

VOL. XVIII
2006

ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DE VEST DIN TIMIȘOARA
SERIE NOUĂ: FILOSOFIE ȘI ȘTIINȚE ALE COMUNICĂRII

ANNALS OF THE WEST UNIVERSITY OF TIMIȘOARA
NEW SERIES: PHILOSOPHY AND COMMUNICATION SCIENCES

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ISSN 1842 – 6638

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FOREWORD

Analele Universității de Vest din Timișoara, seria Filosofie is beginning a new series in 2006 which is intended to include Communication Sciences according to the new structure of the Department. Accordingly, we are now *Analele Universității de Vest din Timișoara. Serie nouă: Filosofie și Științe ale Comunicării (Annals of the West University of Timișoara. New Series: Philosophy and Communication Sciences)*, trying to cover areas of Philosophy, Public Relations and Journalism. We will also welcome research articles on Advertising and Publicity.

We have a newly organized editorial board and collaborate with international academics who have kindly answered to our invitation to advise and critically refer to the submitted papers. We are indebted to all of them.

We strongly hope that for the 2007 issue our Advisory Board will be even more enlarged with academics dedicated to involve in improving the quality of our Journal. We can only assure that we are thankful and committed to offering to the international community an increasingly valuable reference for their study and research.

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ANNALS OF THE WEST UNIVERSITY OF TIMISOARA
NEW SERIES: PHILOSOPHY AND COMMUNICATION SCIENCES
VOL. XVIII, 2006
ISSN 1224-9688

SECTION I:
PHILOSOPHY

PLATO'S SOCRATES AND THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE

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Abstract

The study concerns Socrates of Plato's dialogues, the literary character, for which, however, there is no serious alternative in the surviving literature. Plato's Socrates is the figure which is a paradigmatic embodiment of the philosophical life and whose attitude enabled Plato to disclose the nature of moral knowledge. Socrates is a perfect illustration of the essential inseparability of dialectic and encouragement in Plato's works. The very characteristic traits of Socrates - his atopia, a „magic” effect on his interlocutors (and the dialogues' readers), a superficial rudeness through which the real beauty of his character shows - are subject of analysis. Socratic inquiry, using argumentation ad hominem, combines elenchus and encouragement. The strategy of Socratic discussions (Gorgias is an example) is determined by its protreptical and paidetical goals (which Plato has in consideration). We haven't got to do in them with reasoning of universal logical value, but with persuasion to choos the most beautiful life. Since Beauty is for Plato a perfect way of appealing to reason, a man like Socrates is alone the most powerful argument for Socratic way of life. And, at the same time, he is the best guide to Plato's doctrine of Forms.

Finally, one can say: if Plato ever succeeded in revealing any immortal Beauty, he did so in the case of the beauty of philosophical life of Socrates. It is the moral ideal culminating in the famous paradox: „virtue is knowledge”, and the paradigmatic harmony of logos and ergon in Socrates' life enables Plato to reveal the nature of moral knowledge - the justness of uncompromising Socratic intellectualism lies in its paidetical power.

This study concerns Socrates of Plato's dialogues - Socrates for which there is no serious alternative in the surviving philosophical literature. Plato's Socrates is a literary character, but his influence - as for a long time has been emphasized¹ - can't be compared to the influence of any true-born philosopher. In his work of genius Plato has turned the already established literary genre - the *Sōkratikoī logoi* - to the good account, increasing it to the philosophical level, laying the foundations of the whole ancient moral philosophy, directed to the formation of the individual soul. We know however that Plato has represented his master such a man as he'd really loved him, and - as such - it is a credible picture - not in its philosophical substance but thanks to its psychological cohesion. It must have been that man, we feel, whose companions could find „the best, wisest and the most righteous” (*Phaedo* 118a); who could fascinate cynical and bored aristocrates like Critias or Alcibiades; who could deadly irritate obstinate democrates of Anytos' kind; and who could be perceived by Athenian *demos* as corrupting the young's morals. All this, as Gregory Vlastos has noticed², speaks in advocacy of Plato's testimony against Xenophon's. Of course, as much as one can treat *Sōkratikoī logoi* in general as testimonies³, and not as „the experiments... directed towards capturing the potentialities rather than the realities of individual lives”⁴, which they in fact were. Plato has gone farthest this way, creating the figure, which is a paradigmatic embodiment of the philosophical life; creating the hero, whose attitude enabled him to disclose the nature of moral knowledge; creating Socrates, who is alone the best argument and the most efficient encouragement for the Socratic way of life.

And exactly such Socrates is too, for Plato, the best *mystagôges* initiating in the mysteries of the doctrine of Ideas⁵. Plato has believed that it is required to be intellectually and morally prepared in order to knowing the Ideas⁶. The intellectual preparation trains the learners for grasping the intelligible features of Being; the moral one makes them responsive to its non-sensory beauty. Socrates, defying all previous Greek canons of beauty, and at the same time „magically” attractive for the men to the beauty sensitive⁷, is the best possible guide on the way to the Ideas. Plato has deserved the credit for he was able to translate his personal experience into

¹ See, for example, J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy. Tales to Plato*, London 1914.

² See G. Vlastos, *The Paradox of Socrates*, in *The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays*, (ed. G. Vlastos), Garden City, New York 1971, p. 2.

³ Compare Ch. H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, Cambridge 1996, ch. I.

⁴ See A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography*, Cambridge, Mass. 1971, p. 46.

⁵ I prefer the term „Ideas” as a proper noun for Plato's *eide*, instead of the „Forms”, more often used in English, because the last is a translation, burdened with the metaphysical and logical connotations.

⁶ See *Epistle VII* 343e.

⁷ This „magic” influence of Socrates is best of all described by Alcibiades in Plato's *Symposium* (215b ff.).

philosophical doctrine and to make the man he had really loved the master of philosophers of all epochs.

The attitude of Plato's Socrates is an excellent illustration of the inseparability of the dialectic and the encouragement in the Plato's dialogues. Both are the argumentation directed to the intellect, because the beauty of the moral attitude of Socrates convinces us as much as his elenchus. In this union of the doctrine and the character, which has become a pattern for the whole ancient philosophy⁸, Plato has exposed the nature of moral knowledge as a harmony of *logos* and *ergon*. It is thanks to this union that Plato's Socrates emanates an erotism, the strength of which can't be compared with anything else in the whole philosophical literature. And it was through it that Plato has wanted to show the solution of the Socratic paradox: virtue is knowledge⁹. Let's look therefore on this extraordinary and exceptional man Plato has made the founder of the moral philosophy.

*

The most self-evident attribute of Plato's Socrates is *atopia*; Socrates is *atopos* (*Symposium* 221c), that is „other“, strange and distressingly different, a type which is unable to classify, a hero having got no prototype in the heroic literature. The source of Socrates' *atopia* is the strong contrast between his appearance and his heart of hearts. In the society the highest classes of which held the ideal of *kalos k'agathos*, Socrates, with his stork's step, distended stomach and physiognomy of a ray, must have appeared unusual ugly, and the things he was speaking about - unrefined and coarse. Socrates is even frequent vulgar, as in the conversation in the *Gorgias*: Callicles, prouder of his immoralism, feels indignant at the examples of enjoyment Socrates has called (494 c-e). The crudeness of the last is providently omitted in modern translations. Yet Socrates is able to awake a love in men genuine sensitive to beauty and to move an unfavourable interlocutors. Through the rude appearance shines a new kind of *kalos k'agathos* - the non-sensual moral beauty. In order to reveal its essence Plato, portraying Socrates, has turned to good account all contrasts between what is phenomenal and apparent, and what is profound and latent, showing up the falseness of the first, and revealing the authentic charm of the second.

We can see this in the *Gorgias*, the dialogue in which Plato has represented the clash of the moral attitudes. The choice between two lives was an old theme of Greek literature, but Plato has bestowed on it a dignity of the main decision in our life, decisive whether or not we live authentically.

⁸ Compare excellent, straying from the traditional view, works of P. Hadot: *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, (?); *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?*, Paris 1995.

⁹ The *Apology*, the only of Plato's dialogues which can be treated as a historical evidence (in some sense of course), contains allusions to this thesis (see 26a). As regards the testimonies of Xenophon and Aristotle, we ought to prove first their independence of Plato's; see Ch. H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic...*, *op. cit.*, ch. III.

And he's represented this confrontation as a fight, not a well-mannered conversation, party to which have praised the possible profits of the choice. If one can judge by the attitudes of his disciples, the ruthlessness and the insistence in the demand for the choice of the way of life must have been characteristic for the historical Socrates. But it's been rather the cause of Plato himself the transformation of this in an apology of the life, in which there is no place for any injustice.¹⁰

The three successive interlocutors of Socrates in the dialogue are elenctic refuted on the ground of essentially the same incoherence of the attitudes. It is not any of their propositions what is the matter of testing here, not any theoretical standpoint is impaired, but the way of life, in which Socrates reveals some insincerity and dysharmony. The final argument in the discussion - and the criterion Plato has suggested the dialogues' readers - is the notion of *kalon*: Socrates' interlocutors alone perceive the divergence between what they consider to be beautiful or noble and their avowed principles; and the beauty is what's lacking in their lives.

The skirmish with Gorgias, not quite serious and rather a show, brings to light his status of a teacher of such a moral mediocre art as rhetoric. Polos is right when he says, that only because Gorgias is ashamed to admit that rhetorician is not an expert in what is just, there's not yet a contradiction in Gorgias' speech (461b). He is right - there is a contradiction in Gorgias' life, for he is proud of, and derives benefits from the activity, he in fact thinks to be nothing to brag about.

Some of the commentators have expatiated on the unsoundness or sophistical character of the Socrates' arguments¹¹. In fact, Socrates constantly uses argumentation *ad hominem* in all three conversations in the *Gorgias*. But in the discussion on the way of life, not on the doctrines, it is utterly justifiable. It was philosophical attainment of Plato to show - by a model example of Socrates' elenctic discussions - that in the debates on the moral principles and the good life there's no need for the argumentation of universal logic value. It is impossible to refute a hedonism as a theoretical standpoint, because there's no moral axioms we could support on¹². Instead, it is possible to show the impotence of the hedonism held as a way of life, if we'll appeal to the feeling of the beauty and the ugliness. I think that Plato - in spite of his development of the idea of the king-philosopher who really

¹⁰ Socrates of Xenophon's writings doesn't know such a principle; see *Memorabilia* 2.6.35.

¹¹ A conscious use of the faulty arguments (e.g. in the *Gorgias* 474c) and the dialectical „artifices” impute to Socrates scholars like Friedländer, Dodds, Guthrie. On the other hand, there are some (Santas, Vlastos), who have found out the unconscious faults in the early dialogues of Plato.

¹² We do find some moral „postulates” (in the sense the word „postulate” is used in geometry) in Plato's dialogues, e.g. in the *Meno* 87d, where it is said, that virtue is good. But it is very characteristic for Plato's method of dialectic that they are never used as axioms; on the contrary, they are always the final goal of the philosophical investigations.

knows the Good - has not deviated from his master's practice¹³. Since it is the Good what is the subject of the philosophical knowledge, his dialectic has remained to the end the method of encouragement rather than of argumentation. It is impossible to prove that the just state is good, or that the universe is beautiful, while it is possible to show this - at least to those men whose souls, as Plato says, are akin to the Ideas.

And precisely with such a type of „argumentation” we have to do in the *Gorgias*. The next interlocutor, Polos, is refuted because he admits that doing injustice is more shameful (*aischion*) than suffering injustice (474c). Socrates makes no use here of any „artifices”, he doesn't catch Polos in his words, he just shows the inconsistency in his attitude. This time it is Callicles who is right, saying that Polos is ashamed (*aischyntheis*; 482e2) of his real convictions. But if that is the case, there is a hideous discrepancy in Polos' life and it jars like an untuned lyre. It is poles apart Polos' ideal of the life of tyrant, for this young man doesn't do what he wants, but does what he must - his master is *demos*.

But here is finally a strong opponent before Socrates, proclaiming boldly his contempt for a mob's opinion, considering it is shameful, if one succumbs anything what opposes his will and for any reasons limits his cravings. And this is a confrontation between two radical opposite ways of life, Plato's philosophical *variatio* on the traditional literary theme. What happens to Callicles in this discussion, full of hostility, monkey-tricks, irony and crude examples? Exactly the same, what to his predecessors: it appears, that Callicles is ashamed some of the consequences of the principles he professes. Socrates doesn't hesitate to go so far as to the rudeness in order to reveal this. He makes first Callicles admit that a man who is scratching himself must lead a happy life. Callicles has got a feeling of disgust; but when Socrates mentions the example of the *kinaidos*¹⁴ (494e), he is really indignant. And this is not the rules of Attic law, being hard on men enjoying such a practice, but his own feeling of what is shameful makes Callicles revolt at this. His hedonism is refuted at this moment, because it appears that Callicles holds something dear: the power, the courage, the political efficiency, hence he cannot be a consistent hedonist.

The whole argumentation in the *Gorgias* calls forth the feeling of values: elenchus doesn't serve a refutation of propositions or thesis, but a denouncing of the incoherence of the attitudes. There's no harmony in Callicles' life, as in Gorgias' and Polos'; the reader should perceive this, as the real beauty of the other kind of life, confronted with these. Plato stimulates to a virtue by the example of the man, whose life characterized a perfect harmony of words and deeds. The trial of Socrates, Plato has described in the *Apology*, and his death, are the positive support for his

¹³ Despite Vlastos' thesis (which is essential for his interpretation of the historical Socrates), that the idea of the king-philosopher was the consequence of Plato's radical change of his master's method; see G. Vlastos, *Elenchus and mathematics*, in *Socrates. Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Cambridge 1991.

¹⁴ The *kinaidos* was a passive partner in anal intercourse.

elenchus, Socratic way of life is the supporting argument and the final point of reference all of discussions in the Socratic dialogues of Plato.

Plato's Socrates is not a thinker searching for definition and practicing an inductive argumentation. No matter what was the source for this opinion expressed in the *Metaphysics* (987b)¹⁵, it is in conflict with the spirit of the Plato's dialogues. Yes, we would find in them a support for Aristotle's opinion; but the whole of Socrates' behaviour could be understandable only in the light of this main principle: Socrates in Plato's dialogues breeds to a good life. He does it putting insistently the question „What life is the most beautiful?” and offering an unique pattern of life, the beauty of which is determined by an entirely new type of *aretē*.

In a manner quite extraneous to the modern understanding of philosophy, Plato has not separated an argumentation from protreptics, a philosophy from paideia. He has perfectly combined a personal and doctrinal elements in the character of Socrates; hence all these amazing and embarrassing features of it.

What in fact has Plato done? He has turned the widely known extravagance of his master, the eccentricity causing a mockery, the jeered ugliness and the conversations carrying on at the *agora*, to his own philosophical ends, and he has made him the guide and the educator of the dialogues' readers. Let's stress: of the dialogues' readers, for Socrates (at any rate, when he is practicing elenchus) is not an educator of his interlocutors. For which one could he be? For Lysis - the boy so young, that he cannot know what the really friendship is and to what duties does it oblige? For Euthyphro - a „simple-minded” *mantis*, whose culminant sign of intelligence is a mess in his mind after the discussion with Socrates? For Polos - a youngster so naive in his enthusiasm for political advantages of rhetoric, that refuted in the discussion he will stay for a long time with an open mouth, not becoming aware of what happened? Or maybe for Callicles, who is so mulish in his convictions, that he will not admitt his defeat?

Undoubtedly, for none of them. But at the same time they are a perfect material for such an educator Plato has made of Socrates; the material serving as a criterion for some vision of a good life. Let's explain it.

In the first place, it enables to show the last imputance of the matter. In the Plato's dialogues this is the function of *apories*, caused by questions like „What the real friendship is?”, „What does it mean: to be pious, brave, reasonable?”. If one is not able to answer explicitly the questions, one lives an unconscious life, worthy of nothing, like a child (Lysis) or a fool (Euthyphro).

¹⁵ It is a matter of argument whether Aristotle had access to any reliable historical informations about Socrates (and we can add a doubts about his own reliability as a „historian of philosophy”). Some scholars maintain that Aristotle's testimony is wholly resting on his lecture of Plato's dialogues and writings of Xenophon, the last being also depended on Plato; see A. Patzer (ed.), *Der historische Sokrates*, Darmstadt 1987, 435 ff.; Ch. H. Kahn, *Plato and the... op. cit.*, 79 ff.

Secondly, it makes possible for Socrates to denounce an illusive lure of the life other than virtuous, or a deceit of the life, which only passes for a virtuous. And this is the function of *elenchus*, the art of revealing the incoherence between the man and his doctrine.

Thirdly, it gives a chance to the „conversion”, to open eyes for the moral beauty. And this is the function of Socrates himself, of his personality, the function of ugly Sylen who is golden within.

The historical Socrates couldn't be a better educator for his associates than Plato's Socrates is for the dialogues' readers - he hasn't had yet his most powerful argument: the victory gained by his death. The *Seventh Epistle* seems to prove that. Plato has written there (325b - 326b), that it was only the sentence on Socrates, that had induced him to the philosophy. And to the such one, which aim was to make men better (326 ab). In the mission like this Socrates must have seemed to be the best ally; no wonder that Plato began it with the apology of his master.

*

Thus Plato has turned to his own philosophical ends the character and the philosophical practice of the historical Socrates, assigning him a paidetical and protreptical functions in the dialogues. He has transformed all the facts about Socrates testified also by non-Platonic sources¹⁶ - that is, the examining himself and others in order to care for the soul, connecting virtue and knowledge, the moral confidence of his own mission with declaring ignorance at the same time - into a very coherent conception of philosophy as an education for values, an intellectual conversion and the mystery of knowledge of the Ideas of Good and Beauty¹⁷. The so called Socratic dialogues are like an initial rites in this mystery, a moral preparation for it. Socrates of these dialogues is a protreptical confirmation of the famous Socratic paradoxes: that virtue is knowledge and that no one does wrong willingly; he induces to assent to this doctrine.

Aristotle's critical examination of the Socratic intellectualism¹⁸, valid as regarding a theoretical standpoint, is useless as a critique of Socrates of Plato's dialogues. Since he indeed shows, that virtue is knowledge in the perfect philosophical life, and that a philosopher, who has this knowledge, doesn't allow desires and passions to overcome him. It is an ideal, a normative character of which is determined by its intellectual and moral radicalism¹⁹. Its superiority to Aristotle's subtle analysis of the phenomenon of the *akrasia* in the Seventh Book of *Nicomachean Ethics* lies, first of all, in its paidetical power.

¹⁶ For the testimonies of Socrates see G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, vol. 1-4, Naples 1991.

¹⁷ These are the subjects of the Socratic dialogues of Plato.

¹⁸ See *Nicomachean Ethics*, Books II and VI.

¹⁹ The normative interpretation of Socratic intellectualism has been presented by Ch. H. Kahn; see *Plato and the Socratic...*, *op. cit.*, ch. 8.

And the uncompromising intellectualism of Plato's Socrates (uncompromising as an ideal) reveals the nature of moral knowledge: it is not a true knowledge, if it doesn't determine one's conduct. All of the Socratic dialogues speak for the rightness of this thesis, offering the most beautiful and convincing example of its confirmation in somebody's life. Thus Plato induces to the virtue, to the philosophical life after the fashion of Socrates.

And if not any else, then in revealing this immortal Beauty - the Beauty of the Socratic life - Plato has succeeded.

LE CONCEPT DE LOISIR (ἡ ἄσκησις) ET L'UNITE THEMATIQUE DES
POLITIQUES D'ARISTOTE

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Resumé

Le tableau des sciences aristotéliques impose spontanément une symétrie entre Les Politiques et la Métaphysique, en vertu du fait qu'Aristote situe la science de la politique en tête des sciences pratiques¹, et la philosophie première devant celles théoriques². En outre, l'histoire des exégèses du corpus aristotélique impose à son tour, une symétrie extrinsèque aux objets d'étude des deux traités. Tout cela parce qu'elles semblent en être le plus minutieusement contestées, souvent livre à livre, passage à passage, autant au niveau de leur authenticité, qu'aussi au niveau de l'ordre des textes. Or, cette situation, plutôt dilemmatique, correspond à une longue hésitation de l'exégèse concernant l'éclaircissement de la nature de l'objet disputé. Nous n'allons pas reprendre dans cette analyse, les étapes de la discussion sur les livres et sur l'objet de la Métaphysique. Nous rappelons la solution que Pierre Aubenque a formulée, en proposant un achèvement logique de la dispute³ : il ne faut pas qu'on se demande où est-ce qu'on trouve dans la Métaphysique la science qu'Aristote avait promis et quelles sont ses déterminations systémiques et définitives, mais il faut qu'on considère toute l'œuvre comme une recherche soumise

¹ Cf. *Les Politiques*, III, 12, 1282b 14 sqq.

² Cf. *La Métaphysique*, IV, 1, 1003a 21 sqq.

³ Cf. Aubenque, Pierre, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Essai sur la problématique aristotélique*, Paris, P.U.F., 1962, p. 6.

à une scission fondamentale, qui vient conférer le statut de projet éternel à une science tout à la fois nécessaire et difficile d'être accomplie par l'homme. Une telle vision pourrait améliorer les discussions prolongées sur l'ordre et sur l'authenticité des textes à la recherche d'un système définitif, que l'exégète découvre par un découpage inhérent au texte du philosophe. Nous rappelons cette position parce que nous voulons, à notre tour, proposer une clef de lecture pareille au texte des *Politiques*.

D'ailleurs, l'inconséquence des éditeurs du traité, concernant l'organisation du texte⁴, est bien connue. De l'ordre traditionnelle des livres, respectée par Immanuel Becker pendant 1831, jusqu'aux éditions de Franz Susemihl (1872, 1879) et de W. L. Newman (1887), plusieurs variantes de redistribution du texte ont été successivement enregistrées, ainsi que presque aucune des dernières cinq des huit livres du texte n'a pas gardé sa place initiale. En effet, l'initiative de changer l'ordre du texte appartient à N. Oresmus, l'éditeur du XIV-e siècle, du traité⁵. Cependant, Pierre Pellegrin propose une série d'arguments qui pourrait fermer la discussion sur l'ordre et l'authenticité des textes⁶ : leur chronologie porte avec soi implicitement une interprétation extérieure, et la réordination des livres impose celle des chapitres, des passages – ce qui signifie une rescription du texte, qui ne fait rien que substituer son interprétation. En conséquence, Pierre Pellegrin admet la présence des contradictions, des fractures et des solutions confuses des *Politiques* d'Aristote⁷, et sacrifie leur unité thématique en faveur de l'ordre traditionnelle des livres du traité. Quant à nous, nous allons assumer dans ce qui suit, une hypothèse différente, qui garde la même ordre traditionnelle. Plus précisément, selon notre avis, le texte d'Aristote est le résultat inachevé d'une recherche par laquelle les concepts les plus générales changent et les réponses aux questions formulées finissent parfois, à modifier les questions mêmes. Ainsi, *Les Politiques* peuvent être lues comme un projet dont le schéma commence par les permises assumées dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*. Cette dernière⁸ précède *Les Politiques* et trace une théorie de l'homme-citoyen contourné par la théorie de l'amitié, la théorie de la multiplicité des constitutions, la théorie de la meilleure cité et la théorie de l'éducation au nom de la mesure, pour préciser seulement les plus générales systématisations du texte.

⁴ Pour un tableau complet de tous ces oscillations, voire J. Aubonnet, « Introduction », dans Aristote, *Les Politiques*, vol. I, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1991, p. CVII.

⁵ Cf. Oresmus, Nicolaus, *Le livre de Politique d'Aristote*, (1370-1373), édition critique par A. D. Menut, Philadelphia, 1970.

⁶ Cf. Pellegrin, Pierre, « La Politique d'Aristote », dans Aubenque, Pierre, (coord.), *Aristote politique. Études sur la Politique d'Aristote*, Paris, P.U.F., 1993, pp. 3-34.

⁷ Cf. Pellegrin, Pierre, *art. cit.*, p. 25 : « le texte de la *Politique* est irrémédiablement fracturé » et p. 34, où l'auteur affirme que la lecture des *Politiques* nous force analyser le texte qu'après avoir lu la table des matières.

⁸ Aristote cite à plusieurs fois des passages de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* dans *Les Politiques*, cf., par exemple, *Les Politiques*, II, 2, 1261a 31 etc.

L'entière développement des livres suit les déterminations de la théorie de l'homme-citoyen: de l'investigation des relations originaires, qui définissent l'homme et les modèles de vie (Le livre I), Aristote passe à l'analyse des constitutions projetées (*La République* de Platon, le projet de Phaleas de Chalcedone) ou réelles (de la Sparte, de la Crète, de la Carthagène). Il s'agit d'une combinaison spécifiquement aristotélique de pensée déductive et simultanément empirique, où les deux types de recherche s'accompagnent réciproquement, ainsi que Pierre Aubenque a remarqué dans un étude concernant la méthode aristotélique de recherche dans le domaine de la philosophie pratique⁹. Les deux livres précisés introduisent le problématique du III-e Livre, où on rencontre les plus grandes difficultés de la politique: le principe génératif de la pluralité des constitutions, la définition de la cité et du citoyen, l'indistinction entre l'homme en lui même et l'homme dans la cité, la théorie de l'amitié et de l'égalité proportionnelle, le statut pressé de l'homme exceptionnel situé entre les citoyens qui cultivent l'intermédialité absolue. En effet, on pourrait dire que les premiers deux livres du texte posent à la disposition du troisième les instruments nécessaires pour nommer effectivement les problèmes de la science politique. De ce « livre des problèmes » se dégagent les trois suivantes, où la constance impose une exposition analytique du rapport entre l'homme, la loi universelle et la justice, de la pluralité des pouvoirs dans une constitution et un éloge de la proportion en général (Le IV-e Livre), puis une analyse de toutes les constitutions dans leur développement et leur persistance (Le V-e Livre), comme une analyse des magistratures (Le VI-e Livre). Finalement, une dernière section du traité, constituée du VII-e et du VIII-e Livre, indique les solutions provisoires de la meilleure constitution et de la meilleure éducation que le citoyen peut recevoir du législateur.

Sans vouloir que nous concluions cette développement par un schéma rigide, nous allons argumenter dans ce qui suit son caractère plausible. Plus précisément, nous allons expliquer que l'entier traité comprend une question originaire qui a évolué au long de la recherche, qui a été reformulée et qui a reçu une possible réponse. Cette réponse, à son tour, a modifié certaines des aspects du mode dont Aristote avait pensé dans *l'Éthique à Nicomaque* le rapport entre les différents types de vie de l'homme. Tout d'abord, nous pouvons reformuler la question du début de la recherche ainsi: « Comment est-ce qu'il est possible qu'on assure la justice dans la communauté politique? ». Evidemment, le caractère d'extrême généralité de la question la fait acceptable, mais, en même temps, obscure. Cependant, elle nous rappelle le projet annoncé au début de la *République*, où Platon commençait par une question similaire sur la nature de la justice¹⁰. Par une reconstruction de la théorie aristotélique, nous allons montrer qu'à travers la recherche, cette question a été successivement remplacée par une autre,

⁹ Cf. Aubenque, Pierre, « Théorie et pratique politique chez Aristote » dans *La politique d'Aristote*, éd. Fondation Hardt, Genève, Vandoevres, 1964, p. 104.

¹⁰ Cf. Platon, *La République*, 331e.

qu'on reformule ainsi : « Comment est-ce qu'une communauté autarchique pourrait être forcée à partager la justice, à savoir de juger correctement? ». Notre réponse en serait : « par conférant à cette communauté le *loisir* nécessaire ». Pour soutenir cette interprétation, nous proposons dans ce qui suit une reconstruction du concept de « *loisir*- $\sigma^1 \epsilon\alpha\iota$ », tel qu'il est utilisé dans le texte tel qu' Aristote lui transforme la signification pendant son recherche dans *Les Politiques*. Certes, l'interprétation qu'on propose signifie une superposition entre l'ordre textuelle et l'ordre logique du texte, où la vérification de notre épreuve, au moins au niveau des grandes unités du texte, peut soutenir son caractère plausible.

Si nous proposons comme thème générale des *Politiques* la question « Comment est-ce qu'il est possible obtenir la justice dans une communauté politique ? », celle-ci est suffisamment banale pour qu'elle soit acceptée comme vraie. Mais, plus problématique encore est la raison pour laquelle on croit que cette question a été formulée dans la recherche aristotélique ainsi : « Comment est-ce qu'on peut faire qu'une communauté autarchique juge correctement ? ». Autrement dit, une cité n'est pas bien gouvernée quand ses souverains sont bons, mais si la communauté autarchique des citoyens, soit qu'ils soient maîtres ou maîtrisés est capable de juger en vue d'un avantage commun¹¹ et d'une légalité proportionnelle. Nous allons exposer les occurrences d'une apparente métaphore aristotélique afin que nous comprenons la motivation du primat de la communauté autarchique et réflexive. Au début du traité, dans le chapitre où on trouve la célèbre formule de l'homme comme animal politique¹², Aristote rejoint à cette définition le langage¹³, comme la différence spécifique par rapport à tout autre être social, ainsi que l'homme est situé entre la limite supérieure du dieu et la limite inférieure de la bête¹⁴. L'occurrence de la bête et du dieu semblerait une simple métaphore si elle n'était pas répétée dans autres contextes, plus explicites. Pour l'instant, nous constatons que, d'une part, Aristote établit une liaison entre la sensation, la sociabilité et la bête, et que, d'autre part, il indique la divinité sans aucune détermination. Cependant, entre les deux niveaux du réel, l'homme est situé au niveau du jugement (pendant que la voix communique des sensations, le langage exprime la justice, c'est-à-dire il juge, il forme des synthèses prédictives, ce qui tient exclusivement de l'activité de l'intellect) seulement s'il fait part de la communauté politique, parce que la justice « Or la <vertu de> justice est politique»¹⁵. Dès le début nous constatons une analogie entre la communauté politique et la sphère d'action de la pensée prédictive, inaccessible à la bête et inutile au dieu.

¹¹ Une constitution est juste si elle suit l'avantage commun et elle est injuste si elle ne concerne que l'intérêt des maîtres. Cf. *Les politiques*, III, 6, 1279a 17-20.

¹² Cf. *idem*, I, 2, 1253a 2-3, reprise de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, I, 7, 1097b 11 ou IX, 9, 1169b 19.

¹³ Cf. *idem*, I, 2, 1253a 10.

¹⁴ Cf. *idem*, I, 2, 1253a 28.

¹⁵ Cf. *idem*, I, 2, 1253a 38.

Penser prédicativement (à savoir dire quelque chose sur autre chose à l'aide d'un sujet et d'un prédicat qui sont tout à la fois communicables et disputables, sans les intuitions « grandioses » du dieu, et sans l'irrationalité de la bête) présume dans un certain sens, appartenir à la cité. Cette comparaison semble avoir peu d'importance, mais il y a des autres occurrences de la même hiérarchie, qui prouvent qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une simple analogie. Selon l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, VII, 1 ce n'est que l'homme qui a accès à la vertu, au nom de cette hiérarchie : « de même, en effet, qu'une bête brute n'a ni vice ni vertu, ainsi en est-il d'un dieu : son état est quelque chose de plus haut que la vertu et celui de la brute est d'un genre tout différent du vice »¹⁶. Dans *Les Politiques* Aristote conçoit la vertu comme un *habitus* de l'action qui n'a pas du sens que dans la présence d'une relation : la vertu de l'esclave est différente de la vertu de son maître, de la vertu de la femme, de la vertu de l'enfant ; et toutes ces-ci n'ont du sens que par la relation qu'il y a entre le maître et l'esclave, entre l'homme et la femme, entre les parents et les enfants¹⁷. En retenant ce fait, qui manque dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, nous constatons que le sens de la hiérarchie s'enrichit vue que la moralité dépend seulement de la vie politique, qui n'intéresse point le dieu, et à laquelle l'animal n'a pas accès. Nous trouvons une troisième occurrence de la même hiérarchie dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, VIII, 7, où la thème de l'amitié est réduite à la sphère de l'humain et exclut le dieu¹⁸. Cela signifie que la justice, le langage, la vie politique, l'intellect (au moins dans son utilité pratique) et l'amitié sont des concepts corrélatives, qui excluent la divinité. Pourtant, la quatrième et la plus intéressante occurrence il y a dans *Les Politiques*, III, 16, dans une exposée où Aristote vient systématiser la théorie de la rationalité pratique, par laquelle l'homme ne peut pas juger les faits exclusivement particulières en utilisant que des lois d'une valeur universelle, mais il faut qu'il réalise une entremise :

« Ainsi donc vouloir le gouvernement de la loi c'est, semble-t-il, vouloir le gouvernement du dieu et de la raison seuls, mais vouloir celui d'un homme c'est ajouter celui d'une bête sauvage, car c'est ainsi qu'est le désir, et la passion fait dévier les magistrats, même <quand ils sont> les meilleures des hommes »¹⁹

Autrement dit, le monde stricte de l'universel appartient au dieu et à la contemplation éternelle et immobile, à la différence du monde restrictive de la bête, qui appartient au singulier. En échange, l'homme, qui peut

¹⁶ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, VII, 1, 1145a 25.

¹⁷ Cf. *Les Politiques*, I, 13, 1261a 20 sqq. Le passage est polémique par rapport au dialogue *Menon*, qui soutient l'homogénéité de la vertu.

¹⁸ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, VIII, 7, 1159a 5 : « Toutefois si l'un des amis est séparé par un intervalle considérable, comme par exemple Dieu est éloigné de l'homme, il n'y a plus d'amitié possible ».

¹⁹ Cf. *Les Politiques*, III, 16, 1287a 28-31 sqq.

expérimenter partiellement tous les deux, peut instaurer la justice en découvrant la proportion entre eux, c'est-à-dire par la compréhension continue de la modalité dont l'universel vient s'incorporer dans le particulier. Ce n'est que maintenant que le sens de la hiérarchie se dévoile complètement : entouré par la bête et le dieu, l'homme ne peut récupérer son propre territoire intermédiaire que par la découverte du terme moyen entre l'universel et le particulier à savoir en expérimentant le fait de penser. Les occurrences présentées signifient que ce but n'est à accomplir que par la communauté politique comme altérité de l'amitié et sagesse pratique. Le projet de l'établissement d'une liaison entre l'universalité divine et la particularité de l'expérience de la bête est, sans doute, platonicien ; au contraire, le placement de la communauté politique des amis comme entremise est aristotélique. Voilà le sens dans lequel nous avons affirmé que la question générale concernant la réalisation de la justice se transforme, pas à pas, dans la question sur la possibilité d'une communauté politique de juger. Penser sur la justice signifie penser sur la communauté politique.

Mais, pour que s'on approche du concept fondamental de l'interrogation sur la justice à savoir *le loisir*, il faut qu'on clarifie trois autres concepts imposés par le statut intermédiaire de l'homme entre la bête et le dieu: la rationalité pratique, le concept de l'individu et de l'amitié politique et, finalement, le concept de la cité, comme lieu d'instauration de la justice politique.

Aristote a donné des explications précises dans *l'Éthique à Nicomaque*, VI, 5 concernant le premier concept, qui se réfère à la faculté de faire des raisonnements pratiques. Il différencie un domaine de la rationalité théorique, dont l'objet exclusif est l'universel, et un domaine de l'éthique où les faits à juger ont un caractère particulier et ne peuvent être touchés par des jugements universels. Ces dernières regardent les réalités immuables, sur lesquelles la délibération n'a aucun pouvoir. Quoiqu'elle soit une vertu dianoétique²⁰, la sagesse pratique (*φρόνησις*) est la proportion cherchée, elle n'étant pas un *habitus* exclusivement rationnel²¹. Aristote la définit comme « une disposition, accompagnée de règle vraie, capable d'agir dans la sphère de ce qui est bon ou mauvais pour un être humain »²². Toutefois, dans *l'Éthique à Nicomaque* la possibilité de la réalisation de cette raison pratique n'est considérée que de la perspective de l'homme singulier, exemplaire : son possesseur est Périclès, par excellence, et cette faculté est reconnue par l'observation attentive des individualités qui la détiennent²³. Son régime est tout différent dans *Les Politiques*, et nous trouvons le

²⁰ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, I, 13, 1103a 5-6.

²¹ Cf. *idem*, VI, 5, 1140b 29-30.

²² Cf. *ibidem*, VI, 5, 1140b 4-5, et pour un excellent commentaire sur l'histoire de la découverte dans l'aristotélisme du concept et pour l'analyse de son signification, voire Aubenque, Pierre, *La prudence chez Aristote*, Paris, P.U.F., 1963.

²³ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, VI, 5, 1140a 25.

passage clef dans le III-e Livre, le chapitre 15, 1286a, 7-31, où Aristote oppose l'universalité des lois à la particularité de l'événement:

«Le point de départ de la recherche est celui-ci : est-il plus avantageux d'être gouverné par l'homme le meilleur ou par les lois les meilleures ? Ceux qui sont d'avis qu'il est avantageux d'être gouverné par un roi pensent que les lois ne <peuvent> énoncer que le général, sans <pouvoir> rien prescrire concernant les situations particulières. Ainsi dans n'importe quel art est-il stupide de se diriger <seulement> d'après des <règles> écrites, et en Égypte il est permis au bout de quatre jours aux médecins de s'écarter <des traitements prescrits par les manuels>, mais s'ils le font avant c'est à leurs risques et périls. Il est donc manifeste que la constitution qui se conforme à des lois écrites n'est pas, pour la même raison, la meilleure (...) Mais sans doute semblerait-il, pour répliquer à cela, qu'une personne délibérera mieux à propos des cas particuliers (...) Mais là où la loi n'est pas capable de trancher du tout ou <de trancher> bien, faut-il que ce soit un seul individu, le meilleur, qui gouverne, ou tous <les citoyens> ? En fait, en effet, ce sont là <les citoyens> réunis qui rendent la justice, délibèrent, décident, et ces décisions portent toutes sur des <cas> particuliers. Or individuellement ils sont sans doute pire comparés <à l'homme le meilleur>, mais la cité est <composée> de beaucoup <de ces gens>, et comme un festin payé collectivement est meilleur que celui <offert par> une seule et même <personne>, pour cette même <raison> aussi une masse nombreuse décide mieux que n'importe quel individu ».

Nous avons repris tout le passage parce qu'il contient trois éléments importants qui changent la théorie de la rationalité pratique présentée dans *l'Éthique à Nicomaque*. Premièrement, nous y rencontrons une question apparemment dérisoire, quoi qu'elle soit d'une importance maxime aussi pour la rationalité pratique, que pour la philosophie du loisir : c'est à qui de conduire, aux humains ou aux lois ? Bien que nous soyons habitués à rejeter le règne de l'homme et à en voir l'arbitraire lorsqu'il veut se substituer au pouvoir de la loi, le sens du texte peut être un autre: si n'est que l'universel qui est relevant pour la divinité ou pour la pensée contemplative, il ne s'applique de soi-même et d'une manière évidente au fait particulier. On peut concevoir une société où la loi règne exclusivement, mais il n'est pas certain que cette société soit juste et d'autant moins qu'elle trouve le bonheur et le bien réciproque. Ce n'est que l'homme qui, par la faculté de son rationalité pratique, a l'accès à la descente de la loi dans l'événement, à la décision sur le bien et sur l'avantage commun, en utilisant les lois d'une manière particulière, tout aussi comme les médecins égyptiens ont eu un temps déterminé pour la rationalité pratique, comme un symbole des limites de l'universalité rigide. Le second élément intéressant du texte est qu'à la différence de *l'Éthique à Nicomaque*, Aristote n'accepte plus le fait que la sagesse pratique appartient à un seul homme, mais il affirme que seulement la communauté politique la peut accomplir. Par cette observation, on s'approche de la théorie de l'amitié politique, que nous allons présenter dans

ce qui suit comme fondement du concept de loisir. Le troisième élément important est la liaison entre la pluralité des citoyens et la tradition des festins collectives. Il est possible que, pour Aristote, l'entier concept de cohésion politique ait eu les racines archaïques dans les festins qu'il analyse fréquemment dans *Les Politiques*. Il propose trois synonymes²⁴ pour ce concept et les considère le critère de la citoyenneté²⁵ même. Le banquet collectif est le concept par l'entremise duquel nous clarifions le sens dilemmatique de l'homme dans la cité. En tenant compte du fait que, pour Aristote, trouver la justice signifie appliquer la rationalité pratique dans la communauté des amis, que nous étudions dans ce qui suit le rapport entre l'individu et la cité de la perspective des thèmes de l'amitié et de la justice: nous pourrions déterminer ainsi, l'insertion de l'homme dans le quotidien de la cité et la manière dont Aristote a pensé l'authenticité de cette insertion.

Donc *l'accomplissement de la justice dans la cité est naturel, mais dilemmatique*. Si on rejoint la critique qu'Aristote fait dans le II-e Livre à la cité platonicienne avec sa propre définition du III-e Livre, on retrouve l'idée d'une cité qui est la concrétisation d'une unité essentiellement multiple: quoique l'unité soit un aspect excellent pour une cité, elle ne peut pas subordonner les citoyens à l'idéal de l'unité qui reste au-delà de l'individu – l'unité de la cité et l'unité du citoyen et de la famille sont inversement proportionnelles²⁶. C'est pareil, pour le concept de l'être qui est l'objet de la philosophie première (la première entre les sciences théoriques), et pour le concept de la cité comme l'objet de la politique (la première des sciences pratiques), qui existent concrètement, comme individuels. Pour cette raison, les significations du concept de cité sont multiples. En outre, sa nature est plurielle²⁷. La cité ne signifie pas un certain genre d'existence en communauté, mais peut comprendre, à son tour, des genres différentes de constitution, qui définissent l'individuel qui s'y concrétise, à savoir le citoyen. Tout comme dans la *Métaphysique*, IX, 8, l'acte est antérieur par rapport à la potentialité, de même dans *Les Politiques*, I, 2, la cité est naturellement antérieure à l'individu, et dans le Livre III-e, elle le définit même, parce que la cité est l'acte spécifique de l'homme. À cause de cela, dans la cité d'Aristote, l'homme se définit par l'occupation d'une magistrature: « un citoyen au sens plein ne peut pas être mieux défini que par la participation à une fonction judiciaire et à une magistrature »²⁸. De plus, le citoyen est différent d'une constitution à une autre, et parce que l'homme d'Aristote coïncide avec le citoyen, alors l'homme oligarchique diffère de l'homme démocratique,

²⁴ Notamment *ouss...tiai* (II, 9, 1271a 26), *fidit...ai* (II, 9, 1271a 27 ; II, 10, 1272a 3) ou *ϕndr...ai* (II, 10, 1272a 3).

²⁵ Cf. *Les Politiques*, II, 9, 1271a 35-37.

²⁶ Cf. *idem*, II, 2, 1261a 19-20.

²⁷ Cf. *idem*, II, 2, 1261a 17 ou II, 2, 1263b 36.

²⁸ Cf. *idem*, III, 1, 1275a 23-24.

l'homme tyrannique et le tyran, que l'homme assujetti²⁹. Par ailleurs, l'homme d'Aristote est influencé dans son humanité par la constitution qu'il est assujetti. Il ne peut pas penser démocratiquement et accepter simultanément, avec une conscience morale claire, les idéaux d'une cité tyrannique; il ne fait pas de la dissidence. Nous anticipons l'analogie que nous allons expliquer, et nous précisons qu'ainsi que dans *De l'âme* ce n'est pas la personne qui est engagée, mais un intellect impersonnel qui pense par l'homme, aussi dans *Les Politiques* l'homme n'est pas un individu, mais le produit de son fonction). De plus, la liberté elle-même, est un idéal que la démocratie doit conquérir, mais une aristocratie n'a pas besoin de ce concept et ne peut pas l'intégrer dans son propre système. Par ailleurs, aussi le citoyen, que la cité sont relatives à la constitution. Pour l'instant, le seul terme qui est commun aux constitutions est la justice, même si elle a des sens différents d'une constitution à une autre, sans que ces sens peuvent être hiérarchisés: on peut être juste dans une monarchie et perversi dans un régime constitutionnel ou juste dans une démocratie et corrompu dans une oligarchie.

