the two critics decide, through Selena’s music, “*mestizos* have been able to share their culture with the entire nation, allowing for a (re)formation of symbolic borders and the (re)introduction of mainstream American culture to many aspects of *tejano* culture” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 59).

The possibility of creating a *mestiza* culture, the freedom to manufacture a positive space of intersection at the limit of cultures, which Gloria Anzaldúa dreamed of, is awakened in a symbolic order thanks to Selena’s effort in artistic expression, and is further capitalized on by artists such as Ricky Martin, Cristina Aguilera, and Jennifer Lopez. González and Willis-Rivera remind us that Lopez gave Selena an image, in “an especially symbolic” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 60) manner, thanks to her role in the film that the director Gregory Nava dedicated to the artist, in 1997, only two years after Selena’s death. The two critics acknowledge, as did all who watched the film, the fact that “Lopez looked strikingly like the slain Selena” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 60) a resemblance which Lopez herself confesses, by remarking, along with the fans, and in a non-sexual manner, the “curvy” character of both bodies, which makes them alike in the first place and which stands as a sign through which to read *correctly* the most important attribute of Selena: her physical resemblance to common people. “She blazed and shimmered in the spotlight, but it was the fact that Selena was happily, proudly *del people* – “of the people’ – that forged a powerful, personal bond between her and her audience” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 60) attests the *People Weekly Tribute* publication in an issue of 1995, confirming the image of the “girl next door,” or the “girl from the *barrio*” for that matter, which, (inter)mediated or not, constitutes the privileged reading of (the

body of) Selena, along the symbolic borders of the social-cultural space that her memory created, but also beyond (on this side of?) that “fringe.”

González and Willis-Rivera end their story by noting that “the borderlands made visible to Anglos through Selena are still vibrantly in motion, still fluctuating, defined through music, language, and the body” (González & Willis-Rivera, 2004, p. 60). Therefore, the rhetorical play form, in Peña’s terms, which the *tejano* artist literally put on stage follows the prescriptions of those curved lines (as Lopez put it), the limits of the motion, carefully choreographed, of Selena’s dance on this “fringe,” while articulating, at the level of rhetorical “delivery,” what the artist’s message, in terms of discourse and sound, symbolically creates at the intersection of cultures, while giving a profile and identity to the *mestizo* community through *tejano* music, in an integrative, innovative, and interpellating manner.

It is not by accident that the two critics chose, out of the multitude of available options, Selena’s story and not another, in order to shed light on the concrete manner through which the creation of cultural meanings may convey that perfect coincidence between life and text, an overlapping which, as the authors consider, must be communicated to those who try to “learn something about communication” at the beginning of the third millennium; it should be shared with and to those who, to the same revealing extent, look for it with their own bodies and texts. The message *per se* of González and Willis-Rivera, in this fascinating academic piece, is a revolutionary, heroic message. “Remembering Selena” constitutes the academic representation *par excellence* of the *telos* of the new “politics of inquiry,” which the authors, as we remember, describe in full responsibility in a formula which makes explicit their particular position as regards the new identity of the communication studies field as frankly as possible: that “relational praxis” which Al González talked about, at the end of 2013, cannot be conceived without its *materialization within and throughout academic writing*.

If Selena succeeds in mediation and innovation at the level of her own forms of (artistic) expressiveness, while enriching American popular culture through her effort in articulating a different voice within the discursive space, the same is true as regards the two critics whose piece we have just read. The effort in articulating the most significant aspects of their own culture focuses, as we can see, on an “object” of interest whose appropriation, from an academic perspective, almost “requires” that the two authors approach it in a privileged way. To Selena, to her cultural inheritance which, in terms of a (re)definition of the symbolic borders at the intersection of cultures which, along with the people she interpellated and who responded to her, she managed to forward to the future generations, one does not get close, as González’s and Willis-Rivera’s lines seem to confess, except by showing the same delicacy, love, responsibility, care, and fidelity with which Selena herself always got close to the people around her. To understand Selena and be able to speak *on her behalf*, as well as on behalf of the *mestizo* community which she (well) represented and not, way too inadequately, *about* the artist, implies the effort

of following Selena even from the perspective of that “pedagogical model” that Peña talked about. Here we see researchers of Al González’s caliber assuming responsibility, with the same *joy and pride*, for this life lesson that the *tejano* artist offered, by creating within the academic discursive space a privileged place for the (re)definition of the symbolic borders which, this time, are proper to the field of communication studies and by suggesting, theoretically and practically, an alternative.

The effort in cultural mediation and innovation of the two critics becomes transparent all through *Our voices*, which, in letter and in spirit, manages to bring to the American academic public’s attention “different voices,” voices that articulate, in this volume, a real symphony of alternative cultural meanings, produced along the symbolic borders of the communication studies field, through the effort towards expressiveness of those who have their concrete, everyday experience. Only in these unique terms do the descriptions and interpretations of those who contribute to the compilation of the anthology give an account of the epistemological experiences of the authors and reveal aspects of communication *to which no other access way is available*. It must, therefore, be invented, and the writing of the two critics is such an innovation, as it mixes, in a harmonious manner and in a game with/of textual meanings, the story of Selena with their own story, the story of American popular culture, transformed, thanks to the effort of enlargement of the symbolic borders through *tejano* music, the expressive form *par excellence* of *mestizo* culture, with the story of American academic culture, itself transformed from its foundations by the new symbolic order which Al González and Willis-Rivera conceive and convey, in the company of all the other ethnic scholars who contribute to the realization of the volume, at the border between everything that used to mean, from the standpoint of the dominant culture, “academic research in communication studies,” until *Our voices* appeared, and everything else.

The academic community everywhere should pay attention to the appearance, in the discursive space delineated by communication studies, of this remarkable innovative intervention of the “ethnic” (rhetorical) critics, whose particular perspectives upon communication and culture, legitimized by their own life experiences and articulated in the unique terms in which these scholars wish to describe and interpret them, appeals thus to a public which defines itself, gets its contour, and enlarges with *every reading* of *Our voices*. The anthology changes the face of qualitative and critical inquiry in communication studies, by negotiating, with the academic public everywhere, the possibility of a viable alternative, which offers legitimation and shelter to those who, for one reason or another – and history or histories represent, right?, the best reasons – have found themselves in the shadow, at the margins, in the insignificant corners (from the perspective of those who appropriated, on the basis of the power that they owned in their quality of dominant community, the possible meanings of “inquiry”) of academic culture.

It is time for each of us to respond to the interpellation contained in the volume which Al González, Marsha Houston, and Victoria Chen edited. In other words, it is time for us to ask ourselves, fully sincere, if this reading, this story, this journey has changed us fundamentally or not. If it has changed our identity as researchers in the field of communication studies to such extent as to make us choose to contribute (rather than not), from our particular cultural corner, *visible or not yet* from the perspective of the dominant academic culture worldwide (which is American, especially on communication studies' territory), to the effort of transcendence of the symbolic borders, culturally determined, of the field, an effort that the three editors initiate and which they leave, on the basis of the texts with which they document their experiences, as a legacy to the next generations. The interest of the editors of *Our voices* in each one of us, those who choose to respond to their interpellation with our own texts, far from resonating with the older interest of the imperialist subject in the colonized object, seems, on the contrary, to invite us to the table of negotiations, to propose that we commence our existence, as ethnic scholars do, within our texts, whose meanings should (inter)mediate communication between our cultures from democratically equivalent positions, for the sake of cultural innovation, but also for the sake of a configuration of a universal profile of the discipline, whose symbolic borders are, no doubt, large enough to shelter every human effort to understand the complex phenomenon of communication.