Après une telle conclusion, les choses sembleraient clarifiées et le développement logique du Livre I jusqu'au III-e Livre, ne se heurterait des difficultés. Le naturel d'un juste gouvernement paraît être démontré. Pourtant, pour le philosophe le schéma n'est pas encore complet. Dans la seconde partie du III-e Livre, Aristote parle du fait que la source de la cité est l'amitié, la seule qui peut transformer une agglomération humaine dans une cité où les individus sont définis par une fonction :

« Une <cité> est la communauté de la vie heureuse, c'est-à-dire dont la fin est une vie parfaite et autarcique (...) Certes cela ne sera pas sans que, aussi, <les gens> habitent un seul et même lieu et sans qu'ils recourent aux mariages entre eux. De là sont nés dans les cités les alliances de parenté, phratries, sacrifices publics et autres activités de la vie en commun. Or toutes ces <relations> sont l'œuvre de l'amitié, car l'amitié est le choix réfléchi de vivre ensemble »³⁰.

Aucun commentaire du texte n'est nécessaire pour formuler une réserve sur l'interprétation de G. Glotz, selon lequel cette « amitié » signifierait une forme archaïque de solidarité entre parents³¹. Au contraire, on voudrait argumenter l'idée que l'amitié (° ἀατῦ) dont Aristote y parle est le concept par lequel il propose justement le dépassement de la parenté, tout à la fois avec le dépassement de l'ordre gentilice, dans un ordre « moderne ». Il s'agit ici d'un passage de l'instinct grégaire à la vie politique,

²⁹ La compréhension de ce fait vient clarifier un problème de traduction, rencontré dès le début des *Politiques* (I, 1, 1275a 7-17), où une série de noms neutres ne se réfère pas à l'homme politique, au roi ou au maître des esclaves, comme Tricot le croyait dans son traduction, mais aux genres de la vie que le sujet partage avec son maître et qui diffèrent spécifiquement et pas quantitativement.

³⁰ Cf. *Les Politiques*, III, 9, 1280b 33-39.

³¹ Cf. Glotz, G., *La cité grecque*, Paris, 1928, pp. 7-8.

de la nature à la culture. (*Mutatis mutandis*, sans vouloir faire des extrapolations qui ne sont pas permises, il nous frappe la réponse très différente que Claude Lévi-Strauss et Aristote ont donné au passage de la nature à la culture : pour le premier, ce passage représente l'assumé du système de la parenté, pour le seconde, le même passage signifie le dépassement de la parenté et l'accepte de l'amitié. Nous parlons de la distinction structuraliste dans la mesure où elle a considéré la nature comme ce qui est spontanément et universel, et la culture comme ce qui est variable et dépendent de la norme³². À l'opposé, pour Aristote « la nature » est ce qui est gardé par les rythmes et par les structures données de l'homme et la loi et la cité sont les expressions de l'amitié politique. Certainement, nous évitons l'équivocité de « la nature » dans le sens précisé plus haut et la « nature » du vivant qui est naturellement politique, en remarquant le fait que l'occurrence du terme $\sigma\alpha\beta\alpha$ chez Aristote est plutôt proche du caractère habituel de l'homme comme être politique, que de la « nature » de laquelle parlait Lévi-Strauss). Mais pourquoi est-il si important le concept de l'amitié politique?

Nous pouvons invoquer deux raisons qui nous portent à deux thèmes fondamentales de la philosophie pratique d'Aristote. Premièrement, le fait que l'amitié est le seul concept qui peut fonder une communauté (nous avons vu que la justice n'est possible que dans la communauté est celle qui peut obtenir la justice) s'attache à une série d'affirmations sur la nature de l'amitié qu'Aristote a faites dans *Les Politiques* (où il affirme que la population et le territoire d'une cité doit être si grandes « qu'on peut saisir d'un seul coup d'œil », pour pouvoir instituer avec succès une communauté d'amis³³) et dans *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*. Déjà, dans ce dernier traité on trouve des affirmations qui lient la cohésion de la cité de l'amitié³⁴ mais on trouve aussi une série d'affirmations selon lesquelles l'amitié est la seule relation qui soutient l'expérience authentique de l'autrui³⁵. Ces affirmations nous font croire que l'instauration de la justice dans la cité suppose l'amitié, parce que la justice nécessite l'expérience de l'altérité. Certes, cela ne veut pas dire que la justice est pas impossible pour les non-amis, mais que l'institution de la justice comme modalité de vivre ensemble dans un régime politique suppose ce concept de l'amitié politique. Secondement, l'amitié est lié dans la phrase citée antérieurement de l'expression « vie bonne - $\tau\omega\kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\varsigma$ ». La simple justice, l'équité peut conduire à la survivance, à la

³² Tel comme la caractérise, par exemple, Jacques Derrida: « La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines », dans *L'écriture et la différence*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1967, pp. 409-428.

³³ Cf. *Les Politiques*, VII, 5, 1327a 2-3.

³⁴ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, VIII, 1, 1155a 23 : « L'amitié semble aussi constituer le lien des cités ».

³⁵ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, VIII, 3, 1156a 15-16, où on parle de ce que l'ami « en tant ce qu'est en elle-même la personne aimée - $\hat{\iota}\delta\epsilon\ \phi\iota\lambda\omega\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$, mais aussi IX, 9, 1170b 7, où il y a la formule « l'ami ami étant un autre lui-même - $\acute{\sigma}\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\ \gamma\acute{\iota}\rho\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\sigma}\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ » pour qu'à la ligne 10 du même colonne, qu'on trouve le verbe qui nomme chez Aristote l'expérience de l'autrui : $\sigma\upsilon\lambda\lambda\eta\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$.

réalisation du nécessaire, en temps que l'amitié peut porter envers la vie bonne. Le couple « nécessaire - libre » apparaît fréquemment³⁶ tout au long des *Politiques* et désigne chaque fois la différence spécifique de la cité de toute communauté inférieure. Bref, le couple se réfère à la différence entre la vie qui couvre ses nécessités et la « vie bonne », qui accomplit le bien, le beau moral, l'amitié, et qui est vraiment politique.

Par cette distinction, on se trouve dans la proximité d'un gain conceptuel : maintenant on peut dire que, pour réaliser la justice, la cité d'Aristote suppose nécessairement le gratuit, c'est-à-dire la différence spécifique entre la survivance et la bonne vie : Aristote a un terme précis pour cette catégorie (qui, logiquement, correspond à la particule $\sigma^1 \epsilon\alpha_i$ de la distinction que nous avons précisé plus haut) à savoir le loisir ($\sigma^1 \epsilon\alpha_i$), autrement dit, le concept qui, à notre avis, pourrait offrir une clé d'interprétation pour l'entier édifice des *Politiques*. L'instauration de la justice dans la cité est naturelle, mais dilemmatique, car il n'existe aucune recette pour obtenir le gratuit, mais seulement une possible description de sa présence dans la vie quotidienne. Avant qu'on passe à l'analyse effective du terme, qu'on réalise aussi le parcours inverse à celui de ce passage, c'est-à-dire pas de la cité envers l'individu, mais de l'individu envers la cité, pour souligner les autres éléments qui demandent la présence du même concept de loisir.

Ainsi, la présence de l'homme dans la cité est naturelle, mais dilemmatique. On a déjà vu que l'homme est défini par son fonction, ainsi que la définition citée plus haut, à 1275a 23, peut représenter l'extension de la formule par laquelle l'homme était désigné comme un « animal politique » à 1253a 3. Cependant, si l'homme est par excellence le citoyen, alors, « l'excellence de l'homme de bien et celle du bon citoyen »³⁷ pourraient être considérées elles aussi identiques. En réalité, le problème est plus large et, une fois par cette formule, Aristote ouvre dans *Les Politiques*, III, 4, une de les plus profondes thèmes de sa pensée pratique. Certes, entre « homme » et « citoyen » la différence est insaisissable, étant données les différences antérieures. L'entier chapitre cité peut être considéré une *crux commentatorum* : il est difficile à comprendre si Aristote est d'accord avec l'identité totale des deux syntagmes ou il la rejette complètement. Après qu'Aristote pose le problème du rapport des deux vertus, il reprend l'exemple des différentes fonctions que la direction d'un navire, en établissant une analogie avec la cité : si les fonctions sont différentes, il n'est pas nécessaire que celles-ci supposent l'identité entre la vertu de l'homme compétent et du citoyen choisi, mais l'identité respective serait nécessaire au moins au regard des gouverneurs. Pour cette raison, Aristote précise quelques lignes

³⁶ Cf. *Les Politiques*, 1252b 30 ; 1253b 25 ; 1258a 1-2 ; 1265a 31 ; 1280a 32 ; 1280b 33 ; 1280b 39 ; 1324a 7 ; 1328b 7 ; 1331b 7 ; 1331b 39.

³⁷ Cf. *idem*, III, 4, 1276b 17 sqq.

plus bas que³⁸: « <les deux excellences en question> ne sont pas absolument les mêmes ». Mais le passage suivant nous fait croire que la discussion de plus haut aurait eu lieu seulement dans un sens général (même si le terme $\frac{1}{2}g\grave{a}b$ manque du contexte), pour que l'alinéa qui suit propose une discussion sur le même rapport, mais aussi un « individu déterminé »³⁹, qui pourrait être le gouverneur parce qu'il détient de la sagesse pratique. Après une analyse qui exclut les travailleurs et les commerçants (exactement ces catégories dont Aristote a hésité de les attribuer une forme de loisir), il conclut⁴⁰ :

«Ainsi, s'il faut admettre comme différentes ou comme identiques l'excellence qui fait l'homme de bien et celle qui fait le bon citoyen, voilà qui est évident d'après ce qui précède : dans telle cité elles seront identiques, dans telle <autre> différentes, et dans le premier cas cette identité ne s'applique pas à tout le monde mais à l'homme politique, c'est-à-dire à celui qui est souverain ou qui a la faculté d'être souverain, seul ou avec d'autres, dans la gestion des <affaires> communes ».

Pierre Pellegrin a considéré que ce passage, qui va de pair avec un autre, du final du III-e Livre⁴¹, contredirait celui cité antérieurement⁴², où Aristote niait l'identité des deux vertus. S'il était vrai, alors ni la définition de l'homme par son fonction, ni la définition du « vivant politique » n'auraient plus du sens. En effet, le sens des passages a une autre nuance si on accepte la théorie d'Aristote. Plus précisément, il considère que, dans le cas des gouverneurs politiques qui ont de la vertu, l'identité entre le citoyen élu et l'homme compétent est nécessaire, car leur vertu est une, pendant que pour les autres citoyens elle est recommandable; et pour les travailleurs et les commerçants elle manque complètement ou elle est indifférente. L'enjeu de la discussion nous porte au rapport entre la justice, la communauté politique et la médiation entre le dieu et la bête. Quand nous avons exposé ces problèmes, nous avons signalé le débat qu'Aristote porte à plusieurs fois sur la réponse à la suivante question : « c'est à qui qu'il faut obéir, à l'homme ou à la loi ? ». On rappelle le fait que la médiation entre l'universel et le particulier, entre le dieu et la bête, entre l'intellect pur et le désir plaidait à la défaveur de la loi et à la faveur de la faculté de raisonnement pratique de l'homme.

Mais alors, pourquoi serait l'homme meilleur que la loi ? Pourquoi est ce qu'il connaît mieux l'application de l'universel au particulier, qu'une liste suffisamment élargie, mais limitée des règles universelles ? Parce que seulement les amis peuvent assurer l'ouverture nécessaire du conseil,

³⁸ Cf. *idem*, III, 4, 1277a 12-13.

³⁹ Cf. *idem*, III, 4, 1277a 15.

⁴⁰ Cf. *idem*, III, 5, 1278a 41 – 1278b 5.

⁴¹ Cf. *idem*, III, 18, 1288a 37-39.

⁴² Cf. P. Pellegrin, *art. cit.*, p. 6.

des opinions bien intentionnées, qui ne sont ni loi, ni simple compréhension du particulier. Mais qu'est-ce c'est cette « disponibilité » des amis dans la communauté politique ? La réponse d'Aristote nous oriente envers la même thème du loisir. On croit que la réponse consiste dans une courte sentence du Livre I : « la vie est action et pas production »⁴³. Il faut qu'on joigne cette affirmation avec une distinction qui paraît deux fois dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* et une seule fois dans *Les Politiques*. Aristote fait au début de l'*Éthique* une courte référence aux certaines activités qui comprennent leur but ; à la différence des autres qui ne le comprennent pas⁴⁴. Il revient à la distinction lorsqu'il décrit la rationalité pratique (le Livre V-e, chap. 5), qui a comme objet la pratique, pas la production. Et cela parce que, tel comme on le sait toujours de le début du traité, la pratique contient son but, tandis que la production a un but extérieur à elle-même. La distinction est reprise dans *Les Politiques* : « l'homme laborieux accomplit son labeur en vue de quelque fin qu'il ne possède pas »⁴⁵. Ici il ne s'agit pas seulement de la production, mais, en général, de toute action qui ne comprend pas son but, même de la sphère des actions qui décriraient l'activité pratique. Par exemple, la vie menée pour la survivance est une activité pratique qui ne contient pas son but, et qui, cependant, n'est pas une production. Pour l'instant nous pouvons formuler une analogie : ainsi que la vie est par rapport à la bonne vie, tout ainsi est l'activité qui ne contient pas son but par rapport à celle qui le contient (la dernière de celles-ci signifiant ainsi, le bonheur), tout ainsi est la production par rapport à une certaine partie de la pratique et tout ainsi est l'effort pour le loisir. C'est exactement ce qu'il affirme lui-même : « la vie de loisir, par contre, a, semble-t-il, en elle-même le plaisir et le bonheur de la vie heureuse »⁴⁶. Par ailleurs, la présence du citoyen dans la cité est naturelle, car par son intermède il se définit comme individu. Pourtant, cette présence est dilemmatique parce que la performance de son vertu suppose un effort par lequel l'individu obtient selon une recette obscure et plutôt inconnue, une perception du temps de sa vie. Or, cette conception est complètement différente du rythme du l'effort et du devoir, à savoir du loisir.

Au ce point de la recherche, nous concluons que : le traité des *Politiques* est construit pour répondre à la question suivante : « Comment est-ce qu'il est possible qu'une multitude des citoyens pense moralement et qu'elle porte une existence juste ? ». La réponse est approximée par la formulation des principes de la raison pratique, par la hiérarchie qui situe l'homme entre le dieu et la bête, par l'éloge de l'intermédiation et par l'exposition du procédé par lequel l'homme peut penser la médiation, par la réalisation naturelle et dilemmatique de la justice dans la cité, par la naturalité et par le caractère problématique de l'existence de l'homme dans la cité. Cependant, toutes ces choses-là dépendent d'une formule

⁴³ Cf. *Les Politiques*, I, 4, 1254a 7.

⁴⁴ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, I, 1, 1094a, 4.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Les Politiques*, III, 3, 1338a, 4-5.

⁴⁶ Cf. *idem*, III, 3, 1338a, 1-2.

existentielle encore inconnue, éventuellement d'un nouveau type de vie, d'une modalité quotidienne de la vie, dont Aristote n'en dispose pas totalement. À notre avis, ce qui manque de ce système idéal est le concept de loisir. (Nous précisons que cette interprétation dynamique du concept de loisir des *Politiques* résulte de la modification du sens du terme par rapport à ses occurrences de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, que nous allons les présenter plus bas. Dès que nous avons saisi le changement de sens, nous avons supposé que pour Aristote ce changement était nécessaire en le précisant dans les derniers livres des *Politiques*, là où il s'est proposé d'offrir le modèle optimal de gouvernement et de vie politique).

De plus, nous ajoutons qu'Aristote est le premier qui a défini dans les *Politiques*, le concept de vie quotidienne (*ὄψις τοῦ ἡμετέρου βίου*), proposant un concept qui n'e contient rien du théorique dans soi-même et rien de la nature du projet moral utopique du platonisme. Par contre, il s'agit d'un concept de la vie comme telle, présent dans les distinctions que le temps de chaque journée les impose, entre l'effort et son réalisation. Notamment d'assumer le présent qui fait que la vie soit une vie pratique, c'est-à-dire une activité qui contient en soi-même son but et qui n'est pas une production, c'est-à-dire un plan d'un avenir éternellement scintillant, et pour toujours fixé dans son utopie. Les occurrences du quotidien sont bien fréquentes dans *Les Politiques*⁴⁷ et signifient les temps quand l'effort et le loisir, la communauté de la famille et de la cité se mêlent au début indistinctement, ainsi que toute distinction dépend de la volonté du citoyen, sans qu'un rythme coutumier l'impose. Il est le temps amorphe, que l'homme a à sa disposition pour devenir un citoyen dans une constitution. Il est le temps indistinct, où il faut qu'on différencie dans la médiation, l'universel de la loi et le singulier du particulier. Même en forçant autant qu'il nous est permis par les limites de l'interprétation, nous dirions que celui est le temps qu'Aristote substitue aux rythmes cosmogoniques traditionnelles. C'est là que paraissent invariablement, binomialement et irréconciliablement les cycles : travail/fête, effort/repos (où, on le verra, le repos est complètement différent du loisir), justice/injustice. C'est comme on admettait que toutes celles-là ont appartenu à un temps présocratique⁴⁸, où la simultanéité des contraires n'avait pas encore découvert la solution du terme et où la distinction entre le mouvement et le repos absolu n'avait pas encore connu la solution du « loisir ».

II

Le nom *ἡμετέριος* et le verbe *ἡμετέρω* paraissent vers le final des *Politiques* plus fréquemment dans les dernières deux livres. En revanche, dans tout le *corpus* aristotélique il paraît rarement, à quelques fois dans la

⁴⁷ Cf. *idem*, I, 2, 1252b 14; II, 6, 1266a 1; V, 11, 1313b 21 (dans ce dernier passage le quotidien est associé avec l'absence du loisir).

⁴⁸ Plus précisément nous pensons au fragment DK A. 9 d'Anaximandre et à DK B. 50 de Héraclite, qui annoncent des dichotomies pareilles.

Métaphysique et dans deux passages qu'il faut qu'on retienne de *L'histoire des animaux*⁴⁹ et des *Rejets sophistiques*. Dans la *Métaphysique*, il parle du temps libre spécifique pour la caste des prêtres égyptiens, qui a concédé la parution des préoccupations spéculatives⁵⁰. Le loisir comme le temps de la contemplation est un des sens dominants du terme et, pour notre recherche, il constitue un sens originaire (il est hérité de Platon⁵¹, qui associe le terme avec le temps de l'homme libre⁵²) et une source pour l'acquisition des nouveaux sens. Il peut être compris dans cette occurrence comme une modalité de perception temporelle, mais aussi comme une certaine disponibilité de la raison envers les universels comme des objets de la spéculation. Aristote oppose deux concepts intéressants pour le sens du loisir, dans les *Réfutations sophistiques*, en suggérant que, dans le cas du terme cherché, il s'agit d'une modalité de segmentation du temps, et d'une orientation dans la temporalité. Il dit :

«Par suite, ceux qui désirent résoudre un argument doivent en tout premier lieu examiner s'il est déductif ou non; il leur faut ensuite considérer si la conclusion est vraie ou fausse, de façon que l'on puisse apporter une solution qui consistera soit en une distinction, soit en une destruction, et une destruction qui s'effectuera de l'une ou l'autre des deux façon indiquées un peu plus tôt. Résoudre un argument en étant interrogé, ou en ne l'étant pas, cela fait toute la différence; il en est difficile de prévoir (giftTMæ) la suite du raisonnement, alors qu'en observer (sTMæ) à loisir la marche est plus facile.»⁵³.

L'opposition entre giftTMæ et cûkD#j¹fâ|e#sTMæ#dévoile un nouveau sens du loisir : projeter une action dont le résultat est ultérieur et indépendant de l'action (c'est-à-dire une production) diffère d'une perception du présent, que le loisir la fait possible (c'est-à-dire une pratique). Par ailleurs, la distinction n'est pas entre un temps occupé et un temps libre, mais entre une perception projective de l'action et une qui contient son propre but. Par cette interprétation, la formule est identique à la vie, tel comme elle était comprise dans *Les Politiques*, I, 4, 1254a 7 : comme une

⁴⁹ L' « Index » de Hermann Bonitz marque une occurrence dans *L'histoire des animaux*, V, 15, 547a 28. Voir la traduction de Pierre Louis, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1968, où le loisir paraît comme le temps du consommation des narcotiques : « On s'empresse de les broyer tant qu'ils sont en vie : car s'ils crèvent avant, ils rejettent leur fleur en expirant. Et c'est pourquoi on les garde dans les nasses jusqu'à ce qu'on en ait beaucoup et qu'on ait le loisir de les traiter ».

⁵⁰ Cf. *Métaphysique*, trad. J. Tricot, Vrin, Paris, 1991, I, 1, 981b 20 sqq. : «De là vient que tous ces différents arts étaient déjà constitués, quand on découvrit ces sciences qui ne s'appliquent ni au plaisir, ni aux nécessités, et elles prirent naissance dans les contrées où régnait le loisir. Aussi l'Egypte a-t-elle été le berceau des arts mathématiques, car on y laissait de grands loisirs à la caste sacerdotale.»

⁵¹ Cf. Platon, *L'apologie de Socrate*, 36d ; *Phèdre*, 227b ; *Protagoras*, 314d ; *Les Lois*, 961b.

⁵² Cf. Platon, *Théétète*, 172d.

⁵³ Cf. *Les réfutations sophistiques*, introd. trad. et notes Louis-André Dorion, préface de J. Brunschwig, Vrin/Presses de l'Université de Laval, 1995: 18, 177a 8 sqq.

pratique, et pas comme une production. Sans se présenter comme une philosophie de la vie quotidienne ou comme une anthropologie, le passage donne l'image d'un temps orienté envers l'admission du présent comme le temps de l'authenticité et nomme cette activité « loisir ». Qu'il soit vraiment celui-ci le temps de l'amitié, de la médiation entre l'universel et le particulier, donc le temps du vivant politique ?

Cependant, les plus importantes occurrences du terme se trouvent dans un passage de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, qui précède *Les Politiques*. Celles-ci plaident pour l'admission du loisir dans la vie pratique :

« De plus, le bonheur semble consister dans le loisir car nous ne nous adonnons à une vie active (en effet, le verbe d'Aristote est ὄψιν ἀφαιρῆσαι « on passe notre temps sans avoir du loisir », ce qui n'est qu'une simple négation, et le loisir sera déclaré plus tard, aussi dans *Les Politiques*, une activité) qu'en vue d'atteindre le loisir, et ne faisons la guerre qu'afin de vivre en paix (...) Et l'activité de l'homme d'État est, elle aussi, étrangère au loisir »⁵⁴.

On a deux observations concernant ce texte : premièrement, Aristote a renoncé dans *Les Politiques*, ne refuse plus le loisir pour l'homme politique, énonçant dans le II-e Livre son nécessité pour le bon gouvernement des cités⁵⁵. Ainsi, le loisir est la formule par laquelle l'homme politique peut décider la justice dans la meilleure manière, et ce fait manque dans les livres de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*. Secondement, l'énoncé cité fait partie d'une exposition concernant l'importance de la vie contemplative, où le fait que l'intellect a un caractère divin, et toutefois humain signifie que la vie portée conformément à l'intellect est le bonheur suprême, raison pour laquelle « l'homme doit, dans la mesure du possible, s'immortaliser »⁵⁶. Il est vrai que celui-ci est un des passages qui vérifient « l'intellectualisme » d'Aristote. Pourtant, nous ne retenons de ce passage que l'association pure du loisir avec l'intellect. En effet, il ne faut pas qu'on oublie qu'Aristote a fait une importante découverte dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, VI, 5, concernant le raisonnement pratique (ἐπιθεωρητικόν) : l'intellect a une application pratique, différente de celle contemplative. Il est possible que les conséquences de la théorie ne surgissent pas complètement dans le même traité, elles auraient pu paraître plus tard, dans *Les Politiques*. Or, c'est exactement cette chose qui se passe dans un chapitre du VII-e Livre des *Politiques*, où Aristote est réservé devant la différence totale entre la vie active et celle contemplative⁵⁷ :

⁵⁴ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, X, 7, 1177b 4-6.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Les Politiques*, II, 9, 1269a 34-36, mais surtout VII, 9, 1328b 40 – 1329a 1.

⁵⁶ Cf. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, X, 7, 1177b 33-34.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Les Politiques*, VII, 3, 1325b 14-21.

« Mais si ces affirmations sont justes et qu'il faut poser que le bonheur c'est de réussir, pour la cité prise collectivement aussi bien que pour chacun la vie la meilleure sera la vie active. Mais la <vie> active n'est pas nécessairement en relation avec autrui comme le pensent certains, pas plus que concernent seules l'action les pensées qui ont en vue des résultats pratiques, mais bien plutôt les considérations et les spéculations autonomes et qui se prennent elles-mêmes pour objets. Car réussir c'est une fin, et il en est donc de même pour une certaine <sorte> d'action. Et nous parlons aussi d'agir au sens absolument propre <du terme> dans le cas des gens qui par la pensée dirigent les activités tournées vers l'extérieur ».

Si la vie contemplative est la plus pratique de toutes les activités (pratiques) ou si le fait a plusieurs réalité sous son aspect mental et formel que sous celui sensible, alors il est évident que le concept du loisir devrait aussi être un concept pratique par excellence et qu'il est un concept théorique par dérivation. L'exégèse aristotélique a développé quatre positions concernant la signification du terme $\sigma\lambda\upsilon\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, entre la vie pratique et la vie contemplative. Pendant 1936, J.L. Stocks⁵⁸ a nié le fait que le terme aurait un sens technique, ayant comme argument sa provenance des proverbes grecques, qu'on rencontre dans *Les Politiques*. La thèse a été amendée pendant 1956 par Ernst Koller⁵⁹, qui a soutenu qu'Aristote aurait voulu ressusciter la tradition des banquets publiques par la signification de ce terme. Si on ajoute un des critères cités plus haut, de la citoyenneté proposée par Aristote et qui regardait la participation aux telles réunions, alors on arrive à une liaison nécessaire entre le loisir et la vie politique. Quoique Eino Mikkola⁶⁰ ait considéré le terme discuté comme un attribut de la vie contemplative, pendant 1958, Fr. Solmsen⁶¹ est le premier qui vient changer la perspective : pour cet auteur le sens est le même dans tout le *corpus* aristotélique, et le terme est employé par Aristote pour proposer un nouvel type de vie qui pose l'accent sur la contemplation dans la cité. Finalement, celui qui a changé définitivement l'optique sur le terme analysé a été Paul Dumont⁶², pendant 1993. Il propose un dépassement de toutes les interprétations précédentes et fait la distinction rigoureuse entre $\sigma\lambda\upsilon\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ et le repos ($\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$), en montrant le fait que le loisir ne signifie pas nécessairement relâchement, mais est un type d'activité intermédiaire entre l'activité d'effort et le relâchement totale. Secondement, l'auteur observe le

⁵⁸ Cf. Stocks, J.L., « Scol^{3/4} », dans *Classical Quarterly*, 30, 1936, pp. 177-187.

⁵⁹ Cf. Koller, Ernst, « Musse und Musische Paideia. Ueber die Musikaporetik in der aristotelischen Politik », dans *Museum Helveticum*, 13, 1956, pp. 1-37. Malheureusement, on n'a pas eu le texte de Koller, ni celui de Eino Mikkola (cf. *infra*), auquel on a eu l'accès par le résumé de Paul Dumont, dans l'article cité plus bas.

⁶⁰ Cf. Mikkola, Eino, « Skholé bei Aristoteles », dans *Arctos*, 2, 1958, pp. 68-87 ; cf. la note antérieure.

⁶¹ Cf. Solmsen, Fr., « Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State », dans *Rheinisches museum*, 107, 1964, pp. 193-220.

⁶² Cf. Dumont, Paul, « Le loisir (scol^{3/4}) dans la Politique d'Aristote », dans Aubenque, Pierre (coord.), *Aristote Politique*, Paris, PUF, 1993, pp. 209-230.

caractère par excellence urbain du loisir, en signalant les passages où Aristote rejette le loisir de l'agriculteur (selon notre opinion, cet aspect reste à discuter en détail, car ici il ne s'agit pas seulement de l'opposition entre l'urbain et le rural, mais aussi des deux types de perception de l'ordre cosmique, correspondantes à la distinction entre l'activité et la production). Troisièmement, P. Dumont saisit le fait que le loisir est différent de l'amusement, ainsi qu'il peut être interprété comme un engagement existentiel, mais retient de la longue chaîne des occurrences que : « ce que, dans la *Politique* fonde la supériorité de la fin qu'est le loisir sur l'absence de loisir, c'est donc une analogie de nature idéologique, entre le loisir, la paix, les actes accomplis en vue du beau et la partie rationnelle de l'homme »⁶³.

Nous accepterions une telle interprétation si nous n'avions pas saisi une série d'innovations théoriques des *Politiques*, qui manquaient dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* : la critique de la distinction entre théorique et pratique ; la théorie de la justice comme intermédialité faite par l'amitié politique ; le changement du sens du terme *εὐδαιμονία* des fragments de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* aux celles déjà citées dans *Les Politiques*. C'est pour cela que nous relisons le terme d'une perspective évolutive : il est possible qu'Aristote ait trouvé à son aide une formule de la vie contemplative, quelque qu'elle soit proche de l'espace de la cité, mais aussi une philosophie de la vie et du quotidien et un modèle anthropologique, que les textes qui défendaient la vie contemplative et le loisir ne le supposaient point. Par ailleurs, il faut qu'on réexamine l'hypothèse du terme *εὐδαιμονία* dans les textes aristotéliques.

Premièrement, nous allons reprendre les passages où le philosophe affirme l'urbanité par l'excellence du loisir. Il est vrai le fait que les agriculteurs ne bénéficient pas du loisir, soit qu'ils soient des bergers ou des cultivateurs⁶⁴, parce qu'ils ne sont pas si riches pour cultiver des activités qui contiennent en elles-mêmes leur fins. Pour cela leur existence se consomme inévitablement dans leur propre projet, où ce n'est pas que le temps des grands cycles naturels les prédispose à la séparation entre l'action et la fin. Cependant, ce n'est pas l'entier phénomène urbain qui est prédisposé au loisir, ce qui change déjà même le fait dont Paul Dumont a reconstruit le concept : ni les travailleurs manuels⁶⁵ de la cité ne peuvent avoir du loisir, vu qu'ils n'ont pas une grande fortune. Pourtant, ce n'est pas la richesse qui est déterminante dans ce cas, mais le genre d'activité, selon le fait qu'il contienne ou pas son fin, selon qu'il est une pratique ou une production (c'est-à-dire selon sa manière de saisir ou non l'essence de la vie, énoncée antérieurement) : ni les artisans, ni les commerçants, qui ne sont pas nécessairement pauvres, ne possèdent pas du loisir ou de la vertu.

⁶³ Cf. Dumont, Paul, *art. cité*, p. 220.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Les Politiques*, VI, 4, 1318b 12-13.

⁶⁵ Cf. *idem*, IV, 4, 1291b 24-25.

Celles-ci ne reviennent qu'à l'homme politique⁶⁶. (Maintenant il est évident que, par rapport au sens ancien de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* de l'homme contemplatif, il est transformé dans celui de l'homme politique). Toutefois, il est surprenant que ce n'est pas seulement le citoyen qui se préoccupe du bien et de la vertu de la cité et qui a le loisir, mais aussi l'homme qui se trouve à l'antipode de la vie urbaine, à savoir le nomade⁶⁷. En effet, il est naturel, car aussi le nomade, que l'homme politique échappent aux grands cycles de la nature par leur activité, qu'impose leurs propres cycles et une monde propre, par le rythme des gouvernements ou par les étapes successives de migration. Toutes les deux modalités de vie manquent les rythmes agricoles, que Hésiode décrit et le modèle archaïque du monde. Il est possible qu'Aristote n'aie pas vu dans ce travail l'affranchissement de l'homme, mais une assujettissement sans perspective. Certes, le loisir de l'homme politique et celui du nomade diffèrent par l'application et par leur résultat, quoiqu'ils soient identiques dans leur essence.

Le fait que le loisir signifie un certain comportement de l'homme à l'égard du temps résulte clairement d'une sentence par laquelle Aristote juge les spartiates, qu'« il n'y avait de salut que dans la guerre, et qu'ils couraient à leur perte dès qu'ils avaient établi leur domination, faute de savoir utiliser leur loisir »⁶⁸. Par ailleurs, les spartiates ont déchu a cause d'une male attitude par rapport à la vie : ils fonctionnaient dans la cité selon le rythme de l'acquisition infinie des biens qui n'enrichissait personne, ils ne savaient pas à remplacer la production (des terres guéries) avec le loisir de la pratique de la vie. Par cette occurrence, la signification du terme *σχολή* dépasse le plan stricte de la philosophie morale et passe dans l'ontologie de l'humain. Il peut définir maintenant la liberté et la capacité de l'homme d'instaurer la justice, c'est-à-dire il peut répondre à la question qu'au début de notre étude était considérée fondamentale pour les entières *Politiques*. Il est vrai que ce concept du loisir a une nuance sociale, en désignant l'aisance nécessaire à l'homme politique, suffisante pour qu'il ne soit pas corrompu et pour qu'il ne veuille pas de corrompre les autres⁶⁹. Mais le loisir est beaucoup plus que cela, vu qu'il porte à la gratuité que la prospérité ne suppose pas nécessairement⁷⁰, et s'associe avec la plus importante des vertus, étant, en effet, une synthèse de toutes les vertus que l'homme noble peut les avoir.

⁶⁶ Cf. *idem*, VII, 9, 1328b 40 – 1329a 1.

⁶⁷ Cf. *idem*, I, 8, 1256a 30-32: « Il en est de même aussi pour les hommes, car leurs modes de vie diffèrent beaucoup. Les plus inactifs sont les nomades : <comme> leur nourriture leur vient sans peine des animaux domestiques, ils mènent une vie de loisir... ». En effet, pour Aristote, les types d'activité et de nourriture déterminent les types de vie et celles humaines, fait affirmé plus haut, dans le passage cité (1256a 22-23).

⁶⁸ Cf. *Les Politiques*, II, 9, 1271b 3-5.

⁶⁹ Cf. par exemple, la relation entre le loisir et l'aisance matérielle, énoncée à l'égard du régime de Carthagène dans *Les Politiques*, II, 11, 1273a 23 sqq.

⁷⁰ Cf., par exemple, *Les Politiques*, VI, 8, 1322b 37.

Aristote la nomme dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*⁷¹ δὲ τῆς ὑπέροχης τῆς ἀρετῆς, *magnanimité*, concept lié de celui de liberté, de gratuité et du loisir⁷².

Après avoir tracé les nuances du concept, nous passons à la thème centrale de l'étude : la modalité dont la possession du loisir vient à légitimer l'organisation du gouvernement humaine au dessus du maîtrise de la loi. On a déjà vu qu'Aristote avait soutenu⁷³ cette théorie. Après une telle analyse, on a un bénéfice théorique, c'est-à-dire montrer quelle est la liaison entre le loisir et le rapport de la raison pratique avec les universaux. La définition de la raison pratique de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, VI, 5, était accompagnée par l'exemplification d'un seul homme qui la détienne, voire Périclès. En revanche, dans *Les Politiques*, la rationalité pratique dépend de la communauté politique des amis qui vivent dans une cité pour obtenir le bonheur et pour faire la justice. Or, toutes ces choses-là sont impossibles sans la découverte de l'intermédialité entre l'universel et le particulier. Ce fait n'était possible que dans la communauté des amis qui disposaient de loisir. Conformément à un passage⁷⁴ des *Politiques* l'absence de ces éléments ne dissout pas la légalité et la moralité d'une cité, mais assure la vie (νῆε), sans porter à la vie bonne (τῆς ἀγαθῆς) : « Car dans la mesure où ils s'éloignent de la monarchie et que le patrimoine qu'ils possèdent n'est pas tel qu'ils puissent prendre du loisir sans aucun souci, ni si petit qu'ils doivent être nourris par la cité, ils sont dans la nécessité d'accepter que la loi gouverne et pas eux-mêmes ».

Par ailleurs, n'avoir pas du loisir signifie l'absence de la rationalité pratique et de l'expérience de l'amitié politique. Car la rationalité pratique pose au dessus de la loi universelle l'application de la loi dans un contexte particulier, par l'homme qui découvre l'intermédialité. Autrement dit, n'avoir pas du loisir signifie la clôture dans une éthique de l'obligation, où l'application conséquent de la loi représente tout l'horizon éthique. Ce n'est pas peu, mais c'est le minimum. Au contraire, réjouir du loisir, de la magnanimité, de la sagesse pratique signifie être un créateur moral, c'est-à-dire avoir « un *habitus* de l'action accompagné par une règle vraie », selon Aristote (l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, VI, 5). Il y a ici un certain rapport entre l'homme et l'intellect qui contient toutes les universaux : ce n'est que maintenant que l'homme est devenu son intellect auquel participe avec la communauté de ses amis pour juger la justice. Il nous reste de dire que le loisir est la situation la plus propre et la plus authentique de l'homme. Si « la

⁷¹ Cf. *Éthique à Nicomaque*, IV, 3, 1123a 34.

⁷² Cf. *Les Politiques*, VIII, 3, 1338a 10 – b 3. En outre, les interprétations médiévales de l'*Éthique* ont été influencées par l'intellectualisation excessive du loisir et de la magnanimité (cf. Gauthier, R.A., *Magnanimité, l'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne*, Paris, J. Vrin, 1953).

⁷³ Cf. *idem*, III, 15, 1286a 10 sqq.

⁷⁴ Cf. *idem*, IV, 6, 1293a 15-20.

vie aussi se divise en loisir et labeur, en guerre et paix »⁷⁵, alors la paix n'a pas la signification de la fête et de l'exception du loisir, mais du temps quotidien intermédiaire entre les extrêmes d'une mobilité absolue (la guerre) et une immobilité totale et contemplative.

On peut faire maintenant une série d'analogies : tel comme la cité se trouve entre la bande des loups et l'isolement de dieu, tout ainsi le jugement pratique et théorique se trouve entre la singularité des faits de la bête et l'universel immobile du dieu, de même l'homme est entre l'animal et la divinité, de même le loisir est entre le labeur et le repos. On se permet même une extension des analogies : l'individuel comme concept de la philosophie première et de l'être éléate est pareil par rapport à la transformation héraclitéenne ; selon la définition d'Aristote, il est « quelque chose qui était pour être »⁷⁶, une essence actualisée dans la matière, $\# \kappa \iota \# \kappa \alpha \# \delta \epsilon \# \mu \epsilon \hat{\iota} \alpha$. Ainsi, le loisir est le « principe de tout »⁷⁷, la formule pratique par laquelle l'homme devient ce que la nature l'a préparé devenir, c'est-à-dire être politique.

Aristote ne demande au citoyen que du loisir, mais il prépare aussi une série des institutions du loisir, intermédiaires entre le repos et le labeur. Par exemple, il conditionne une cité libre de la présence du loisir, en affirmant que son absence porte à la tyrannie⁷⁸. De plus, le traité contient une entière liste de prescriptions pour le maintien de la tyrannie, où la suppression du loisir, la présence des espions, l'expulsion des élites en sont des formules spécifiques⁷⁹. Il suit, puis, l'interdiction des conversations élevées (expression pour laquelle Aristote utilise le terme $\mu \epsilon \tau \alpha \beta \alpha \sigma \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \sigma$ qui a aussi cette signification, d'où dérivera plus tard le terme *schola*, pour désigner en général une activité éducative organisée)⁸⁰. En revanche, une cité optimale gouvernée doit assurer son plus important espace, c'est-à-dire l'*oikos*, qui n'est pas destinée au commerce, mais aux débats politiques⁸¹.

Plus qu'une éthique ou qu'une modalité alternative de vie, le loisir est l'accomplissement de l'humain même, ainsi qu'il est inséré dans le monde comme une être douée. Pour expliquer cela, on dirait que la philosophie du loisir correspond vraiment à une analogie cosmologique. Dans la définition de l'âme⁸², qu'Aristote donne dans le traité *De l'âme*, il crée une tension qui a alimenté la tradition des commentaires arabes et latines médiévaux du texte et qui a été une des plus importantes sources prémodernes de la

⁷⁵ Cf. *idem*, VII, 14, 1333a 31-33.

⁷⁶ Pour la signification de ce concept, cf., par exemple, Courtes, P., « L'origine de la formule $\tau \acute{\omicron} \tau \iota \hat{\alpha} \nu \epsilon \nu \alpha \iota$ », dans *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 1964, pp. 169-197, avec une excellente bibliographie de la thèse et avec ses principaux sources dans *corpus aristotelicum*.

⁷⁷ Cf. *Les Politiques*, VIII, 3, 1337b 32.

⁷⁸ Cf. *idem*, V, 5, 1305a 19-20.

⁷⁹ Cf. *idem*, V, 11, 1314a 20 sqq.

⁸⁰ Cf. *idem*, V, 11, 134a 3.

⁸¹ Cf. *idem*, VII, 12, 131b 12-13.

⁸² Cf. *De l'âme*, II, 1, 412b 3-5: « l'entéléchie première d'un corps naturel organisé ».

conception de la subjectivité. En somme, on pourrait dire que parmi les autres, la tension consiste dans le fait que la définition supposait un principe de correspondance entre les facultés de l'âme et les organes corporelles, mais affirmait l'inexistence d'un organe corporel pour l'intellect. Ce fait clarifiait bien une série de questions dans la théorie de la connaissance, comme l'aspect formel de la pensée, la possibilité de se rappeler, l'immatérialité de l'intelligible etc., mais occultait l'ontologie de l'intellect. Les commentateurs du texte, d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise jusqu'au Averroès, quoique par des manières différentes, ont fait appel au même texte du traité *De la génération des animaux*⁸³ pour expliquer cette origine. Aristote affirme qu'un « principe est indépendant de la matière chez tous les êtres où se trouve inclus un élément divin - tel est le caractère de ce qu'on appelle intellect » en suggérant que le ciel en serait la source. En effet, il est le contenant sensible et intelligible du monde et a des mouvements circulaires, parfaites et éternelles, il est immobile sous l'aspect des toutes catégories à l'exception du lieu, il comprend les principes génératives du monde sublunaire. L'homme, étrange au son ciel originaire, étrange au monde corporelle où il est jeté, a une existence marquée par la scission fondamentale entre le ciel et la terre, que la constitution de son âme reprend proportionnellement. Pierre Aubenque a eu l'intuition d'interpréter l'entier projet de la recherche infinie de la philosophie prime de la perspective de cette scission⁸⁴. Qu'on retienne de ce problème qu'on n'a esquissé que partiellement, le principe d'une analogie entre l'activité de l'intellect et le mouvement du ciel, parce qu'un fragment des *Météorologiques* est frappant pour ce qui est des mouvements du ciel, par la ressemblance avec les types d'action possibles pour l'homme. Aristote en dit⁸⁵ :

« Ce monde est nécessairement en continuité d'une façon ou d'une autre avec celui qui tourne là-haut, si bien que toutes ses impulsions sont commandées de là-haut. C'est, en effet, le principe d'où part pour tous les êtres le mouvement, qui doit être considéré comme la cause première. En outre, ce principe est éternel et son mouvement n'a pas limite dans l'espace ; il est toujours parfait, tandis que tous les corps dont il est question ici occupent des lieux (καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τοῖς τόποις) les uns des autres ».