References:

- Anzaldúa, G. (1987). *Borderlands/La Frontera: The new Mestiza*. San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute.
- Carbaugh, D. (1988). *Talking American*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Gabor, G. (2014). *Politics within parentheses: Qualitative research methods in communication studies*. Iași: European Institute (in Romanian).
- González, A., Houston, M., & Chen, V. (Eds.). (2004). *Our voices: Essays in culture, ethnicity, and communication*, 4th ed., Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- González, A., & Willis-Rivera, J. L. (2004). "Remembering Selena". In A. González, M. Houston, & V. Chen (Eds.), *Our voices: Essays in culture, ethnicity, and communication*, 4th ed. (pp. 56–61). Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Griffin, E. (1997). *A first look at communication theory*, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Limon, J. E. (1994). *Dancing with the devil: Society and cultural poetics in Mexican-American South Texas*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Martin, J. N., & Nakayama, T. K. (1999). "Thinking dialectically about culture and communication". *Communication Theory*, 9, 1, pp. 1–25.
- Peña, M. H. (1985). *The Texas-Mexican conjunto: History of a working class music*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

THEATRE IN THE ROMANIAN CULTURAL PRESS - BETWEEN REPORTING AND THEATRE CHRONICLE

Simona BADER

West University of Timisoara

simona.bader@e-uvt.ro

Abstract:

One of the most common questions when talking about theater in press is whether that approach is literature or journalism. In the period immediate following 1989, the distinction was hard to make because people who wrote about theater were not trained in the cultural field, coming from journalism or outside it. Before 1989, it was thought that a person with theatre studies was able to become a theater critic. After 1989, the link between the theater specialization and the newspaper articles was significantly reduced, increasing the number of literary chroniclers who have gone to the theater chronicle. Simultaneously, with the increasing number of cultural publications and general information newspapers, the texts about theater have begun to transform into informational journalism: news stories or developed stories. For this reason, I believe that a broad approach of the two genres: narrative and dramatic chronicle is necessary, to understand the distinction between these two.

Key words: journalism, culture, theatre, chronicle, news

The present article is a part of a larger research about theatre journalism in Romania between 1990 – 2000. Here below I make a discussion about the main journalism species, their characteristics and a review of Romanian authors' opinions about journalism related to theatrical field.

Between an accredited journalist for theatre and a theatre columnist there is a certain distinction: an accredited journalist is enabled legally to access information from institutions, while a columnist must learn new profession writing about the theatre life and shows. From this distinction we can begin the discussion about two journalistic styles, namely opinion or information journalism which are related with the chronicle and a journalistic report respectively. Another question when we speak about writing on art in media is if we deal with journalism or literature. Sorin Preda states that these two are

interrelated: the writer likes to have permanent editorial in a large journal while the journalists write thinking to collect his reports or chronicles in books. The literature and press seems to be connected by an underground system of communicating vessel (S.Preda, 2006, 17).

In Romania, in the beginning of 90's many of those who wrote about theatre had not formal instruction in the field coming both from the general press and from outside. Before 1989, it was considered that graduated of university section theatre was a suited person to become a theatre critic. Afterwards, the connection between the theatre department of universities and papers theatre chronicles loosened. In the same time, the number of publication increased and texts about theatre spectacles became closer to information journalism, news or short reporting. For this reason I consider necessary a broader approach of these two journalistic genders, to better understand where from come the distinction and the reason why theatre journalists need not only a special training but also understanding vision and a critical eye about the spectacle in peculiar. Houdebine states that we can define the text as a being or a linguistic fact, which is susceptible of a practical analyze and sends to other annalistic types of language (Houdebine, 1980, 283-284).

The journalistic text is defined by its capacity to present as many information as possible in few words that means to be informative and concise. On the contrary, the literal text use linguistic ornaments, metaphors, comparison in the propose of creating esthetic emotion as in all arts. Sometimes specific elements of literary style are found in journalism as well, especially when it's about art. According to Doina Rusti the journalistic articles might be grouped in two categories: narrative species (short news, reportages, serial, and portrait) and non-narrative species (program, manifest, essay, commentary, chronicle, pamphlet, interview, review, polemics, and open letter) (D.Rusti, 2002).

There are several criteria to differentiate types of journalism. One of the most common is to divide it in information journalism (news, report, interview, and story) and opinion journalism (editorial, chronicle, comment). The information journalism may present to other types according to the inquiry and exposition methods: interpretation journalism and investigation journalism (C.Popescu, 2003). For Claude Jean Bertrand the western direction and the Russian journalistic direction are different and the western journalism may be divided according to its means of diffusion (agency journalism, media journalism, broadcasting journalism, TV journalism, and online journalism) and its functions (information journalism and opinion journalism). The Russian version of dividing types of journalism comprehends: informative species (news, interview, reportage, story, informative correspondence); analytical species (analytical correspondence, editorial, problematic articles, review, chronicle, press review, letter, and analytical comment); and literary journalistic species (the sketch, portrait, profile, essay, pamphlet, parody) (J.C.Bertrand, 2001, 46-49).

The two types of journalism and their species have distinct rules that do not allow their intersection. In the opinion journalism as a consequence of expression freedom the independent press should consider any opinion available if it is not contrary to the general public interests or to the right of image or private life, but should start from correct and verified information and the author should be except of any interest conflict.

The role of opinion journalism should be to help the public to orientate in his daily political, social, economic and cultural life and to help the public to create its own value scale and criteria.

1. Reporting – an information journalism species

Reporting was defined as a narrative longer than the news, written at the third person referring to real facts aiming a selection of the most important information from one event field, and without any personal, emotional or value consideration from the author (Balbaie, 1997, 140). Reporting is in fact a more complex and elaborated news which offer larger explanation on an event. It is situated between the news and reportage presenting information according to the journalist selection. In daily press on 90's reporting was badly defined because often it was a mix of journalistic styles and genres: in the same article named story one could find elements of news, opinion, reportage, even interview. In the professional definition of the report, the presence of the journalists at the place and time of the event is mandatory, without any collateral describing the weather or portrait or even any form of humor. The journalist simply writes as possible the basic elements from the place, what happened, how it happened, who was there and a short timeline.

To make a good report from whatever event (political, economic, cultural, sport etc.) the journalist needs specific professional abilities and competences: good observation, capacity to keep neutrality, good documentation, transparency). He must understand to make himself understood, he must see to make things visible, he must hear to make him heard of, he must know to make things known for the readers (Balbaie, 1997, 141). In the same manner as for any other material to be published, for the report the journalist must make the same mandatory steps: pre-documentation (about general information, participants, circumstances, issues); documentation (participation at the event and investigation on all its aspects); and post-documentation (including other information in a larger perspective and collateral information). The journalist makes not a simple recording but must obtain supplementary information by investigation paying attention to all contexts, nuances and participants on the event. The story starts with the basic questions of all journalistic texts (what?, who?, when?, where?, how?, why?) but a good journalist must go beyond them and note every unpredictable element which can modify the preliminary view. From the whole field of information at disposal he must be sensitive to those new elements which written in a text could become interesting for a public not participating directly to the event.

2. Next day story

While reporting presumes an exposition of facts without intention to be developed in a larger item and with the precise aim of informing, the story is built on a narrative developed or not, in a subjective discourse with the intention of creating an emotional state or a message connected with it (D. Rusti, 2002, 16).

In every simple reporting we have a presentation and description of facts, events and their finalities, but reporting may be the base for a larger text which describes with a subjective implication the events in which the author was present. In the process of next day story the event modifies subjected to a reconstruction with narrative and esthetic intentionality. For Claude Bremont, the next day story is not just a complex of events and roles organized following rules which are foreign to it but it's another story which enrolled the narrative (C. Bremont, 1981, 401).

In what concern the textual structure of the story, this must answer the basic questions and is a medium size text of maximum two pages. The story becomes a mixture of information and testimony or, as named by Curtis MacDougall, in fact it is a next day story. As every narrative it has three major parts: introduction, named professionally lead, the content or the field of text and the ending which must not be closed but let conclusions to the public. For Sorin Preda the lead must avoid useless introduction and the plan of the text does not impose special rigors. The most used type of plan is the free one (mosaic type) and it would not be advisable a chronologic or demonstrative plan. The most important would be information ranking and the correct and expressive management of details (Preda, 2006, 154).