Par ailleurs, il y a deux types possibles d'action, un qui ne contient pas la fin du mouvement (et qui revient au monde sublunaire, dans une éternelle labeur et transformation), et un autre, qui contient son fin (et cela revient aux mouvements du ciel, dans une éternelle circularité sans effort – ainsi qu'Aristote affirme dans un passage de la *Métaphysique*, IX⁸⁶). Les deux

⁸³ Cf. *De la génération des animaux*, trad. Louis Pierre, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1961, II, 2, 736b 27 – 737a 1.

⁸⁴ Cf. Aubenque, Pierre, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote, œuvre cit.*, p. 352.

⁸⁵ Cf. *Météorologiques*, trad. Louis, Pierre, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1966, I, 1, 339a 21-26.

⁸⁶ Cf. *Métaphysique*, IX, 8, 1050b 24.

types d'action sont analogiques avec celles des *Politiques*, VIII⁸⁷. Plus précisément, nous ajoutons à notre analogie le fait que le loisir se situe entre le repos et le labeur, comme les mouvements du ciel entre le premier moteur immobile et la transformation du monde sublunaire, comme les activités de jugement (soit pratique, soit théorique, quoiqu'on a vu que la pensée théorique soit un cas particulier « plus pur » de celle pratique), se trouvent entre une contemplation purement intuitive⁸⁸ et une activité exclusivement des désirs. Il nous reste à conclure que le loisir est la forme authentique d'insertion dans le monde de l'homme, d'admission de son scission intérieure entre le ciel et la terre, d'instauration de la justice et de bonne survivance à l'intérieur de la communauté des amis. De plus, il n'importe pas si l'activité de la raison est pratique ou théorique, car les distinctions sont les mêmes : la vie dans la cité peut obéir au loi comme simple exécution de l'universel, mais alors elle est survivance, sans qu'elle soit du bonheur. Au contraire, elle peut être de l'homme qui décide les lois, les applique pratiquement et accomplit son essence de vivant politique à la façon du loisir. C'est pareil pour la raison théorique, même si le texte d'Aristote n'est pas le seul à inaugurer une telle perspective. *Mutatis mutandis*, l'intellect aussi peut pratiquer le labeur, par les « projets » dont l'acte ne contient pas son fin propre, en perfectionnant infiniment ses propres instruments jusqu'au délai totale de la compréhension cherchée ou, inversement, peut interpréter le sens du loisir spirituel comme un genre d'activité contemplative, où l'acte contient son fin. Le loisir est l'établissement de l'homme dans sa propre scission. L'impossibilité de réaliser complètement la philosophie première comme science déterminée devient ici la théorie de l'insertion infinie de l'homme dans la cité. C'est la raison pour laquelle on a soutenu au début de l'étude l'analogie thématique entre *Les Politiques* et la *Métaphysique*.

Nous considérons que le loisir pratique, qu'aussi le loisir théorique ont eu leurs défenseurs historiques et que chacun d'eux a réduit le sujet lancé à une compréhension univoque. Par exemple, dans le plan de la rationalité théorique, l'idéal de l'intellectuel des universitaires parisiens de la fin du XIII-e siècle a été contaminé de l'interprétation de l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* du loisir (*otium*) comme activité spécifiquement contemplative. Alain de Libera affirme la présence d'une solidarité intellectuelle autour le concept d'*otium*, vu comme un prototype de vie intellectuelle, reprise de l'éthique aristotélique de la contemplation⁸⁹ dans les commentaires averroïstes à l'*Éthique à Nicomaque* de la fin du XIII-e siècle.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Les Politiques*, VIII, 3, 1338A 1-6.

⁸⁸ De laquelle parle, probablement, le passage de la *Métaphysique*, IX, 7, 1072b 15.

⁸⁹ Cf. de Libera, Alain, *Penser au Moyen Âge*, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p. 240 sqq. Le texte de référence de la morale intellectualiste pendant le XIII-e siècle est le traité de Boèce, *De summo bono sive de vita philosophi*, qui, quoiqu'il n'utilise le terme *otium*, il a en vue une analogie entre l'étage suprême du monde accessible à l'homme, qui est l'intellect universel et la faculté suprême de l'homme, qui est la pensée, pour que l'éthique prend de cette analogie l'idée que l'activité intellectuelle est la forme de suprême moralité de l'homme dans cette vie. Chez Thomas d'Aquin le terme *otium* a le plus souvent la

Dans le plan de la raison pratique, Hannah Arendt a fait une analogie intéressante entre le concept grec $\nu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ et la théorie marxiste du loisir, en affirmant que :

« Chez Aristote, l'articulation même des modes de vie, dans laquelle la vie de plaisirs joue le petit rôle, s'inspire nettement de l'idéal de la contemplation (théôria). À l'ancien affranchissement des nécessités vitales et des contraintes, les philosophes ajoutèrent l'exemption d'activité politique (skholè), de sorte que l'exigence chrétienne cherchant à se libérer de tous les soucis et de toutes les affaires de ce monde eut une aïeule et trouva son origine dans l'apolitia philosophique de la fin de l'antiquité »⁹⁰.

Selon l'opinion de Hannah Arendt, (qui critique à son tour, le marxisme), ces deux manières de comprendre le loisir auraient devenu l'idéal marxiste du loisir complet, qui attend l'humanité après l'abolissement des classes et la production infinie. Cependant, notre opinion y est contraire, car $\nu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ne signifie point le repos opposé au labeur, mais l'intermédiaire entre le repos et le labeur, un $\nu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ qui n'exempte pas des activités politiques, mais, par contre, représente leur essence, comme accomplissement de l'être politique.

Pourtant, l'erreur intervient dans une interprétation erronée du loisir du point de vue même du marxisme, dont la logique binomiale se développe entre le labeur et le repos, entre le temps quotidien et le temps de la fête. Nous avons argumenté plus haut la position conformément à laquelle Aristote a essayé de dépasser justement le temps des cycles cosmiques, gentilles et agricoles, qui fonctionnaient selon ce principe prémoderne, en proposant le loisir comme solution pour leur dépassement. Le loisir n'est ni l'activité qui exécute mécaniquement un principe universel, ni l'envie chaotique de la reconstruction mythiques du temps dans les sociétés tribales ou celui de la paresse de dimanche du peuple travailleur moderne, forme au plus sécularisée d'une pensée archaïque religieuse, qu'Aristote s'est proposé de les surpasser dans *Les Politiques*. Et pour cette raison il est moins probable que l'idéal de la pensée politique grecque, particulièrement aristotélique, trouve l'accomplissement dans les derniers projets métaphysiques de la modernité européenne⁹¹. Le projet marxiste, au contraire, a manqué le loisir, le concept urbaine et grec, dans la formule gentille de la fête qui célèbre le chaos, le repos et le redressement des forces génératives de l'univers.

À la fin des *Politiques*, Aristote propose encore deux occurrences du loisir, qui annoncent la parution de la philosophie dans un contexte historique

signification de repos (*omne quod exit de otio ad actum*, In *I Sententiarum libri*, q. 2) ou il est associé avec la contemplation (*otium contemplationis* - In *I Sententiarum libri*, q. 3).

⁹⁰ Cf. Arendt, Hannah, *La condition de l'homme moderne*, Paris, Gallimard, 1982, chap. « La tradition et l'âge moderne », p. 49.

⁹¹ Selon Hannah Arendt, *oeuvre cit.*, p. 51.

du loisir et d'euphorie des cités grecques, après les guerres médiques⁹², comme une belle ironie qui fait définitivement la distinction entre le loisir et le repos absolu⁹³ :

«Donc il faut du courage et de l'endurance pour <le temps de la> besogne, de la philosophie pour <celui du> loisir, et de la tempérance et de la justice pour ces deux temps, mais surtout pour ceux qui vivent en paix et dans le loisir. Car la guerre contraint <les gens> à être justes et à vivre dans la tempérance, alors que la jouissance d'un sort heureux et la vie de loisir en temps de paix les poussent à la démesure. Il faut donc beaucoup de justice et beaucoup de tempérance à ceux qui paraissent réussir le mieux et jouir de tout ce qui rend bienheureux comme ceux, s'ils existent, qui, aux dires des poètes, <vivent> dans les Iles des Bienheureux. Car ce sont ces gens-là qui ont le plus besoin de philosophie, de tempérance et de justice, dans la mesure où ils mènent plus <que d'autres> une vie de loisir dans l'abondance de tels biens ».

L'ironie du passage consiste dans le fait que l'espace paradisiaque du bonheur et du repos absolu, l'île des bienheureux, est indésirable, car il n'est pas naturel pour l'homme, destiné au sens de la justice réalisable que par le loisir. Par ailleurs, cette île est une utopie, et les poètes mentent, pendant que l'homme peut devenir au plus, une être politique, c'est-à-dire maître du loisir et de la justice possibles dans la communauté des amis et dans la cité qu'on peut «saisir d'un seul coup d'oeil». L'ironie du passage confirme encore une fois notre interprétation au concept de $\eta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ comme intermédiaire entre le repos et le mouvement, le loisir découvert entre les amis est le concept fondamental de l'accomplissement politique de l'homme dans la vision d'Aristote, ainsi que le ciel est l'intermédiaire entre le divin et le terrestre, ainsi que l'homme est entre le dieu et la bête ou entre l'isolement et les parentes. Que nous systématisations, par ailleurs, les analogies de notre recherche :

Le dieu	L'isolement	La paresse	L'universel	L'être	Le moteur premier	L'intuition
L'être politique	Les amis	Le loisir	Le jugement pratique	La chose individuelle	Le ciel	L'intellect discursif
La bête	Les parentes	Le labeur	Le particulier	La transformation	Le monde sublunaire	La sensibilité

Quoi qu'on soit d'accord avec le fait qu'un argument étymologique ne prouve rien le plus souvent, parce qu'il est le plus aisément compris par le voile de l'équivocité, peut-être que la provenance du terme grec qui nomme l'institution écolière (*schola*) n'est pas accidentelle. La nuance active et celle

⁹² Cf. *Les Politiques*, VIII, 6, 1341a 28-32.

⁹³ Cf. *idem*, VII, 15, 1334a 27-34.

passive du terme s'imbriquent dans un projet de dépassement de ce qu'il est donné par ce que l'esprit peut produire par lui-même. On croit que par le concept du loisir, Aristote propose une manière générique humaine de dépassement des cadres de la pensée gentilice, des dichotomies : travail et paresse, économies et gaspillages, labeur et fête, insuffisance et excès, mouvement et immobilité, effort et contemplation. Il est le projet de dépassement d'une prémodernité close dans les dichotomies qui sont toujours aussi actuelles pour l'homme moderne, que la possibilité de leur dépassement.

THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. *THE METAPHYSICAL
DEDUCTION*

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Abstract

The reference to a “metaphysical deduction” appears in The Critique of Pure Reason only in edition B, §26, where Kant refers to the purpose¹ of the argumentation regarding the argumentation of the deduction of categories: „In der metaphysischen Deduction wurde der Ursprung der Kategorien a priori überhaupt durch ihre völlige Zusammentreffung mit den allgemeinen logischen Functionen des Denkens dargethan (...)”². Thus, if these categories will be deduced by reference to the universal logical functions of thinking, we must specify, before all, what these functions are. In order to do that, a presentation of the Kantian conception of logic is needed.

Although Kant considers logic to be a closed science, when he uses it to deduce the categories, he presents his own view upon this subject. Logic, Kant says, is the science of the rules of the intellect in general. It can be approached from two perspectives: as a general usage of the intellect, or as a particular usage of the intellect. The first one contains the absolutely necessary rules of the intellect, while the second contains the rules of using the intellect to refer to a specific kind of objects. The first one is the

¹ E. Cassirer considers that this chapter will answer the problem of applying mathematical concepts to experience (see Casirer E., *Kant's Life and Thought*, trans. By J. Haden, Yale University Press, 1981)

² Imm. Kant., *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, B159

elementary logic and does not consider any particular aspect of objects, while the latter is the organon of some sciences.

General or elementary logic - as it was mentioned above – can be, in its turn, divided into pure logic or applied logic. General pure logic does not regard all the empirical conditions that influence the activity of the intellect (the influence of the senses, the play of imagination, the rules of memory), it regards strictly *a priori* principles and is a canon of intellect and reason, but only regarding the formal part of their usage (no matter what the content would be, empirical or transcendental). If general logic takes empirical conditions of the usage of the intellect into account, then Kant calls it applied logic.

Only pure general logic is a science in the proper meaning of the term:

1) Als allgemeine Logik abstrahirt sie von allem Inhalt der Verstandeserkenntniß und der Verschiedenheit ihrer Gegenstände und hat mit nichts als der bloßen Form des Denkens zu thun.

2) Als reine Logik hat sie keine empirische Principien, mithin schöpft sie nichts (wie man sich bisweilen überredet hat) aus der Psychologie, die also auf den Kanon des Verstandes gar keinen Einfluß hat. Sie ist eine demonstirte Doctrin, und alles muß in ihr völlig *a priori* gewiß sein.”³

Transcendental logic does not ignore all kinds of content, such as general logic, it relates to a pure content, as it is possible due to the pure intuitions of space and time. This logic deals with the origin of knowledge of objects, as long as this origin lies in the subject and is not empirical.

Not any knowledge is transcendental:

„daß nicht eine jede Erkenntniß *a priori*, sondern nur die, dadurch wir erkennen, daß und wie gewisse Vorstellungen (Anschauungen oder Begriffe) lediglich *a priori* angewandt werden oder möglich sind, transscendental (d.i. die Möglichkeit der Erkenntniß oder der Gebrauch derselben *a priori*) heißen müsse.”⁴.

The difference between the transcendental and the empirical does not lie in the relation of knowledge to the object, but in the critique of knowledge. Kant uses the usage of space as an example, which, if related to objects in general, is transcendental, and, if it is related to objects of the senses, it is empirical. In the first case, space is the origin of some *a priori* knowledge, and in the second case it is the origin of some *a posteriori* knowledge.

Transcendental logic is, in its turn, divided into analytics and dialectics. *Transcendental analytics*, Kant says, exposes the elements of the pure consciousness of the intellect and the principles, without which no object could be thought. It is a logic of truth. Using logic as an organon leads to

³ Imm. Kant, *cited work*, A54 / B78

⁴ Imm. Kant, *cited work*, A56 / B80

errors and appearances, their critique being the object of dialectics. *Transcendental*⁵ *analytics* must take into account the following facts: its concepts must be pure, not empirical; they must not belong to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and the intellect; they must be elementary, not derived concepts; their table must be complete.

Transcendental analytics has two parts: the analytics of concepts and the analytics of principles. The analytics of concepts is not an analysis of concepts, but a decomposition of the intellect itself as a faculty, in order to examine the possibility of *a priori* concepts. This decomposition supposes that there will be a search for pure concepts in the intellect and an analysis of the pure usage of the intellect. The discovery of these concepts must be done by following a criterion that will, in this way, assure the completeness of the table. If their discovery is attempted through the observation of the intellect in various ways of knowledge, then we will never be able to say that the analysis is complete, because there will always be unanalyzed knowledge.

Unlike intuitions, which are based on affections, concepts rely on functions:

„Das Urtheil ist also die mittelbare Erkenntniß eines Gegenstandes, mithin die Vorstellung einer Vorstellung desselben. In jedem Urtheil ist ein Begriff, der für viele gilt und unter diesem Vielen auch eine gegebene Vorstellung begreift, welche letztere denn auf den Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen wird.“⁶

All judgments are functions of unity in our representations, and all acts of the intellect can be reduced to judgments, which lead to the conclusion that the intellect is a faculty of judgment. Moreover, all the functions of the intellect can be found, if a complete exposure of the functions of unity in judgments is accomplished.

Starting from these premises, Kant will start the metaphysical deduction of categories. From this moment on, in edition B of the *Critique*, Kant numbers some sections in order to distinguish the discussed elementary concepts better, as he mentions at the end of the transcendental deduction of categories from 1787.

The table of functions⁷ of unity in judgments is presented without many arguments, which led to a lot of criticism. It is presented this way:

1. The quantity of judgments: universal, particular, singular

⁵ M. Flonta considers that this chapter includes the systematic elaboration of pure Physics. (Flonta M., *An Explanation of the concept of "pure Physics" in The Critique of Pure Reason*, in *Immanuel Kant, 200 years from the release of The Critique of Pure Reason*, The Publishing House of the Academy of Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, 1982, p. 40)

⁶ Imm. Kant, *op. cit.* A68 / B93

⁷ J.H. Paton identifies „the form of judgment” with the „function of judgment”, although they have different connotations, (see Paton H.J., *A Key to Kant's Deduction of the Categories*, Mind, New Series, vol. 40, no. 159, 1931, p. 319)

2. Quality: affirmative, negative, infinite
3. Relation: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive
4. Modality: problematic, assertorial, apodictic

How did Kant get to this table? If he had the functions of unity in judgment as a criterion, which, in fact, are the categories, then it means that he deduced the table of judgments from the table of categories, and not reciprocally. The idea that he sustains, is, nevertheless, that the table of categories will be deduced from here and, this way, it will be complete. As the author himself states, this table does not entirely follow “the usual technique of logicians”, this being the reason for which a few explanatory observations are offered. The first observation refers to singular judgments, that logicians think we can treat as we treat the universal ones. For example, the judgment “Socrates is mortal” is singular, while the judgment: “All humans are mortal” is a universal one. But the predicate “mortal” refers to an entire sphere of the subject, whether it is made of a single object or of an infinity of objects. Kant agrees with this observation, but, he says, if we regard judgment not only in the sense of the relation subject-predicate, but like a piece of knowledge, then the singular judgment is quantitatively different from the universal one, and it relates to it like unity to infinity. So, the unity that singular judgment represents is a quantitative one, not a synthetic one. But the difference between these judgments finds its place in a „Tafel der Momente des Denkens überhaupt (obzwar freilich nicht in der bloß auf den Gebrauch //B97// der Urtheile untereinander eingeschränkten Logik)”⁸.

In conclusion, the table of the functions of unity in judgment is not a table of general logic, but a table of pure logic, which cannot, by any means, contradict general logic, because, in the end, it makes it possible, but which, due to the expansion of its domain, by considering a pure content, affords some distinctions that cannot occur in general logic. So, the difference between singular and universal judgments does not lie in their shape, but in the pure content associated with them. From a formal point of view, transcendental logic does not say more, but when judgments are regarded as pieces of knowledge, meaning that they have a pure content, what is singular is related to that which is universal, as unity related to multiplicity, like an undividable unity related to a whole made of such units. But is this difference a quantitative one, or a qualitative one?

Furthermore, in the same direction of transcendental logic, Kant distinguishes infinite judgments from the affirmative ones, and this is a distinction that can't be made in general logic. For example, the judgment “The soul is immortal” is a judgment that has a negative predicate, but, in fact, it is an affirmative judgment. This judgment is an infinite judgment, because, if the subject is the negation of a predicate, it can be, according to that judgment, a lot of other things. The example Kant chose is not very clarifying, because, if a soul is not immortal, then it is mortal, meaning that

⁸ Imm. Kant, *op. cit.* A71 / B 96-97

the sphere of possibilities has but two variants, which hardly justifies the attribute of "infinite" given to the judgment.

In argumentation, Kant expands the universe of the discourse, from "soul" to "beings" in such a way that, if a soul is immortal, then there can be an infinity of other beings that are not mortal. „ Diese unendliche Urtheile also in Ansehung des logischen Umfanges sind wirklich bloß beschränkend in Ansehung des Inhalts der Erkenntniß überhaupt, und in so fern müssen sie in der transscendentalen Tafel aller Momente des Denkens in den Urtheilen nicht übergangen werden, weil die hierbei ausgeübte Function des Verstandes vielleicht in dem Felde seiner reinen Erkenntniß *a priori* wichtig sei kann."⁹ So the difference does not consist in the quantitative relation between infinite and finite, as in the case of the previous paragraph, but in the way in which a content of the judgment is given.

The third observation regarding the table of judgments concerns the relations of thinking in judgments, which can be: a) of the predicate related to the subject; b) of the principle related to the consequence; c) of divided knowledge and of all the members of the division between themselves. The first one is the categorical judgment, the second one is the hypothetical one, and the last one is the disjunctive judgment. The discussion about the disjunctive judgment and its relation to consciousness by taking a content into account has a clarifying purpose for the argumentation of the third analogy of experience, in the chapter dedicated to the principles of pure intellect.

„Es ist also in einem disjunctiven Urtheile eine gewisse Gemeinschaft der Erkenntnisse, die darin besteht, daß sie sich wechselseitig einander ausschließen, aber dadurch doch im Ganzen die wahre Erkenntniß bestimmen, indem sie zusammengenommen den ganzen Inhalt einer einzigen gegebenen Erkenntniß ausmachen."¹⁰

These judgments can be interpreted as relations of the elements of a judgment, relations of a judgment to another judgment, and, in the end, relations of a judgment to the universe of the discourse.

The fourth observation regards the last group of judgments, those of modality. Again, Kant distances himself from the interpretation of the modalities from general logic, where the modus can be: possible, impossible, contingent or necessary. For Kant, this type of categories does not contribute in any way to the content of judgment. But the difference between transcendental logic and general logic was previously stated as the pure content that the first one takes into account. So, if in this case the judgments of modality do not relate to the content, it means that they should correspond to the classification from general logic. The thing that Kant focuses on here is the relation of the copula to consciousness, from which it could be deduced

⁹ Imm. Kant, *op. cit.*, A72 / B98

¹⁰ Imm. Kant, *cited work*, A74 / B99

that the judgment is: possible (arbitrary), assertorial (real) or apodictic (necessary). The problematic judgment expresses only logical possibility, a free choice. The assertorial judgment expresses logical truth, reality; in a hypothetical reasoning, the antecedent is problematic, but the consequent is assertorial. The apodictic judgment thinks the consequent in an *a priori* relation with the antecedent, that is, in a necessary manner.

„Dieselbe Function, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urtheile Einheit giebt, die giebt auch //B105// der bloßen Synthesis verschiedener Vorstellungen in einer Anschauung Einheit, welche, allgemein ausgedrückt, der reine Verstandesbegriff heißt.“¹¹

We can deduce from here that the functions of unity in judgment must correspond to the functions of unity in intuition, meaning that what makes a judgment possible can also make experience possible. The relation between categories and the table of judgments is a dual one. On the one side, categories are deduced starting from the table of judgments, and on the other side, categories are conditions of possibility for judgments. Two directions of argumentation become distinctive. Firstly, when categories are discovered, one starts from something familiar, from the faculty of judgment. Kant, through the metaphysical deduction of the categories does not argue their validity, their objective validity. It hasn't already been established that there are pure concepts of the intellect that have an objective validity. The categories discovered here are only pure concepts, but their role in knowledge has not been proved yet. In the transcendental deduction, it will be shown that the unification functions of the intellect are conditions of possibility for knowledge, so categories have an objective validity. Starting from the table of judgments, Kant can deduce only a part of the attributes that categories should have, this meaning the fact that they are pure originary concepts, but, as I have already said, their role in knowledge hasn't been established yet, so, the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgments is not clear. The table of judgments is the starting point of a discovery, but not of a validation. The categories are the ones that generally make a judgment possible, so they condition the table of judgments itself. This way, the *a priori* origin of some concepts is derived from the table of judgments, - which constitutes the metaphysical deduction, and the validation of categories is done in transcendental deduction, where it is also shown that these categories are conditions of possibility of judgments in general, so they are conditions of possibility for the judgments in the presented table.

This way, an argumentative series of discoveries and foundations is distinguished. From here, we can draw the conclusion that we can properly speak of categories only after it is proved that these pure concepts deduced here are objectively valid.

This is the table of the categories:

¹¹ Imm. Kant, *cited work*, A79 / B104-105

1. of quantity: unity, multiplicity, totality
2. of quality: reality, negation, limitation¹²
3. of relation: inherence and subsistence (*substantia et accidens*), cause and dependence (cause and effect), community (reciprocal action between active and passive)
4. of modality: possibility– impossibility, existence– nonexistence, necessity – contingency

These are the pure concepts of the intellect¹³. They are originary concepts, unlike the derived ones, which are pure, too. The discovery of derived concepts is left by Kant as the task of another work. Even if these originary concepts are derived from the table of the functions of the intellect in judgment, it does not mean that they were deduced from other concepts, and this way they are not originary. What was found with the help of the table of judgments was only the title of some individual concepts that belong to the intellect, not their properties. It is known, at this point, that they are *a priori*, because they were not extracted from experience, but it hasn't been proven yet that they are conditions of possibility. So, these concepts will get the attribute of "category" only after the transcendental deduction will found the existence of some concepts that, they alone, make experience possible¹⁴. For now, naming these concepts "categories" must be taken with the announced reserve. However, Kant was convinced that such concepts existed, moreover, he brings into discussion other philosophers' attempts to discover and establish them.

Kant names pure concepts "categories", in Aristotle's terminology. He objects that the ancient philosopher had no method in obtaining the list of these concepts.

On the other hand, Kant claims that he had borrowed a principle that makes the list of categories complete. This principle is the faculty to judge. Kant does not mention the exact manner in which the list of judgments was made. Having the faculty to judge (or to think) as a principle, the judgments were not deduced analytically, so that their completeness is assured, but, apparently, the functions of unity in judgments were aimed. This manner is one that cannot assure completeness, because, even if judgments were followed in the framework of general logic; this one, in its turn, doesn't have a unique criterion for their classification and, more than that, Kant only starts from general logic, what he really aims at is transcendental logic – that's where the changes in the list of judgments come from, as found in the

¹² C. Noica names this category „limitation that does not limit" (see C. Noica, *Becoming in Being*, Humanitas, 1998, p. 249)

¹³D. Johnson considers that the derivation manner of the categories implies, doubtlessly, the fact that they are concepts about objects. (see Johnson D., *Kant's Metaphysical Deduction*, Proceedings of the Eight International Kant Kongress, vol. II, part 1, Ed. H. Robinson, Memphis, 1995, p. 274)

¹⁴ I. Pârnu identifies two functions of the categories: a logical one and an „ontological-immanent" one, structurally defining the object of possible experience (see Pârnu I., *The Possibility of experience: a theoretical reconstruction of The Critique of Pure Reason*, Bucharest, Politeia-SNSPA, 2004, p. 129)

studies in logic from his time. This way, the argumentation is circular; the functions of unity are searched for in knowledge in order to discover judgments, and, from here on, categories are discovered – as they are in fact functions of unity. The discovery of the categories, taken apart from the setting of the table of judgments has, in fact, a criterion, and is, from this perspective, complete. But the starting premise is not apodictic, it is only assertorial. The thing that Kant cannot guarantee is the completeness of the table of judgments. More than that, the relation between judgments and the corresponding categories is not one that can be argued, but it is based, as the third observation mentions, (§11¹⁵) rather on evidence. It is understood that the connection between them must have some sort of evidence, because, in the end, the same unification function is the subject of this issue; nevertheless, the terms designating these functions are different. But this is the case of any term, which, at the level of language, says more than the notion initially corresponding to it. Kant does not mention the relation between the judgments of quantity and the corresponding categories. If, in the case of other correspondences, one could say that there is a relation of order, meaning that the first category of quality corresponds to the first judgment of quality and so on, as far as quantity is concerned, this relation doesn't seem to be obeyed.

I think that the category of unity rather corresponds to the singular judgment, and the category of totality corresponds to the universal judgment. The relation between the singular judgment and the universal one is the same as the relation between unity and totality.

The second observation concerning the table of categories says that a third category results from the union of the second one to the first one. In the case of totality, it is obtained by unifying plurality with unity, in such a way that a synthetic unity is obtained. So, if a horizontal correspondence can be established between the two tables, then the singular judgment should be placed ahead of the universal one. But, going back to the derivation of the third category from the first two, this fact does not make that particular category a derived one. It represents an originary act of the pure intellect, because even the union of the first two categories is, in itself, an originary act for each group.

The first observation regarding the table of categories is, in fact, a grouping of the types: the first groups are categories that regard the objects of intuition (pure or empirical) and are called mathematical, and the last two groups are categories that regard the existence of objects (in the relation between them, or in relation with the intellect) and are called dynamic.

The third observation states the correlation of the community with disjunctive judgment, which „nicht so in die Augen fallend“¹⁶. Disjunctive

¹⁵ Paragraphs §11 and §12 do not appear in the 1781 edition, (p. 115 – 118 in the Romanian cited edition), they were added in the 1787 edition

¹⁶ Imm. Kant, *cited work.*, B112

judgments include a whole divided into pieces, and these pieces exist in reciprocal relations, like an aggregate, not in serial relation, in one direction. In this type of whole, the parts are not subordinated to one another, but are in relations of reciprocal causality, not including their existence.

Kant's appreciation that this relation can be encountered in the case of a body in which the parts attract and reject each other led to exaggerated interpretations, as can be seen in the chapter dedicated to the principles of the pure intellect.

This is the metaphysical deduction of the categories, a chapter that Kant placed in front of the transcendental deduction of pure concepts. The connection between these chapters is not tight enough, so that transcendental deduction could have been easily placed before the metaphysical one. Various exegetes (among whom A.C. Ewing) argued that, in fact, the order of the two deductions *must* be reversed, otherwise the metaphysical argumentation has no meaning.

I believe that both deductions discover different determinations of the same reality – the categories; these determinations do not involve, essentially, the existence of a connection of causality between them, in such a way that an order necessary for their presentation could be established.

The metaphysical deduction *discovers* the titles of categories, and the transcendental deduction *establishes* their objective validity. Of course, it is preferable that an argumentation starts with a discovery and not with a founding, although, in this case, the founding is not done for each and every category, but for the particular fact that a category represents in general.

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FROM ONTOLOGY TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY HEIDEGGER'S
FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL
ILLNESS

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Heidegger's analytic of existence, by inquiring into the being of the whole man, can provide not scientific, but philosophical understanding of this wholeness. Such an understanding can indicate to psychiatry the limits within which it may inquire and expect an answer and can, as well, indicate the general horizon within which answers, as such, are to be found.

Ludwig Binswanger

Can we understand everything? The reality of mental illness, by opposition with normal human behavior, does not consist in intelligibility but, on the contrary, it consists in its resistance in front of every attempt to comprehend it.

Michel Foucault

Abstract:

*This paper argues that Heidegger's fundamental ontology in *Being and time* could not be used as a serious addition to the conceptual framework of clinical psychiatry. In brief, our analysis will describe the way in which some strictly psychopathological concepts can be utilized within an existential analysis which is based on Heidegger's fundamental ontology. As we will see neither Heidegger's*

fundamental ontology from Being and Time nor Ludwig Binswanger's Existential Analysis are able to deliver a number of valid criteria in order to distinguish between "normal" and "abnormal" psychological conditions. From this starting point our analysis will be directed upon the possible conceptual relations which may occur between the theoretical discourse of psychopathology and the ontological discourse from Heidegger's analytic of existence. Our study will underline the ambiguous status of Heidegger's fundamental ontology when this philosophical construction is used by psychopathologists in order to describe, or to cure by psychotherapy, the mental conditions of their patients.

In this study we try to apply, regarding the conceptual relations between psychopathology and the analytic of existence from Being and time, Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity by arguing that these two ontological concepts can indeed provide some help for understanding the nature of mental illness within an existential – phenomenological approach. But, as we will try to argue, by these two ontological concepts we cannot seriously describe the mental illness within a pure psychiatric – psychopathological approach. This is the reason why our study will underline the limits of Heidegger's analytic of existence from his fundamental ontology as these limits occur when the whole set of Heidegger's ontological descriptions are "borrowed" by the conceptual framework of the existential – phenomenological type of approach.

It had become almost a common place to say that Heidegger's influence upon western culture of the 20th century was enormous and deep. However, beyond this general opinion, we have to admit that Heidegger's influence upon western culture cannot be reduced to some general cultural lines or types of thinking which were born as a result of his thought. The best example which can sustain our observation can be taken from a very specific area within human sciences where the impact of Heidegger's philosophy cannot be seen as an only "general cultural dialogue". This very particular field of theoretical interest is the medical discipline of *psychiatry*. Even today Heidegger's impact upon this humanistic and medical science is very little known by the average intellectual public. Despite this situation Heidegger's influence on psychiatry and anthropology in general was prolific and deep. The Existential Analysis, as an anthropological conception upon human being, is just a part of these influences. Of course, Heidegger's influence on psychiatry must be understood as a part within a larger movement in the western philosophy, which is known under the name of "phenomenology", a movement which changed the face of philosophy in the 20th century.

Ludwig Binswanger, the founder of Existential Analysis, was one of the numerous authors upon which Heidegger's thinking had a very deep effect. In order to be brief I will not enter here in details regarding this subject. In short, we must to notice here the fact that Binswanger's ideas about a new and solid ground for psychiatry were born as a result of his contact with the conceptual frame of Heidegger's fundamental ontology from *Being and time*.

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein and search for the grounds of psychiatry within Binswanger's intellectual project

It is well known that Binswanger's phenomenological anthropology is based, at least in its first period, upon Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*. This important chapter from *Being and Time* has in Heidegger's work a role of a *preliminary discourse* which was developed in order to obtain a minimal ontological knowledge about the human being¹. Of course, by "minimal knowledge" we do not understand here something irrelevant or something which is too weak to sustain a real and solid knowledge. On the contrary, the "minimal knowledge" which was obtained by Heidegger after his analysis of *Dasein* had to be understood in the sense of a genuine and *originary* ontological knowledge about the human being. According to Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* the human being can be described through a set of characteristics which has a profound *ontological relevance*. These characteristics of human being were called by Heidegger *existentials*. It is less important here to show the whole set of existentials with every particular "technical" and philosophical detail. However, as it is known, the main frame of Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* is given by two fundamental characteristics of human being: 1) *being – in – the – world* and 2) *being – with – the other*. Of course, the whole set of *existentials* can be tracked down to its last details but here we want only to draw the main picture of them in order to make possible the analysis of Binswanger's ideas.

Let us return for a moment to Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*. For Heidegger the first fundamental characteristic of human being is that this being is *always already in a "world"*. "Technically" speaking this is possible by the presence of *intentionality* which in Heidegger's explorations has a profound ontological impact. But beyond this strictly phenomenological approach let us observe that for Heidegger *to be in the world* is the first beginning for every ontological analysis about human being². Despite its apparent simplicity this observation will have, as we will see later, a deep influence upon Binswanger's conceptual framework of Existential Analysis. *Being – in – the – world* is much more than the simple fact of "being alive among things" in the general sense of this expression. *Being – in – the –*

¹ For Heidegger the task of answering the question of Being is implying firstly a task of searching into the being of that particular being which has the capacity to formulate such an ontological issue. And this particular being is the human being, *Dasein* in Heidegger's terminology.

² As Binswanger noticed "*The shift from the <theoretical> ascertainment and description of the psychic processes or events in a <subject> to the ascertainment and description of the forms and structures of <intentional consciousness>, consciousness of something or directed toward something, was a quite decisive shift for psychopathological research*", Binswanger, Ludwig – *Being – in – the – world*, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1963, p. 207. Of course, this picture is capturing the psychopathological perspective upon Heidegger's way of thinking because intentionality is placed at the ground of Heidegger's fundamental ontology and it can not only seen as epistemic tool for different types of anthropological research. *Being – in – the – world* means always being *with* and *through* intentionality. The whole analysis of intentionality in its relation with Husserl's project for a transcendental phenomenology is developed by Heidegger especially in Marburg summer semester from 1925.

world mean that every individual is always “trapped” in a network of possibilities within temporality. In fact, the concept of *being – in – the – world* was obtained by Heidegger as a result of the observation that the human being is always living “inside” of an existential project, or, as Binswanger says sometimes, within a *world – design*. Of course, in this situation it is very clearly that for the human being, in Heidegger’s vision, the *future* is the only fundamental temporal dimension. The fundamental characteristic of being able to choose constantly between a number of possibilities, and this characteristic is present for the human being at any level and from every perspective, has very quickly lead to another important conclusion: the human being has no an essence of its own. The only stability of the human being is its instability and this is already a strictly philosophical conclusion of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology from *Being and Time*.

The second fundamental coordinate of the human being (*Dasein*) is the fact that this particular being is always a being which has the capacity to encounter *the other* inside of its own “world”. In other words, as humans we always live in a social network. Of course, Heidegger’s description has a much deep purpose than this simple observation. Heidegger’s conclusion must be correctly understood only at its *ontological level* because his investigation regarding the being of *Dasein* has a purpose which *transcends* by far a simple sociological type of investigation. Anyway, *being – with – the other* is another characteristic which will be imported by Binswanger inside his own intellectual project.

These two major *ontological* coordinates of human being had been both already mentioned by Heidegger in a 1924’s Marburg lecture which was performed by him at Theological Society. This lecture is known by the title “The concept of time”. Few years later Heidegger will offer a much more systematized version of his existentials. In *Being and time* there will be three major existentials – *thrownness, project and fallenness*.

Let us make here two final observations. First, we have to mention that Heidegger’s set of existentials are hold together under the conceptual umbrella of another fundamental concept from *Being and Time*: care (*Sorge*)³. And secondly, Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* was also underlined the types of temporality which can be experienced by the human. I think that for the moment this general picture is enough in order to make possible the next step of our study – a brief picture of the Existential Analysis.

Being and time had a profound impact upon Binswanger’s intellectual trajectory. The Swiss psychiatrist did not miss, at that historical moment, the opportunity to make a huge conceptual import from Heidegger’s recently published ontology. This was done in order to use it as a solid ground for

³ As it is known Binswanger did not accepted Heidegger’s conception regarding the concept of *Care*. It is less important here to see why Binswanger rejected Heidegger’s point of view. Here we want only to show a general picture of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and its relation with Binswanger’s ideas in order to make possible our analysis

psychiatry and also for any anthropological research in general. In Binswanger's view Heidegger's fundamental ontology from *Being and time* has a double significance for psychiatry.

Firstly, the fundamental ontology from *Being and time* has the capacity to deliver a new set of methodological tools for the psychopathological research. This is a subject with its own distinct conceptual frame and we will discuss about it later in our study.

Secondly, according to Binswanger's view Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* has the unique capacity to shed a clear light upon the possibilities and also upon the limitations of psychiatry as a science. Binswanger had a strong reason to sustain such a point of view because his enthusiasm regarding Heidegger's work was fueled by his very elaborate critique upon a few epistemological paradigms which were so active at that historical moment and which were used in order to deliver a conceptual structure for the ground of psychiatry. In brief, Binswanger has rejected the *naturalistic – objectivist* paradigm by arguing that this epistemological vision is only blocking every authentic effort to understand the human being in its genuine way of being. The details of this huge intellectual affair are very interesting but here we do not want to insist upon them.

In Binswanger's view psychiatrists had to search for the grounds of their domain only in the manner which was pointed out by Heidegger in his work:

... a science understands itself only when it – in the full sense of the Greek *lógon didónai* – accounts for its interpretation (expressed in its basic concepts) of its particular region of being upon the background of that region's basic ontological structure⁴.

We do not want here to uncover the whole story of Binswanger's point of view regarding the way in which psychiatry can obtain its authentic epistemic grounds. We only want to underline the fact that his conception was lead him later to accept Heidegger's phenomenological type of investigation upon human being. This means precisely that for Binswanger psychiatry must renounce to any traditional epistemic paradigm. In this situation, neither biological approach, which is based upon a naturalistic conception regarding the science and human being in general, nor the psychological approach, which is based upon the traditional Cartesian paradigm regarding subjectivity, are able to say something really relevant about the human being:

The conception of being as a physical – psychological – spiritual unity does not say enough. For, as Heidegger says, the being of man cannot be ascertained by the "summative enumeration" of the rather ambiguous ontological modes of body, mind, and soul⁵.

⁴ Binswanger, Ludwig, 1963, p. 208.

⁵ Idem, p. 211.

The “thing” which had to be “destroyed” was the Cartesian conceptual schema about the human knowledge based on the subject – object relation. And this is exactly what Binswanger did. Besides this shift of paradigms, according to Binswanger’s observation, Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* from *Being and Time* has the great advantage of understanding the human being as a *whole*:

... Heidegger’s phenomenological – philosophical analytic of existence is important for psychiatry. This is so because it does not inquire particular regions of phenomena and fact to be found “in human beings”, but, rather, inquires into the being of man as a whole. Such a question is not answerable by scientific methods alone⁶.

Thus Binswanger had soon become very confident in Heidegger’s ideas. For him the analysis of *Dasein* from *Being and time* is much more than a simple tool in the hands of psychiatrists:

In practice, whenever the psychiatrist himself tries to look beyond the limitations of his science and seeks to know the ontological grounds of his understanding and treatment of those placed in his care, it is Heidegger’s analytic of existence that can broaden his horizon. For it offers the possibility of understanding man as both a creature of nature, and a socially determined or historical being – and this by means of one ontological insight, which thus obviates the separation of body, mind, and spirit⁷.

It is very clear now that for the Swiss psychiatrist Heidegger’s ontology can provide not a scientific but a strictly philosophical ground for psychiatry. This is not just a simple illusion because Heidegger’s efforts were directed toward the ontological level. And this is the reason because his results of the analysis of *Dasein* cannot be ignored by someone who really wants to obtain a *genuine* description about the way in which human beings are living in the world.

Let us turn our attention to the way in which Binswanger did in fact used the Heidegger’s fundamental ontology inside his own intellectual project. Only after this we can go further with our analysis toward the investigation regarding the conceptual relations which exists between psychopathology and the main frame of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology – the analysis of *Dasein*.

Firstly, we have to observe that for Binswanger too the approach was one exclusively *phenomenological*. The human being cannot be seen as only a part of nature in a strictly physical way. Also, the “soul” cannot be “intercepted” through a Cartesian subject – object schema. The only way in which these difficulties can be over passed is by using a phenomenological

⁶ Idem.

⁷ Idem, p. 212.

approach. In other words, the concept of *intentionality* is the only available methodological tool by which we can go deep inside the personal world of an individual and also it is the only way by which the traditional epistemic paradigms can be overthrown. We can no longer talk about an isolated subjectivity closed inside his own ontological limit as Descartes did when he used his subject – object epistemological schema.

Secondly, the results of Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* were integrated in Binswanger's project in the form of an *ontic structure* by which we was able to offer an anthropological description regarding the human being as a whole. Heidegger later rejected this way of understanding his philosophical work but let us notice here the manner in which Binswanger had made his conceptual import. According to this way of applying Heidegger's fundamental ontology at the level of a *concrete* anthropological investigation results the fact that each individual is always "trapped" in a "world" which is shaped by intentionality. Even more, this phenomenological "world" is fully comprehensible through Heidegger's description of *Dasein*. In brief, Binswanger's phenomenological anthropology can be seen as a large scale application of Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* at the ontic level of facticity.

Heidegger's analytic of existence as phenomenological anthropology

Heidegger's general schema based on his set of existentials did have a fundamental contribution upon the development of Binswanger's phenomenological anthropology. In Binswanger's view Heidegger's existentials can be used to describe the subjective – personal world of each individual at the ontical level of facticity⁸. In other words this means that Binswanger had tried to apply a strictly ontological discourse in order to obtain a very concrete anthropological knowledge. This situation is in itself very problematic but we do not insist here on it. Let us focus on Binswanger's results.

Firstly, the Swiss psychiatrist had very often underlined that his conceptual construction is *neither a philosophical anthropology nor a medical one*. His anthropology, which was build under Heidegger's conceptual umbrella, is not a philosophical one because it does not sustain any ontological thesis. The set of ontological thesis is entirely taken from Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*. In a way, we can even say that by doing so Binswanger had totally renounced at any personal philosophical considerations and thus he had become entirely dependent on Heidegger's philosophical heritage⁹. Also, his anthropology is neither a medical one since

⁸ The term *facticity* has in Heidegger's thinking a very specific content. By this term Heidegger describe the human condition in its most concrete and natural circumstances.