When reporting from a theatre spectacle some information are mandatory, like the title of play, the author, interprets, date, place, the time of show and the type as a dramatically gender. The difference from simple cultural news is that the story should contain details about the content of the spectacle or the public reactions but without any subjective comment to avoid sliding in opinion journalism as is a theatre chronicle. For Mariana Brandl-Gherga the story is a journalistic species between *mimesis* and *diegesis*: if the receipted reality is vague, certain relativity will be found in the journalistic text too. The journalistic text lives often in a dangerous hermeneutical ambiguity (Brandl-Gherga, 2007). In the same time some questions appropriated to literature texts are available for the journalistic texts as well, because even if they are different from a compositional and stylistic point of view, they both try to reconstruct reality in the intimate texture of the language. For the same author, the complete separation of text genders is a utopia and the story is in the heart of this dichotomy, being a text between description and narrative, between *mimesis* and *diegesis*. These two terms were stated by Platon as two basic principles in literature: *mimesis* (imitation) is the descriptive part of the text or event and *diegesis* (story) is a narrative about the event. In the next day story we have both

compositional modalities in such a way we can name it descriptive narrative (Brandl-Gherga, *ibidem*).

The story about theatre show should take into account all these considerations: a too short text could be tedious but a text with too many personal opinions would be beyond the border of informational journalism. Therefore the journalist specialized in the cultural field should in the same time keep his objectivity but should be able to make and offer well founded value opinions to make comparison and be acknowledged of the collateral information, even anecdotic in which the cultural field is rich (S.Preda, 2006, 161).

3. The theatric chronicle – specie of opinion journalism

The name *chronicle* comes, etymologically, from the ancient Greek *chronos* meaning time. The technical meaning is relating and commenting a development in time of facts and events as for example in the syntagma Romanian chronicle or the Moldavian chroniclers. This term was subjected to many semantic modifications, sometimes abusively confused with a critic article or a reporting. For Jose de Broucker the chronicle implies a debating discussion upon a fact even trivial, and should prove originality and erudition in a relaxed non-ostentatious manner, being a proposal of thoughts connected with the actuality even connected with the most peculiar aspects of social, moral or artistically life (Broucker, 2006, 186).

The chronicle is a journalistic specie in which the author reports, describes and comments in the same time the spectacle; it's propose is to inform but in the same time the journalist becomes a guide and a potential opinion trainer. The chronicle addressed a possible sensitive receptor but opens the reception understanding of an artistic act. The dramatic chronicler tries to understand the relation between the actual *mise and scene* and the dramatic text written by the author, following in the same time the peculiarities of direction, scenography and the way in which the spectacle transpose the literary text in a living show. For the director the text is just a pretext, an initial idea for creating a new artistic work bringing his own understanding and new meanings.

Theatre columnist should have a complex culture in literature and in theatre art as performance. When he writes about a new play he must make consideration on the subject and would write as a literature columnist implicitly. When he writes about classic plays with a new *mise and scene* his endeavor would focus on novelty of directing vision, actors, play, scenography and other details worthy to be revealed. His task is double: to inform the potential public about a new spectacle and on the other side, to reveal for the competent public the pluses and minuses of the show in an appealing mode (C. Popescu, 2004, 147). In other words, he should pay attention to all details like a terrain journalist but must value the spectacle like a dramatic critic. Not always those who write about theatre fulfill all these requirements, many chronicles are written by unspecialized journalists or by culture people coming from other fields (literature, art).

Marian Popescu noticed two pernicious tendencies in the theatre chronicle during the last decades of 20th century and the beginning of century 21. On one side the spectacular writing using epithets from tabloid press (amazing, gorgeous etc). On the other hand a closer personal relation of the columnist with the people implied in show business can lead to biased sentences and judgments (M. Popescu, 2012).

A dramatic columnist guides the taste of the public making evaluations and writing about the cultural context of the spectacle, he works on the public education. Apparently, many journalists doesn't consider too difficult to write theatre chronicle. On the contrary, the life of a theatric columnist seems to be nice and easy: one has not anything to do to see spectacles every day and then write about them. This is why so many unspecialized journalists write about spectacles and their opinion have no major impact. When we speak about specialized chronicles things are different. Not only information, but talent, culture and knowledge are necessary, because in the second instance chronicles are supposed to be the major cultural feedback expected by director, artist and all the theatre team (the first feedback instance is the public reaction in the spectacle hall) (D. Popa, 2002).

After the chronicle feedback, the director and actors can modify parts of their vision and sometimes the chronicle may indicate the good or bad parts which can be improved. The theatre chronicle is an opinion journalism species and therefore it is characterized by subjectivism in the freedom to choice the item, the tune, freedom in using first person in writing and freedom to express personal opinions and judgments. On the other hand, a columnist should subject not to publicist and deontological rules: he should make his article read but in the same time in his opinions he should respect what he consider being right and truthful about spectacle.

In many journals, the chronicle is permanent rubric, in the same place, page and day of the week. The public and the show business give feedback to chronicles: it can increase the audience of publication or, on the contrary, it can decrease it. In this context, the columnist should be an authorized receptor and his opinions can make the difference in the public appreciation and in value judgments about the show (Moiescu in Parhon, 2006, 5).

According to American journalism school, a columnist should take into account some questions he must answer when writing an article:

- Do I know well the item I'm writing about?
- Do I like or not the item?
- If I don't like it or I don't know it, why I'm writing about?
- Do I know enough to tell others about it?
- What the readers know about the item?
- What readers expect reading this article?
- How long the article must be?
- What is the main interest of the reader? Which is the main information?

- What I underline in text? What I have to omit?
- How to organize the text; with what to begin and to finish?
- How technical or accessible should be the language?
- How much I can perform stylistically?
- How much can I be present in the text as author?
- Did I write with pleasure or not? (S. Preda, 2006, 187)

For Doina Rusti a chronicle should respect some structural necessities:

- Who, where and when?
- A short presentation of the item
- A short two or three notes about the general vision offered by show
- On what elements the artistic vision is based (scene, interpretation, scenery, costumes etc)
- What is new in the artistic vision in comparison with others similar?
- General appreciation, subjective or quoting other opinions
- The public attitude (number of spectators, applause, short comments in the hall) (Rusti, 143).

In every theatre chronicle we can speak about some essential elements. First are the quality and specificity of information as in all journalism texts. The second is the purpose of the chronicle as description or analysis or judgments about it. The third one is the public to which the chronicle addresses. In general press the addressability is wider and the language is simpler. In cultural publications the language, the style, the cultural references, comments and even the purpose of the chronicle is different, taking into account a more cultured and educated audience.

4. Chronicle or theatre critic?

Sometimes is difficult to make a clear distinction between theatre chronicle and theatre critic. Making a synthesis of different definitions given by different authors (Coman, Preda, Popa, C. F. Popescu, Rusti) we can conclude that an article of theatre critic is an outline of the event followed by personal opinions of the author, or, in other words, it is a mixture of review and analyses having as purpose to promote lecture. In Romanian press the critic has a privileged place in the editor's board and in the cultural life of the community; eventually he can impose or exclude names, influence awards and recognitions. Sorin Preda enounces the differences between critical texts and the chronicle:

- Critical text has not the rhythm of a chronicle
- The lecture is focused on the present work
- There are more quotes and examples
- It values, it gives a diagnostic and make sharper judgments (Preda, idem, 29).

While the chronicle is “a comment text more or less specialized published regularly by the same person in the same layout” (Husson and Robert, 1991, 52), the critic appears sporadically and is addressed mainly to a narrower public. For Dinu Chivu the main reason why spectators don't trust the chronicles and critics are imprecision of views, liability of criteria and lack of authenticity besides scholarish digressions and a complicated style with many quotes, sometimes these texts “floats in an irreproachable ambiguity” (D. Kivu, 2009, 128). Some chronicles pay more attention to the self-image of the author than to the event and they are built on a simple receipt combining a mixture of contradictory observations and appreciations which end by reciprocal annulation. Another critical point of the same author is that sometimes instead of sending people to the spectacle, the critic make larger references to the dramatic texts. Among other defects, the author notes: to many quotes, the mania of epithets, lack of arguments in sentences or even bad intentions and lack of talent (ibidem, 130).