⁹ Of course, we have to remember the fact Binswanger had developed his own vision upon the way in which we have to understand Heidegger's existentials but this does not change in a substantial manner

it does not have the task to uncover a set of symptoms which later would be defined in a purely medical manner of psychiatry. In brief, Binswanger's phenomenological anthropology is a kind of *conceptual bridge* between Heidegger's ontological ideas from the analysis of *Dasein* and the strictly psychopathological discourse of psychiatry as a medical discipline. We say this because, as we will see later, Binswanger's phenomenological anthropology is strongly linked with psychopathological theories¹⁰.

Secondly, regarding the task of finding a concrete way in order to apply Heidegger's ideas within a phenomenological anthropology there is only one major thing which was needed to be done: the analyst or the "therapist" must to uncover and discover the personal world of an individual, by having in mind the whole set of Heidegger's existentials, and to try to see if in this recently discovered inner world of an individual there are or there are not any "broken" or "damaged" points in the existential schema. Of course, this is only a general picture but even so the main idea of the entire Binswanger's project can be very easily understood.

Let us turn our attention upon the problem regarding the concrete way by which Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* could be applied at the level of anthropology knowledge¹¹. Because, if for Binswanger the main goal of Existential Analysis is to penetrate the personal subjectivity of the individual by using Heidegger's set of existentials then we have to discuss some issues about this type of project.

Firstly, in Binswanger's vision Existential Analysis is a type of empirical and phenomenological anthropological research. The Swiss psychiatrist did not encounter any apparent difficulties when he used intensively Heidegger's ontological analysis at the level of an anthropological concrete research¹². But even so, let us see now which are in fact Binswanger's observations regarding this issue. If his methodological tools were taken entirely from an ontological discourse this means that the theoretical discourse of Existential

our affirmation: even so Binswanger's essential conceptual frame was entirely based on Heidegger's analytic of existence.

¹⁰ Binswanger, Ludwig – *Analyse existentielle et psychanalyse freudienne. Discours, parcours et Freud*, Gallimard, Paris, 1970, pp. 51 – 120. Here it can be found the whole set of Binswanger's ideas regarding the conceptual relations between Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* and his project of a phenomenological anthropology.

¹¹ As it is known, Heidegger rejected any attempt to see in his analysis of *Dasein* a simple anthropological discourse. But this is a separate subject and we do not want here to insist upon it. We have mention it because of its importance in the whole discussion about his fundamental ontology from *Being and time* and Binswanger's intellectual project in general. However, for a very substantial introduction regarding the way in which Heidegger rejected Binswanger's application of the analytic of existence you can see Boss, Medard (editor) – *Martin Heidegger. Zollikon Seminars. Protocols – Letters – Conversations*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 2001.

¹² The theoretical dispute between Heidegger and Binswanger regarding the issue of a philosophical anthropology is a complicated theme. Here we wanted only to underline the fact that for Binswanger was no problem to use Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* as an elevated form of anthropology within his own conceptual construction.

Analysis has no any criteria in order to distinguish between “normal” and “abnormal” mental conditions. This is a thing which was recognized by Binswanger himself:

It should be clear after all that Existential Analysis is not just a simple structural and analytical form, or a theoretical structure of psychology, or, even less, of psychopathology, for the simple reason that Existential Analysis makes a very explicit difference between something general and something which is not so – and just because of this the Existential Analysis can describe the changes of *Dasein* – but Existential Analysis does not have any criteria in order to sustain the morbidity of those changes¹³.

So, neither Heidegger’s fundamental analysis of *Dasein* nor Binswanger’s Existential Analysis have any single valid criteria which it could be used in order to decide about “normality” and “abnormality” of a psychological condition. This observation is indeed very simple but it has serious consequences upon the way in which it may be seen and understood the relation between Existential Analysis and psychopathology.

Secondly, if Existential Analysis has no any serious criteria for “normal” or “abnormal” psychological conditions than we should ask ourselves very seriously about the manner in which Binswanger understands the relation between psychopathology and Existential Analysis. In Binswanger’s view there seems to be two very distinct ways by which Existential Analysis can make a conceptual approach upon those phenomena which can be considered “abnormal” or “pathological”. On the one hand there is a strictly psychopathological discourse, which is taken from psychiatry as a medical science and which can be successfully used to describe, with great accuracy, the mental status of an individual which is considered, or at least suspected, to be derailed from “normality”. This psychopathological discourse is something more like a *formal* description of mental status and it does not have any ontological or deeper signification than a simple set of coordinates in order to obtain a *diagnostic*. With minor observations I think that this perspective is entirely correct. I prefer here to simplify things in order to sustain my point of view. Anyway, Binswanger did not reject such a perspective:

A psychopathologist is doing his job by describing and dividing abnormal mental conditions in classes and species, (...) the personal lived experience or the particular pathological functioning is always considered as a particular case of a species¹⁴.

¹³ Binswanger, Ludwig, 1970, p. 96. The translation and adaptation from French into an English version is belonging to me.

¹⁴ Binswanger, Ludwig – *Introduction à l’analyse existentielle*, Paris, Minuit, 1971, p. 104. The translation of the passage which is used by me in this study is also belonging to me.

Later in his text Binswanger have made very clear that a phenomenological approach, even it does not renounce to the conceptual frame of psychopathology, it is never limited to a *positivist – objective* perspective¹⁵. The phenomenological psychopathologist must always depart in his journey toward the mental status of an individual from the idea that every individual personal “world” is an irreducible one. And he must do this *regardless the possibility of a general psychopathological theory*. From now on the way to a pure existential interpretation of the psychopathological phenomena had been very wide opened. For Binswanger, as for others existential oriented psychiatrists, there is a huge step to make beyond the first description, a description which is offered by psychopathology. And this step is exactly the existential – phenomenological perspective.

In short, we have to be perfectly aware that beyond any objectivistic approach regarding the psychopathological phenomena – an approach which is based upon a general schema within a positivist conceptual perspective – there is a vast territory for an existential phenomenological type of exploration. And this territory is exactly the strictly philosophical side of the mental conditions of any particular individual. The existential oriented therapist must to be able to see beyond the whole set of psychological data of the person who is seeking for psychiatric medical assistance. Only by entering in this type of existential approach the therapist would become fully prepared to uncover the inner existential schema of the person. In this way would later also become available a description regarding the personal life of an individual according to Heidegger`s analysis of *Dasein*.

Before we go any further from here and before we will try to see in what might consist the conceptual relation between Heidegger`s analysis of *Dasein* and the problem of mental illness, in its epistemological and ontological perspective, let us make here a resume of Binswanger`s ideas regarding the concept of a phenomenological anthropology:

1. This type of anthropology has nothing to do with a pure philosophical discourse and it must be seen only as a direct application of Heidegger`s analysis of *Dasein*.
2. Because of this such a type of phenomenological anthropology has no epistemic criteria in order to make a clear and valid distinction between “normal” and “abnormal” mental conditions.
3. Anyway, this phenomenological anthropology is still maintaining a strong link with the theoretical discourse of psychopathology but its

¹⁵ Here, the use of the term *positivist* it does not imply for the psychopathological theoretical discourse a necessary complete and solid scientific perspective like for the chemistry or physics. We designate here by this term only the idea that for Binswanger psychopathology – as a solid and coherent set of classifications – it always see the set of psychological “derailed” conditions as a *particular cases* of a general theory and classification. Also, here the term *positivist* means the fact that psychopathological discourse does not have for Binswanger the capacity to uncover the irreducible set of characteristics of a particular individual.

goal is to see much further beyond this technical and medical – positivist horizon.

4. The psychopathology, in its pure medical and psychiatric dimension, has for a phenomenological anthropology only a formal value. It helps the psychiatrists to offer a diagnosis but it does not offer them too much for a proper and authentic interpretation of this diagnosis. Because of this within the phenomenological anthropology we can talk, I think, about the existence of two separate and very distinct sides of the psychological description regarding the mental status of an individual. One which is strictly medical – objectivistic (the set of psychopathological theories), and the other which is strictly philosophical (existential - phenomenological) and which can only be discovered by searching deep *beyond* the psychopathological description.
5. The ultimate task of a therapist who is using this type of an existential – phenomenological approach is to uncover the existential schema of his patients by using Heidegger's set of existentials. Only at this level it is possible to see in what measure a personal existential schema of the individual has been "damaged" and also to see what could be done in order to "repair" it by psychotherapy.

Now it is possible to start the discussion about the way in which Heidegger's ideas from his analytic of existence can be used byBinswanger's phenomenological anthropology for in order to deal with the problem of mental illness.

Two perspectives on mental illness: the clinical and medical psychiatric approach vs. the existential – phenomenological approach.

There maybe no other proper way in order to make a good analysis regarding the manner in which Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* can affect at the conceptual level of the problem of mental illness than to use a *concrete example*. By doing this I think that we can see and discuss in a much more clear and profitable manner about the whole set of perspectives of *any* particular case.

We will begin our analysis by remembering that Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* cannot be used as a set of criteria in order to distinguish between mental health and its opposite situation. And this is so because of two reasons:

1. Firstly, Heidegger's analytic of existence has no any resources for a real medical – epistemological investigation regarding the psychological conditions of an individual. His analysis of *Dasein* is a strictly philosophical one and we always have to be fully aware about this.

2. Secondly, even if it had any medical purposes (but it did not), Heidegger's analysis does not have, anyway, the necessary resources in order to deliver a real number of criteria for mental health. This is so because his investigation is a philosophical one but not in the sense of a simple artificial construct build through speculation and imagination! No, the Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* must to be seen as a philosophical undertaking but only in the Heidegger's sense: it is build entirely by researching within the *facticity* of the *Dasein*, by searching trough, to say so, the "ontological nudity" of human phenomena. Because of this it can be never seen as a type of speculation which has little or nothing to do with reality.

Only by having in mind those two considerations we can make a substantial and a proper centered discussion about the possible relation between Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein* and the problem of mental illness.

Let us now focus on a concrete example. Firstly, we should mention that Binswanger too had done something similar throughout his medical career¹⁶. But, we will not focus here upon a known case and we will not develop a complete medical analysis on it. We will choose a relatively simple case in order to argue for our point of view.

So, let us imagine here, as an example for our analysis, a case of intense melancholia, a case with *no* manic states. To say so, just a simple case of a man who is trapped in his personal past and who is experiencing severe and continuous state of depression. Also, we should mention that in our case there are *no biological or chemical causes* for his deep depression. In other words, in our example the state of depression is not a result of some bio – chemical abnormalities in the brain of the patient. This observation is a very important because only in this type of situation we have the possibility to see much more clearly the real substance of an existential – phenomenological approach in psychiatry.

From a strictly medical and psychopathological point of view the description of such a case it can be done very easily and with a great amount of "technical" (medical) terms in order to describe even the most remote detail of the patient mental condition. This would be, in a sense at least, the level of psychological description. Here we have a number of technical terms which are used within psychopathological theoretical discourse in order to offer a diagnostic. Within the technical description of modern psychiatry – if there are no any proven biological causes for this patient depression – his mental conditions would be probably diagnosed as a *comprehensible reaction*. Anyway, let us notice that a medical psychopathological description of his condition will make from our patient just a *particular case of a general*

¹⁶ The set of five particular cases which had been fully investigated by Binswanger through its existential – phenomenological approach are known under the next names: *Ilse*, *Jürg Zünd*, *Lola Voss*, *Suzanne Urban* and *Ellen West*. Of course, these names are all fiction – names in order to protect the real identities of the patients.

schema of understanding by which his set of symptoms can be put together under the “umbrella” of a diagnostic.

What would be about this case the point of view of an existential – phenomenological type of approach? Firstly, an existential – phenomenological oriented psychiatrist would not consider the condition of our patient as something which might be described *in a complete manner* by a general schema. In other terms, an existential approach would certainly go much further beyond the description which can be offered by the psychopathological discourse. This means that for an existential psychiatrist the all set of psychological phenomena of the patient is nothing more than a *cipher* and the real task for the psychiatrist is to try to discover the “code” of this cipher. Of course, any psychological phenomena could be understood as a kind of a “first gate” which covers a much more profound reality and almost any psychological type of theory has its own perspectives about what lies beyond this “first gate”. But here we want to know only the existential perspective. And this existential perspective, in Binswanger’s view, must be able to understand the patient mental condition by using Heidegger’s set of existentials. This means that an existential therapist must to uncover the personal “*world – design*” of the individual and to see in what “condition” is the personal ontological schema of that individual. Of course, this kind of task requires not only some special type of psychological talent but also requires a serious number of personal information regarding the life of the patient: his past together with all its important events. For example, in his entire career as a psychiatrist Binswanger had manage to apply this type of deep existential analysis only in five cases.

As a direct application of Heidegger’s set of existentials an existential – phenomenological psychiatrist would say the next set of things about our case:

1. The temporal schema of our patient is profoundly damaged. He can no longer concentrate on his own future and because of this his personal existential freedom is severely affected.
2. Also, because of his withdrawal from the “world” the patient had also become directly affected at his level of social functioning and this means that he is no longer able to live like a free man, in the ontological sense, among the others. In other words, in his personal schema is seriously “damaged” that existential which in Heidegger’s analytic of existence is known under the name of “*being – with – the – other*”.

Besides these two major observations an existential oriented psychiatrist would probably say much more about this type of case but we do not want here to extend to deep our analysis in this direction. Let us notice that existential approach would lead us to the point from which the mental status of our patient could be fully understood through Heidegger’s general schema of existentials. Binswanger would probably go even further and he would say that the condition of this patient *must* to be understood as a kind

of malfunction of his personal ontological schema. And, an existential – phenomenological oriented psychotherapy would have nothing else to do in this kind of situation but to show to the patient the ways which he must follow in order to “repair” his own broken ontological schema¹⁷.

Finally, let us see now the ontological perspective in this kind of situation. As we have already seen Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* does not offer any substantial reason for an anthropological using of his ideas. Also we have noticed the fact that Binswanger did not care about this. We also have seen already what would be his perspective upon this issue. Regarding the strictly ontological perspective we say here only this: the fact of *being – in – the – world* or *being – with – the – other* have for Heidegger a strictly ontological content in the sense that by these two existentials the German thinker is describing a genuine and ordinary level of the human being. Even if he did not rejected entirely the possibility of applying his ideas within a medical – psychiatric perspective he was, however, very circumspect with Binswanger’s method. Anyway, for Heidegger, the set of existentials cannot be used within an anthropological level at least for the reason that human phenomena cannot be reduced to something as “psychological”. *For Heidegger the human “phenomena” is in itself something purely ontological.* From an ontological point of view – in Heidegger’s sense – it is not possible to make a serious description regarding our example in the anthropological sense or, even less, in the medical – psychiatric perspective. In the best case we can only see it through Heidegger’s existential of existential authenticity or inauthenticity.

Conclusions: mental health and existential authenticity vs. mental illness and existential inauthenticity.

Let us now draw some conclusions. Firstly, we have to underline the essential ambiguity which persist in the case of any attempt to apply a strictly ontological conceptual frame – which is the case with Heidegger’s analytic of existence – within a concrete anthropological research regarding the human being. This very fragile status is possible because the specificity of a pure medical approach but also because of Heidegger’s purposes. The German thinker has repeatedly said that his intellectual undertaking has a pure and strictly *ontological purpose*. Far away from being just a manner of speaking this thesis is solidly based upon Heidegger’s critique of tradition and

¹⁷ Binswanger, Ludwig, 1970, pp. 117. Here the Swiss psychiatrist is very clear and says that “*An existential oriented psychotherapy is exploring the personal life of the patient (...) but it does this in its own way. An existential oriented psychotherapy (...) understands this life history as a set of changes of the entire structure of being – in – the – world. (...) An existential therapist can be compared with a professional mountain guide, who knows the terrain very well, and who knows the way back to the valley, by comparison with a tourist who can not make any step further or any step back*”. Of course, the tourist who does not know the way back to the safety of the valley is the patient. Translation and adaptation of this passage are also belonging to me.

especially upon his critique regarding the heritage of the Cartesian epistemological schema. This “destruction” – an epistemological one, if we can call it so – has latter lead him to the conclusion that the only suitable mode by which we can hope to go directly at the ontological level of the description regarding the human being is by throwing away any traditional perspective upon this being. This means that Heidegger’s ontology, based entirely upon a phenomenological method, cannot be used as a philosophical anthropology or, even less, as a kind of an elevated phenomenological psychology. So, the strictly ontological purpose of Heidegger’s project together with the content of his critique upon the traditional epistemology – with all of what this issue imply – are the two major reasons because of whom the analysis of *Dasein* from *Being and time* cannot be used as a kind of a conceptual platform for a phenomenological anthropology in the sense which was indicated by Binswanger. Of course, regarding this issue, as we know, there was a whole theoretical debate. However, we have to mention the fact that Heidegger did not rejected the possibility of using his ideas within a medical approach upon the human being – we have in mind here the case of another Swiss psychiatrist, Medard Boss (1903 – 1990) – but we also have to mention that this version of medical application of the analysis of *Dasein* has a strong ontological background and purpose¹⁸.

To add even more to the ambiguity of this issue we can also remember the fact that Binswanger himself not only that he tried to apply Heidegger’s ideas within his own intellectual project but also he tried to “improve” or to “adapt” Heidegger’s ideas in order to fit them properly inside his own theoretical construction¹⁹.

After this general introduction to the main type of problem regarding the relation between Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* and the Existential Analysis let us focus now upon some conceptual details in order to see in which manner can be sustained a realistic perspective regarding the possibility of using Heidegger’s analytic of existence for a definition of the concept of “mental illness”.

If Heidegger’s analytic of existence is a strictly ontological type of discourse then I think that any attempt to say something about the concrete psychological condition of an individual by using this ontological discourse must be grounded upon its irreducible specificity. This could mean the following set of conclusions:

¹⁸ For a comprehensive introduction to this theme we recommend here Boss’s book *Zollikon’s Seminars. Protocols – Letters – Conversations*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 2001. Here it can be found the entire conceptual debate regarding the way in which Heidegger rejected Binswanger’s phenomenological anthropology but also the theoretical discourse of Boss’s *Daseinanalyse*.

¹⁹ Heidegger also rejected Binswanger’s “contribution” to his analytic of existence from *Being and time*. For the details regarding this problem see also the Boss’s book.

1. This discourse cannot be used without some serious cautions within a psychological description about the mental status of an individual. We do not intend here to discuss about the whole set of reasons which were used by Heidegger in order to reject Binswanger's theoretical conclusion. Anyway, these reasons are in itself strong enough to put in serious danger Binswanger's intellectual adventure. Here we must emphasize that Heidegger's analytic of existence has indeed nothing to do with psychology as we know it at the level of common sense. Of course, we have to admit the fact that this very rough conclusion is a little bit confusing. And this confusion can be put in the next question: if Heidegger's analytic of existence has nothing to do with psychology then why his ideas were been used, with his personal agreement, within an anthropological psychological conception about the human being? We have in mind here the work of another Swiss psychiatrist – Medard Boss (1903 – 1990). The reason for why this was possible is, as we have already mentioned earlier in our study, the fact that Boss's theory had a strong *ontological* perspective but this answer could not solve our confusion. So, it still remain the question: in what way we must understand the idea that Heidegger's analytic of existence had absolutely nothing to do with psychology?

2. Let us try to answer: even if Heidegger's analytic of existence cannot be used as a kind of criteria in order to distinguish between "normality" or "abnormality" it does have anyway something to say about the human being. But not in the sense of a "psychological" approach because for Heidegger, as we have mentioned earlier, we just cannot reduce the human phenomena to something else then it really is. In short, for Heidegger the human phenomena – which always had to be understood in the terms of *facticity* – represent in itself the ontological level and it cannot be reduced to something much simple by a psychological type of discourse. Heidegger does not talk about "conscience" or "soul", "disposition", "wish" or "project" in the way which psychology does this thing:

"Heidegger did not talk about the human phenomena in psychological or cognitive terms. (...) The human existence, which always belongs to a concrete individual, could be described in its different types of relations, with the others and with the world, but it could not be defined through more simple terms. The human existence is in itself an ontological fact, not a psychological or an empirical one, and there is nothing "supreme" in it. The human existence it does not contain any source of supreme certitude about itself, about God or about the universe"²⁰.

Heidegger just does not believe in the *ontological relevance* of any human discipline theoretical discourse. This is the reason for which Heidegger's was so circumspect with Binswanger's type of construction. We have already seen that for the Swiss psychiatrist it was not a problem to mix

²⁰ Kolakowski, Leszek – *Horror Metaphysicus*, Bucharest, All, 1997, p. 58. The translation and also the adaptation of this passage from Romanian into English are belonging to me.

two very distinct types of theoretical approach – the medical anthropological one and the ontological one.

3. From this starting point I want now to argue that at the concrete level of human life those two types of discourse must to be apply in a strictly *separate* way or, if we still want to apply them together then we must to be aware about the whole set of confusions which can occur. Even if it seems possible to use both type of discourse I think that very soon will appear some serious confusions.

Let us turn to our example. From a psychopathological point of view the things are very clear. For the Existential Analysis the whole set of psychopathological phenomena is nothing more than the sign of a “damaged” existential – ontological schema. But from an *ontological one* the things are not anymore so simple. If we have in mind the things which we said until this point then I think that is very clear now the fact that for Heidegger the psychopathological description does not have even the slightest relevance. It just does not counts the “psychological” or “psychopathological” evaluation since the general concrete condition of an individual cannot be reduced to something else then it really is in its pure conditions of *facticity*. I think that the attempt to make a link between some kind of a general ontological schema and the psychological status of an individual had to be strongly rejected because of the next few reasons, even if Binswanger had tried to do exactly the opposite thing²¹:

- Heidegger`s ontological schema, as we have shown, has nothing to do with psychology; even more, his ideas are not suitable for an anthropological philosophy;
- Following this line it became very clear that, once again, the analytic of existence from *Being and time* does not have any criteria for the mental health or for mental illness;
- Of course, nobody could ever deny the fact that there are indeed possible some changes in the Heidegger`s general ontological schema. For example, as in our case, someone could be absorbed totally by his own past but such a situation, from Heidegger`s perspective, *is in itself something ontological* (and it must be “judged” only through the terms of “authenticity” or “inauthenticity”) and it could not be understood by the

²¹ Binswanger, Ludwig, 1963, pp. 102 – 119. The study of Jacob Needleman is very interesting but his point of view regarding the problem of mental illness within the conceptual framework of Existential Analysis is very similar to Binswanger`s point of view. For him, as for Binswanger, mental illness could be very easily and also very clearly understood through the conceptual “tools” of Heidegger`s analytic of existence. For example, in our case from this study the inner personal world of the individual has been “constricted” or “narrowed” to his own past and because of this he is no longer free for his own existential future. The whole set of psychopathological description is nothing more in such a case then a *sign* for a deeper causality of the patient mental condition. In short, there is nothing wrong for Binswanger to make a link and to overlap the psychological and psychopathological discourse on the ontological one. As we will argue this perspective has very serious conceptual problems, and, if we really following the Heidegger`s point of view then we must reject it.

conceptual “lens” of psychology or, even less, by those of psychopathology;

Only now we can argue that there is indeed possible to make a link between Heidegger’s ideas from his analytic of existence and the problem of mental illness but this link must *not* be seen in Binswanger’s way. If Heidegger’s discourse is strictly ontological then we should follow his claims in any attempt to make an analysis regarding the concrete situation of an individual. This means that every possible “malfunction” at the level of his general ontological schema had to be understood in the terms of “authenticity” or “inauthenticity” and not through the conceptual framework of psychopathology. Of course, there will be always possible to make a psychopathological approach but this type of approach could be very easily rejected by Heidegger. His argument will be that the psychopathology and psychiatry in general are build with the strong desire to make from them serious human sciences and this is already enough in order to reject them. Why is that? Because for Heidegger *any* human science has two fundamental flaws:

1. For the modern human sciences the human being is reduced to an *object*. Besides, the whole discourse of the human sciences is grounded on the Cartesian traditional epistemic paradigm. We do not insist here upon this aspect, we only take it in its general sense.
2. By building a conceptual discourse in order to “intercept” the human reality the modern human sciences are in fact *losing* the contact with the ontological level. Because, as we have seen, this ontological level could only be found in the pure nudity of *facticity* and every attempt to build *another* reality through a theoretical discourse is condemned to miss the genuine contact with the ontological level of human reality.

One of the fundamental conclusions of our study is that Binswanger’s ideas must to be rejected not because they could not be “logically” fit into Heidegger’s analytic of existence but because they are based on a totally different *epistemic* grounds²². Besides, we want to add here the idea that even if we could connect properly Heidegger’s analytic of existence with Binswanger’s Existential Analysis it would still not be possible to use the analytic of *Dasein* as a “criteria provider” for the problem of mental health. Let us make more systematic our conclusions.

Firstly, from Heidegger’s perspective, as it appears in his analytic of existence, any possible type of concrete situation of a particular individual could be described and analyzed only as an *ontological situation*. This

²² Boss, Medard (editor), 2001, pp. 301 – 315. Here it can be found Richard Askay’s study “Heidegger’s philosophy and its implications”. The author makes here a very clear resume of Heidegger’s critique upon Binswanger’s intellectual project by pointing out the whole set of confusions which occur if we try to conflate the ontological level of description with the anthropological one. The author makes his analysis by taking into consideration the epistemic perspective of the whole debate.

means that within the analytic of existence there is no point to search for psychological clues or psychopathological descriptions. Of course, this position is quite radical but I think that is the proper manner by which we could really get close to Heidegger's way of thinking regarding the problem of ontological level of "human reality". From this starting point it is clear that any kind of psychopathological phenomena could be indeed understood through the psychiatric – scientific paradigm but these psychopathological phenomena have anyway very little importance for the strictly ontological description. Even if we can describe a "damaged" ontological schema, as it is the case with our example, we could never prove, within Heidegger's perspective, that a "broken" ontological schema is in itself a sign of mental illness. We could only judge such a situation through Heidegger's concepts of "existential authenticity" and "existential inauthenticity" and even by doing so we must always be very carefully to not make any mistake because sometimes it is very tempting to "discover" the concrete anthropological level by the conceptual "lens" of Heidegger's *ontological* analysis. In brief, the ontological level of existential inauthenticity could never be the same thing with the anthropological level of mental illness. And this because, as we have seen, the ontological condition of any particular individual could be never described, within Heidegger's "paradigm", through a traditional epistemic conceptual framework and, even more, any scientific attempt to deliver a real ontological description about the human being is from the very beginning doomed to fail. We have already seen the reasons for this situation so we do not insist here anymore on it.

Secondly, it is also very clear the fact that the pure psychiatric and psychopathological description can very easily be done without any concern regarding the ontological level. Even if within the Existential Analysis the ontological level have such an enormous importance we do not believe that this anthropological conception could really "intercept" this level as long as it does makes its analysis by using a set psychopathological theories. The only problem with this kind of theories is the fact that they are ultimately based upon very problematic epistemic paradigms. For example, even if Existential Analysis went and searched beyond the visible "wall" of psychopathological phenomena we have always to be aware that this kind of "trip" was possible only because in the first case there was indeed "something" to be seen from a psychopathological perspective. And this perspective is based on a theoretical discourse which must be considered, as Heidegger did, as something *artificial* and completely useless. Why is this happen? Because, says Heidegger, we just do not need any *artificially* added theories in order to describe something which is *visible by itself – facticity*. That is why any attempt to make a link between psychopathology, even if it is "trapped" within an anthropological theory, and ontology would be always very problematic. In brief, by using psychopathology we can only describe the concrete mental condition of an individual in terms of "health" and "illness" (with all set of controversies regarding these two concepts) but we will never be really able

to say something from a psychopathological perspective regarding the ontological level the human reality.

Of course, it would be almost impossible to deny the fact that even the strictly medical paradigms, with all its theories, are not interested in the ontological problems. But it is completely wrong to believe that by combining the medical – anthropological perspective with a very special type of ontological discourse you could find the authentic human reality²³. On the other hand, we can also appreciate Binswanger's efforts made by him in order to find a solid philosophical ground for psychiatry. There is no doubt that Heidegger's analytic of existence could be useful, from many point of views, to psychiatrists in their rough job, but the analysis of *Dasein* could never decide which are the criteria for mental health or for mental illness. The psychopathology can describe with great accuracy the whole set of psychological phenomena and, as we have seen, Heidegger's ideas could be successfully used in order to describe what lies beyond the psychopathological "wall". But, and here is the main issue, the analytic of existence could never be used in order to decide who is ill and who is not from a medical – psychiatric point of view. The analytic of existence could only "speak" about the human being in terms of "authenticity" or "inauthenticity" but it can never take the role of medicine in the sense of a scientific discipline. We have already shown why is this happen within Heidegger's thought and because of this we do not want here to insist upon it anymore.

Anyway, even if we decide to mix those two very distinct types of discourse we will find ourselves very quickly in great confusion. Because, as an example, it could be very easily to show that someone might be completely inauthentic from Heidegger's point of view but in the same time it also might be mentally health from a pure medical and anthropological perspective. Of course, we have in mind here the general picture of this type of situation but I think that it could be understood easily the main idea. If we follow this line of reasoning we might even describe four possible conceptual situations:

1. Ontologically authentic – mentally health;
2. Ontologically inauthentic – mentally ill;
3. Ontologically authentic – mentally ill;
4. Ontologically inauthentic – mentally health;

We must to make here the observation that this possible schema is taking here into consideration only by referring to Binswanger's project, because, from Boss's point of view, the things are quite different. We prefer here to simplify a little and because of this it is clear that this possible conceptual schema must to be understood in its *general aims and ideas*. For any type of conceptual pair it could be relatively easy find examples except maybe the third possibility: ontologically authentic and mentally ill. Anyway, with a little effort we can "solve" the problem. Let us think at the next

²³ Idem.

example: someone suddenly decide to renounce to his job, his wife and children, his career and so on. The same person, after few months decide in the same manner to change again his style of life. After another few months he makes the same “move” once again. From an ontological perspective there would be no serious problems in order to show that this person have done nothing more than to search for his own existential authenticity. But from a medical – psychiatric perspective it is more than obvious the fact that this person could very easily suspected of at least some severe personality disorders as, for example, the borderline type of severe personality disorder

We do not insist here on this problem. We wanted only to show the practical difficulties which can occur if we decide to mix the ontological discourse from Heidegger`s analytic of existence with a medical – anthropological one. Heidegger did the same think in his discussions at Zollikon with the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss (1903 – 1990) but he, of course, has insisted much more upon the conceptual difficulties and not so much upon practical examples.

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THE FUNCTION OF SIMILARITY WITHIN PAUL RICOEUR'S
METAPHOR THEORY

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Abstract

*The following research will deal with a less analyzed aspect of Paul Ricoeur's metaphor theory, namely the role which similarity holds within the mechanism of sense making. In order to maintain the importance of similarity in metaphorical process, Ricoeur offers four arguments that were detailed in the sixth study of the *The Rule of Metaphor* (1975). Many of Ricoeur's exegetes afford a special attention to the fourth argument, which dwell on reinterpreting the notion of imagination as well as the iconic feature of similarity, so that it may belong to the semantic level of the metaphorical phrase. We will herewith attempt a discussion on the first three arguments, referring to the way Ricoeur explains creation of a new semantic bearing, that is the mechanism through which metaphor produces meaning, by means of the similarity concept.*

First we must mention that Ricoeur exceeds the two theories that of substitution and that of tensivity which were confronting within the debates with regard to the kind of speech at the level of which metaphorization occurs. Whereas the substitution theory (P.Fontanier, J.Cohen, R.Jakobson) approaches metaphor from the rhetoric point of view, tackled like a figure of speech or a trope being produced at the level of the word taken as a discrete linguistic unit, and the meaning of metaphor hence assumes a similitude relationship between the compared terms, the tensional theory of metaphor (E. Benveniste, M.Black, M.Beardsley, I.A.Richards) approaches metaphor

from the semantic point of view, with metaphorization being produced at the level of the whole phrase, tackled as an instance of nonbearing predication. The tension of the metaphor consists of the dissimilarities between the subject to attributes are ascribed (*tenor, focus*) and the subject from which the attributes are borrowed (*vehicle, frame*), that is between the literal primary subject and the figurative secondary one.

Ricoeur surpasses the antinomy between metaphor-word and metaphor-phrase in the space of hermeneutics, upholding that, although occurred at the level of speech as a whole, metaphor focuses on the word; which is to say that, within the speech, the function of semantic identification, modified by metaphor, is nevertheless provided by the word. Metaphor does not assume only a deviated use of the names, but also a novel predication, which influences the semantic consistency of the speech, as it is established by the lexicalized meanings of the terms.

We have to keep in mind that Ricoeur sees metaphor as an element of the language which consists of affording logical subjects to predicates that cannot usually be compatible with them. Metaphor building requires a novel predication liable to nullify the semantic consistency of the phrase as it is established by the usual or lexicalized meanings of the terms. Due to this new consistency, a modification applies to the words' usual meanings, as well as their incompatibility at the level of phrase's literal interpretation. The *living metaphor* assumes that an underlying, latent meaning becomes more obvious than the explicit one. The semantic novelty equates with a new predicative consistency, with an addition of meaning.

The mechanism by which metaphor makes the sense or produces the meaning is explained by Ricoeur through the similarity concept. The theory of substitution and the tensional theory seem to differ as concerns the role they assign to similarity within the metaphorical process. Whereas the substitution theory sees the function of similarity as indubitable, the tensional theory of metaphor seems to grant it less importance. Ricoeur's intention is to separate the role of similarity from the substitution theory and reinterpret it from the tensional theory's perspective.

Within the tropology of classic rhetoric, metaphor was defined as a trope built on basis of a similarity relation assumed by a transfer from the initial, primal idea to the new one, respectively from the proper to the figurative word. As Ricoeur maintains, this theory could not tackle the topic of similarity without reference to other themes such as: digression, borrowing, substitution, exhaustive paraphrase.

"Indeed similarity is firstly reason of the borrowing; it is then the positive aspect of a process which has as a negative side the deviation; it is also the internal connection of a substitution field and it is finally the guideline of paraphrase which, while recovering the proper sense – cancels the trope. To the extent where the postulate of substitution can be considered significant to the entire chain of postulates, similarity is the substitution fundamental that acts in metaphorical transposition of the signs and, in general, of the words". (1)

At this level of the argument, Ricoeur insists mainly on Roman Jakobson's support to maintaining the similarity's function within the substitution theory. By making general the distinction between metaphorical and metonymical, Roman Jakobson consolidated the principle of the substitution and similarity concepts' solidarity by conceding that they are involved in semantic processes that occur on various levels of language performing, and not only on the level of its figurative function. With one of his researches on language, the author suggests a binary theory on metaphor, starting from the distinction between two manners of producing linguistic signs: selection and combination. In the process of combining word terms within a certain code or message, on the basis of contiguity relation, their willing inversion is resorted to, which, as Jakobson notes, pinpoints the metonymic level of language. For instance, the two terms of a metonymy can express the cause through its effect, the effect through the cause, the content through the container, the abstract through the concrete, plural through singular number. On the other hand, selection of the terms is made on basis of contiguity relation between different logical categories and it takes place only at the code's level, which is equivalent to the metaphoric level of language (2). Whereas metaphor creates a relation between the two compared terms, metonymy assumes an already existent connection between them. Metonymy does not require transposition from one domain to another, as metaphor does. Metonyms seem to be more obviously grounded in our experience than metaphors since they usually involve direct associations.

Ricoeur presents several objections to Jakobson's theory. First, this binary approach limits the tropology to only two figures of speech – metaphor and metonymy, although there were at least six admissible ways of figurative expression. Beside the two above mentioned, synecdoche is included – which Jakobson sees as only a special case of metonymy – as well as allegory, hyperbole and catachresis.

Another objection brought to attention by Ricoeur is that Jakobson's theory, when ignoring the distinction between the semiotic and the semantic levels of language, locates metaphor only in the space of isolated word, just like classical tropology and rhetoric, and not at the level of speech as a whole, which leads to omission of the metaphor's predication characteristic. As it is only a names' substitution, accomplished on the basis of syntax rules among coded linguistic units, metaphor adds no semantic content. Under these circumstances, Ricoeur's position seems justified when he insists that metaphor will define a general semiotic process rather than a form of affording, which previously requires the distinction between speech and sign.

“...Metaphor will define a general semiotic process and not a form of affording which requires a previous distinction between speech and signs”. (3)

Furthermore, within the context of Jakobson's theory, the distinction between usual metaphor and inventive metaphor becomes problematic. The usual metaphor seems to be identical with metonymy, in as much as the relation between the connective terms is considered conventional. Or, the inventive metaphor is produced at the level of speech and functions like a novel predication and not simply like a name's extension.

"It may be noticed that for Jakobson the combination is made within the code or message, whereas the selection operates between entities associated inside the code. In order for the selection to keep itself free, a novel combination must result which is created by the context and consequently distinct from the combinations performed inside the code; in other words, the secret of metaphor must be sought at the level of new syntagmatic connections, of new and purely contextual combinations". (4)

In fact, the aim of Ricoeur's criticism is seemingly that of showing to what extent the similarity game can be developed, up to the level of the entire sentence. If in the substitution's case, things are explicit enough – substitution of a term for the other being compulsory on the basis of a similitude relation – the tensional theory adepts express reluctance in accepting the similarity's function within metaphorical process. A first argument they bring forth upholds that a metaphorical phrase, due to its tensive nature, admits any kind of relation between the composing terms and not only that of similarity. For instance, Max Black, when discussing metaphor's tensive nature based on the *focus-frame* relation, will maintain that similarity is a vague notion and the multitude of its undetermined gradations makes it belong to the area of subjective reception rather than to that of objective observation. Similarity is hence more the metaphoric phrase's result than its source, since metaphor does not express a pre-existing similitude but creates one itself. It seems that M.Black employing an empirical biased conception of similarity, whereby the function of metaphor to create new significations over any already established system of meanings is lost. Questioning the primacy of similarity within metaphorization, he admits that the meaning shift in variation with the context could occur without necessarily following logical fundamentals.

"Generically, there are no simple fundamentals of the necessary changes in meaning, or a reason that will explain why certain metaphors are operational and others fail...". (5)

We will find the same line of thought with Monroe Beardsley; since he considers metaphor to be a self contradictory signficatory affording (6), due to the incompatibility between the lexicalized level and the contextualized level of meaning, he grants the main role in metaphor explaining to the logic absurdity at the level of primal meaning, as means to point out the secondary

meaning. Hence, focus falls on the incompatibility of designations at the primal level of terms' meaning, rather than on the similarity between them.

A third argument is concerned with ambiguity, vagueness of the similarity term, the sense of which assumes a number of nuances. Even the way in which Aristotle uses the word similarity seems to provide for this interpretation. In his writings about metaphor we can find at least three meanings to similarity, out of which only one is rigorously defined. We are hereby referring to analogy, or the "proportionality rapport" defined as an equivalence of relation among at least four items, where the rapport between the second and the first is identical with the rapport between the fourth item and the third, for instance, "old-age to a lifetime is like night-fall to a daytime" (7). The proportional metaphor however refers only to the fourth species, and not to the genus. One clarification concerning similarity which applies to the entire field of the metaphor is that their construction assumes perceiving/seizing the similitude between things or ideas (8). On the other hand, the similar seems to be mixed up with "what is one and the same thing", that is with the generic identity, and generality of similitude looks to be incompatible with specific reasoning of the analogy.

Ricoeur's strategy in recovering the similarity game within the metaphoric process can be summarized as follows:

- a. similarity is a necessary condition to the tensional theory of metaphor
- b. similarity is the result as well as the source of the metaphoric phrase (the paradox of similarity)
- c. similarity can acquire a logic status by which the indicated ambiguity is surpassed.

We will analyze herewith each of the three presented arguments.

- a. Disadvantages of the tensional theory can be overcome if we look past the semiotic characteristic of metaphor, to its semantic characteristic, in other words, if we bear in mind its inseparable functionalities as phrase and speech authority. This equals to a change of the similarity status, which now must be understood as a feature of predication affording and not of names' substitution. The novel consistency obtained by metaphorical process stands on a semantic order closeness, which occurs between logical genera, in spite of the difference between them. Speech units that are different from a semiotic point of view can be correlated at a semantic level by means of the similarity game, based on perceiving a "generic relatedness" or an "eidetic similar", in Aristotle's words.

The semantic newness, by which a novel proximity between two ideas is implicit, in spite of the logical distance, can be hence related to the similarity rapport. The tensional nature of the relatedness between the terms used in metaphorical process is present only at the semiotic level of analysis, where similarity is equivalent with substitution. If the semantic level is being

considered, similarity becomes itself a predication act, which operates between terms that are placed in a tensional relation.

b. In order to express the tensive nature of metaphor, Ricoeur resorts to the distinction evidenced by Philip Wheelwright between epiphor and diaphor (9). Any process of metaphor building implies both an epiphoric and a diaphoric aspect. The epiphoric is a designator for transfer as such, the assimilation occurred between unrelated ideas, which are actually that way on account of location in different logical genera. This process of assimilation implies an apperception, an insight, which is the intuitive seizing of the similar in whatever initially looks as opposite. It can be maintained that the diaphoric expresses an irreducible discursive moment of the metaphor; whereas the epiphoric unifies the immediately related terms at the level of image, the diaphoric acts by mediation and combination, providing a link between discrete terms. Since similarity is present both in the epiphoric and the diaphoric spaces, it follows that it can be regarded as both cause and effect of the metaphor. It is in fact a matter of using two different perspectives on similarity: those of relation and respectively process.

The epiphoric and the diaphoric pinpoint the paradoxical time of the metaphor, in other words, they express the rapport between designation and suggestion, image and meaning, lexicalized meaning and virtual meaning. Actually, as Ricoeur would have it, the paradox lies in the semantic order, since the focus of the discourse authority falls on the eccentric feature of predicative designation.

Under these circumstances, Ricoeur's arguments can be arraigned for a psychologizing tendency. His case seems to move beyond the semantic level, where he had stood beforehand, to the level of events' psychology. In the end, the matter may even appear as an error of methodology, as his stated intention to locate his conception and arguments in the semantic space is contradicted by the psychologizing approach to the intuition's role in seizing whatever similar between the connectives of the metaphorical construction.

Naturally, Ricoeur himself warns that some elements in his theory which concern the intuitive moment of the metaphor building process are recollected in the field of psychology:

"The so called *Getalt*psychologie is in this aspect very instructive when applied to the phenomenon of invention in order to show that any change of structure goes through a sudden intuition's moment when the new structure reveals itself from the erasing and reshaping of the previous configuration". (10)

We feel that the objection holds only as far as metaphor analysis at the semantic level is concerned. But Ricoeur's vaster design is to place the metaphor building process within the space of hermeneutic phenomenology. The relevance of metaphor at the level of hermeneutics consists not so much of the semantic impact created by the similarity relation between different or

even opposing logic genera as it does of necessarily triggering a reaction, that is an interpretation from the reader or the audience. This is also the reason why Ricoeur is especially interested in how living metaphors are formed, as lifeless metaphors are relevant only from the semiotic point of view.

c. The logic status of similarity is reestablished to the extent where the previously indicated paradox is transferred from the level of assimilation activity to the level of similarity relation. The conceptual structure of similarity is dual; opposition becomes manifest at the semiotic level, whereas identification is a semantic level fact. Similarity becomes the logic category opposing and in the same time unifying whatever is identical and whatever is different. Literal contradiction upholds the difference and semantic identity expresses the similarity.

This “enigmatic” feature of the metaphor, as Ricoeur calls it, made some authors (11) state that the metaphorical phrase, expressing one thing based on the similarity with another, totally different thing, implies what Gilbert Ryle used to call a category mistake. This mistake resides in presenting facts within a category using the idioms specific to another category. For Ricoeur, the metaphorical does not imply a category mistake but a category transgression: it abolishes logic categories and enlightens new aspects left out by the previous ones. Similarity must be understood first of all as a tension between “identicalness” and “difference” within the predicative operation set in motion by the semantic novelty; it resides in “a change of distance” within the logical space, given by the occurrence of a new semantic consistency. Therefore, the thesis by which similarity is indissolubly connected to a substitution theory is contested in favor of a theory of similarity understood as tension between two contradictory aspects within the predication activity which incites the creation of a new semantic consistency.

Notes:

1. Paul Ricoeur, *Metafora vie*, Editura Univers, București, 1984, pp.271-272
2. Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasia Disturbances”, in *Fundamentals of Language*, Haga, Mouton, 1956, p.49
- 3 P. Ricoeur, *op.cit.*, p.275
4. *idem*, p.281
5. Max Black, *Models and Metaphors*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1962, p.45
6. Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958, p.141
7. Aristotel, *Poetica*, Editura Iri, București, 1998, p.94

8. *idem*, p.98
9. Philip Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality*, Indiana University Press, 1968, pp.17-18
10. P. Ricoeur, *op.cit.*, p.304
11. Colin Murray Turbayne, *The Myth of Metaphor*, University of South Carolina Press, 1970; Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000

RELATIVISM VS. INDEXICALISM: FACING THE INTUITIONS

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Abstract

Relativism about truth has recently taken the form of a semantic account to be given to some specific areas of discourse. Among these relativistic-treatable discourses are those about future contingents, knowledge attributions, epistemic modals, gradeable adjectives, and cases of what has been called "faultless disagreement". Other applications, not worked out yet, are seen as having good prospects to fit the truth-relativistic model.

This paper is concerned with the application of truth-relativism to evaluative discourse. My aim is to see how relativism fares when compared with one of its major opponents – indexicalism – in the evaluative sphere and to analyse some arguments that have been adduced in relativism's favour. In section 1 I will lay out two ways in which a relativistic semantics can be constructed. In section 2 I will introduce indexicalism and talk about how we could adjudicate between the two rival positions. In the next section, on the basis of an example concerning matters of taste, I will analyse whether and to what extent the two positions conform to the common-sense intuitions we have about such matters by way of looking at two arguments that relativists have summoned against indexicalism. Section 4 will expand this kind of analysis to moral discourse. In the final section I will state the conclusion.

1. The relativistic framework

Relativism's main claim is that the same proposition could be true when evaluated relative to one parameter (or set of parameters) and false when evaluated relative to another parameter (or set of parameters). (In

another formulation, relativism claims that two propositions that contradict each other could both be true when evaluated relative to different parameters or set of parameters.) There are two ways to construct a semantic theory that is relativistic, in the sense specified, both of which take their point of departure and deviate from traditional semantics in a more or less radical way. By “traditional semantics” I mean the Kaplan-style two-stage or two-dimensional semantics according to which establishing a sentence’s truth-value requires two steps: establishing the content an utterance of the sentence has (the proposition expressed) and establishing its truth-value proper. Crucial for the first step is the notion of *context of utterance*, whereas for the second, crucial is the notion of *circumstance of evaluation*. (Kaplan 1989). According to Kaplan, an utterance of a sentence must be evaluated both with respect to the possible world where the given utterance takes place and to the time the utterance has been made. These two factors (world and time) were the only ones that Kaplan allowed in his theory to play a role in establishing the truth-value (the second step mentioned above) of an utterance of a sentence, by evaluating it at the world and time of the utterance.

David Lewis (1980) has done further work within this framework. He replaces Kaplan’s notion of “context of evaluation” with another technical term: “index”. An index, in Lewis’s view, is a set of features of context of various sorts, features he calls “coordinates” of the index. Establishing the truth-value of a sentence must take into account both its context (the concrete circumstance where it was uttered) and its index. An index is a quadruple formed by a speaker, a time, a place and a world. When the coordinates of an index are the same as those of the context, then the index is called the index of the context. A sentence is true at a context when it is true at the context at the index of the context.

Lewis’ conception of sentence-truth and his introduction of the technical term “index” has broadened the factors that could play a role in the establishing an utterance of a sentence’s truth-value. From here to what the relativist is after is just one small step. The step is made by adding more factors in the circumstance of evaluation (or index, in Lewis’ jargon). For example, a relativist about taste will claim that an utterance of a sentence containing taste predicates needs to be evaluated against a standard of taste parameter. A relativist about morality will add to the circumstance of evaluation a moral-outlook parameter, and so on. Since the parameters used might yield different results in establishing the utterance’s truth-value, the relativist can claim that the same proposition expressed by the utterance of a sentence could vary in truth-value with the new introduced parameter.

This way of giving a relativistic semantics does depart from the traditional view in that it introduces more parameters in the circumstances of evaluation of an utterance than usually allowed. The second, more radical

way to construct a relativistic semantics is to introduce another factor that plays a role in establishing the truth-value of an utterance of a sentence. According to John MacFarlane (2003), there are cases in which the introduction of a new parameter in the circumstance of evaluation does not yet give us a fully truth-evaluable proposition. His main example, which I find quite convincing, is discourse about future contingents. Under the assumption that we are not determinists, an utterance of the sentence "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" is neither true nor false at its context of utterance, since the future is open. Nevertheless, MacFarlane observes, there is a sense in which such utterances are true or false, for the sea battle either will happen or not. Thus, in order to establish the truth-values of sentences about future contingents, we need to introduce a perspective, or what MacFarlane calls a *context of assessment*. Assessed at its context (that is, before the sea battle has taken place or not), the utterance is neither true nor false, but assessed from a perspective in which the sea battle took place (or not), the utterance is clearly true (or false). Therefore, the same proposition expressed by an utterance of the sentence "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" is, according to this kind of truth-relativist, true, false or neither true nor false when assessed from different perspectives.

2. Indexicalism, relativism and intuitions

One major counter candidate for relativism in explaining linguistic phenomena in such areas as those mentioned at the beginning of the paper is indexicalism. I use "indexicalism" as general name for a cluster of views holding that terms belonging to a given discourse behave like indexicals, in the sense that their semantic value varies with context. The way in which the different semantic values are triggered in different contexts is a matter that depends on the details of the specific theory adopted. The most salient position seems to me to be the one Jason Stanley has exposed in his (2000) paper. According to his view, the semantic value of a sentence (the proposition expressed) is a function of the semantic values of the expressions composing it - with the additional claim that for some sentences there are unarticulated constituents that participate in composing the semantic value of the sentence. These unarticulated constituents do appear at the level of logical structure in the form of argument places for hidden indexicals, and these argument places are saturated by contextually provided values triggered by the indexicals in question. Applying this view to evaluative discourse, the result will be that the logical form of evaluative sentences has an argument place for a hidden indexical, which is saturated by triggering a standard of taste, in the case of taste discourse, or a moral standard, in the case of moral discourse, and so on. According to this form of indexicalism, then, in order to evaluate utterances of sentences belonging to the evaluative discourse there is no need to introduce other parameters in the circumstances of evaluation than the usual ones, since the logical form itself (with its argument place for the hidden indexical) is enough to yield a

semantic value for the sentence that is evaluable by ordinary means. This clearly conflicts with what relativism maintains. But even if one does not subscribe to the version of indexicalism presented, the important point is that relativism is ruled out by any form of indexicalism. And by applying it to various discourses, for every discourse for which relativism offers an account, indexicalism offers an alternative one. In other words, indexicalism and relativism are at odds and there is an ongoing debate about which is the most appropriate view.

This last issue is not easy to settle. In order to decide which of the two competing positions fares better, it is important to get clear about the difference between them. Both could be said to be theories that purport to offer accounts for the dependency of context of expressions belonging to one discourse or another. The main difference, though, is that while indexicalism locates the source of variation in the proposition expressed in a given context by a given utterance of an evaluative sentence, relativism locates the source of variation in the truth-value that the utterance takes in a given context. More specifically, in terms of the framework sketched above, the indexicalist limits context-dependence to contexts of utterance, whereas the relativism assigns it to circumstances of evaluation (or to contexts of assessment, in MacFarlane's case).

Now, the methodology I will use in what follows in order to shed light on the debate between relativism and indexicalism needs a bit of discussion. It consists in analysing whether and to what extent the two competing positions align with the common-sense intuitions triggered by our ordinary use of language when we make evaluations. However, intuitions have and always have had a dubious status in philosophy. Therefore, in my analysis I'm not going to allow intuitions to play the role of having the last word on deciding which theory is the correct one. Nevertheless, I found two reasons to take intuitions into consideration when trying to find the best semantic theory for evaluative discourse. The first is one of principle: I do think that a semantic theory should preserve the intuitions and practices to be found in the area of discourse to which the theory purports to apply. Although fallible, these intuitions are part of the data to be explained, and no theory that leaves them aside should be considered complete. The second reason is related with the form the very debate I'm considering has taken: relativists themselves argue against indexicalism by pointing to some intuitions or common linguistic practices and then accusing the indexicalists that they overlook or fail to accommodate them. Thus revealing or highlighting other, perhaps contrary intuitions and practices and testing the views against those should be a perfectly legitimate procedure, even by the lights of the accusers. However, in what follows I don't want to commit to any philosophical view about intuitions and their role in philosophy; I will proceed with my analysis with total neutrality on this matter.

3. Taste discourse and two arguments against indexicalism

In order to have a clearer view of how the debate between relativism and indexicalism unfolds, let's start with an example. Imagine the following, utterly simple conversation about matters of taste:

Dialogue 1:

Maria:(1a) Avocado is tasty.

Juliet:(1b) No, it isn't.

According to relativism as presented in the first section, (1b) contradicts (1a), because the proposition expressed by (1b) is the negation of the proposition expressed by (1a). For the relativist, the proposition expressed by Maria's utterance of (1a) is simply that avocado is tasty, whereas the proposition expressed by Juliet's utterance of (1b) is that avocado is not tasty. In order to evaluate the two utterances, we need to appeal to perspectives – which, in this case, are standards of taste. Moreover, they could both be true when evaluated relative to different standards of taste. In contrast, for indexicalism (1b) does not contradict (1a), because the proposition expressed by (1b) is not the negation of the proposition expressed by (1a). According to one version of the theory,¹ (1a) will be rendered as expressing the proposition that avocado is tasty for Maria, whereas (1b) will be rendered as expressing the proposition that avocado is not tasty for Juliet - and these are not contradictory propositions. To be sure, they both could be true, but this is simply because they have different content. No relativization to perspectives is needed to establish their truth-value.

Now with this example on the table, let us take a look at some arguments against indexicalism that relativist anti-indexicalists have proposed. A common feature of these arguments is that they all make appeal to intuitions at some point, though the intuitions appealed to are of different kinds and at different levels. In what follows I will consider two arguments that revolve around the idea that indexicalism cannot account for the intuition that in ordinary cases what looks like genuine contradiction really is so.

3.1. *The argument from "the contradiction intuition"*

The argument I'm considering in this subsection has the following form. If indexicalism were right, then two people who seem to disagree about matters of taste don't in fact disagree no more than one person uttering "I'm a doctor" and another one "I'm not a doctor" do. But our common-sense intuitions about cases of evaluations tell us that a real disagreement takes

¹ Namely, the one according to which the relevant standard of taste is that of the individual who utters the sentence. For discussion of other versions, in which the relevant standard of taste is not that of the utterer, see Lasershon (2005).

place in such cases. Therefore, indexicalism cannot be right, since it overlooks our common-sense intuitions.

The argument (which is, to face it, simply an appeal to sheer intuition) is best illustrated by the following quote from Peter Lasersohn's paper "Context Dependence, Disagreement and Predicates of Personal Taste"²:

This solution [i.e., indexicalism] cannot be right, however - ... because of the relation between contents and contradiction If I say "Roller coasters are fun," and you say "No, roller coasters are not fun," on this analysis, you are not contradicting me, because the negated sentence doesn't express the same content for you as it does for me. In effect, my utterance means roller coasters are fun for me, and your utterance means roller coasters are aren't fun for you, and there is no conflict or contradiction between those at all - indeed, there is no reason to think we disagree in any way, on this analysis. ... But in this situation, [you are contradicting me] - in fact it seems like a very overt, direct contradiction. (Lasersohn 2005: 649)

Let's call the intuition³ triggered here "the contradiction intuition". There is no point in denying that in such cases, the intuition is, indeed, triggered. But that doesn't mean that the intuition alone is enough to constitute an argument against indexicalism. For "arguments" such as Lasersohn's simply overlook other features of our linguistic practice that might trigger different intuitions. Consider, for example, the following continuation of *Dialogue 1*:

Dialogue 1 (continuation):

Maria:(1c) Well, I like it. It is tasty for me.

Juliet:(1d) OK, suit yourself. I don't like it at all.

The feature highlighted in this example is our willingness to "let the other go", the lack of any insistence that the other has committed a mistake or is somehow at fault. Let's call the intuition triggered by the continuation of *Dialogue 1* "the non-combat intuition". The important fact for the present debate is that the non-combat intuition is in tension with the contradiction intuition in such a way that they cancel each other. So the indexicalist can reply to the argument from the contradiction intuition that, given the feature of our linguistic practice stressed above, she doesn't have to take the contradiction intuition seriously, since it is cancelled by the other one, the non-combat intuition. This doesn't directly support indexicalism, but blocks the argument from the contradiction intuition. (I'm assuming here that the case is such that the interlocutors think that the matter is important, they have enough time etc., such that, for example, finding the matter unimportant, or not pursuing it because lack of time, should not be

² For another "argument" along these lines, see Wright (2001: 51-52).

³ For explicit talk of intuitions in Lasersohn, see 2005: 650.

considered reasons that account for the non-combat intuition.). To the relativist's accusation that indexicalism cannot account for the contradiction intuitions we have in such cases, the indexicalist answers that she shouldn't, since there are other intuitions that cancel it. So far the indexicalist is in no worse position than the relativist.

3.2 The "denial test" argument

Max Kölbel (2002) has given another argument against indexicalism (or revisionism, as he calls it). The argument consists in testing the indexicalist's predictions in cases in which one denies what somebody else says. The test could simply be performed by considering the two following dialogues:

(D1)A: Licorice is tasty.

B: No, you're wrong. (Meaning: No, licorice is not tasty.)

(D2)A: I find licorice tasty.

B: No, you're wrong. (Meaning: No, you don't find licorice tasty.)

If the indexicalist were right, B's utterances in both dialogues should be interpreted in the same way (that is, as meaning "No, you don't find licorice tasty"). But there is a clear sense in which B's two utterances differ. In the first case, B is denying a sentence which is about licorice, whereas in the second case B is denying a sentence which is about A's taste. If there is a difference between sentences that negate other sentences, then there must be also a difference between the negated sentences themselves. Therefore, the indexicalist's identification of the meanings of A's utterances in both dialogues fails.

This argument has far more substance than the one considered in the last section. Although one might note that even here there is an appeal to intuition – namely in distinguishing the two ways of denying the A-sentences – there is an elegant way in which the indexicalist could get around Kölbel's argument. What the indexicalist has to do is to somehow save the contradiction intuition. I will call any such view that purports to do this "sophisticated indexicalism". According to one version⁴ of sophisticated indexicalism, A's utterances in the two dialogues are semantically equivalent, but they carry different presuppositions. In (D1), A's utterance carries the presupposition that those participating in the dialogue share the same standard of taste with the speaker. In (D2), there is no such presupposition. In my example, *Dialogue 1*, when Juliet utters (1b), she signals that it is the case that she and Maria share the same standard of taste. The contradiction comes from the fact that one claims that avocado is tasty whereas the other

⁴ That of Dan Lopez de Sa (forthcoming), called "the presuppositional view". This is also the only view in the literature that I'm aware of that could be designated by the term "sophisticated indexicalism" as I use it.

claims that it is not tasty – but all this according to the same standard of taste, which they share. The contradiction is possible only under the presupposition that there is a shared standard of taste. The contradiction intuition is saved, and there is no need to evaluate the two utterances against different standards of taste. Therefore, the relativist cannot claim that indexicalism has no means to account for it. Again, so far the indexicalist is in no worse position than the relativist.

4. Moral discourse

Let's move now to the moral discourse. As above, to make things easier, imagine the following, utterly simple conversation about moral matters:

Dialogue 2:

Maria:(2a) Killing is wrong.

Juliet:(2b) No, it isn't.

The diagnosis in this case is similar with the one in the case of taste discourse. According to relativism, (2b) contradicts (2a), because the proposition expressed by (2b) is the negation of the proposition expressed by (2a). For the relativist, the proposition expressed by Maria's utterance of (2a) is simply that killing is wrong, whereas the proposition expressed by Juliet's utterance of (2b) is that killing is not wrong. In order to evaluate the two utterances, we need to appeal to perspectives – which, in this case, are moral standards. Moreover, they could both be true when evaluated relative to different moral standards. In contrast, for indexicalism (2b) does not contradict (2a), because the proposition expressed by (2b) is not the negation of the proposition expressed by (2a). According to the version of the theory for which the relevant standard is that of the person uttering the sentence, (1a) will be rendered as expressing the proposition that killing is wrong for Maria, whereas (1b) will be rendered as expressing the proposition that killing is wrong for Juliet – and these are not contradictory propositions. To be sure, they both could be true, but this is simply because they have different content. No relativization to perspectives is needed to establish their truth-value.

Now, the question I want to raise is the following: what about the contradiction intuition and the non-combat intuition in the moral case? Consider, in that respect, the following continuation of *Dialogue 2*:

Dialogue 2 (first continuation):

Maria:(2c) Well, I find it wrong. It's wrong for me.

Juliet:(2d) O.K., suit yourself. I don't find it wrong at all.

Although not entirely absent from our practice, this way of continuing the dialogue is rather rare, and definitely worrisome. A much more natural continuation of *Dialogue 2* is, I think, the following:

Dialogue 2 (second continuation):

Maria:(2c*) What do you mean it's not wrong? Of course it is.

Juliet:(2d*) No, it isn't.

... [and so on]

The insistence marked by the “...” shows that the intuition triggered in this case is *not* the non-combat intuition. It would be fair then to say that the contradiction intuition is the prevalent one.

Now the question is: does this show that relativism is right in the moral case? We should be careful not to jump to conclusions. The prevalence of the contradiction intuition in the moral case shows that it is much harder for the indexicalist to claim that what moral sentences really mean is something having to do with our moral standards rather than with the objects of our moral evaluations. But on the other hand, the fact that the relativist's diagnosis aligns with the intuitions triggered will constitute enough evidence for its rightness just for those who give intuition a decisive role in establishing philosophical conclusions. Though, even for them, the further development of indexicalist position might cancel this fragile advantage.

And indeed, as in the case of taste discourse, the indexicalist does here have room for manoeuvres. What I've called above “sophisticated indexicalism” could easily be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the moral discourse. The only data that change are the kind of presuppositions that are in place, namely that the interlocutors share the *moral* standards, instead of the taste standards. In *Dialogue 2*, when Juliet utters (2b), she signals that it is the case that she and Maria share the same moral standard. As before, the contradiction comes from the fact that one claims that killing is wrong whereas the other claims that it is not wrong – but all this according to the same moral standard, which they share. The contradiction is possible only under the presupposition that there is a shared moral standard. Again, the contradiction intuition is saved, and there is no need to evaluate the two utterances against different standards of taste. Thus, even in the moral case, where the contradiction intuition is prevalent, indexicalism is not entirely eliminated without further argument.

5. Conclusion

I have considered two arguments against indexicalism. I've tried to show that both of them are not as effective as it is usually thought. However, the conclusion that the indexicalist has not been put down by the arguments considered should not be interpreted as an decisive argument against relativism or in favour of indexicalism. It shows, rather, that things are more

intricate and complex and that, in order to choose one theory over the other, more philosophical work must be done.

Nevertheless, I think there is a more positive conclusion to be drawn. If what I said is right, then the relativist is left with two options, none of them very attractive. If she is willing to accept that intuition is a safe guide to philosophical conclusions, she has to admit that inside evaluative discourse itself there are cleavages – as the interplay between the contradiction intuition and the non-combat intuition shows. Accepting this might force the relativist to limit her theory only to some parts of evaluative discourse, and this constitutes a serious drawback, since usually in our semantic theories we seek for unity rather than diversification. On the other hand, if she denies that we should give intuition such big a role, then not only she loses a precious ally, but she has to confront with the more sophisticated indexicalist position that I outlined above. Obviously, I don't claim that this is impossible; but the counter arguments are yet to come.

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CONTEXTUALISM, ANATOMISM AND THE INSTABILITY OF
SEMANTIC CONTENT

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Abstract

The particular issue that I will pay attention to in this paper is the relation between semantic contextualism and atomistic theories of meaning. I want to argue both that semantic contextualism entails semantic atomism and that contextualism puts the same constraints on a theory of meaning as atomism. Since it entails atomism, I'll argue, contextualism has the same consequences as atomism has: it makes sharing semantic content highly improbable and puts serious constraints on meaning individuation. I deal with the most common type of contextualism that construes context-dependence not as syntactically triggered but as dependence on presuppositions, propositional attitudes and intentional states. So I will not take on the positions that offer a syntactic account of context dependence in terms of hidden indexicals or unarticulated constituents. I will proceed in the following way: I'll start with some very general characterizations of atomism and contextualism, both necessary for the present purpose. I continue by arguing that context dependence (aside indexicals¹) is just meaning-interdependence broadly construed. Then I will try to give several reasons why both context-dependence and meaning-interdependence make semantic content impossible to share. I will end by generalizing both the point made by atomism and contextualism and the point made by some arguments against contextualism and atomism. The latter might provide some very general outlines of a strictly minimalist semantics.

¹ Actually I will not mention not only pure indexicals but any kind of overt indexicals generally

1. Anatomism and Contextualism

1.1 *Semantic Anatomism*

It is important to notice that both contextualism and anatomism can be seen as general semantic theories: neither is necessarily committed to a particular thesis of meaning individuation. Anatomism doesn't necessarily tell you what the meaning-constitutive relations between a sentence and other sentences (or between words and sentences) have to be in order for a sentence or a word to have meaning. Nor does contextualism necessarily tells you what the relation between a token sentence and the embedding context has to be for that token sentence to have meaning. For example, anatomism does not entail Conceptual Role Semantics or any other theory committed to a particular account of meaning individuation but its turn is entailed by CRS and other accounts. The same goes with contextualism regarding the issue of how meaning is contextually determined. There are two stances that we can take towards context-dependence and meaning-interdependence. For one we can take anatomism and contextualism as by-products of particular theories on meaning individuation. For example, we can view anatomism as a by-product of conceptual role semantics, or verificationism. Or, we can adopt a methodological stance and take context dependence and meaning interdependence as general characteristics of meaning. In that case contextualism respectively anatomism can be seen as putting forward the general constraints that any semantic theory must follow². Adopting such a methodological stand leads to rejecting those particular theories of meaning individuation that are not anatomistic or contextualist.

One way of arguing that contextualism entails holism is to show that context-dependence is just a case of meaning-interdependence. It is important to define/characterize semantic anatomism in terms that are independent of any particular theory of meaning. The most neutral and general characterization of anatomism would be that the meaning of a linguistic item within a linguistic "totality" depends on the meaning of *some* other linguistic items from the "totality" it is embedded into. On the other hand, holism is a radical form of anatomism and claims that the meaning of a linguistic item depends on the meaning of *all* the other linguistic items from the linguistic totality it is embedded into (whether the totality is language, theory, language game, etc). For the present purposes such a general characterization suffices (see Pagin:2006, and Fodor and Lepore, 1992: 8-9).

Contextualism can be characterized in general terms as well. I think that all (non-indexicalist) contextualist positions put forward account for context dependence in terms of dependence on presuppositions or propositional attitudes. I'll deal in this paper only with non-indexical

² This is the stance adopted towards contextualism by Recanati (2004) and towards minimalism by Cappelen and Lepore (2005). A terminological clarification: I'll use 'meaning' and 'semantic content' interchangeably, as it is usually done in the literature.

contextualism. Briefly, indexicalism (here I use Recanati's terminology, see Recanati 2005) are the accounts that explain context sensitivity in terms of hidden indexicals or unarticulated constituents. It is claimed that sentences contain in their logical form hidden indexicals or other constituents that are not articulated in the grammatical form. Since the logical form is different from the grammatical form and the indexicals take different values in different contexts the sentence expresses different propositions in different contexts. The role of the context is to supply the unarticulated constituent (which can vary contextually) or/and values for the hidden indexical. The point is that context dependence is triggered syntactically or lexically. On the other hand non-indexicalist contextualism claims that context-dependence is pervasive and isn't syntactically or lexically triggered.

1.2. *Semantic Contextualism*

Contextualism can be best seen in its dialectic with minimalist semantics. Contextualism is basically a reaction to the orthodox semantic tradition of minimalist truth-conditional semantics. It is a continuation of the theses and methods of philosophy of ordinary-language, and a reaction to the gricean attempt to accommodate context-sensitivity in a minimalist, truth-conditional framework (which in its turn was a reaction to ordinary-language philosophy). The debate can be seen as a debate regarding what are the bearers of semantic (truth-conditional) content. According to minimalism, sentences (or more precisely sentence-types) are the bearers of truth-conditional content. Contextualism on the other hand takes sentence-tokens or speech-act content³ as the bearers of truth-conditional content. According to contextualism the speaker has a crucial role in determining the semantic content of a sentence-token and you can't grasp its content unless you can recover the speaker's intentions in uttering that sentence. For minimalism the speaker has no role in determining the semantic content of a sentence-token, and in recovering the semantic content of a token sentence one needs not be aware of the speaker's intentions at the time of utterance or of the context of utterance. According to minimalism, the semantic content of a sentence (or a word) is the content that can be grasped independently of any context of use of that sentence or word. More precisely minimalists think that literal meaning determines a truth-conditional content and that this content is stable across contexts. If a sentence-type is tokened in different contexts the

³ Very frequently it is talked about *utterance-content* (as opposed to sentence-content), and the debate between minimalism vs. contextualism is seen as a debate between a sentence-based semantics vs. an utterance based semantics. But the talk about utterance-content is misleading. An utterance is just an *act of uttering a sentence*. That means that the content of an utterance *u* of a sentence *s* is, depending on the position you adopt, either the content of the token-sentence *s*, or the content of the speech act, that is, what the speaker means (i.e. conveys) by that speech act. For some theorists (Recanati, Bezuidenhout) the token vs. type sentence overlaps the speaker's vs. sentence meaning, so the two options are equivalent for them. As Bach pointed out, utterances are not something and above sentences, or in a limbo between speech acts and sentences (Bach 2006).

sentence has the same semantic content across contexts and the semantic content can be grasped in total ignorance of the context(s) of utterance. Actually, some minimalists (Cappelen and Lepore 2005) define semantic content exactly in this way: the semantic content of a sentence *S* is the content that is available to us and reportable even when we are totally ignorant about *S*' context of utterance. So, in terms of the relation between meaning and intentions, the debate can be described as follows: according to minimalism, it is the conventional speakers' intentions that generate truth-conditional content while contextualism takes the intentions of a particular speaker in a particular circumstance to do the job (see Borg, 2004: 45).

For the minimalist, the semantic content of a sentence is determined in a strictly compositional manner starting from the literal meaning of the subsentential parts. The semantic content (or what is expressed) might not be the only content conveyed by the uttering of a sentence in a particular context. But the other contents that are conveyed by an utterance *u* of a sentence *s* and that are not derived compositionally from the literal meanings of the subsentential parts of *s* are derived inferentially (given the context) from the semantic content of *s*. The line between semantics and pragmatics runs over the line between semantic content (what is expressed) and speech act content (what is conveyed). On the other hand for contextualists the semantic vs. pragmatic demarcation does not overlap the semantic content vs. speech act content demarcation (hence the use of terms like 'truth-conditional pragmatics', 'utterance-centered semantics' for contextualism). The semantic content is affected (i.e. constituted) by pragmatic processes and considerations. Even if the processes affect the semantic content they are *still pragmatic in nature*, and not semantic, because (a) they are not linguistically generated by the syntax and the lexical semantics of the sentence (i.e. nothing in that requires for that process to take place, as opposed to indexical saturation) and (b) they are optional – i.e. counterfactually cancelable⁴. (see Bezuidenhout, 2002:192 Bach and Bezuidenhout, 2002: 300, Recanati:2004, 24-30)

Ambiguity and indexicality aside, contextualists consider that "some sentences are such that the information they semantically encode underdetermines the propositions they express on particular occasions of use" (Bach and Bezuidenhout, 2002: 294) and that context dependence is not a post-semantic phenomenon that can be relegated at the level of pragmatics. What is context-dependent is exactly the semantic (truth-conditional) content of sentences. More than that, pragmatic considerations appealing to the context of utterance and the intentions of the speakers are necessarily to get the truth-conditions of the uttered sentence. Even if you

⁴ We can imagine a context in which the pragmatic process does not take place and the literal meaning of sentence still determines a full proposition. On the other hand necessary processes like indexical saturation are not counterfactually cancelable.


know the semantic contents of the sub-sentential parts and the composition of the language it is still not enough to recover the semantic content. In order to get the truth-conditional content you need to appeal to wide-contextual factors. And in order to do that you need to use pragmatic processes.

I'll use the following classic example (by Travis 1985, Bezuidenhout 2002) to illustrate the difference. Take the sentence:

(1) "That kettle is black"


Imagine that in a context C1 one is looking for an old used kettle for an art-installation, while in a context C2 one is looking for a brand-new kettle to match the colors of the kitchen furniture.

For contextualists there is a folded "structure": (I) the literal meaning of (1) is "that kettle is black" while (II) the semantic content (even after determining for good the value of demonstrative "that", to a particular kettle and a particular set of indices) varies depending on the wide context⁵ of utterance. In the context C1 it can be *That(a) kettle is soothed black*, while in context C2 it can be *That kettle is painted black*. Finally, there are (III) the contents that the speaker wants to convey by uttering the sentence (1), that is the speech-act content(s): *it is just what I need* if one sees a soothed n C1, or/and *I'll take this(a) kettle*. The speech act contents are wide-context dependent as well. In other words, we have the following structure:



On the other hand for the minimalist the picture is simpler on the semantic side but a bit more complex on the pragmatic (speech act) side: (I) there is the literal meaning of (1) which is "this kettle is black" which determines (II) the semantic content (once the value of the demonstrative is determined) *That kettle is black* and then there is (III) the speech-act content(s) (what is communicated) that can vary from context to context. In context C1 the speech act content can be *that(a) is soothed black* in while in C2 it can be *that is painted black* and even the implicature *This is not what I need* can be generated and is at the same pair with the previous two.

⁵ The wide context is made by all the contextual factors that are relevant in determining the intentions of the speaker, all the presuppositions that the speaker and the audience exploit in giving, respectively recovering the intentions that lies behind uttering a sentence. The context-dependence that contextualists are concerned with is wide-context-dependence.



For both positions the speech-act content is open to express any number of propositions depending on the wide-context of the particular situation of communication. But, according to contextualists it is downright the semantic content that is context dependent and affected by pragmatic considerations and not only the speech-act content/implicatures/what is conveyed. Literal meaning alone does not give truth-conditional content. Only literal meaning plus the context of utterance generates truth-conditional content. (Recanati, 2004:20-21.)

An issue on which a lot of the discussion hinges is what counts as semantic content. What is the criterion for semantic content (for telling apart semantic content from speech act content). There are no commonly agreed criteria among contextualists but two: (a) the semantic content must be fully propositional, it must be such that it expresses a full proposition and not a proposition radical. The other criteria that pops up is the following: (b) the semantic content of an uttered sentence in a context is *what the speaker*

⁶ I try to give a picture as neutral as possible. So I leave open whether the speech-act content is exhausted by implicatures or whether there are other expressed (but non-implicated) propositions that depart from the literal meaning and that are part of the speech act content. That is I'll leave open whether the speech act content must be activated inferentially or not. This is a debate that cuts across the spectrum of semantic positions. Although, according to Recanati (2005) this is part of the criteria distinguishing minimalism from contextualism (i.e. if there are propositions richer than the literal meaning and are not inferentially activated they must be taken as the semantic content and not as speech act content). But others, on both sides, disagree (Bezuidenhout 2002, Carston 2002, Bach 2006, Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Travis 1991)

*intended to express*⁷ by uttering that sentence. I think that actually, the two usually combine in order to form a unique criterion.

The reason why full propositionality is taken to be semantic content is the following: implicatures are derived inferentially from the semantic content of an uttered sentence. so, the semantic content functions as a premise in the inferential process that delivers the implicatures (the what is conveyed). In order for something to stand as a premise in an inferential process, it must be fully propositional. As (b) goes the reason for claiming that the speaker's intentions have a bearing on the semantic content, is the following: the semantic content must be *available* (i.e. intuitively accessible) to the speaker⁸. So the conscious availability of a proposition and the potential to be used as a premise for an implicature-producing-inference make the contextualists claim that the semantic content of a sentence is the proposition that the speaker wants to *express* by uttering that sentence in order to *convey* a certain content. This is exactly what leads to a pragmatic intrusion into the truth-conditional content.

Here is how some of the most outspoken representatives of contextualism account for context-dependence of semantic content.

According to Travis: "any sentence [...] may, on one speaking of it or another, have any indefinitely many truth-conditions, and that any [...] expression may, meaning what it does, make any of many different contributions to the truth-conditions of wholes in which it figures as a part" (1997: 87). "What a meaning does is to make a sentence a means for expressing *thoughts* – not *one* thought but any of myriad different ones" (1997: 88) "Given words may have any of many different semantics [i.e. contents], compatibly with what they mean. Words in fact vary their semantics [i.e. contents] from one speaking of them to another. In that case their semantics [i.e. content] on a given speaking cannot be simply fixed by what they mean [i.e. literal meaning]." (1997: 100)

Here is the 'classic' formulation from Searle: "the notion of literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of background assumptions, and furthermore these background assumptions are not all and could not all be realized in the semantic structure of the sentence in the way that presuppositions and indexically dependent elements of the sentence's truth-conditions are realized in the semantic structure of the sentence" (Searle: 1979: 120). "The truth-conditions of the sentence will vary with variations in these background assumptions and given the absence or presence of some background assumptions the sentence does not have determinate truth-conditions." (Searle: 1970: 125)

⁷ Which is different from the speaker's intention to convey a content although in many cases the expressed content is the conveyed content. The second criterion is not endorsed as much as the first one and has some detractors.

⁸ One reason is that in order to (a) infer the speech act content of an utterance of a sentence, (b) to indirectly quote the sentence one needs to be aware of the content of a sentence.

And one of the forerunners of this view, Austin put it this way: “the question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on a sentence *is*, not yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not *as such* either true or false.” (Austin 1962: 111)

The idea behind these examples is that there is a gap between the literal meaning of a sentence and the truth-conditions of the sentence. The content of a token sentence in context is much richer than the literal meaning of the sentence (the meaning of the sentence type). This is known as the underdeterminacy (or incompleteness) thesis.

2.Contextualism and Underdeterminacy

Underdeterminacy, (or incompleteness) arguments are abundant in the contextualist literature, so I'll just briefly offer a survey and will not go much into details concerning the particular examples. What I'm interested in is the structure of the arguments.

The linguistic meaning of a sentence underdetermines the semantic content expressed by an utterance of that sentence. This is so because the literal meaning of an uttered sentence does not determine a full truth-conditional content even after disambiguation and the indexical reference was fixed, therefore the literal semantic content of a sentence is incomplete given, and needs contextual completion.

There are two positions among contextualists regarding underdetermination. Moderate contextualism claims that underdetermination is both restricted to a set of expressions, and that there is an end in sight with the contextual supplementation. These claims are somehow different faces of the same coin: if the underdetermination is restricted to a set of expressions then the completion of an underdetermined sentence can halt if we can express the presuppositions that the sentence requires or even the content of the sentence in terms that are not underdetermined themselves (see Carston, 2002: 29-20, Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 59-63) But, this position needs a principle based distinction between those that are underdetermined and those that aren't. This touches exactly the point made by radical contextualists. Radical contextualism claims that underdetermination is not restricted to a group of linguistic expressions but is spread over the board of all linguistic expressions and that there is no end in sight with the supplementation, therefore there is no such principled basis.

Contextualists run the following examples as a kind of intuition pumps in order to make the case that the truth-conditional content of a sentence is much richer than the literal meaning:

1. John is tall. [compared with whom? relative to what standards?]
2. It is raining. [where?]

3. The apple is green. [where? on the inside, on the outside? spotish-green?]
4. John weights 80 kg. [in what conditions?]
5. I had lunch. [when? today, in your life?]
6. Steel is strong enough. [for what?]
7. John is ready/prepared. [for what?]
8. John finished the book. [writing? reading? burning?]
9. The cat is on the mat. [how? in what conditions?]

and many, many more.

Unless a completion is given such as to offer an answer to the question in th brackets the sentences do not express a full proposition relative to their context. I'll take (7) for a short illustration of how incompleteness arguments go (I'll briefly follow Cappellen and Lepore: 2005, 61-63). (7) is deemed as not expressing a complete semantic content because independently of context it doesn't tell *for what* steel isn't strong enough, for building bridges, supporting roofs, etc. But assume that one says that in a particular context, (7) expresses the proposition *Steel isn't strong for supporting roofs*. Now, a contextualist can take this as an incomplete content because it doesn't settle for how long the support must last: seconds? hundreds of years?, nor in what conditions of temperature, what amount of steel, and so on⁹.

The content of the sentences require completion before they can be truth-evaluable relative to a state of affairs, that is before a particular state of affairs can be considered as offering their truth-conditions. The content expressed by the literal meaning of a sentence does not determine a fully truth-conditional content. In for that to be the case one needs to appeal to contextual factors. But even the completed content can be deemed incomplete if imaginative changes are brought in the context. Therefore a new round of semantic supplementation needs to take place. But even the new supplemented content can be deemed incomplete if some other aspects of the context are changed or deemed relevant. It seems that in order to specify or determine the semantic content of a sentence one must offer criteria by which the semantic content of a sentence is complete in a given context, otherwise, if one considers that sentences need a bit of contextual supplementation in order to get semantic content and does not provide such criteria there is no stop in sight with the contextual supplementation. And this is exactly the argument run by radical contextualists in favor of the context-dependency on an indefinite number of presuppositions. As radical contextualists like Searle, Travis, Recanati, Bezuidenhout go at pains to argue, for any sentence we can change its truth-conditions by imaginatively changing the background presuppositions and a sentence can be deemed incomplete every time a different factor of the context of utterance is deemed relevant.

⁹ For a classic of the genre see Searle's long analysis of (10) and Travis' analysis of (5) and their scenarios purporting to show that (10) respectively (5) are essentially incomplete. Searle 1979, Travis 1997.

The argument that it is impossible to offer criteria by which to decide which contextual factors are necessary in the completion of a sentence's semantic content and which are not, entails the thesis that "truth-conditional content depends on an indefinite number of background assumptions" (Bezuidenhout, 2002: 105). For the same reason why a sentence does not have a (stable) minimal semantic content it is dependent on an indefinite number of features of the context. Not only that any attempt to determine the meaning of an uttered sentence takes part against a background of presuppositions. Any attempt to clarify the presuppositions themselves takes part on a background of other presuppositions as well. Very bluntly the point can be put as follows: 1) To determine the meaning of a token sentence we need to appeal to certain presuppositions made in the context. 2) The moment we try to specify those presuppositions (contextual factors) we are using sentences to express them. 3) But *any* sentence token needs a background of presuppositions to be interpreted. 4) It means that we need to appeal to other presuppositions when we try to specify the initial round of presuppositions that we are making in the context. And so on. (Bezuidenhout, 2002: 124, Searle, 1979 130, Travis, 1997: 111).

So, no sentence fully encodes the proposition that it expresses in a particular utterance. Given the above reasons for contextualism it is impossible in principle to rule out anything (*any* factor can become content-constitutive): if *a* is a feature of the context *C* that is content determinant for the utterance *u* of the sentence *S* in context *C*, then when specifying *a* we appeal to further other background presuppositions. And these presuppositions in their turn become relevant for the content of *s* in *C*. This is to say that there is no necessary and sufficient set of presuppositions for the application of a sentence (i.e. for determining the truth-conditions of a sentence). Saying that there are no necessary presuppositions for determining the truth-conditions of a sentence is saying that we can dispense with *any* set of presuppositions as long as we appeal to others, and the sentence would still express a content, though a different one. This amounts to saying that there is no minimal truth-conditional meaning for a sentence, or so to speak that sentences do not carry their presuppositions down their sleeves, i.e. there is no set of presuppositions that accompany a sentence in its every application and determines a stable meaning. On the other hand, saying that there is no sufficient set of presuppositions for determining the truth-conditions of a sentence is *just* saying that the meaning of a sentence depends on an *indefinite* number of features of the context. The two points pull in the same direction: there is no *constant* set of presuppositions for determining truth-conditions but rather an open ended number of elements can be relevant for determining the truth-conditions of a sentence.

3. Context-Dependence as Meaning-Interdependence

Context dependence is described as dependence on the presuppositions and assumptions that were already put forward in the prior context of discourse, presuppositions about the physical environment of the conversation (mostly, but not only, presuppositions about the *shared* physical environment), presuppositions about the speaker's intentions and purposes, etc. Then all context-dependence is dependence on presuppositions and propositional attitudes.

Most of contextualists think of presupposition rather as a propositional attitude held, although implicit, in the context. Presupposition is not taken as a semantic relation between propositions (say p presupposes q iff for p to have a truth-value q must be true; q is necessitated by both p and non- p) but as a propositional attitude: people make presuppositions and propositions are the content or the objects of presuppositions. "[T]o presuppose a proposition (...) is to take its truth for granted, and assume that others involved in the context do the same. (...). Presuppositions are propositions implicitly supposed before the relevant linguistic business is transacted." (Stalnaker 1999:38) It is important to stress out both aspects of presuppositions. Being the propositions whose truth is taken for granted, presuppositions are something like the *background beliefs* of the speakers. On the other hand, if it is part of the concept of presupposition that the speaker assumes that the others presuppose everything that he presupposes, then presuppositions are the propositions which the speaker believes to constitute the accepted background information for a given situation, that is what the speakers take to be *common ground*

A set of presuppositions specifies particular states of the world and having some particular presuppositions is taking for granted that certain states of affairs obtain. This is so because presuppositions have as their content proposition and a proposition is a way of dividing the world into states compatible with it (or possible worlds where it is true) and states ruled out by it (possible worlds where it is false).

So, holding a presupposition is just believing that such-and-such a state holds and believing that the other is aware that such-and-such a state holds.

If context dependence is dependence on presuppositions (because the context is made up by presuppositions) then context dependence is dependence upon the content of presuppositions. And since presuppositions have propositional content then context dependence is dependence upon the propositional content of the presuppositions. But then this is exactly the definition of atomism (Fodor and Lepore 1992): the meaning of a linguistic item depends on some of one's contents of beliefs. and presuppositions are propositional attitudes and have the same direction of fit (or status) as beliefs: a proposition p is a presupposition in a context C just if the speaker

beliefs that p and beliefs that the addressee believe p as well¹⁰. So for contextualism the semantic content of a linguistic item depends on the propositional content of some of one's propositional attitudes¹¹.