For the ordinary reader, the chronicle or critic article is more or less informative, but for the theatre people the opinions of a columnist or critic values as professional opinions which could be taking into account for improving performance. There is a close connection between the actors implied in the performing art and the critics in both critical articles and chronicles. We can say that both of these sides make part of a single cultural whole represented by the totality of participants related to theatre. In this totality, all parts are both active and passive and the roles interchange in time: the dramatic author is active in writing the text but afterwards becomes “passive” when the text is dramatized letting a place of activity for the director, scenographers, actors, which are active in the conception and performance; but afterwards they enrolled passivity, while the critic, which was a simple receptor, becomes now active by writing the text for a public who apparently is always passive, but in fact represents the ultimate aim and purpose of the whole cultural act. All these interplay has finally one single purpose: to move the spectator. In this chain, the press has its specific role: it informs the public, it guides the public, it reflects the opinions and established certain artistically standards for this cultural field.

In the present article I tried to make a review of the main journalistic species correlated with the cultural field of theatre underlying the specificities of each type and making considerations about how these were perceived in the end of 90's, their different definitions and the critical opinions about what should be and what actually was.

References:

- Agnes, Yves, *Introducere în jurnalism*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2011.
Bertrand, Claude-Jean, *O introducere în presa scrisă și vorbită*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2001.
Brandl-Gherga, Mariana, *Eveniment și imagine în presa scrisă*, Timișoara, Editura Artpress, 2002.
Bremond, Claude, *Logica povestirii*, București, Editura Univers, 1981

- Coman, Mihai, coordonator, *Manual de jurnalism. Tehnici fundamentale de redactare*, vol. I, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1997.
- Coman, Mihai, coordonator, *Manual de jurnalism. Tehnici fundamentale de redactare*, vol. II, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1999.
- Coman, Mihai, *Introducere în sistemul mass-media*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2007.
- Gaillard, Philippe, *Tehnica jurnalismului*, București, Editura Științifică, 2000.
- Houdebine, Jean Louis, *Pentru o teorie a textului. Antologie „Tel Quel” 1960-1971*, București, Editura Univers, 1980.
- Husson, Didier, Robert, Olivier, *Profession Journaliste*, Paris, Eyrolle, 1991.
- Keeble, Richard, *Presa scrisă. O introducere critică*, Iași, Polirom, 2009.
- Kivu, Dinu, *Rezistența prin teatru, (vol. I și II)*, București, Editura Tracus Arte, 2009.
- Mouilland, Maurice, Jean Francois Tetu, *Presa cotidiană*, București, Editura Tritonic, 2003.
- Parhon, Victor, *Cronici teatrale (1990 – 2000)*, București, Fundația culturală „Camil Petrescu”, 2006.
- Platon, *Republica*, București, Editura Științifică, 1993
- Popa, Dorin, *Genuri și specii jurnalistice*, Galați, Editura Fundației Universitare „Dunărea de Jos”, 2002.
- Popescu, Cristian Florin, *Manual de jurnalism. Redactarea textului jurnalistice. Genurile redacționale*, vol. I, București, Editura Tritonic, 2003.
- Popescu, Cristian Florin, *Manual de jurnalism. Jurnalism specializat*, vol. II, București, Editura Tritonic, 2004.
- Preda, Sorin, *Jurnalismul cultural și de opinie*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2006.
- Preda, Sorin, *Tehnici de redactare în presa scrisă*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2006.
- Randall, David, *Jurnalismul universal. Ghid practic pentru presa scrisă*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1998.
- Ruști, Doina, *Presa culturală. Specii, tehnici compoziționale și de redactare*, București, Editura Fundației Pro, 2002.
- Brandl-Gherga, Mariana, Sebastian Petrișor, *Relatarea, gen jurnalistice între mimesis și diegesis*, <http://culturasicomunicare.com/pdf/2007/brandl.pdf>, nr.1, anul 2007.
- Popescu, Marian, *Cronica teatrală și jurnalismul de nișă*, „Artactmagazine.ro”, <http://www.artactmagazine.ro/cronica-teatrala-i-jurnalismul-de-ni-a.html>, nr.168, consultat la 30.06.2013.