If one prefers the more general account of anatomism, (the meaning of a linguistic item is dependent on the meaning of some other linguistic items from the same totality) dependence upon propositional content can be described as meaning-interdependence in the following way: the semantic content of a sentence s in a context C depends on the semantic contents of the sentences that are in the clauses of the reports that report the presuppositions adopted in the context C . Given this formulation it is fair to say that the meaning of a sentence s is dependent on the greater linguistic totality in which it is embedded (i.e. the context).

One process that contextualist make extensive use of and exhibits openly meaning interdependence is the modulation of semantic content (see Travis, 1991, Recanati, 2005, Carston 2002). For brevity I'll concentrate on Recanati's account. Here is a very short account: I'll present how modulation works in the case of a simple sentence like $F(a)$ where 'F' is a predicate and 'a' a singular term.

When 'a' is accessed its literal semantic content is accessible, but when the semantic value of the predicate 'F' is accessed it triggers a shift in the meaning of 'a' (modulation) and an associated semantic content/representation becomes more accessible than the literal semantic content. Being more accessible, the associated meaning (the non-literal meaning) is computed into the proposition expressed together with the meaning of 'F'. The modulation of 'a' is triggered by the predicate *before* the literal proposition is computed (i.e. before something like <Lit F, Lit a> is computed)

Take the following examples:

(11) "the ham-sandwich left without paying"

¹⁰ See Stalnaker (1999: 49-60) for a more detailed account

¹¹ A caveat regarding Searle's position is necessary. According to Searle "each of the sentences [...] is understood within a Network of intentional states and against a Background of capacities and social practices. [T]he differences in the Network and in the Background of practices produce different understandings [...]. (Searle 1983: 147). Sentence meaning is dependent both on the Background and on the Network of intentional states. For Searle the Background is a set of pre-intentional states and not a set of presuppositions or states with propositional content. The background is only a precondition of having intentional states and speaking about the background as a set of assumptions is just a *façon de parler*, a helpful, though a misleading one. Since the background is not made of intentional states, dependence on background is not dependence on propositional content and thus it does not lead to meaning interdependence. But since semantic content is dependent on the network of intentional states (and the intentional states are individuated holistically within the network) semantic content is dependent on propositional content. Thus, this dependence leads to meaning-interdependence.

[for simplicity I'll note it $F(a)$, "the ham-sandwich" = a , "left without paying" = F]

(12) "the ham-sandwich is about to be eaten"

[this one I note as $G(a)$, "is about to be eaten" = G]

When 'a' is uttered a certain meaning/representation becomes active (*ham-sandwich*), but as soon as 'F' is uttered and its meaning becomes accessible another representation/meaning of 'a' becomes activated and, given the meaning of 'F', it turns out to be more active than the initial one. (i.e. *the person who ordered the ham-sandwich* becomes more active). 'a' has different meanings in (11) and (12) (*the person that ordered*, respectively *the ham sandwich*) just because of modulation, that is because the predicates applied to 'a' are different. And this shift occurs before *any* proposition expressed by the sentence is computed by the speaker or/and audience. (It is irrelevant whether the literal proposition is absurd or not, it simply does not get computed before the modulated meaning. So, the absurdness or the in-appropriateness of the literal proposition plays no role in triggering the modulation) (Recanati, 2004: 27-29 and 30-32, Carston, 2002: 83-89, 120-135).

Moreover, Recanati and Carston both claim that nothing is fixed, all constituents can be given derived as well as non-literal meaning, and how we interpret a constituent cannot but affect how we interpret the others. (Recanati: 2004, 34-36)

Take the following example:

(13) The city is asleep.

which in one context can mean

(13') *the inhabitants of the city are asleep* if "the city" is given a derived meaning, or in another context it means:

(13'') *the city is quiet* if "asleep" is given derived meaning.

That is if we utter ' $F(a)$ ' the meaning of 'F' can affect the meaning of 'a', or the meaning of 'a' can affect 'F', or maybe in some cases in both direction, both affect each other's meanings. Here the meaning of a term depends on the meaning of another term in the sentence, as in (11). But in which direction the influence (the shift) goes (from 'city' to 'asleep', or the other way around) depends on the *coherence of interpretation*; that is, it depends on the larger context whether we accept (3') or (3''). Or in the previous notation whether we accept $\langle F, a \rangle$ or $\langle F, a' \rangle$ as the semantic content of ' $F(a)$ ' depends on the context and the considerations regarding the coherence of interpretation¹².

To put it somehow differently: in order to know the direction of modulation we need to take into account the coherence of the interpretation and the larger context of the utterance. In order for modulation to take place before any proposition (literal or otherwise) is computed, the context (the

¹² There are serious problems whether modulation can take place before a semantic content is computed in the cases like (3) where the direction of modulation is open. But I won't harp on that.

presuppositions) must affect the meaning of one of the sub-sentential parts *directly* – i.e. without the mediation of the meaning of the sentence. “[M]odulation is the process whereby the meaning of a given word is affected by the meanings of the other words in the same sentence.” (Recanati: 2004:131) and “[t]he ‘internal’ interaction of the word-meanings within the same sentence or discourse is only a reflection of the more general phenomenon: the interaction between the word meaning and the situation the words are used to talk about” (Recanati, 2004:133).

According to the picture put forward the presuppositions that make up the context determine the meaning of a term, and given the meaning of a term in a sentence, the rest of the meanings get modulated. Which term gets modulated first, and what representation becomes associated with the meaning, so that it becomes the input to modulating the rest of the terms, depends on the presuppositions of the context.

4. Sharing semantic content

Given the conclusion of the underdetermination (incompleteness) arguments that context dependence is dependence on an indefinite number of features of context together with the above claim that context dependence is just meaning interdependence I think that we can have an argument not only that contextualism entails semantic anatomism but it has the same consequences as semantic holism: no two people will share the same content unless they share exactly the same context that is unless they share the same features among the indefinite number of contextual factors.

Since (a) there is no end in sight with the specification of presuppositions in determining the semantic content and (b) context dependence is dependence on the propositional content of presuppositions then the content of an expression is determined by an indefinite (and open-ended) number of propositional contents.

But then no two people will share the same content unless they share exactly the same context, unless they share *the same* indefinite number of propositional contents. And here an argument (that parallels Fodor’s and Lepore’s argument against anatomism) can be run neatly against contextualism. It is highly improbable that any two people will share such rich and fine-tuned contexts, that any two people will share an indefinite (or even a large) number of such propositional attitudes. If two people are to share a context but one has more beliefs (or just different beliefs) than the other, and context dependence is open-ended, nothing prevents that his extra beliefs become part of the features of the contexts and thus meaning determinant. But then they will not share a context and a semantic content, and the context would turn out to be defective.

A moderate contextualist might not be pleased with this conclusion, but then he needs to provide criteria by which some presuppositions counts as

part of the context (and thus, relevant) and others don't, or by which a proposition is incomplete and another is not. But a moderate contextualist can't provide such criteria because he uses himself incompleteness arguments, or using such arguments is just eliciting intuitions regarding the potential contextual situations in which a linguistic expression is used, and this is open-ended. So one either uses incompleteness arguments but then accepts and goes all the way with radical contextualism and its consequences, or one doesn't use such arguments and remains minimalist. And here is the place to make some generalizations.

5. In place of conclusion: generalizing the strategies

It is important to notice that the arguments against contextualism and atomism parallels each other because both can be generalized to make the same point: if semantic content depends on an indefinite and/or an open-ended number of factors (no matter what these factors are) then sharing semantic content becomes improbable. That is the case because it asks that two persons share *the same* indefinite number of properties that are constitutive for semantic content. This can reveal a metaphysical constrain on semantic content individuation: no matter what those semantic content constitutive properties are, if semantic content is individuated by an indefinite number of properties and if in order for two persons to individuate the same meaning they must share the same indefinite number of properties, then meaning becomes non-sharable. Actually the incompleteness arguments and the argument going from atomism to holism parallel each other. In contextualism's case: (1) the meaning of *s* is dependent on the presuppositions made in a context (2) there is no principle-based distinction between the presuppositions that are relevant in a context and those that are not (i.e. any presupposition can be deemed relevant) (3) the semantic content of a sentence depends on an indefinite number of presuppositions. the argument for holism goes like this: (1') At least some of the non-semantic liaisons (epistemic constraints, inferential relations, representational associations, etc) of a sentence or word constitute its meaning - atomism. (2') If some of the non-semantic liaisons of a sentence or word constitute its meaning then all of them do because there is no principled way to decide which of a sentence's inferential properties are meaning-constitutive and which are not. (3') So all of a sentence's or word's non-semantic liaisons constitute its meaning – full-blown holism Fodor and Lepore, 1992: 22-23).

According to Fodor and Lepore and many holists meaning instability is an inevitable consequence of holism. If any change, no matter how small is brought in the linguistic totality then the meaning of all linguistic expressions changes, since all expressions from the same totality are inter-dependent. So if *any* expressions changes meaning (or if there is a doxastic change) then the meaning of *all* other expressions changes, therefore meaning becomes extremely instable. Again, the same goes for dependence on presuppositions: if the meaning of a sentence depends on an indefinite

number of presuppositions then any change in presuppositions is a change in meaning.

The point that anatomism and contextualism make can be generalized as follows: the meaning of a sentence is not 'underwritten' by its truth-conditions, but it depends on the semantic content of other sentences from the same 'linguistic totality'. In order to determine the semantic content of a sentence one needs to appeal to other propositional contents (the meaning of other sentences in the case of anatomism, or to the presuppositions made in the context of utterance of that sentence - contextualism). Both make the more general claim: you can't determine the semantic content of a sentence (i.e. a truth-evaluable content) just using the compositional rules of the language and the information encoded in the literal meaning of its sub-sentential parts.

More than that both contextualism and holism lead to the conclusion that *there are no semantic properties*: if there is spread underdetermination and the incompleteness arguments are in use, then one cannot ever specify a fully truth-conditional content of a sentence (since that content can always be claimed as incomplete, and thus, not really fully truth-conditional), and if anatomism is right one cannot specify a propositional content unless one specifies a full range of semantic contents. (Searle, 1979: 129, Fodor and Lepore, 1992:34-35)

A literalist/minimalist can reply: there is no principled way of distinguishing between extra elements that must be available for semantic content and other that don't. That is to say that there is no criteria to stop raising incompleteness claims (once one uses incompleteness arguments to make the case for contextualism) and no criteria for distinguishing between meaning-constitutive relations and non-meaning constitutive relations between sentences (unless buying the a/s distinction). The generalized point is that there is no way to stop non-arbitrarily with the specification of semantic content once you start going beyond the minimal compositional way, no way of writing down the semantic content. In that case, the fact that semantic incompleteness leads to a slippery slope argument that leads to the impossibility of pinning down a truth-conditional content is a *reductio* of the underdetermination thesis and of contextualism.

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A THEORY ABOUT MODERNIZATION

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Abstract

In what follows I present Fukuyama's reasoning as it was first put forth and the new shape he has recently gave it. I aim to show how his vision changed over time. I will also talk about his critiques and the author's answer to the divergent views.

Is history a teleological process which unfolds its climax in contemporary Western democracies or is it rather a sum of events that occur as a result of human desires and in accordance with the self-preservation principal?

Francis Fukuyama argued in the early nineties that liberal democracy represented "the final form of human government" and "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution". A world of "extreme pessimism" (F. Fukuyama, 1992, p.5) caused by a century of dictatorships and genocides could hope again as the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union reaffirmed the universality of the democratic ethos. Since the first publication of the essay "*The end of history*¹?" in *The National Interest* (1982) followed by "*The end of history and the last man*" (1992), numerous critiques challenged his thesis. After more than a decade and a half the author

¹ The phrase was perceived as the end of concrete political events. This is a misinterpretation because by 'end' Fukuyama understands both purpose and final point, not the lack of future possible political regime changes. He sustains in this essay that liberal democracy will overcome all possible variations.

reconsiders the argument, restates some of his initial views and reflects upon the challenges liberal democracy must prevail.

In "*The end of history and the last man*" Fukuyama offers a teleological view of history as an evolutionary process. He embraces Alexander Kojeve's interpretation of Hegelian thought and believes that history gradually reveals itself. The final point consists of a form of government that would not collapse because of internal contradictions as its ethos corresponds with a human being's longing for freedom. It is only liberal democracy and its core principals- liberty and equality that can assure the fulfillment of this longing.

Hegel depicted history in relation to the advancement of societies from the tribal to the modern ones. Theocracies, monarchies or feudal aristocracies represented mere stages in the unfolding of the Spirit (Weltgeist). The "world history is the necessary development, out of the concepts of mind's freedom alone, of the moments of reason, and so of the self-consciousness and freedom of mind" (G.W.F. Hegel, 1956, p.342). Moreover peoples act in accordance with the Spirit of the world as it becomes self-conscious. The individual's will fades away. Only the great man's subjective will gives birth to actions that allow the Spirit to unfold itself. Thus when Napoleon defeated the Prussian monarchy at the battle of Jena 1806, history came to its end because the Spirit of the world, human reason, entered its final phase. Then, for the first time, liberty and equality, the principles of French and American Revolutions proved themselves to be universal.

Karl Marx developed Hegel's thought as he also sustained that history had been linearly driven towards a goal. For Marx the process evolved as the means of production progressed shaping societies and they culminated with the industrial age. In his view it was communism, not liberal democracy the most efficient and satisfactory way to fulfill human fundamental needs. Fukuyama touches upon Marx's argument only to reaffirm its weakness as it has been proven *ipso facto* that communist order can be self-destructive.

As it happened with fascism, communism failed to become a viable ideological replacement for liberal democracy. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union situated United States in a privileged position on the international arena. Fukuyama's optimism about the Western democratic model and its universality relies on the new world order after 1989.

In addition to this empirical proof- the defeat of the authoritarian regimes from Eastern Europe, Latin America or Asia², the author appeals once more to a philosophic argument. He uses Hegel's concept of the struggle for recognition to sustain the directional nature of history.

Fukuyama explains along Hegel's lines that the human individual struggles to be recognized by the others as a being with intrinsic value, a

² An example would be Japan's transformation after World War Two.

dignified being. This is a struggle for prestige in which humans would risk their lives to be 'seen'. They fight for abstract ideas and to attain higher goals, not only for immediate necessities that assure self-preservation.

Hegel argued that the struggle for recognition leads to a battle that eventually gives rise to the master-slave dialectics. Class division reflects the effect of the separation between those who would risk their lives in battle (the Master) and those who would give it away out of fear (the Slave). Hegel shows that with time neither the master, nor the slave could achieve recognition. The former attained recognition only from the slave (who was considered humanly incomplete), but not from other masters. The latter's humanity used to be obscured by the existing social order. French and American Revolutions put behind this distinction and inserted the principals of popular sovereignty as well as the rule of law. Consequently citizens recognize each other's dignity. Also the state grants them rights as a form of recognition.

Reading Hegel through Kojève's lenses with the emphasis on the struggle for recognition allows Fukuyama to perceive the longing for a social status as the "motor of history". However his explanation of a coherent and directional human history is ampler. The author brings into play modern natural science to support his thesis. Modern natural science is the result of a "cumulative and directional" process based not on human's rules, but on the laws of nature. The natural science unfolded while spreading its uniformity effects on all societies.

On the one hand uniformity is anchored in technological progress that was appealing to the most. For example a state's independence was facilitated by military advances. On the other hand scientific progress brought about uniformity of the means of production. Fukuyama shows that economic growth (as a result of technological development) multiplies the same pattern and leads to homogenous societies. Moreover economic growth implies the replacement of traditional forms of social organization with efficiency based new orders, a more educated population, urbanization and national unification.

Consequently societies had the tendency to resemble more and more among each other as they were connected by global markets and "the spread of a universal consumer culture" (F. Fukuyama, 1989). All of which seemed "to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism" (F. Fukuyama, 1989). The author explains that capitalism offers a frame in which human desires are satisfied because of the access to unlimited wealth accumulation. So history's riddle about both human preservation and abstract longings is solved by liberal democracy intertwined with capitalism.

How can one then explain the multitude of internal challenges Western liberal democracies have to overcome? Issues like homelessness, drug addiction, racism, nationalism are few examples of serious matters that don't conform to Fukuyama's optimistic picture. Still when critiques were made at this level of the discourse, the author insisted on the distinction between the

ideological realm and the realm of concrete events. He sustained that the end of history occurs at the level of the idea. Fukuyama acknowledges the diverse, problematic nature of such concerns. But he believes that on the long run reality would overlap the ideal because the principles of liberty and equality are best put to practice by liberal democracy and the free market.

The internal challenges of Western democracies are less perturbing (since they can be solved with time) than the ones that appear in other parts of the world. The train of universal history has arrived in the West at its final destination. It cannot be said the same about Third World countries or even about the Developing Countries as they are still caught in history. Some of them might never succeed to create the institutions and to assume the values that would render them free, that would make them achieve the purpose of history. At the same time reversals might take place, totalitarian regimes might revive in some Developing Countries that are democratic at present. But Fukuyama argues that even if that happened, people would strive to attain what gives them security and freedom- liberal democracy as well as a free market.

After relying on Hegel to prove that history is directional, after insisting that technological progress leads to uniform societies and free market, that the universality of liberal democracy was once again proven by end of the Cold War, Fukuyama develops a different side of the matter. He examines the nature of democracy, to what extent one can speak in terms of its goodness, not only of its efficiency or "the best form of government". He brings into question what it means to be human in an age that requires no struggle for abstract purposes, since those have already been reached. At this point the author takes Nietzsche's path and envisions the "last man" would be a being with no aspirations, a contempt human being condemned to a parsimonious happiness as his riches are material. The end of history reveals an individual driven by no profound purposes only by the constant, endless hunger to accumulate goods.

After seventeen years since the Cold War ended Fukuyama revises his paradigm. He confronts his previous views with the changes that supervened in global politics over time. He also answers his critiques and reaffirms some of his initial arguments. In the afterward to the second edition of the book³ Fukuyama wrote: "the central question is whether western values and institutions have a universal significance or whether they represent the temporary success of a presently hegemonic culture"⁴ He sustains that liberal democracy has a universal significance regardless of its Christian historical origins. Liberal democracy can transgress the cultural barriers as

³ *The end of history and the Last Man*, Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., NY Press, 2006. Also at www.opendemocracy.org

⁴ *Idem*, also at www.opendemocracy.org

much as the scientific method could become a worldwide asset even if it was based on Descartes and Bacon's philosophic thinking.

The author also reaffirms his belief in an "overall logic to historical evolution"⁵. Liberal democracy is no longer viewed as the result of the struggle for recognition, but it is the "byproduct" of economic development. Since economic growth facilitates the access to education people become more interested to actively participate in the political realm.

More exactly Fukuyama presents his thesis as an argument in favor of modernization as it facilitates the appearance of democratic frameworks. If a country wanted to be modern it had to establish democratic institutions and market economies⁵. Furthermore the phenomenon of migration stands as proof that most people choose to live in modern societies. So they also want democracy. This image differs from his initial position when democracy was not an issue of choice, but a necessary historic consequence.

The author no longer talks about the realm of ideology that would overlap reality in the long term. Instead he bases his "weak" determinism on the universal need to be free of tyranny and to live in a modern society. People that leave their countries to live in modernized societies of the West or in Japan want to live in a system that offers them better health care, more job opportunities, individual rights, etc.

Also even if "poor countries" wanted to be modernized they lacked the policies and institutions to secure trade, to protect property and to grant rights. Fukuyama reflects on the difficulty to start modernization and thus to spread democracy in the Middle East. He draws attention that this challenge, not cultural barriers, makes liberal democracy seem impossible in some areas of the world.

If the desire for modernization is universal and modern societies are often governed by liberal democracy what could limit its spread besides the lack of policy and institutions?

Nowadays it is often argued that Islam represents a threat for liberal democracy. As there is no separation between the state and religion the Muslim world is considered reticent to the democratic ethos. However Fukuyama disagrees with this view. He explains that Islam is not a threat to democracy and it does not create a cultural barrier. Mali, Turkey or Indonesia serves as examples of democratic Muslim states.

Conversely, radical Islamism understood as political ideology is neither rooted in Islamic traditions, nor does it promotes Islam teachings. It is based on Left-Right extremist beliefs. It appeared as a result of modernization that can have a disruptive effect on any culture and generates alienation. Fukuyama writes: "contemporary *ihadists* are following the footsteps of anarchists, Bolsheviks, fascists of the earlier generations". So it is not Islam, but radical Islamism that represents an obstacle for democracy. It also

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *The American-Interest- The Clash of Cultures and American Hegemony*- a speech delivered for the American Political Science Association (APSA) Convention, September 1st, 2006.

disturbs the internal order of western societies like France or The Netherlands where the Muslim minorities are not assimilated. The frustration of second and third generations of Muslim emigrants who cannot integrate is fueled by Islamism. A clear example of minority groups that released their frustration is the riots from Paris in October and November 2005.

Nonetheless the idea that history ends in the democratic west is put behind. Fukuyama admits that other forms of government, new social orders might arise in time. Technological progress might assure the manipulation of the human body in different ways such as new solutions for life extension or the control of the genome, maybe even through a future neuroscience. But he doesn't believe that environmental issues (global warming, climate change, limited resources, pollution, etc) might lead to new ideologies. The more technology advances the higher the possibility of new ideologies, of new political frameworks.

Fukuyama tries to clarify that the vision described in "*The end of history and the last man*" was by no means linked to America's foreign policy or with the Iraq invasion. It was not mean to support military interventions neither in the Middle East, nor in any other parts of the world. He believes America's current foreign policy creates tension relationships with its allies. The Iraq war was expected to finalize in a democracy. But peacekeepers don't succeed to stabilize the region. America's intervention was rushed and improperly calculated. Fukuyama said "one thing I did not anticipate at the end of the Cold War was the degree to which American behavior and misjudgments would make anti-Americanism itself one of the chief fault-lines of global politics³".

Moreover the European Union represents the closest embodiment in reality of the final stage of history, not America. This is another misinterpretations Fukuyama refers to. The European nation-states attempt to transcend national sovereignty and to avoid the use of military power. By working to create a transnational rule of law and to replace traditional power, the EU project can be considered a framework for a post-historic society. In opposition Americans have a different understanding of sovereignty, "applaud their military, and like their patriotic Fourth of July parades⁴".

Fukuyama's afterword discloses a less optimistic author, unsatisfied with America's hegemonic power. It seems that his nostalgia is not connected to the aspects in which history did not go along with his optimism, because he continues to believe that history is directional, although it hasn't ended yet. He admits that new forms of government might replace it in the future.

³ *The American-Interest- The Clash of Cultures and American Hegemony*- a speech delivered for the American Political Science Association (APSA) Convention, September 1st, 2006.

⁴ www.opendemocracy.org, democracy and power.

In conclusion Francis Fukuyama admits that history has not reached its final point. Still in order for that to happen modernization is the key. Fukuyama believes that any ideological evolution will continue to have as ethos the principles of liberty and equality. It was history (?) that made him review his theory, will it be history and its unfolding a cause for a further revision of his paradigm?

Maybe by the time of the third edition of "*The end of history and the last man*" Fukuyama will also present a different vision of history. He could argue that history represents a sum of events that occur as a result of human desires without an overall logic driving it. As well, environmental concerns, demographic growth and climate change might challenge his optimism about modernization after all.

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LE RAPPORT IDENTITÉ-DIFFÉRENCE ET LA CONJONCTION
COLLECTIVE. ASPECTS LOGIQUES¹

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Resumé

On pourrait dire, sans exagérer, que dans la philosophie européenne tout part du thème de l'identité et de la différence, de l'un et du multiple. Il s'agit, donc, non pas d'un thème entre autres de la culture européenne, mais du nucléé même de notre pensée, bien qu'on n'ait pas toujours conscientisé cette chose.

Les essais de solutionner le rapport identité-différence se sont souvent cantonnés dans le plan ontologique, métaphysique, puis aussi dans les domaines de l'éthique, de la politologie, de la psychologie sociale ou de la théorie de la culture. Dans la logique, la thématization de ce rapport a été faite surtout par l'intermédiaire de la contradiction. Mais les logiques nouvelles, non-classiques, ont attaqué tour à tour les principes de la logique traditionnelle: la logique cuantique s'abat du principe de l'identité, la logique intuitionniste met en discussion le principe du tiers exclus, et les logiques paraconsistantes visent le principe de la non-contradiction. Mais on a moins conscientisé le rôle que peuvent avoir les opérateurs logiques dans la clarification de l'opposition identité-différence. Lorsque cette chose s'est, pourtant, réalisée, l'accent a été mis sur la problématique de la négation, qui est, il semble, le plus provocateur thème de métalogue.

En ce qui nous concerne, dans cette étude nous essayerons de surprendre les valences que l'opérateur de la conjonction peut les offrir pour une meilleure compréhension du rapport identité-différence.

¹ Cette étude a été communiquée pour première fois au XXXI^{ème} Congrès d'ASPLF, Budapest, 2006.

1. Fondements de la distinction distributif-collectif

Comme on sait de la logique classique, les notions collectives ont été prises en compte au moment où on arrivait au dévoilement de certains paralogismes. Malheureusement, elles n'ont pas été traitées avec l'attention adéquate, chose qu'on peut observer aussi des divers traités de logique, où, souvent, leur abordation manque quand on discute la classification des notions. Cette omission de la part des logiciens est d'autant plus grave qu'une série de sciences comme la biologie, la géographie, la géologie ou la chimie opèrent prioritairement avec ce type de notions. Plus généralement, de telles notions sont réclamées partout où apparaissent des problèmes de *structure* et de *constitution* (Botezatu, Petre, 1969, p. 211).

Solidaire avec la division des notions en distributives (divisives) et collectives est la classification, de date récente, de l'opérateur de la conjonction en *conjonctions distributives* et *conjonctions collectives*. Mais quels sont les fondements de cette classification? Il faut préciser, pour le début, la tension connue dès l'antiquité entre le désir d'obtenir, sur la base de l'identité, les types les plus généraux de connaissances et la demande, tout aussi puissante, de connaître le particulier et l'individuel, comme expressions de la diversité. Un fin connaisseur de la logique et de la philosophie de la science, comme c'est le cas d'Emile Meyerson, appréciait que le principe de l'identité est la plus vaste hypothèse du nombre des possibles, parce qu'il s'applique à la totalité du monde sensible, mais on ne doit pas oublier que ce qui est particulier n'est jamais complètement explicable (Meyerson, Emile, 1902, p. 449). Ce qui signifie qu'un déductivisme, mené à la limite, peut n'importe quand échouer.

La tension mentionnée ci-dessus est amplifiée, en même temps, par le manque d'univocité de ce que signifie l'identité par le terme "est". Ce verbe est pris dans de multiples acceptions – possession d'une qualité, appartenance à une classe, inclusion dans une classe, opération d'identification, l'affirmation d'une existence, etc. –, mais il peut exprimer aussi quelque chose plus profond: il s'agit de "*la persistance de la substance, de l'essence de la chose, au delà des vicissitudes des accidents*" (Botezatu, Petre, 1994, vol. I, p. 35).

Ce sens fort de l'identité, comme "persistance de l'essence", tant logique, qu'ontologique, a été imposé par Aristote. Mais on a observé souvent que dans le plan logique le Stagyrite a oscillé entre une "logique de la sphère" et une "logique du contenu". Cette oscillation peut être vue aussi dans la manière dans laquelle Aristote conçoit l'unité. Respectivement, l'unité est de deux sortes: a) de type prédicatif, dans le sens que l'unité se présente comme un universel, donc comme un prédicat des composants; b) de type intégratif, cas dans lequel l'unité résulte de plusieurs parties intégrantes (Aristotel, 1996, p. 216).

Nous considérons que cette division de l'unité dans les deux types se trouve à la base de ce que plus tard a été nommé le rapport distributif (divisif)-collectif. Car l'unité comme universel, comme "prédicat des composants", fonctionne en sens distributif. Par exemple, quand nous disons de "l'homme" qu'il est "animal", nous dénommons le genre de celui-ci. La notion "animal" est l'attribut commun des notions d'"homme", "cheval" etc., est l'unité de genre ou le prédicat de ceux-ci. L'unité de genre est distributive à toutes les espèces qui entrent dans la composante du genre, car la notion d'"animal" est ici l'unité de mesure pour les notions d'"homme", "cheval" etc. En échange, la même notion d'"homme", prise comme l'expression de l'unité de type intégratif, respectivement comme unité des parties composantes (tête, tronc, membres), fonctionne en sens collectif, ce qui signifie que les propriétés du niveau de l'entier ne se distribuent pas au niveau des parties². Ou, dans les termes d'Aristote: là où l'unité est un universel (= prédicat des composants) on peut réaliser un dénombrement, c'est-à-dire on peut compter les composants – des espèces du cadre du genre, parce que le prédicat commun (le genre) représente implicitement l'unité de mesure, pendant que dans le cas de l'unité de type intégratif, "le dénombrement ne peut pas du tout être fait, car il s'agit des prédicats de l'un et même être qui, du point de vue numérique, est seulement un" (Aristote, 1996, p. 557).

On sait que dans la tradition aristotélicienne il y a une profonde liaison entre ontique et logique. En ce sens, la distinction distributif-collectif du plan logique se fonde elle aussi en plan ontique. Car en liaison avec "les objets" ou "les entités" du plan ontique, "l'une des distinctions possibles est celle entre le sens distributif et le sens collectif de l'*objet*" (Poli, Roberto, 1996, p. 9). Employé en sens distributif, "l'objet" signifie "chose", et utilisé en sens

² En liaison avec la classification des notions en "distributives" et "collectives", dans les différents ouvrages de logique persistent de nombreuses confusions. Certains auteurs les approchent très beaucoup de la classification en "notions générales" et "notions individuelles", d'autres de la classification en "notions composées" et "notions simples". En ce qui nous concerne, en accord avec la théorisation d'Aristote concernant le problème de "l'unité" (dans le sens que la même notion peut exprimer une unité prédicative, comme le genre, lorsqu'elle est regardée dans son unité de genre, ou une unité intégrative, quand elle est regardée comme le résultat de l'intégration), nous considérons que dans le plan logique une même notion peut se présenter soit sous l'aspect distributif, soit sous l'aspect collectif. Le logicien roumain Petre Botezatu, attirant l'attention sur le fait que le sens distributif ou collectif d'une notion ne résulte pas toujours d'une manière claire des expressions verbales, offre une solution contextuelle, dans le sens que l'univers de discours contextuel concret est celui qui peut nous aider à trancher si la notion est utilisée de manière distributive ou collective (Botezatu, Petre, 1994, vol. II, p. 69). Une nuance subtile dans cette discussion est introduite par le logicien Teodor Dima, qui suggère de distinguer entre le plan sémantique et le plan logique prédicationnel de l'analyse. Respectivement, si dans le contexte logique prédicationnel la même notion peut apparaître soit en sens distributif, soit en sens collectif, en plan sémantique, en fonction de la référence de la notion, certains termes peuvent être seulement collectifs. Des termes comme "faune", "flore", "bibliothèque", "équipage", "famille", etc. sont collectifs par "la signification qu'ils reçoivent de la part de la référence" (Dima, Teodor, 1990, p. 104).

collectif, "l'objet" signifie "entier"³. Avec la précision que, dans la même tradition aristotélicienne, entre l'unité collective et l'unité distributive existe une asymétrie en faveur de la première en plan ontologique, car l'unité collective est plus relevante (elle exprime la substance prime, les individuels), pendant que l'unité distributive semble avoir une relevance plus réduite (car elle exprime la substance seconde, l'universel comme genre).

En ce moment une autre observation s'impose. Il faut conscientiser le fait que "l'unité collective" ne représente pas une simple entité non-différentielle, mais, au contraire, elle suppose des différenciations intérieures, une certaine typologie. Jusqu'à Lesniewski ce problème ne s'est presque pas du tout posé, en parlant des notions collectives de manière générale, sans des nuances⁴. Dans la présente étude nous aurons en vue surtout quelques suggestions faites par les logiciens et philosophes roumains Ion Petrovici et Petre Botezatu.

Dès 1910, Ion Petrovici, dans son ouvrage *La théorie des notions*, montre que les notions collectives représentent "des collections d'objets", ce qui signifie une minimale *homogénéité* des objets (Petrovici, Ion, 1998, p. 142). Ces notions collectives considèrent les différents objets individuels "comme parties d'un tout plus grand", ce qui signifie, ensuite, qu'il y a aussi une certaine hétérogénéité et une certaine liaison entre les parties, liaison qui peut être plus faible ou plus forte. Quand les liaisons entre les parties sont plus fortes, les notions collectives peuvent se transformer dans des notions composées.

A son tour, Petre Botezatu attire l'attention que la division des réalités collectives dans des agregats, collectifs, systèmes ou composés est seulement l'une relative, à un objet pouvant "prédominer l'un ou l'autre de ces aspects" (Botezatu, Petre, 1969, p. 214). Par exemple, la proposition peut être considérée un "agregat" de lettres, mais aussi bien un "collectif" de mots, ou un "système" de parties de proposition ou un "composé" d'idées.

Nous retenons, de ces suggestions, les aspects suivants, qui nous semblent utiles à l'analyse: a) dans toute réalité exprimable par des notions collectives on a besoin d'un minimum d'homogénéité, comme un fond sur

³ Roberto Poli montre qu'à Abelard encore nous avons une parallèle parfaite entre ce qui existe (comme *res*) et ce qui existe comme "chose" (comme *ens*) et la distinction collectif-distributif (collectif en parallèle avec *res* et distributif en parallèle avec *ens*). Pour Abelard, l'entier collectif: a) n'est pas prédicat d'éléments constitutifs; b) n'est pas l'universel; c) il est composé de parties, mais il ne se réduit pas à ses parties composantes; d) il permet seulement une prédication singulière. Et l'entier distributif: a) est prédicat de ses éléments constitutifs; b) il est subordonné à la relation genre-espèce; c) il est l'universel; d) il implique une prédication universelle (Poli, Roberto, 1996, p. 10).

⁴ Dans la littérature roumaine de spécialité Petre Botezatu propose quatre types de totalités, d'unités collectives: a) l'agregat; b) le collectif; c) le système et d) le composé (Botezatu, Petre, 1969, p. 212-213). Mais Petru Ioan fait l'observation que la typologie proposée est déficitaire, surtout pour le fait qu'on ne peut pas faire des différenciations entre "agregat" et "collectif" (Ioan, Petru, 1996).

lequel peuvent être distingués aussi les divers aspects hétérogènes; le minimum d'homogénéité (d'une sorte ou d'autre, substantielle, énergétique, fonctionnelle, etc.) est nécessaire pour pouvoir avoir lieu des connexions entre les "parties" du tout; b) l'importance de la nature des liaisons entre les "parties", en qualité de critère fondamental pour la formation d'une typologie des notions collectives.

Nous proposerons, sur cette base, le tableau des notions collectives suivant:

Types de notions collectives	L'Agregat	Le Système	Le Tout	La Totalité
La liaison entre des parties				
en fonction de l'homogénéité	parties avec prépondérance homogènes	Parties avec prépondérance hétérogènes	Parties avec prépondérance hétérogènes	parties avec prépondérance hétérogènes
en fonction de la subordination	subordination positionnelle	subordination fonctionnelle	subordination relationnelle	subordination existentielle

Ces types de notions collectives forment une série dans le cadre de laquelle, de l'"agregat" à la "totalité", la liaison entre les "parties" devient de plus en plus forte. Dans le cadre de "l'agregat" nous avons des entités du même type, donc des "parties" homogènes (comme, par exemple, les nombres entiers d'une série mathématique, les appartements situés dans un immeuble etc.), mais la liaison entre les entités est extérieure, plus spatiale, ce qui fait que les respectives entités gardent leur l'individualité. Dans le cas des systèmes, la liaison entre les éléments (qui peuvent être différents) devient plus puissante, étant caractérisée par une subordination fonctionnelle (comme c'est le cas des différents mécanismes, machines etc.). Là aussi les éléments gardent encore leur individualité, pouvant être regardés aussi en qualité de composants séparés, mais subordonnés du point de vue fonctionnel au système. Avec l'entier nous nous trouvons en face d'une subordination plus forte encore des "parties", comme il se passe dans le cas des organismes, par exemple. Là les parties ne peuvent plus être regardées "séparément", mais seulement comme "parties" de l'entier, la subordination signifiant la conservation de cette relation "partie-tout". Enfin, les totalités expriment la subordination la plus forte des moments composants, cas dans lequel les composants peuvent fusionner, comme dans le cas de certains composés chimiques, des différents processus psychiques ou des créations socio-culturelles.

2. Types de conjonctions collectives

Comme nous avons déjà mentionné, parallèlement avec la distinction entre les notions distributives et celles collectives, pendant le dernier temps

a eu lieu une division de l'opérateur de la conjonction logique en conjonction distributive et conjonction collective. Et cette dernière distinction a un fondement ontologique. Et qui est de plus, entre tous les opérateurs logiques, il semble que seulement la conjonction permet une abordation non-problématique dans un "langage intrinsèque élémentaire" (Poli, Roberto, 1996, p. 22), c'est-à-dire dans un registre ontologique⁵. Les racines de la conjonction logique doivent être cherchées dans une ontologie des connexions, car, pour former les concepts, nous avons besoin d'opérateurs de type "collecteur" ou "unificateur" (voir aussi Perzanowski, Jerzy, 1996).

Il n'est pas difficile à observer que derrière un opérateur conjonctif de type "unificateur" se trouve l'unité de genre établie par Aristote, et derrière une conjonction "collectrice" nous trouvons l'unité de type intégratif. L'opérateur de la conjonction sous sa forme de "conjonction distributive" est fondé dans l'analyse aristotélicienne du rapport genre-espèce. La sphère de l'espèce est incluse dans celle du genre sur la base d'une propriété, d'une note qui se distribue à toutes les espèces composantes. La conjonction distributive, additionnant des espèces dans un genre commun, réussit à conserver l'identité de genre, en négligeant les différences. A l'aide de la conjonction distributive on peut former des classes d'objets comme simples "formations" à référence divisible, distributive.

Par exemple, si nous avons en vue la notion de "planète", respectivement "la classe des planètes", elle résulte de l'application de la conjonction distributive: p (planète) = df {Mercure & Vénus & Terre & Mars & Jupiter & Saturne & Uranus & Neptune & Pluton}. La conjonction distributive réunit dans ce cas neuf éléments (les planètes) et rien d'autre. Les éléments réunis ont la même caractéristique (d'être des planètes), la classe résultée étant unidimensionnelle (voir aussi Biriş, Ioan, 1999, p. 262).

Les choses deviennent très compliquées lorsque l'opérateur de la conjonction est utilisé non pas comme un "unificateur" unidimensionnel, mais comme un "collecteur" pluridimensionnel, respectivement comme une conjonction collective. La classe qui résulte dans ce cas n'est plus une simple totalisation, une simple constitution mais un ensemble indivisible, avec des propriétés non-distributives.

Si la conjonction distributive néglige les différences en faveur de l'identité, la conjonction collective a le rôle de souligner les différences et de les réunir dans des unités intégratives. Mais les différences peuvent être extrêmement diverses, apportant des complications pour l'opérateur de la conjonction collective. Aristote saisit que, par exemple, un colectionnement, une conjonction des contradictoires est impossible et logiquement et ontologiquement. En échange, la co-présence des contraires est largement

⁵ Dans une vision de manière accentuée platonicienne, seulement l'opérateur de la conjonction et le quanteur universel ("tous") ont de dignité ontologique (Da Costa, Newton, 2004, p. 102).

répandue. Il est vrai que dans les *Catégories* (Aristote, 1997, p. 109), lorsqu'il s'agit de "quantité, surtout des quantités déterminées, Aristote souligne clairement – "les quantités n'ont pas de contraires" –, car, par exemple, les couples "beaucoup-peu", "grand-petit", n'appartiennent pas à la quantité, mais au relatif.

En échange, dans sa *Métaphysique* (Aristote, 1996, p. 553), Le Livre XIV (N), chapitre 1, le Stagyrite accepte qu'à chaque sujet, à chaque "substrat" sont inhérents les contraires, à l'exception de la Substance (qui est antérieure par rapport aux attributs contraires). Et dans la *Physique* (Aristote, 1966, p. 122), lorsqu'on étudie le mouvement, on attire l'attention que le passage d'un état à l'autre se fait par "des intermédiaires", qui sont des contraires (par exemple, la couleur gris est un intermédiaire entre les couleurs blanc et noir, et "le gris est blanc par rapport au noir et noir par rapport au blanc").

Pour Aristote, entre toutes les différences possibles, la contrariété exprime la différence parfaite. Le cas de la contrariété est extrêmement intéressant pour l'opérateur de la conjonction grâce aussi au fait qu'il inclut tant des situations où il n'y a pas d'intermédiaires, que des situations où les intermédiaires sont présents. Par exemple, les propriétés "pair" et "impair", bien qu'elles soient des contraires, comme des espèces différentes, elles n'admettent pas de situations intermédiaires, pendant que les contraires "blanc" et "noir", en qualité d'espèces différentes extrêmes, admettent diverses situations intermédiaires.

Nous considérons qu'en ce moment nous disposons de suffisants éléments pour esquisser une typologie des conjonctions collectives. Si nous laissons de côté la conjonction des contradictoires (car elle conduit à des paradoxes) et nous retenons les soulignements d'Aristote liés à la situation des contraires, et aussi le fait que les différentes notions se forment à la base de certaines opérations différentes, alors nous pouvons synthétiser les aspects discutés jusqu'ici de la manière suivante:

Types de conjonctions collectives	La conjonction collective sommative	La conjonction collective assembliste	La conjonction collective intégrative	La conjonction collective synthétique
Caractéristiques				
La situation des contraires	sans intermédiaires	sans intermediaires	Avec intermédiaires	Avec intermédiaires
L'opération spécifique	agrégation	Assemblage	Intégration	Synthèse
Les notions collectives correspondantes	l'agregat	le système	le tout	la totalité

L'observation de ces espèces de conjonctions nous appartient. Nous avons la conviction qu'elle peut contribuer à une meilleure compréhension

du rapport classique identité-différence, du moins dans les directions suivantes:

1) au développement de la logique non seulement comme une théorie des équivalences, mais aussi comme théorie des différences (voir aussi Piaget, Jean, 1991, p. 148). Si la syllogistique aristotélicienne a favorisé par excellence le type de la conjonction distributive, mettant l'accent sur des identités, une fois avec l'apparition de la mereologie de Lesniewski, le champs des conjonctions collectives, qui peuvent mettre en évidence les différences, s'impose aussi à l'attention (Lesniewski, Stanislav, 1983). On relève ainsi le fait que l'opérateur de la conjonction logique a un potentiel sinergique (Lupasco, Stéphane, 1982, p. 112), ce qui permet un avancement tant dans la direction de l'identité, que dans celle de l'hétérogénéité;

2) à l'enrichissement de la théorie des notions, du contenu de celles-ci et du rapport contenu-sphère. Dans cette direction, le logicien roumain Ion Petrovici, en 1910, puis Edmond Goblot, en 1917, attirent l'attention que la loi du rapport inverse contenu-sphère n'est pas universelle. Cette observation conduit à des conséquences importantes concernant la théorie du contenu des notions.

Kant, pendant son temps, soulignait que "toute notion peut être appliquée de manière *générale* ou de manière *particulière* (*in abstracto* et *in concreto*)" (Kant, Immanuel, 1996, p. 155). L'application dans l'abstrait (c'est-à-dire faisant abstraction de certaines notes) conduit au genre suprême, et l'application dans le concret (ajoutant des notes au contenu de la notion) conduit à l'individu. Sous l'aspect de la connaissance, considère Kant, nous ne pouvons pas apprécier quelle application est plus avantageuse, mais toutes les deux sont utiles.

De telles idées constitueront un objet d'analyse détaillée pour E. Goblot. Celui-ci montre que si nous nous imaginons une classification hiérarchique de tous les êtres, alors, respectant la lois du rapport inverse contenu-sphère, cela signifierait que les dernières espèces (et même les individus) auront le contenu le plus riche, et le genre suprême, l'Etre, aura le contenu le plus pauvre (même vide) (Goblot, Emond, 1929, p. 114-115). Mais la loi mentionnée n'est valable que pour les notions de la même série. Dans les autres cas, le contenu des notions augmente et diminue en même temps que la sphère. Mais cela signifie que dans le contenu d'une notion nous tenons compte non seulement des notes déterminatives, mais aussi des notes variables.

Avec ces idées, E. Goblot a l'intuition qu'il est nécessaire de distinguer entre plusieurs types de contenu. Celui classique, aristotélicien, c'est le *contenu spécifique* de la notion, obtenu par genre suivant et différence spécifique. Appliquant la notion "dans l'abstrait" (comme disait Kant), on arrive à un autre type de contenu, le *contenu général* de la notion, qui comprend des notes en plus par rapport à celles spécifiques, c'est-à-dire les

notes du genre (qui se retrouvent dans plusieurs espèces, non seulement dans celle exprimée par le contenu spécifique). Quand la notion s'applique "dans le concret", nous avancerons vers un autre type de contenu, respectivement *le contenu total* de la notion, qui comprend toutes les notes d'un objet, non seulement celles spécifiques ou générales.

Le passage d'un type de contenu à un autre réclame la différenciation de l'opérateur de la conjonction, de la manière que nous espérons avoir relevée dans la présente étude.

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L'ANALYSE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE MIRCEA DJUVARA SUR
L'EVOLUTION DU DROIT

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Résumé

La science fondamentale du droit met en évidence le fait que toute recherche juridique, et implicitement tout système juridique, est élaborée conformément à une matrice conceptuelle, structurée autour d'un ensemble d'hypothèses fondamentales, provenant de diverses zones du milieu culturel à l'intérieur duquel prend naissance le mental collectif d'une certaine société. Compte tenant de ces hypothèses, on établit les solutions juridiques qui s'imposent et l'on élabore le système des normes juridiques positives. Les éléments de la matrice conceptuelle constituent un système unitaire, qui fonctionne dans le domaine du droit à l'instar de la manière dont fonctionnent divers paradigmes en physique.

L'évolution de ces matrices conceptuelles, dont le but principal est l'optimisation du système judiciaire sur la base duquel on réglemente les relations sociales, s'accomplit par un processus dialectique de la raison pratique. L'élément rationnel (conceptuel) détient le rôle prioritaire dans le couple dialectique raison - réalité, ce qui implique la postulation par Mircea Djuvara du caractère conceptuel du droit. Dans une telle vision, la rationalité du droit n'est pas une transcendante, mais immanente, ce qui implique, maintes fois, une évolution non cumulative du droit.

L'analyse philosophique de l'évolution de la science du droit met en évidence, d'une manière inévitable, une grande hétérogénéité en ce qui concerne les différents courants et orientations qui se sont proposé d'offrir une explication scientifique des phénomènes juridiques. La multitude de

concepts juridiques, suivie implicitement de la variété de systèmes positifs de droit, a produit le long du temps de nombreuses disputes, qui ont induit, maintes fois, une attitude sceptique généralisée en ce qui concerne la possibilité de réaliser un accord de principe sur les problèmes fondamentaux du droit. Plus que cela, en partant de cette situation, il y a beaucoup de théoriciens qui ont contesté le caractère scientifique du droit et implicitement la possibilité du progrès rationnel dans ce domaine.

Pour prévenir quelques malentendus plus grands encore, on impose, dès le début, la clarification de certains aspects.

Premièrement, selon l'affirmation de Mircea Djuvara, nous devons réaliser, en permanence, une délimitation stricte entre la science du droit d'une certaine époque et le droit positif de la même période. La première s'appuie sur une ou plusieurs théories juridiques dominantes et il y a la possibilité réelle d'établir, d'une manière rationnelle, le degré de constitution de chacune d'elles. On peut même identifier, comme résultat de l'analyse épistémologique, une série de critères de comparaison de ces théories juridiques, comme la vraisemblance, la simplicité, la cohérence, la remarque pragmatique. De l'autre côté, le droit positif se constitue différemment d'un Etat à l'autre, s'établissant ainsi une multitude de systèmes juridiques, bon nombre d'eux étant, le long du temps, complètement incompatibles les uns avec les autres (par exemple, le droit coutumier d'une société primitive avec le système positif d'un Etat civilisé contemporain).

Deuxièmement, il faut faire une nette distinction entre la science fondamentale du droit et les diverses disciplines de branche. La science fondamentale du droit se fait remarquer par le degré élevé de généralité des concepts utilisés et par cela des problèmes abordés, tandis que les disciplines de branche se font distinguer par une technicité excessive du langage utilisé et par une exactitude très accentuée des détails des situations juridiques analysées. L'analyse comparative est plus facile à réaliser au premier niveau, entre les différentes théories fondamentales, grâce à la généralité des problèmes abordés et au langage utilisé, où l'un peut trouver plus facilement des méthodes logiques de traduction du langage d'une théorie dans le langage de l'autre. Au second niveau, celui des disciplines de branche, la traductibilité et implicitement l'analyse sont plus difficiles à faire.

La science fondamentale du droit se présente, dans la plupart des cas, comme un ensemble de suppositions théoriques générales, se constituant, en fait, sur d'amples analyses conceptuelles sur la réalité juridique. D'ailleurs, dans l'édification de toute science, on part, comme on le sait, de certains énoncés théoriques fondamentaux, qui, dans leur interdépendance, réalisent la matrice conceptuelle de la science respective. La matrice conceptuelle de la science du droit est formée de la totalité des concepts de base, et aussi du système de présuppositions fondamentales, utilisées ultérieurement pour expliquer les phénomènes juridiques. Ces éléments

forment un système unitaire, qui fonctionne en droit à l'instar des divers paradigmes en physique. Les éléments respectifs forment, en même temps, le cadre de sélection, conformément auquel on met en évidence les phénomènes juridiques relevant. La plupart des explications juridiques utilisent les éléments de cette matrice et plus encore, comme il résulte de la conception de Mircea Djuvara, tous les faits juridiques sont ordonnés en fonction de la matrice respective.

Le type d'explication que l'on offre quand on analyse la nature des phénomènes juridiques dépend, en grande mesure, du spécifique de la matrice conceptuelle adoptée, des présuppositions fondamentales qui dominent la pensée juridique en cause. A ce que l'on sait déjà, la matrice conceptuelle est l'élément sur la base duquel on établit le degré de mise en évidence et de justesse de certains faits au détriment des autres. Si l'on pense à un certain exemple offert par Mircea Djuvara lui-même, le régicide était un fait juste dans la conception de certaines tribus primitives, alors que pour nos contemporains c'est un fait plus que condamnable. Dans les deux cas analysés on utilise, pour le jugement du même fait, des systèmes de référence différents, chacun étant construit autour de matrices conceptuelles distinctes. Les systèmes juridiques, présentés ci-dessus, confèrent au même événement des valeurs différentes, en fonction du spécifique des conceptions juridiques dominantes (celui des valeurs) existant dans chaque matrice conceptuelle.

La matrice conceptuelle, selon laquelle on évalue les faits juridiques, correspond, en grand, au concept de droit rationnel, qui est utilisé par Mircea Djuvara. Celui-là comprend des jugements rationnels, fondés sur une série de concepts juridiques fondamentaux s'organisant autour de l'idée de justice. Comme, par l'intermédiaire du droit rationnel on détermine la moyenne de compréhension d'une certaine communauté sociale sur le caractère juridique de divers faits, on peut dire qu'il suppose une certaine activité commune de conception de la vie juridique, similaire, en grand, à l'activité théorique existant dans la science.

La communauté de ceux qui interprètent et évaluent les faits juridiques ressemblent, en grand, à une certaine communauté scientifique, parce qu'elle utilise son propre paradigme explicatif, paradigme qui, tout comme c'est le cas des paradigmes des sciences naturelles, est élaboré autour d'une certaine matrice. Les membres d'une telle communauté utilisent la même terminologie et vont adopter les mêmes solutions communes, à propos des problèmes théoriques fondamentaux¹. Les matrices conceptuelles du droit se sont modifiées et ont évolué, le long du temps, comme toutes les matrices conceptuelles des diverses sciences, tout en connaissant des évolutions linéaires, relativement lentes, mais aussi de

¹ On peut dire que les théoriciens du droit, qui sont d'accord avec une certaine théorie juridique, partagent un ensemble commun de suppositions, pareil à celui d'une communauté de physiciens, qui, par l'acceptation d'une certaine théorie physique, vont adopter une série de suppositions communes concernant la structure ontologique des phénomènes physiques étudiés.

vraies transformations révolutionnaires, fondées sur les innovations conceptuelles profondes².

Le droit, autant dans sa qualité de science sociale normative, que dans celle d'élément concret de la réalité sociale, évolue en base de nos conceptions générales toujours plus raffinées, concernant l'essence de la justice et la structure de la connaissance juridique. Les conceptions ont été présentées, le long de l'histoire culturelle de l'humanité, soit dans une forme systématisée (le droit – comme science fondamentale, logiquement structurée), soit dans une forme non systématisée (le droit – comme une forme non écrite, coutumière, d'appréciation du juste). Les deux formes sont l'expression de la même intention rationnelle d'identification du modèle juridique légitime, sur lequel on peut réaliser la meilleure hiérarchisation des faits sociaux, conformément aux valeurs juridiques que la société partage. Ces deux formes de concevoir la réalité juridique coïncident, chacune de son côté, avec le droit rationnel, tel que Mircea Djuvara le définit: les théories juridiques fondamentales, amplement élaborées (en tant que formes de conception logiquement systématisée), aussi bien que les croyances juridiques tacites (en tant que formes de conception non systématisée et non écrite), sont édifiées sur des jugements libres (indépendants de toute contrainte positive), des jugements qui ont dans leur structure des appréciations rationnelles de droit.

Elaboré en conformité avec une matrice conceptuelle, le droit rationnel se transforme et évolue en même temps que celle-là, tout en entraînant, avec ses changements, des modifications du système de normes juridiques positives, système qui régleme effectivement la vie sociale. Les changements essentiels de la matrice conceptuelle vont produire des modifications significatives dans le système d'évaluation, ce qui produit, ultérieurement, une série de modifications du système de droit positif, qui lui est subjaçant³.

² Certaines modifications des matrices conceptuelles du droit, de même que les changements sur les types d'explications juridiques utilisées, peuvent être interprétés comme des changements révolutionnaires, dans le sens où Thomas Kuhn définissait les changements révolutionnaires de la science. Par exemple, la conception de l'école idéaliste du droit peut être considérée révolutionnaire en comparaison avec le jus naturalisme, concernant l'identification fondamentale de la vie juridique. L'école idéaliste modifie, totalement, l'image jus naturaliste sur le droit. Toutes les transformations qui se passent dans la science juridique n'ont pas eu un caractère révolutionnaire. Par exemple, la doctrine moderne du droit naturel, maintenue par certains théoriciens, tels Hugo Grotius ou Charles Montesquieu, marque l'apparition d'une évolution linéaire (non - révolutionnaire) de l'ancienne doctrine jus naturaliste qui était soutenue jadis, par certains penseurs tels Cicero, Augustin ou Thomas D'Aquino.

³ Par exemple, l'adoption par certaines communautés de l'Etat de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme, comme cadre conceptuel de débat, a produit d'amples ajustements dans les législations des communautés respectives. La modification de la matrice conceptuelle générale détermine des ajustements des systèmes positifs privés.

En conséquence, le droit, considéré comme ensemble de connaissances juridiques, évolue lui aussi comme toute autre discipline scientifique. Il évolue autant que système explicite de connaissances (par les successions des différentes théories juridiques), que système tacite (coutumier) de connaissances juridiques (mot qui correspond mieux au concept de droit rationnel utilisé par Mircea Djuvara).

Même s'ils diffèrent, sous le rapport de la forme où ils se présentent et se manifestent, les deux systèmes (le système systématique - discursif et le système tacite) sont, en fait, deux aspects distincts du même élément constitutif: la matrice conceptuelle utilisée⁴. C'est la raison pour laquelle, la science juridique, ainsi que le droit rationnel, vont évoluer dans le même sens que la matrice conceptuelle constitutive.

Dans la conception de Mircea Djuvara, le modèle évolutif de la science du droit est adopté en fonction du modèle de la connaissance juridique. La méthode qui coordonne toute la connaissance juridique (la méthode dialectique), détermine, considérablement, les développements successifs des concepts juridiques.

Le droit est l'expression des convictions sociales d'une certaine communauté et, en concordance avec ces convictions, toute la réalité juridique est expliquée (Djuvara 1997, p. 170). Mircea Djuvara ne néglige jamais l'apport considérable que doit avoir l'expérience, dans la connaissance juridique, mais lui, il ne partage pas les idées positivistes, conformément auxquelles il y aurait une expérience neutre qui puisse représenter le fondement de toute la connaissance. L'expérience, qui existe à la base de toute connaissance, est le résultat d'amples élaborations, effectuées en concordance avec nos convictions théoriques fondamentales. De l'avis d'un philosophe contemporain, bien qu'on se réfère aux sciences de la nature ou aux sciences sociales, la simple accumulation de données ne peut être considérée expérience, que si elle se déroule dans une relation herméneutique entre le fait et la théorie (Gadamer 1999, p. 57).

Le droit se constitue sur les réalités sociales concrètes, lesquelles ont un rôle déterminant dans sa structuration, mais il représente, toujours, une réalité normative construite, établie conformément aux exigences rationnelles du mental collectif. Même si l'expérience sociale – comme fondement de la connaissance juridique – semble être indépendante de notre subjectivité, elle est, finalement, le résultat d'une construction rationnelle, réalisée en conformité avec une certain point de vue. La réalité physique, en général, et la réalité juridique, en particulier, ne se présentent pas à notre esprit tel un reflet, mais elles sont, chacune de son côté, le résultat final d'une longue série de synthèses que le raisonnement suppose en permanence, même si dans la plupart des cas il les réalise inconsciemment. Selon l'affirmation de Mircea Djuvara:

⁴ La signification qu'on attribue au concept de matrice conceptuelle est, en grand, similaire à la signification que Thomas Kuhn confère au terme de matrice disciplinaire dans l'œuvre la „Structure des révolutions scientifiques”(Kuhn 1999, les pages 260-266 surtout).

« Il est, en conséquence, impossible de expliquer l'expérience par une simple analyse expérimentale. On ne pourrait réussir à la comprendre que si l'on reconnaissait l'activité dialectique de la raison qui crée toujours de nouvelles relations objectives, en les unissant par des synthèses systématiques. Cette explication de l'expérience ne nie absolument pas la réalité objective: bien au contraire, nous croyons, qu'elle est la seule qui rende facile à comprendre cette réalité » (Djuvara 1938, p. 118).

Le caractère constructif de la connaissance dialectique ne suppose pas, obligatoirement, le renoncement à l'exigence de l'objectivité de la connaissance, parce que, finalement, le raisonnement doit toujours accepter la pression constante des faits. La connaissance dialectique ne représente pas, dans la conception de Mircea Djuvara, la subjectivité pure, mais elle est seulement l'expression d'une médiation permanente que le raisonnement réalise entre nos systèmes conceptuels et la réalité. A la fin de cette longue série de médiations, certains énoncés objectifs nous attendent, mais, totalement opposés à l'esprit positiviste, ils ne peuvent pas être considérés en tant que *réalité donnée*, mais comme *une réalité construite*. Ce fait nous offre la possibilité de considérer que

« rien n'est donné dès le début ou définitivement et tout est création logique et systématique de relations entre les termes donnés, ceux-ci étant eux-mêmes réductibles aux relations » (Djuvara 1938, pp. 118 - 119).

La construction dialectique de la réalité juridique ne peut, donc, échouer en solipsisme, justement pour le fait qu'elle est l'expression de la co-participation de toutes les connaissances à ce processus.⁵ Chaque

⁵ Il est intéressant de suivre, dans toute l'oeuvre de Mircea Djuvara la tension existant entre la dimension objective et celle subjective de la connaissance. Le philosophe roumain essaie toujours d'établir un équilibre des plus transparents entre le caractère créateur de notre raisonnement d'un côté, et l'évidence empirique, de l'autre côté. D'ailleurs, le problème du rapport entre l'élément subjectif et celui objectif de la connaissance est le thème central de toute philosophie qui postule le caractère dialectique de la connaissance. Voilà ce que Hegel déclarait, dans ce sens, lorsqu'il se référerait au caractère dialectique de la connaissance: „La dialectique à un haut degré du concept est la détermination, non seulement comme barrière et contraire, mais elle doit par elle-même produire et faire comprendre le *contenu* positif et le résultat, par lequel elle seule est *développement* et progrès immanent. Cette dialectique n'est pas un procédé *extérieur* d'une pensée subjective, mais le *cœur* même du contenu qui germe organiquement ses branches et ses fruits. La pensée en tant que pensée subjective concerne seulement le développement de l'idée comme activité propre à son raisonnement, sans y ajouter quelque chose de sa part. Considérer quelque chose de raisonnable ne signifie pas conduire un raisonnement de l'extérieur à l'objet et l'interpréter par celui-là, mais que l'objet est raisonnable par lui-même, c'est ici qu'on trouve l'esprit dans toute sa liberté, le plus haut degré du raisonnement conscient de soi-même, qui offre sa réalité et se produit dans le monde réel; la science a seulement la préoccupation de ramener à la conscience cette activité propre au raisonnement du fait ” (Hegel 1998, pp. 94-95).

individu possède les mêmes structures cognitives dont dispose un autre, et de ce fait l'intersubjectivité est possible. La vérité juridique est, de cette manière, deux fois conditionnée, car il y a, d'une part, la médiation entre la conscience et les faits et, de l'autre part, la médiation intersubjective entre les différentes consciences. Quant à Mircea Djuvara, il soutient:

« Cette conception (la conception dialectique sur la connaissance – n.n.) ne peut pas du tout conduire à un solipsisme illogique et absurde, comme on pourrait le croire. Il est impossible de soutenir sérieusement l'idéalisme sous la forme de l'existence unique et exclusive de mon propre ego, dont le monde ne serait qu'une représentation dans le sens d'une image subjective. Ma conscience est, bien au contraire, elle-même un produit de relations qui déclenchent, nécessairement et obligatoirement, par leur dialectique créatrice, une pluralité de consciences » (Djuvara 1938, p. 122).

Les énoncés que nous formulons sur la réalité sont l'expression de nos plus profondes convictions, parce qu'ils sont *construits* en conformité avec celles-ci. Il est évident que la réalité empirique a un rôle décisif pour déterminer la signification de ces énoncés, mais cette signification dépend, finalement, du système général de nos connaissances. Grâce au caractère constructif du raisonnement, Mircea Djuvara considère que l'unité des énoncés scientifiques et leur cohérence doivent être considérées des éléments essentiels de la définition de la vérité:

« Aussi la vérité est-elle essentiellement cohérence: le sens commun détermine d'ailleurs, l'application continue de cette loi. C'est pourquoi la vérité ne pourrait jamais être définitive et elle n'est jamais donnée absolument; elle est, bien au contraire, dans une formation et un perfectionnement sans cesse. La vérité est, dans ce sens, relative, rapportée à un système de référence, ce que la physique contemporaine a dû finir par reconnaître » (Djuvara 1938, p. 122).

Dans un tel contexte, on ne peut plus comprendre le droit dans son acception positiviste, conformément à laquelle les normes juridiques proviennent, exclusivement, de l'expérience. Le droit est, premièrement, une réalité pensée, un système conceptuel, un résultat des élaborations successives du raisonnement pratique, élaborations qui doivent être en conformité avec les valeurs fondamentales dominant la culture d'une certaine communauté, car il s'agit là, premièrement, de la valeur de la *justice*, de la valeur de la *vérité*, de celle du *bien* et même de celle du *beau*.

Le droit ne peut pas être neutre vis-à-vis de ces valeurs, comme il ne peut pas non plus être indifférent à l'égard des convictions profondes d'un certain peuple. Ayant comme principale obligation l'obtention d'un ordre social juste, le droit de toute communauté doit être cohérent avec toutes les vérités partagées par le mental collectif respectif, parce que c'est justement une telle co-participation à la réalisation des valeurs fondamentales partagées qui lui en assure la légitimité. Le caractère conceptuel du droit est,

dans ce contexte, une conséquence du caractère unitaire de la culture d'un certain peuple. D'ailleurs, à l'intérieur d'une telle unité, les valeurs du droit ont un important rôle régulateur, ces valeurs garantissant l'existence, le fonctionnement et la conservation des autres valeurs. Selon Dimitrie Gusti:

« Les catégories existentielles ne peuvent pas se maintenir sans le concours d'autres catégories sociales, qui ordonnent le déroulement, celles politiques et juridiques, qui les organisent et les réglementent » (Gusti 1965, p. 116).

Manifestant une certaine subordination à l'égard des valeurs fondamentales de la société, le droit évolue simultanément avec celles-ci. Voilà pourquoi il n'y a rien de faux, sauf le signe d'une contingence foncière, dans l'affirmation que certains faits, considérés justes dans le passé, sont devenus, avec le temps, injustes. La validité des normes juridiques, qui réglementent la vie sociale, est, dans ce sens, contextuelle, le droit ayant une validité relative à un certain cadre référentiel.

On obtient toutes les vérités, à l'intérieur d'un cercle herméneutique, dans lequel certaines règles générales de la pensée sont adaptées à une situation sociale concrète, en obtenant, par l'intermédiaire d'une telle contextualité, une série de règles juridiques positives, dont l'efficacité est expérimentée, ensuite, dans la vie sociale concrète. Cette particularité du droit est caractéristique, en fait, de toute la philosophie pratique, qui, à la différence des sciences naturelles, semble plutôt être intéressée à recruter un grand nombre d'adeptes, qu'à l'obtention de la objectivité scientifique. En ce sens, la citation suivante de Gadamer est très édifiante:

« Je remplacerais, pour ce domaine de nos connaissances (celui des sciences de l'esprit – n.n.), l'idéal de la connaissance objective, idéal élevé par l'éthos scientifique, par l'idéal de la participation. La participation aux conquêtes essentielles de l'expérience de l'humanité, qui ont trouvé leur expression dans l'art et l'histoire, voilà le critère proprement dit, qui nous montre si les thèses des sciences sociales ont ou non un contenu» (Gadamer1999, p. 59).

Même si le droit, en se perfectionnant en même temps avec les accumulations successives du raisonnement a, en principe, une nature conceptuelle, il ne peut pas être considéré, exclusivement, l'expression de la subjectivité, parce que son caractère intersubjectif lui confère de l'objectivité. Du moment qu'il s'objective dans certaines institutions et systèmes d'action, le droit devient phénomène de culture et, de la sorte, objet d'un accord possible (Gadamer1999, p. 58).

Comme sous-système du système de la réalité sociale et, en même temps, comme sous-système du système culturel, le droit appartient, autant, aux sciences naturelles qu'aux sciences de l'esprit, justement grâce au fait

que «le social est, a la fois, un contenu pour les sciences naturelles et un contenu pour les sciences de l'esprit.»(Riedel 1998, p. 43). Une telle constatation complique d'une certaine manière, la problématique de l'identification de la méthode la plus appropriée pour la recherche juridique. Car, si la science juridique est, au moins jusqu'à un certain point, pareille aux sciences naturelles, on pourra considérer que la méthode de la recherche herméneutique n'est plus suffisante ou bien, encore plus, qu'elle n'est plus adéquate à la recherche juridique. En se référant à ce genre d'objection, Mircea Flonta la considère non fondée et il partage l'opinion qu'elle est causée par ces présuppositions philosophiques qui soutiennent l'idée qu'entre les sciences naturelles et les sciences sociales il y a une différence de nature et non seulement des différences graduelles. En s'opposant à de telles présuppositions, Mircea Flonta soutient non seulement que la démarche herméneutique des sciences sociales est totalement justifiée, mais aussi le fait que cette démarche est légitime dans le domaine des sciences naturelles aussi:

«En principe, l'objet des sciences naturelles, tout comme l'objet Geisteswissenschaften, se constitue par rapport à un horizon de connaissance, à un cercle d'intérêts et de problèmes conditionnés par le social et l'historique; non seulement le contact du chercheur de Geisteswissenschaften, mais aussi le contact du chercheur de la nature et du chercheur des sciences sociales analytiques avec l'objectif de la recherche, qui se propose de formuler des lois, est favorisé par l'histoire» (Flonta 1981, p. 30).

Même s'il est le résultat des médiations constantes entre le raisonnement et la réalité, le droit prend plutôt un aspect théorique qu'empirique. Cette science est, vraiment, une science normative – elle implique, de ce fait, un dialogue permanent avec l'expérience, surtout avec celle sociale – mais, jusqu'à la fin, ce qui lui confère de la légitimité et de l'effectivité, n'est pas forcément son caractère empirique, mais son caractère rationnel. Ce n'est que parce qu'elle implique, par sa structure tout entière, des liaisons permanentes avec les valeurs rationnelles unanimement acceptées (comme celle de la justice, du bien, de l'équité, etc.), qu'elle peut devenir opérationnelle dans différents contextes. L'adaptation continuelle aux valeurs fondamentales de la vie pratique – et plus que cela – transforme le droit dans un élément dont la légitimité sera reconnue de tous les agents rationnels. Or, dans cette nouvelle acception, le droit n'est plus un *donné*, mais il a la signification d'un construit, ayant, dans sa structure, tout un potentiel théorique des élaborations idéalisatrices – et toutefois idéales – du mental collectif. Voilà, d'ailleurs, la vraie signification de l'affirmation de Mircea Djuvara, conformément à laquelle le droit est le résultat des élaborations rationnelles.

Comme résultat des élaborations rationnelles – dans le sens d'élaborations théoriques – tous les concepts juridiques auront comme message certains intérêts de recherche, tout en exprimant, à la fois, le

spécifique d'une certaine mentalité, d'une certaine communauté qui déroule et rend légitime, simultanément, la recherche juridique. Le droit, comme toute autre science, d'ailleurs, ne peut pas être neutre par rapport à certaines valeurs, par rapport à certains intérêts et buts, ou par rapport à certaines présuppositions adoptées. Dans une telle interprétation, il est évident qu'on ne peut pas négliger le rôle de l'expérience pour la connaissance juridique, mais ce qui est le plus important, au niveau général du discours, c'est la théorie. C'est justement la vraie signification de la conception de Mircea Djuvara, conformément à laquelle jusqu'aux plus élémentaires activités d'observation même il y a une multitude d'aspects théoriques, une série complexe de *points de vue* du raisonnement (Djuvara 1938).

L'élément essentiel dans l'opération de constitution du droit est représenté donc par le caractère constructif de l'activité théorique, basée sur l'interprétation phénoménologique de la réalité sociale, interprétation qui, sans jamais perdre de vue l'adéquation continue à l'objet, suppose le rapport dialectique entre sujet et objet. Le caractère rationnel de l'activité théorique, impliquée dans la science juridique, n'est pas dû, comme les positivistes le croient, à sa subordination à des règles supérieures de raisonnement, mais à sa subordination à l'ethos et au praxis social, entendu, ici, comme expression de la co-participation des agents sociaux à l'activité d'identification des conditions assurant un ordre social juste. Une telle théorisation, comme celle supposée par la science juridique, exige la conscience permanente des pressions des faits, mais comme les faits juridiques nous représentent, en qualité d'agents sociaux, nous devons les interpréter en fonction de nos buts et intérêts. Une telle démarche n'est plus strictement une démarche théorique – le théorique ayant ici la signification qu'on lui attribue dans les sciences naturelles – mais, plutôt, herméneutique. Sur la spécificité des disciplines herméneutiques, où l'un peut trouver aussi la jurisprudence, Manfred Riedel affirme:

« Certes, la philologie et l'histoire ou la jurisprudence et la théologie sont elles aussi, d'une certaine manière, des sciences théoriques, qui ont affaire à ce qui est, ou ce qui a été; et dans ce cadre, autant avec l'individuel qu'avec quelque chose de général. Mais les deux prennent dans leur intérieur une autre forme. Car *singularia* vers laquelle elles se dirigent ne sont ni de purs faits de la nature, ni des cas de lois de la nature, mais quelque chose que l'homme lui-même produit: mots et actions, textes et oeuvres. Ce sont – pour circonscrire le plus précisément possible cet état de fait élémentaire – des produits qui expriment toujours leur auteur aussi, ses actions et ses souffrances, ses besoins et ses désirs, ses buts et ses intentions, ses attentes et ses craintes » (Riedel 1989, p. 32).

L'évocation de quelques éléments communs de la conception de certains philosophes, appartenant à l'orientation herméneutique, n'est pas du

tout accidentelle, parce qu'il y a bien des similitudes entre les points de vue de ceux-ci et la conception philosophique de Mircea Djuvara. Ce rapprochement est assez naturel si l'on tient compte de leur préférence commune pour la philosophie hégélienne et, implicitement, pour la justification de l'usage de la méthode dialectique dans le processus de la connaissance. Mais ce qui nous intéresse, dans ce contexte, c'est la conception de Djuvara sur la manière concrète dont évolue le droit.

Etant le résultat des élaborations conceptuelles – qui, obligatoirement, tiennent compte aussi de l'évidence des faits sociaux – le droit peut être considéré une réalité reflétée, résultat d'une théorie spécifique, fondée sur certaines présuppositions, données a priori. Appliquées à la réalité sociale, ces présuppositions sont soumises à l'immanence, devenant principes juridiques concrets. Cette opération a comme résultat des présuppositions juridiques fondamentales circonstanciées, processus complexe qui suppose le rapport dialectique du raisonnement avec le monde social. Mais, en vertu de cette médiation, le raisonnement juridique ne construit pas que l'objet de la réalité juridique, il se construit lui-même. Le raisonnement est circonstancié simultanément avec ses objectivations, d'où la multitude de conceptions juridiques, de même que celles de systèmes positifs de droit.

Mircea Djuvara soutient dans sa conception que toute conception juridique est l'expression d'une matrice conceptuelle, adoptée selon les besoins et les intentions des agents sociaux qui y souscrivent. Dans un tel contexte, la pression des faits peut jouer un rôle significatif dans la structuration des diverses explications juridiques, mais, ce qui compte le plus, finalement, c'est le système de présuppositions générales partagées par les membres de toute la collectivité. Le mental collectif s'organise, toujours, autour de certains éléments catégoriaux, sur la base desquels on synthétise, ensuite, toute l'expérience sociale. Ainsi, la connaissance scientifique, en général, aussi bien que la connaissance juridique, en particulier, se distinguent par un important caractère paradigmatique, ayant, chacune de son côté, une certaine légitimité contextuelle, toutes les deux étant subordonnées à un certain système de référence. Avec une validité paroissiale, les paradigmes juridiques ne peuvent pas évoluer sur le modèle positiviste - logiciste du progrès cumulatif. Du moment que les normes de rationalité des paradigmes juridiques ne sont pas trans- historiques, il nous est impossible d'identifier un principe universel pour comparer ces paradigmes, la validité de chacun d'eux étant jugée en fonction de son contexte général. Cela n'exclut pas, obligatoirement, l'idée de la rationalité du droit, mais seulement celle de son progrès linéaire, de son évolution cumulative⁶.

⁶ Quand on affirme que de la conception de Mircea Djuvara résulte le caractère non cumulatif de l'évolution du droit, on n'utilise pas le sens appréciatif de ce terme. Le fait que les paradigmes juridiques n'évoluent pas d'une manière linéaire, dans une direction cumulative, ne signifie pas, nécessairement, que le droit ne progresse pas, qu'il ne se perfectionne pas, mais justement qu'il n'y a pas de continuité logique entre les divers paradigmes juridiques.

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ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DE VEST DIN TIMIȘOARA
SERIE NOUĂ: FILOSOFIE ȘI ȘTIINȚE ALE COMUNICĂRII
ANNALS OF THE WEST UNIVERSITY OF TIMISOARA
NEW SERIES: PHILOSOPHY AND COMMUNICATION SCIENCES
VOL. XVIII, 2006
ISSN 1224-9688

SECTION II:
COMMUNICATION SCIENCES

TRANSPARENCY AS A STRATEGY FOR PRIVATE
ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract

I discuss a few widely accepted meanings of transparency and compare them to the results of my own study cases to show that traditional understanding of the term as reactive strategy has important limits in PR. My conclusion is that transparency as reactive strategy is a more coherent and operational concept in terms of relations between organizations and publics.

In recent years transparency has become a very familiar topic for communication scientists along with related subjects like openness or disclosure. We are accustomed to be assured about transparency of budgets, taking decisions, government information, and so on. We are also more and more accustomed with local institutions that encourage people to get involved in administration, we are familiar with claiming rights and access to many information concerning short and long-term policies, and, in recent years, we are familiar with newspapers or websites which provide us with these information without any effort of *claiming* it. On the contrary, our own ideas and opinions become part of the administrative system¹. Thus, we

¹ Tsuru Kotaro, "Transparency and government. Part one", in *Economics Review*, 2003, 7.7.

might at once admit as an axiom of democracy that transparency is paramount in every public affair.

Transparency of private companies is also an increasingly discussed subject. When confronted with publics, any company will consider the obvious advantages of letting people have information about how the company works, about its partners, environment policies, products, and so on.

The PR campaigns are the most effective way to build transparency for companies and usually it is admitted that it consists in asserting true sentences, by different means of communication, about what a company does, when it does good.

My paper endeavors to discuss the other side of the problem, namely, whether it is desirable or not for a company that its publics know about negative facts of a company. "Should people know when you are in trouble?" is a bold question to address to any manager and some consistent amount of analysis is needed to pick an answer.

Understanding transparency

In the first part I would like to discuss about what we generally understand by transparency. When trying to locate a meaning for transparency we find ourselves instantly in the situation of investigating among several dozens of definitions.

We use *transparency* to mean openness and communication, as a metaphorical extension of the meaning in the natural sciences where a transparent object is one that can be seen through. Therefore we think that transparency must be the quality of an object (assume that object could be a public institution or a piece of glass) to let *light* pass through it; that is, something is transparent if one is able to see beyond that object. A second and more interesting meaning is that we are able to see *inside*.

These two meanings are basic, I think, and all the rest are extensions from them. As a result, we may understand transparency in many confusing ways, and I find it useful picking up a few meanings from the *Wikipedia Online*, as an expression of how the large community came to understand the word:

- the quality of allowing any kind of radiation pass through, which is a physical extended meaning;
- the property of a computer to be user-friendly, that is, preventing the user from being concerned about technical details like installation, updating, downloading drivers and so on. For instance, a program that automatically detects the monitor resolution is more transparent compared to one that requests the user to enter it manually;
- in data compression: transparency is the ideal result of lossy data compression. If a lossily compressed result is perceptually indistinguishable from the uncompressed input, then the result can be declared to be

transparent. In other words, transparency is the situation where compression artifacts are nonexistent or imperceptible;

- in linguistics: the effort to suit one's rhetoric to the widest possible audience, without losing relevant information in the process;
- access to exchange of information;
- the clarity with which a regulation, policy or institution can be understood and anticipated, even opened to public scrutiny;
- the quality of a media text by which it appears to be natural rather than constructed.

To sum up, transparency is when an object is either accessible, easy to grasp with to a user, or lets another object like radiation to pass through it. We speak also about subjective transparency, which is a state when a subject is aware he is in that state.

I would like to discuss this further because a more comprehensive approach is needed to understand the nature of transparency. We have seen that transparency is a quality of an object or entity, or of the epistemic subject. The next question I will ask is a philosophical one. It is about intentions, purpose and hierarchy. What is the object we are interested in within a transparency context? In other words: are we happy to know there is a transparent object or are we interested in the other object that can be seen through the transparent one? Yet another rephrasing: what is the good here, the transparency itself or the information beyond?

I find this question very significant since many people believe that PR is about creating an interface discourse able to *cover* and *ornate*, not really expose, the facts in a company. If we are interested in the information beyond, then transparency is the quality of the discourse, but if we are interested in the transparency itself, then it becomes an object and the company facts and information are mere qualities of this object. Consequently we may have to choose from transparency as an object and transparency as a quality.

In the first case it is right to say that transparency as an object is separable from the organization and should be fully operational as such in a company. The company *is* interested in transparency as an object or entity to deal with, improve, and show out. For companies transparency may even be as objective and financially valuable as a brand.

On the other side we have transparency as a quality of an object, assume this object is organization itself. Publics and customers are interested in this sort of transparency as they seek for the *thing beyond*, that is, the information about company and products. In this sense, one of the definitions above is more representative than the others: transparency as *user-friendly* entity. Public is not especially interested in the technicalities of what transparency is or how does a company succeed in being transparent. Public is interested in the *availability* of information and the quality of a company to be *user-friendly*.

We can therefore assume that the above question has a twofold answer, depending on who is asking.

Transparency for private companies, governments and their publics.

In a very enlightening and comprehensive article published in the *Economics Review*, Tsuru Kotaro assumes as a definition for transparency a very interesting comparison or more precisely a model that says transparency is when "information asymmetry" is being mitigated. That is, improvement of transparency means tendency towards even distribution of information². It is important to see how this model works because we shall use it in our further discussion (with some alterations). The problem is divided in two parts: private sector and governmental sector, but transparency in governmental sector is finally discussed in analogy to the first.

In the private sector the information exchange between company and publics depends upon the nature of public. We have two types of public here, namely, *shareholders* and *customers*. One general principle assumed is that transparency or information symmetry is less effective when the company endeavors by itself to work the situation. Usually *financial analysts* and *rating agents* should be involved.

Shareholders have two mechanisms of responding to information asymmetry: *voice mechanism*, that is, governance imposed upon company and information gathering which is a high costs operation, or, on the contrary, *exit mechanism*, that is, selling shares away.

Customers, at their turn, are in the position to respond by the *voice mechanism* on the market and by requesting governmental policies. That is, market competition is the optimal tool for voice responding to information asymmetry. The *exit mechanism* means refusing products. Thus, for the customers the product itself is more important than product information. Quality and price of product acts as the basic exchange of information and builds the favorable reputation of the company. Product information (like: ingredients, methods, etc) is considered less important but nevertheless it counts in improving transparency to customers.

According to this model, product itself improves reputation and product information improves transparency. If we accept that company information is important only for shareholders and government, and not to customers, then we could conclude that transparency is less important than reputation for the customers. When customers access company information they act like shareholders or partners.

In this point we disagree with the presuppositions of Tsuru Kotaro and assume that customers *should* be treated like partners interested in both product and company information.

² Tsuru Kotaro refers to Geraats, P. "Central bank transparency", *Economic Journal* 112, 2002, pp 532 – 565.

When speaking about *government publics*, Tsuru Kotaro uses the same model and even analyzes this kind of publics in the same terms. Government public as *shareholders* is a minority of persons sharing one vote each, having divergent interests and therefore no “voice” option; the government should advertise efforts to create it. A specific instance of Government publics as shareholders is the *interest group*; it acts like a major shareholder and has the tendency to block information symmetry. In exchange, Government should avoid information closure and advertise both intentions and efforts.

Government public as *customers* are individuals as taxpayers; they cannot change offers, therefore have no “exit” option. Transparency means the similar act of Government to advertise efforts.

There is still a fourth kind of government public, the “consumers”, which is different than customers because a consumer gives a more solid credit and tends to believe in the so-called *infallibility myth*. A consumer public is very desirable for private companies on the short term but not for democratic governments because unlimited credit generates high risk of mass abandon when unsuccessful actions occur. For this, governments should constantly make efforts not to hide information concerning failures. That is, a government is advised to create *confidence* to its public, instead of *trust*. We can sum up the whole discussion in a figure like the following:

PUBLIC		COMPANY	
“Shareholders”	Minority	Government (voters)	Private
	Majority		Private
“Customers”	Customers		Private
	Taxpayers	Government	
	Consumers	Government (devoted public)	Private (faithful customers)
	Interest groups	Government	

We notice that transparency is understood as aimed to create or increase the favorable reputation of a company or public institution. There is one question that remains only partly answered, namely the question concerning crisis situations. How do we handle a crisis with transparency? We are told that governments should advertise *efforts* in order to create a *voice option* where there isn’t one, like in the case of voters and tax payers, or improve information symmetry in order to avoid interest groups influence.

For the private sector we are told that company information counts only for shareholders and government, not to common customers, because for customers only the product itself is important, expressed in quality and prices. I find it rather a cynical than comprehensive approach since products’ quality and prices are not, as a matter of fact, the main goal of transparency.

It is of course important to have these two things fully available for the public but it is the market itself which requires such information to be available.

Crisis and transparency

It is as well a matter of fact that financial analysis, ratings, product ingredients and so on become nowadays more and more public information. It is also true that customers *like* to act and be treated like potential partners and shareholders since they access company information.

Obviously, the *faithful customers* or *devoted public* is the ideal target for companies and their marketing campaigns involve serious advertising investments to achieve such public. For governments, the devoted public is paradoxically the most uncomfortable on the long term since an eventual unsuccessful action generates mass abandon. The advice that governments should advertise information concerning failures is, in our opinion, an advice related to crisis management. That is, crisis management involves teaching public that crisis occur at some point.

Regarding private companies it is usually asserted that crisis management means to deal with issues before they get out of hand. We have, actually, a set of crisis-related concepts³:

Situation, or a set of circumstances facing an organization, either as opportunity or as an obstacle. When it is a concerning obstacle it can be understood as an issue.

Issue, or situations that present matters of concern (trend, event, development or matter in dispute that may affect an organization).

Crisis, understood as issues got out of hand.

A crisis in the private sector is therefore when issues get out of hand and the most tempting example for lecturers is the widely used story about how Johnson&Johnson managed to maintain its customers' trust after it was discovered in 1982 that the medical product called Tylenol contained poisonous cyanide. This is a classical product story, fully accorded with the theory we have just discussed.

Now, what I want to do in my remaining paragraphs is to create a crisis in these theories. I suggest in the first pace that such classical product-related crises are able *to awake* public vigilance concerning *company-related information*. At least we may ask whether product-related crisis management is a ready-made recipe able to work any time after its precedent cases.

I assume *any* crisis and in time *every* occurrence is able to modify public attitude towards companies and therefore require changes within company strategies. In the classic Tylenol example, customers were finally convinced that a *product* is after all trustworthy because they noticed important dynamics *on the market*: warnings, 31 million bottles pulled from shelves, new triple-seal tamper-resistant package, free replacement, and discount coupons. How many times will it work again with other products?

³ See Ronald D. Smith, *Strategic Planning for Public Relations*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005, pp. 17-24.

There is a different concept concerning public which is being used by specialists, *information-seeking publics*. I suggest this concept (or some modified form of it) is able to cover a wider category of publics than just people who like to be informed and therefore would read tips and manuals and specialized magazines. It is the very category of customers I am trying to refer to, namely, customers who actually *seek for* information related to company, ingredients, financial analyses and ratings, not for the sake of being informed but for the purpose of buying one product or another. They are neither shareholders nor professional customers; advertising is not fully convincing for them because they know it is styled and metaphoric.

Companies are fully aware of this increasingly wider category of public and try to cover its needs by adding more information to products presentation. This is the category which corresponds to the taxpayers in the figure above and thinks like them, with one difference: when speaking about private sector, these "taxpayers" *do have* an exit option. They are not subjects to one life offer like in the case of government social insurance system and therefore do not judge in terms of requesting more information about that unique offer. Rather, they are in the position of permanently judging between "exits" or offers. They see companies' offers not as "entrances" but as "exits". They permanently decide which one offer is better than the one they already tried and are ready to change immediately. For a marketing specialist this would seem absurd; there are strategies to stabilize consumers, he would say.

Since marketing is global as any part of our culture, it tends to turn into a "confusopolis", to use a term from the propaganda techniques. (Confusopolis is the communication environment where many similar messages seem to have the same meaning so that the public does not have a real choice and act according to more or less hazardous decision because all the offers seem identical, like in the case of insurance or banking services). *Confusopolis* is the brand for our globalized relation between companies and clients. Choosing a piece of bread, soap, a rewritable CD or a window glass has become more or less similar to choosing a bank or an insurance company: for about the same money, any brand will do the trick. Brands have similar power; they change according to economical environment.

It is a very popular complain that certain brands known for their internationally acknowledged quality sell lower quality products in the Central and Eastern Europe countries for a lower price. We do not need to quote academic statistics for hearing people saying that "Coca-cola tastes better in Germany than in Romania", or "Tuborg beer in Romania is worse than the same in Denmark".

I do not want to make an issue out of this; I only want to point to another everyday reason for people becoming *information-seeking customers*. They want to know ingredients, company policies; they read stories about work force used in certain regions and so on. Some major

companies that invest in Romania advertise on this and try to attract workforce and customers on such a basis.

What people say

To illustrate my point, I will use two sets of simple questionnaires we addressed to customers, on the first hand, and to some companies, on the other. The questionnaires were addressed to customers and managers in Timisoara. We addressed three simple questions to customers:

Is it important to you that a certain product once made in Romania has some difference (e.g. ingredients, price, presentation, work force) than when it is made in western countries? - 8 out of 11 said yes.

Is it important to know information about company or from inside the company you buy products from? What kind of information? - 5 of 11 said yes. The kind of information listed was: the location (4 subjects); country of origin (5 subjects); average age of employees (3 subjects); environment policy (2 subjects);

Would you be interested in visiting the company you buy products from? - 9 out of 11 said yes.

This was a very simple questionnaire without much sociological calculations but nonetheless representative. It says that customers *are interested* in “shareholders-like” transparency. I believe this is an increasing trend which companies and PR specialists should pay more and more attention to.

We did ask whether negative information is of interest to them and all the answers were yes. The problems we were concerned afterwards were two. First, whether companies should hide negative information or not, and second, whether PR specialists should advertise negative information (perhaps in the form of efforts to solve or having solved the issues) *within* their *proactive* communication strategies.

A PR case

The nationwide known case in Romania is called “Gabrielresources” and “Newmont”, two companies trying to massively invest in the gold mining area called “Rosia Montana”. Their first public messages several years ago were mainly reactive communication caused by NGO attacks. It was said that:

- the development of the mining in the area would destroy environment (environmental argument).
- the company has a major Romanian shareholder who is by definition not trustworthy (moral argument).
- developed mining would destroy an important archeological site in the area (cultural argument).

The messages of the investors were reactive in the first moment and all they tried to do was to reject accusations. At some points they even tried to deny they have problems there.

The subject faded from public attention for one year or so but recently they began a new advertisement campaign, using press and internet (see <http://www.truestory.ro/index.php>), building positive messages and asserting as well negative messages. Positive messages are meant to contradict the accusations and negative messages are taken from accusers themselves. We can read what the accuser NGOs are saying in harsh words from the defendants' site.

Another important change in the communication strategy was that investors have begun using explicit informational terms. They ask people whether they feel well informed, they call their investment "Project" and teach the lesson of "Responsible mining".

The case of Rosia Montana is one of the most interesting PR and communication cases in Romania nowadays and my purpose of mentioning it here is that I recognize a very clever new strategy of *telling plainly that we are in trouble*. Not reactive strategy but simply bold and intelligent proactive negative messages. After reading the website one is probably supposed to pity the poor investor and think: "unfortunate people, they are in trouble!"

What managers say

In the meanwhile, most company managers think positive messages are the best. The second questionnaire I want to mention here consists of following questions⁴:

How do you evaluate the situation when a concurrent company asks you for advice? - 2 of 12 said *yes*, 1 said *no*, 9 said *it depends*. This is a positive message transparency question. We notice that managers evaluated the question in terms of concurrence because "it depends" was argued in terms of "not telling them how we succeeded" or "they should pay for advice". Only two gave positive answers, situation that means a low understanding of company transparency. "Giving advice" could be interpreted as "sharing experience" but only two of twelve did this.

Would you let your public find out about relation problems between your employees? - 3 said *yes*, 8 said *no*, 1 said *it depends*. Again, public access to internal information has been understood as high risk situation.

Would you agree with public access in some spaces within your company? - 6 said *yes*, 2 said *no*, 4 said *it depends*. More positive answers but we must point to the fact that it was the commercial companies. We should read these 6 positive answers in terms of "they come anyway to see our showroom".

Is your company ready for an "Open day" event? - 10 said *yes*, 1 said *it depends*, 1 said *not the case* (production company). This enlightening question allowed ten managers out of twelve to admit that "Open day" is fashionable and worth doing. The most interesting answer is the "not the

⁴ The questionnaire was operated by two of my students to whom I am grateful: Cristina Cuvineanu and Otilia Miholca.

case” one. It was a production company that thought public was not interested to come inside!

Is it acceptable for you that press or the public know about your conflicts with authorities? - 2 said yes, 8 said no, 2 said it depends.

“They should not know we were in trouble!” – is the way I read these answers. One of the two positive answers was actually this: “Yes, when authorities went wrong!”

I believe such answers prove that only few managers think transparency brings profit. Or, they understand transparency not as “something one can see through” but as “something they *should* see through”.

Conclusions

Transparent Communication is a relatively new concept – as Ronald D. Smith puts it – mostly understood as developing a proactive public relations strategy consisting in helping public understand the organization in order to be able to support its actions. It builds and supports *knowledge* and understanding, that is, having a public not simply aware of facts but mostly aware of reasons.

“Too often, organizations exhibit a ‘just trust us’ mentality by announcing plans without providing reasons why those plans are necessary, and today’s publics aren’t inclined to trust blindly”⁵.

Starting from a few common definitions of transparency, using Tsuru Kotaro’s classification of transparencies according to different kinds of companies and publics, we have tried to show that the concept of transparency is basically understood as a proactive strategy consisting in positive messages according to the marketing assumption that public equals consumers. This assumption is obsolete in PR and I have noticed a new trend in the case of Rosia Montana mining investment.

My thesis is that public of private companies does not act only as “consumers” receptive to product information and positive narrations but, recently, there is a trend of company oriented, educated public who is more receptive to internal information and able not to equal negative messages with danger. In other words, crisis educates public and there is a consistent public who evaluates negative information as transparency.

⁵ Ronald D. Smith, *Strategic Planning for Public Relations*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005, pp. 99-100.

TEMESWAR – „KLEIN WIEN“. EINE JOURNALISTISCHE
IMAGOLOGIE

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Rezumat

Sintagma Mica Vienă a devenit vibrația metonimică a orașului nostru statornic și secular în aspirația imperială. După 1989, asocierea celor două nume s-a făcut, adeseori, de la negativul extrem până la pozitivul mirific. Sintagma Timișoara – Mica Vienă a devenit pentru bănățeni o aspirație, o mentalitate, un comportament, un mod de viață. Nu e nimic subversiv sau ocult în această afirmație. Ea se altoiește tocmai pe o căutare a identității, profundă și națională.

Die Formel „*Klein Wien*“ wurde zur metonymischen Bezeichnung unserer in ihren imperialen Bestrebungen über Jahrhunderte hinweg beständigen Stadt. Nach 1989 erfuhr die Nebeneinanderstellung der beiden Begriffe eine Fülle von Konnotationen von extrem negativer bis hin zu übertrieben positiver Prägung. Die exzessive Verwendung der Wortverbindung bewog uns zu einer eingehenden semantischen Betrachtung.

Vor der Wende im Dezember 1989 verwendete man die „magische“ Formel im Geheimen, unter Freunden, und besetzte sie mit der unmissverständlichen Bedeutung der westlichen Freiheit: die Donau zu überqueren und über Jugoslawien in ein österreichisches Lager zu gelangen, wo die Freiheit einen erwartete. Manche gelangten erst nach Überwindung unvorstellbarer Schwierigkeiten dorthin. Andere wurden zu ihrem Unglück

von den Serben „zurückgewiesen“: Entweder waren sie ertrunken oder den Kugeln der kommunistischen Achtsamkeit zum Opfer gefallen.

Für die heutigen Banater ist die syntagmatische Wortverbindung *Temeswar – „Klein Wien“* zu einem Wunschbild, einer Mentalität, einem Benehmensmuster, einer Lebensweise geworden. Diese Behauptung verbirgt nichts Subversives oder Okkultes. Im Folgenden soll bewiesen werden, dass sie sogar mit einer tiefgreifenden Suche nach der nationalen Identität einhergeht. Journalisten verwenden die Wortverbindung als Barometer, das die Nähe zu, bzw. die Entfernung von einer abendländischen, integrierenden Bezugsgröße anzeigt. Man könnte sagen, dass „Klein Wien“ ein Beiname oder eine Metapher oder eine Metonymie ist. In welcher Epoche jedoch diese Nebeneinanderstellung entstand und wie sie zum Substitut für einen Stadtnamen wurde wollen wir erläutern.

Nach Beendigung der Türkenherrschaft 1718 wird Temeswar und das ganze Banat bis 1918 zu einem Teil des Habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaates, der – mit seinen teils umstrittenen, teils glanzvollen Dimensionen – das rumänische Nationalbewusstsein im 19. Jahrhundert nicht nur im Banat, sondern auch in Siebenbürgen entscheidend beeinflusst und geprägt hat.

Ein wichtiges gesellschaftliches und politisches Ereignis für das Österreichische Kaisertum ist in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts die Entstehung der Wiener *Ringstraße*. In jener Zeit war die Reichshauptstadt eine von schweren Mauern umgebene Festung, in der die Innenstadt von den sich entfaltenden Außenbezirken isoliert war. Die Urbanisation Wiens wurde durch den heftigen Protest des Militärs in Bezug auf die Schleifung der Festungsmauern stark gehemmt.

Obwohl Kaiser Franz Josef schon Ende des Jahres 1857 seine Absicht die Festungsmauern zu schleifen kundgetan hatte, begann die städtische Umgestaltung Wiens erst ein paar Jahre später, 1860. „Seit dem Augenblick ihrer Machtübernahme leiteten die Liberalen die Umformung der Stadt nach ihrem Abbild ein, sodass Ende des Jahrhunderts, als sie abgesetzt wurden, die Verwandlung Wiens einen wahr gewordenen Traum darstellte. Das Zentrum dieses städtischen Umbaus wurde die Ringstraße, ein riesiges Gelände mit öffentlichen Bauten und privaten Wohnhäusern, das sich über einen breiten Streifen erstreckte und die Innenstadt der alten Burg von ihren Außenbezirken trennte. Dank ihrer Ausmaße und ihrer stilistischen Einheitlichkeit erhielt die *Wiener Ringstraße* für die Österreicher die Eigenschaften eines Begriffs und entwickelte sich zu einer Aktualisierungsmöglichkeit der Merkmale einer Epoche.“¹

An der Ringstraße – wegen ihrer ringförmigen Gestaltung so genannt – stehen die großen öffentlichen Bauten, die Wien als ewig währende Monarchie ausweisen werden. Vier Gebäude mit politischer, sozialer, bildender und kultureller Bestimmung stehen für das liberale baukünstlerische Unterfangen ein: *das Parlament, das Rathaus, die Universität und das Theater*.

¹ Carl E. Schorske: *Viena fin-de-siècle. Politică și cultură*, Iassy: Polirom, 1998, S. 23.

Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts befand sich Temeswar in derselben Lage, die für Wien Mitte des Jahrhunderts charakteristisch war: eine Burg, deren dicke Festungsmauern den Verkehr und die städtische Entwicklung hemmten. 1892 entschieden die Behörden das Schleifen der Festungsmauern der Stadt; die Festungsmauern wurden jedoch erst 1906-1910 endgültig geschleift. Schon 1894 waren die Systematisierungspläne beendet. „Diese legen die Gesamtstruktur der Stadt auf ein *strahlenförmig-konzentrisches* System fest. Die Burg wird von zwei Prachtstraßen umrundet: eine breitere, mit einer Ansicht von 40 m, die in etwa den inneren Konturen der Festung folgt, und eine andere – die innere Grenze des Glacis. Der Grundgedanke der beiden Prachtstraßen ist symptomatisch für die Emphase des Temeswarer Bürgertums. In der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts hatte Temeswar den Ruf, „Klein Wien“ zu sein. Durch die Schleifung der Festungsmauern ab dem Jahr 1859 war in Wien der berühmte *Ring* entstanden. Auf die Festungsmauern verzichtend, sollte Temeswar nun zwei *Ringstraßen* haben.“²

An dem Temeswarer „Ring“ beginnen größere und kleinere von der Wiener Architektur beeinflusste Gebäude zu erscheinen. Durch seine barocken oder neuklassischen Fassaden wurde Temeswar äußerlich zu einem kleineren Ebenbild des Wiener imperialen Modells. Das Innere, der Herzteil, hatte sich schon längst die Geheimnisse des „Zentrums“ angeeignet und sich in kaiserlicher Gesinnung entwickelt. „Klein Wien“ erschien am Rande der Monarchie als Miniatur eines glanzvollen Vorbildes.

Wir erwähnten die imperialische Gesinnung des Banats und Rumäniens im Allgemeinen. Im Verlauf der Geschichte gilt das Gebiet zwischen der Donau, den Karpathen und dem Schwarzen Meer als Grenze zwischen den Einflussbereichen der Großmächte, aber auch als „Schnittpunkt toter Kaiserreiche“³, da sich die politisch-strategischen Kolosse gerade hier, am Rande Europas, in Zwickmühlen und Unfähigkeit verstrickten. „Die Geschichte Rumäniens verläuft in einem Grenzraum: die äußerste Grenze des Römischen Reichs, die Grenze des Byzantinischen Reichs, die Peripherie des türkischen Einflussgebietes, der Schnittpunkt der Expansion und der Herrschaftsansprüche des Abendlandes, so wie sie von Berlin und Wien aus im 19. Jahrhundert durchgesetzt wurden. Der Krieg ist hier eine greifbare Realität. In der Gegenwartsgeschichte wird Rumänien zum Wetteinsatz im Konflikt zwischen dem Russischen und dem Osmanischen Reich; zum Wetteinsatz im Untergang des Russischen Reichs und der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Doppelmonarchie während des Ersten Weltkriegs; zum Wetteinsatz in der Verteilung der post-kommunistischen Einflussbereiche im Balkan und in Zentraleuropa.“⁴

Das rumänische Volk lebte zweitausend Jahre zwischen diesen mehr oder minder einflussreichen Großmächten, sodass die kollektive Vorstellung

² Mihai Opris: *Timișoara. Mică monografie urbanistică*, Bukarest: Editura Tehnică, 1987, S. 114.

³ Claude Karnoouh: *România. Tipologie și mentalități*, Bukarest: Humanitas, 1994, S. 211.

⁴ Catherine Durandin: *Istoria românilor*, Iassy: Institutul European, 1998, S. 11.

die imperiale Allgegenwärtigkeit als unvermeidlich empfunden hat und sie heute als erstrebenswert empfindet. In Zeiten sozial-politischer Krisen, die alle Bereiche der nationalen Existenz betreffen, ist das Leben angeschlagen und voller Ungereimtheiten. Dem zur Anpassung an die geschichtlichen Gegebenheiten genetisch vorherbestimmten Rumänen bleibt keine andere Wahl, als sich der in eine Utopie projizierten Hoffnung oder dem geschichtlich Imaginären hinzugeben.

Die imperiale Gesinnung übersetzt einheitlich und zusammenhängend die Bindung einer Gemeinschaft an ein geistiges Zentrum, das das alltägliche Leben in seine natürliche Bahnen lenken soll. Wenn dieses Zentrum nicht real vorhanden ist, kann es überall angesiedelt werden und kann die Verschwendung durch vergebliches Leiden miteinschließen.

Nach 2000-jähriger imperialer Translation bleibt Rumänien ein viel komplizierteres *postkoloniales* Gebiet als wir es uns vorstellen: voller Fallen und ohne das letzte Wort in der Geschichte gesagt zu haben. Ein jedes Kaiserreich – ob flüchtig oder beständig – hat Spuren oder Narben im Bewusstsein der Menschen und der Orte hinterlassen. Sie haben Trugbilder hinterlassen, die auch heute noch durch unsere Mentalitäten geistern, unnatürliche Reaktionen und fortdauernde Nichtanpassung.

Unsere Identität bildete sich und zerschellte im Rhythmus der kaiserlichen Kavallerie und Artillerie. Die auf dem Gebiet Daziens angesiedelten Römer haben uns ihr Blut und ihre Sprache hinterlassen. Wir sind ein lateinisches Volk mit einer romanischen Sprache. Das Byzantinische Reich griff durch die orthodoxe Religion ins rumänische Gebiet über. Die Türken des Osmanischen Reiches haben viel zu lange bei uns verweilt, verderbend und raubend.

Die griechisch-orientalischen Spuren haben sich während der letzten Herrschaft, der sowjetischen, die unser Land und unsere Seelen geplündert hat, nicht verwischt, sondern vertieft. Jetzt, nach dem Verlassen des roten Haifischbauches, durchschreiten wir schlaftrunken die Übergangszeit, umgeben von den großen, fest in das rumänische Bewusstsein eingepflanzten Übeln: Korruption, Lüge, Veruntreuung, Demütigung, Betrug.

Die postkoloniale Krise in Rumänien erstreckt sich über eine Zeitspanne von Hunderten von Jahren, in denen ein Kaiserreich nach dem anderen die Geschichte prägte. Heute, beim Verlassen des sowjetischen Hofes, besitzen wir nichts als eine zerstörte Identität, angeschlagenes Streben, oftmals gescheiterte „europäische“ Versuche.

Ein jedes Teilgebiet hat versucht, sein Zentrum dort zu finden, wo es Ähnlichkeiten und Identifikationsmöglichkeiten gab. „Es ist scheinbar anachronistisch, eine Geschichte, die uns allen als einheitliche Geschichte der Rumänen gehört, zu *provinzialisieren*. Dennoch muss berücksichtigt werden, dass gewisse Regionen einen besonderen Status inne haben, der meist auf den geographisch-geschichtlichen Kontext zurückzuführen ist: die Beziehungen zu den benachbarten Völkern oder sogar die Zugehörigkeit zu anderen Staaten, was ihrer Geschichte und Kultur eine eigene Prägung

verliehen hat. Wenn wir über Moldauer, Wallachen, Siebenbürger, Banater sprechen, so legen wir nicht nur einfache geographische Regionen fest, sondern wir verwenden eine kulturelle Terminologie, die die besonderen geschichtlichen und kulturellen Bedingungen dieser Gebiete und ihr einzigartiges geistiges Profil vorschlägt oder unterstreicht.⁵

Die Identität des postkolonialen Banats nährte sich aus der habsburgisch-monarchistischen Gesinnung, die nicht auf die Faszination einer bedingt bekannten Geschichte zurückzuführen ist. Das Kaiserreich bot den Banatern eine geistige Haltung. Nicht eine unproduktive geschichtliche Nostalgie steht hier zur Debatte, sondern eine Identitätssuche, eine Begegnung mit vertrauten Symbolen, die die Bindung zwischen Orten und Menschen verstärken. Die kollektive Vorstellung versucht, das Realitätsdefizit durch geschichtliche und mythische Sinnggebung zu kompensieren. Der nächstgelegene symbolische Raum – ein verlorenes Zentrum, das uns in der Vergangenheit glorreiche Momente beschert hat – ist das kaiserliche, prunkvolle, imaginäre Österreich.

Das Habsburger Kaiserreich war das einzige politische und kulturelle Gefüge, das den Banater Raum organisiert hat und in der kollektiven Erinnerung als vorteilhafte und formende Anwesenheit besteht. Die so oft in alltäglichen Kommunikationssituationen, in den Medien und bei kulturellen Veranstaltungen anzutreffende Formel *Temeswar – „Klein Wien“* bestätigt diese Aussage. Gestaltungsformen der Temeswarer Architektur, die aus der Kaiserzeit übrig gebliebenen sind, bilden unterschwellig das Bewusstsein der Zugehörigkeit zu einem kaiserlichen Raum, selbst im Imaginären – mit der Bedingung, die Stadtteile des „kommunistischen Reichs“ zu ignorieren, die jedwelches Streben im Keime ersticken. Ein Spaziergang durch „Klein Wien“ gleicht einer Zeitreise durch die imperiale Geschichte der Stadt. Auf der einen Seite springen die entstellten Hochhäuser der kommunistischen Gesellschaft das Auge des Betrachters an: über die ganze Stadt verstreut, identisch und tragisch, scheinbar dem Alptraum kranker Aktivistenhirne entsprungen. Auf der anderen Seite erstrecken sich die wienerischen Bauten, beseelt durch sinnliche Schwingungen und barocke Entfesselungen.

Der habsburgische Mythos macht sich um so bemerkbarer, je weiter wir fortschreiten in eine unklare Zeitspanne, die *Übergangszeit* heißt. In Wirklichkeit befinden wir uns in einer postkolonialen Periode, in der wir danach ringen, uns aus dem doktrinären Labyrinth des „sowjetischen Imperialismus“ zu befreien.

Der habsburgische Mythos hat sich in das Bewusstsein der Provinz auf einem schlüpfrigen, fehlerhaften und uneinheitlichen Hintergrund eingeschlichen. Es mag wohl befremdend wirken, im Falle eines Vielvölkerstaates über nationale Identität zu sprechen, da dieser bestrebt war, eben dieses Gefühl zu unterdrücken und eine übernationale, auf Dynastie-, Kirchen- und Kulturtreue begründete Identität durchzusetzen.

⁵ Gheorghe Jurma: *Descoperirea Banatului*, Reschitz: Timpul, 1994, S. 13.

Und trotzdem baut die Vorstellung der Banater – auch die der Europäer – ihre Identität um den habsburgischen Mythos auf, obwohl das „Tausendjährige Reich“ eine moderne Erfindung und eine Anpassung an die Gegenwart einer komplexen Geschichte darstellt. Die imperialische Träumerei hat sich zu einem mentalen Anhaltspunkt entwickelt, der durch die Unzulänglichkeiten der Wirklichkeit gefördert wird. „Erwähnenswert wäre außerdem, dass die aktuellen Verschiebungen in Zentraleuropa – unter den verschmelzenden Einflüssen der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der Aufsplitterung des Sowjetischen Reiches – den habsburgischen Mythos erneuert haben als Utopie einer harmonischen Gemeinschaft der Völker im Donaubecken von Wien bis hin zum Schwarzen Meer und zur Adria.“⁶

Es ist unwichtig, ob das prunkvolle und unerreichbare Reich sich in Zentraleuropa oder in Mitteleuropa befindet. Die beiden rhetorischen Begriffe entzünden Diskussionen unter den Historikern und Gelehrten, ohne aber eine besondere Bedeutung für den gewöhnlichen Menschen zu haben. Das Reich als Geisteszustand und als Wunschtraum befindet sich in unserer Vorstellung und lässt sich nicht geschichtlich und geographisch einordnen. Es gibt „einerseits ein sich auf eine Art deutschen Expansionismus zentriertes Mitteleuropa als geographisch-historischer Begriff und andererseits ein auf Wien ausgerichtetes Zentraleuropa als soziokultureller Begriff.“⁷

Das heutige reelle, westliche und in die EU eingeschlossene Österreich besteht heute in der Banater Vorstellung parallel zu einem kaiserlichen, glanzvollen, historischen österreichischen Raum, der hier Brauchtum, Mentalitäten, Kultur hinterlassen hat. Welche Teilbereiche des Wiener Geistes haben den Banater postkolonialen Geist belebt und fehlen heute aus dem rumänischen sozial-politischen „Erbgut“? Wohl die Abwesenheit eines Machtzentrums, selbst eines zerbrechlichen, das alltägliche Gelassenheit und finanzielle Sicherheit verleiht. Eine Ordnung, die die Gesellschaft, das Leben, den Geist strukturiert.

Die imperiale Dimension der Banater Vorstellung bleibt in dieser postkolonialen Periode die Personifizierung eines gesuchten, erwünschten, erwarteten Zentrums. Die modernen politischen Spitzfindigkeiten dringen jedoch ununterbrochen in den realen und fiktiven Raum jedwelcher Region ein und untergraben die Illusionen bis zur Entstehung von Angstzuständen und Alpträumen. „Egal ob als Land betrachtet, das seine Lebensgeister aus den Resten des Osmanischen oder Zaristischen Reichs bezieht oder aus den Ruinen des Österreichischen Kaiserreichs aufersteht, oder als ein nach dem Niedergang des Sowjetischen Reichs gesunder Körper, wird Rumänien als postimperial (postkolonial oder eher halb-kolonial) wahrgenommen. Es steht den Rumänen frei, sich politische Machtzentren

⁶ Jacques Le Rider: *Modernitatea vieneză și crizele identității*, Iassy: Editura Universității „Al. I. Cuza”, 1995, S. 24.

⁷ Livius Ciocârlie: *Un dialog cu membrii grupului de studii culturale „A Treia Europă”*, in: Jacques Le Rider: *Europa centrală...*, S. 20.

als Bezugsgrößen zu wählen um ihre Identität neu zu definieren und ihre Entwicklungsstrategien festzulegen. Dies wäre ein Beweis, dass sie als Aktanten die Bühne der europäischen Geschichte betreten und nicht bloß als Requisiten im Machtspiel der politisch und wirtschaftlich entwickelten Länder.“⁸

Das Streben nach einem einheitlichen und europäischen Temeswarer Raum schlägt sich in organisiertem Rahmen auf der Ebene der Lokalverwaltung nieder. Das Kulturprojekt *Temeswar – Klein Wien* verdeutlicht die Zielsetzung des Bürgermeisteramtes Temeswar bezüglich der Entwicklung und der kulturellen europäischen Integration. Die Beteiligung der gewählten Vertreter am Leben der Stadt setzt einen geistig und affektiv geprägten professionellen Einsatz voraus, eine tiefe Liebe zu dem, was Temeswar ist und werden könnte.

Das im „Jurnalul bănăţean“ erschienene Manifest des stellvertretenden Bürgermeisters Adrian Orza zielt auf den ausdrücklichen Wunsch der Stadtverwaltung nach europäischer Zivilisierung eines Raumes, der sich einst über Kultur identifizierte. „Mögen wir gemeinsam den wahren Geist Temeswars wiedererwecken, erneut in Klein Wien leben. [...] Nicht zufällig haben wir gerade dieses Datum gewählt, um unser Projekt zu starten. Der 9. Mai ist der Tag, den unser Kontinent als Europatag feiert. Und weil ich von der Bestimmung Temeswars zu einer wahren europäischen Stadt überzeugt bin, gibt es keinen günstigeren Moment als diesen, wahrhaftig ein Teil Europas zu werden. Die Örtlichkeit ist ebenfalls nicht zufällig. Am 2. November 1846, d. h. in einer Zeit, als Temeswar „Klein Wien“ war, konzertierte Franz Liszt am Domplatz, im Großen Saal, der heute unter dem Namen Barockpalais bekannt ist. [...] Und weil am 9. Mai 1950 in Paris der erste Schritt zu dem, was man heute Europäische Union nennt, gemacht wurde, haben auch wir uns vom kulturellen Modell der französischen Hauptstadt anregen lassen, es zu *wagen*, ebenfalls ein kleines Montmartre zu erschaffen, einen für Künstler bestimmten Raum.“⁹

Der Text begründet ein Projekt durch einige umfassende europäische Symbole: Klein Wien, Europatag, Franz Liszt, Barockpalais am Domplatz, die französische Hauptstadt, Montmartre, Europäische Union. Das geistige Weltbürgertum zielt auf die „Wiener Moderne“ um 1900. Der Vergleich mag übertrieben erscheinen, doch wenn wir die Dimensionen der Epoche anpassen, werden wir sehen, dass die Bestrebungen der Stadtverwaltung und der Temeswarer ernst zu nehmen sind.

Ein postkolonialer Raum, der seine Identität in den barocken kaiserlichen Anhaltspunkten des Domplatzes und in den multidisziplinären Ereignissen sucht, verwertet die Selbstfindungsversuche seines Ur-Ichs. In Abwesenheit anderer bleibender Werte, ist der im Banat der habsburger Kolonisierung blühende *Mythos Wien* unsere Bezugsgröße geworden. Der

⁸ Carmen Andraş: *România și imaginile ei în literatura de călătorie britanică. Un spațiu de frontieră culturală*, Klausenburg: Dacia, 2003, S. 51.

⁹ Adrian Orza: *Timișoara europeană*, in: „Jurnal bănăţean“, II. Jahrgang/ 2004, Nr. 311, S. 3.

Begriff Postkolonialismus hat zur Zeit vor allem in Europa eine Bedeutungsverschiebung erfahren. Es bedarf nicht immer Soldaten, Panzern und Terror um von einer wirtschaftlichen und politischen Macht beherrscht zu werden. Wenn dies aber wahrhaftig geschehen ist, entstehen unheilbare Narben und die zerrüttete Identität klammert sich an positive Symbole des „Herrschaftserlebnisses“, wenn das interne gesellschaftlich-politische Angebot keine haltbare Unterlage bietet.

Die journalistische Vorstellung blieb nicht außerhalb dieser imperialen Identitätsentwicklung. Die Einschätzung von Situationen und Ereignissen, die klar und glaubhaft wirken müssen, greift auf die Formel „Klein Wien“ zurück. Die Entfernung von der oder die Nähe zur Bezugsgröße verleiht eine Bandbreite an Bedeutungen, die zwischen dem extrem Negativen und dem absolut Positiven liegen. Diese Problematik werden wir im Folgenden anhand von 25 Artikeln vertiefen, die 2004 in acht Temeswarer Publikationen erschienen sind: „Agenda“, „Agenda zilei“, „Focus Vest“, „Jurnalul bănăţean“, „Prima oră“, „Renaşterea bănăţeană“, „Timișoara“, „Ziua de Vest“.

Das voraussehbare oder unerwartete Alltägliche wird erst dann zum journalistischen Ereignis, wenn es als allgemein und für das Publikum als interessant gilt und wenn der Erwartungshorizont der Beteiligten – Journalisten und Leser – erfüllt wird. Im Falle eines vorhersehbaren Ereignisses ist der Werdegang zeitaufwendig und dreidimensional: das geplante Ereignis, das reale Ereignis und das versprachlichte Ereignis.

Das geplante Ereignis bezieht sich auf die Vermarktungstätigkeit der Veranstalter durch Pressekonferenzen, Werbeartikel und Mediatisierung des Projektes. Im Allgemeinen wurde das Ereignis in den Printmedien durch einfache oder ausführliche Meldungen angekündigt, die Aufschluss über die Zeit und den Ort des Geschehens, die Teilnehmer und die Art der Veranstaltung gaben: C. Călărășanu, *Mica Vienă este reînviată cu muzică și artă plastică în inima cetății (Wiedererweckung Klein Wiens durch bildende Kunst und Musik im Herzen der Burg)*¹⁰; Vali Corduneanu, „*Timișoara – Mica Vienă/ Deschiderea oficială a proiectului (Temeswar – Klein Wien/ Die offizielle Eröffnung des Projektes)*“¹¹; Simona Popovici, *Spiritul european și plăcerea artei/ Evenimente culturale multiple la Timișoara (Der europäische Geist und die Lust an der Kunst/ Mehrfache kulturelle Ereignisse in Temeswar)*¹².

Ein einziger informativer Zeitungsartikel ist um die Meinungsstruktur aufgebaut. Die geistige Dekadenz unseres städtischen Raums hat Ștefan Both dazu bewogen, die informativen Vorlagen zu sprengen und – in der Hoffnung auf ein provokatives Ereignis – aufrührerische Meinungen zu

¹⁰ C. Călărășanu: *Mica Vienă este reînviată cu muzică și artă plastică în inima cetății*, in: „Agenda zilei“, IX. Jahrgang, Nr. 99 (2295)/ 2004, S. 1.

¹¹ Vali Corduneanu: „*Timișoara – Mica Vienă/ Deschiderea oficială a proiectului*“, in: „Agenda“, XV. Jahrgang, Nr. 743/ 2004, S. 1.

¹² Simona Popovici: *Spiritul european și plăcerea artei/ Evenimente culturale multiple la Timișoara*, in: „Agenda“, XV. Jahrgang, Nr. 743/ 2004, S. 16.

äußern. „In einem Land, in dem minderwertige Erscheinungen zum Rang hoher Kunst erhoben werden und das alltägliche Leben von schlechtem Geschmack, Frivolität und Unreife bestimmt ist, beginnt in Temeswar erneut ein westlicher Wind zu wehen. Durch ein vom stellvertretenden Bürgermeister Adrian Orza eingeleitetes Projekt wird versucht, Temeswar erneut zu einem Klein Wien zu erheben, indem man Kunst und Kultur auf die Straßen hinausträgt. Was bisher nur einer Gruppe von Auserwählten zugänglich war, kann jetzt den ganzen Sommer hindurch auf dem Domplatz, einem der schönsten barocken Gebäudekomplexe des Landes, angetroffen werden.“¹³

Diese aufrührerischen Meinungen bergen das Streben nach Identität, nach imperialen und europäischen Anhaltspunkten. *Mica Vienă în micul Montmartre (Klein Wien im kleinen Montmartre)*¹⁴ beinhaltet keine Nostalgie, sondern formuliert eine Forderung. Die im Artikel zitierten Worte des stellvertretenden Bürgermeisters Adrian Orza bekräftigen die Idee der ehemaligen und zukünftigen Europäisierung. „Ich habe viele europäische Staaten bereist und dergleichen in Frankreich, Italien und Österreich gesehen. [...] Stellen Sie sich vor, wie einige der 140 Walzer von Johann Strauss klingen werden vor einer Kulisse wie dem Römisch-Katholischen Dom, dem Barockpalais, der Dreifaltigkeitssäule, der Serbisch-Orthodoxen Kirche, aber auch anderen Bauten, die ihre schon im 18. Jahrhundert ausgeprägten architektonischen Merkmale bewahrt haben.“¹⁵

Das verschriftlichte Ereignis setzt die journalistische Umformung einer Handlung voraus, so wie diese vom Zeitungsschreiber rezipiert wurde. Ein Zeitungstext stellt, unabhängig von seiner Gattungszugehörigkeit, einen zerbrechlichen Transfer von realer und ausgewählter Information auf linguistischer Grundlage dar. Die vergängliche „Ewigkeit“ des Alltäglichen vervollkommnet sich im verschriftlichten Ereignis. Es liegt bloß ein kurzer Bericht über die Ereignisse vom 8. und 9. Mai 2004 vor: G.T., „*Mica Vienă*“, *în mare sărbătoare/ Ziua Europei a fost marcată și la Timișoara („Klein Wien feiert/ Der Europatag wurde auch in Temeswar begangen)*¹⁶.

Im Rahmen des Projektes *Klein Wien* hat das Bürgermeisteramt der Stadt Temeswar zusammen mit einem seiner Projektpartnern, dem Französischen Kulturzentrum, ein französisches Musikfestival eingebürgert: *Fête de la Musique*, das in Temeswar zwischen dem 19.–20. Juni 2004 stattgefunden und klassische Musik, Jazz- und Rock-Musik von rumänischen und ausländischen Künstlern gefördert hat. Zwei Artikel berichten ausführlich über das Ereignis: Nicoleta Sadovan, *În perioada 19-21 iunie/ „Sărbătoarea muzicii va răsună în „Mica Vienă“/ Formația Zdob și Zdub va concerta duminică, în Piața Unirii (In der Zeitspanne zwischen dem 19.-21. Juni wird*

¹³ Ștefan Both: *Mica Vienă în micul Montmartre*, in: „Ziua de Vest“, V. Jahrgang, Nr. 1514/ 2004, S. 4.

¹⁴ Ebenda.

¹⁵ Ebenda.

¹⁶ G.T.: „*Mica Vienă*“, *în mare sărbătoare/ Ziua Europei a fost marcată și la Timișoara*, in: „Renașterea bănățeană“, Nr. 4344/ 2004, S. 1.

*das Fest der Musik in „Klein Wien“ erklingen/ Die Gruppe Zdob și Zdub wird Sonntag auf dem Domplatz konzertieren)*¹⁷; Simona Popovici Donici, *Sărbătoarea tuturor muzicilor ține trei zile în Mica Vienă/ Stephane Ré și Viceprimarul Adrian Orza au pus la cale o ediție bogată, ca la nunțile împărătești (Das Fest aller Musikrichtungen dauert drei Tage in Klein Wien/ Stephane Ré und der stellvertretende Bürgermeister haben eine reiche Auflage vorbereitet, wie bei einer königlichen Hochzeit)*¹⁸.

Die Formel „Klein Wien“ wurde – wie schon erwähnt – zum Maß des Guten und des Bösen, das in diesem von mikro-kaiserlichem Sinn beherrschten Raum geschieht, beginnend mit dem zwielichtigen Bereich der geschichtlichen Berichterstattung, bis hin zu Schmähschriften. Nicht alle Temeswarer „frönen“ der Musik und einem raffinierten Geschäftsleben zwischen Mobiltelefonen, Limousinen und Computern der letzten Generation. „Klein Wien“ ist bis heute klein geblieben: Hinter den barocken Bauten und den Wohnblocks des totalitären Regimes erstrecken sich die grünen Felder der Heimat. Ein idyllisches Leben führen dort Schafe, Ziegen, Kühe, Schweine u. Ä. und Hirten, die ihre Herden in anderen Gefilden hüten sollten.

Folgender Titel beinhaltet ein Spiel der konnotativen und denotativen Bedeutungen und erinnert an die im Bewusstsein der Rumänen immer noch lebendige und zu lange verweilende Zeit der Balladen: H.B., *Cu Miorița prin Mica Vienă/ Proprietarii de animale din Timișoara sunt invitați de primarul Gheorghe Ciuhandu să plătească taxele de pășunat (Mit der ‚Miorița‘ durch Klein Wien/ Die Tierbesitzer aus Temeswar wurden von Bürgermeister Gheorghe Ciuhandu eingeladen, die Weidenutzungsgebühren zu bezahlen)*¹⁹.

Von der spielerisch-idyllischen Ironie gelangen wir in einen Raum der tragischen Persiflage, der kindlichen Bettelei: Liana Dacilescu, *Cerșetorii se întorc în „Mica Vienă“/ Autoritățile încearcă să stopeze fenomenul, însă copiii se pare că îi păcălesc de fiecare dată – Următoarea perioadă va fi foarte grea – Sărbătorile de iarnă nu aduc numai cadouri, ci și cerșetori (Die Bettler kehren nach „Klein Wien“ zurück/ Die Behörden versuchen, das Phänomen zu stoppen, die Kinder überlisten sie jedoch scheinbar immer wieder – Die nächste Zeit wird sehr schwierig – Das Weihnachtsfest bringt nicht nur Geschenke, sondern auch Bettler)*²⁰. Der schwerwiegende soziale

¹⁷ Nicoleta Sadovan: *În perioada 19-21 iunie/ „Sărbătoarea muzicii va răsună în „Mica Vienă“/ Formația Zdob și Zdub va concerta duminică, în Piața Unirii*, in: „Timișoara“, XV. Jahrgang, Nr. 3552/ 2004, S. 1.

¹⁸ Simona Popovici Donici, *Sărbătoarea tuturor muzicilor ține trei zile în Mica Vienă/ Stephane Ré și Viceprimarul Adrian Orza au pus la cale o ediție bogată, ca la nunțile împărătești*, in: „Agenda zilei“, IX. Jahrgang, Nr. 142 (2338)/ 2004, S. 5.

¹⁹ H.B.: *Cu Miorița prin Mica Vienă/ Proprietarii de animale din Timișoara sunt invitați de primarul Gheorghe Ciuhandu să plătească taxele de pășunat*, in: „Ziua de Vest“, V. Jahrgang, Nr. 1523/ 2004, S. 1.

²⁰ Liana Dacilescu: *Cerșetorii se întorc în „Mica Vienă“*, in: „Ziua de Vest“, V. Jahrgang, Nr. 1724/ 2004, S. 3.

Gegensatz *Bettler* und „*Klein Wien*“, Elend und Glanz, Armut und Feiertage besteht in unserer barocken Burg und wird weder durch Polizeibeamte oder Ordnungskräfte, noch durch Mitarbeiter des Jugendamtes beseitigt werden können. Unsere überall im Land anwesenden Straßenkinder – einsam, krank, schmutzig, von Kinderschändern und Untergrundorganisationen missbraucht – zeugen von Entfernung von einem imaginär-imperialen Streben, das, wie im Märchen, unerreichbar bleibt. Die Bettelei, eine Seuche ohne Heilmittel, betrifft auch Erwachsene und Alte. Und damit die Ironie tragischer und schmerzhafter wirkt, veröffentlicht die Tageszeitung „*Prima oră*“ eine „*Mica Vienă*“ („*Klein Wien*“)²¹ betitelte Fotoreportage über Bettler aller Altersgruppen. Das Logo dieser Fotoserie war das Bild einer alten und kranken Bettlerin.

Um von der Ironie zum Sarkasmus zu wechseln muss man nur die Gattungsgrenze überqueren und seine Identität in die gewünschte Gattung einfließen lassen. Der Name des Journalisten wird dann zu „*Patrocle Del Bosche*“ (in etwa: ‚Struppi von der Streun‘) oder durch Initialen unkenntlich gemacht, während die Artikelüberschriften suggerieren, dass die Stadt „mit Pedigree“ ihre Auszeichnung einbüßt, wenn sie von Promenadenmischungen bevölkert ist. Es folgt eine Fotoserie über Hunde: 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din zona UMT* (1001 Streuner in Klein Wien/ Heute: die Hunde aus dem Stadtteil UMT)²²; T.S., 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din centrul Timișoarei* (1001 Streuner in Klein Wien/ Heute: die Hunde aus der Innenstadt Temeswar)²³; T.S., 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din Complexul Studentesc* (1001 Streuner in Klein Wien/ Heute: die Hunde aus dem Studentenviertel)²⁴; T.S., 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din cartierul Giroc* (1001 Streuner in Klein Wien/ Heute: die Hunde aus dem Stadtviertel Giroc)²⁵.

Weidende Nutztiere neben der Großstadt, Bettler aller Altersgruppen auf allen Straßen neben streunenden Hunden bremsen die gesellschaftliche Begeisterung und vermehren die semantische Inflation des Begriffs „*Klein Wien*“. Es mag wohl eine krasse, von Sarkasmus durchtränkte journalistische Ironie scheinen, doch schlägt die umgebende Wirklichkeit schmerzhaft Spuren. Neben der wendigen und grauenvollen Symbolik des Negativen wächst die Hyperbel des Drecks, die expandierende Mülldeponie, wie eine Beschmutzung aller Bestrebungen der Temeswarer, die Richtung nach Wien einzuschlagen, wie ein Attentat auf das symbolische Stadtwappen: Simona Vasi, Radu C. Munteanu, De la „*Mica Vienă*“ la

²¹ *** „*Mica Vienă*“, in: „*Prima oră*“, Nr. 1592/ 2004.

²² *** 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din zona UMT*, in: „*Prima oră*“, Nr. 1630/ 2004, S. 8.

²³ T.S.: 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din centrul Timișoarei*, in: „*Prima oră*“, Nr. 1636/ 2004, S. 8.

²⁴ T.S.: 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din centrul Timișoarei*, in: „*Prima oră*“, Nr. 1642/ 2004, S. 8.

²⁵ T.S.: 1001 *maidanezi în Mica Vienă/ Azi, câinii din cartierul Giroc*, in: „*Prima oră*“, Nr. 1648/ 2004, S. 8.

„marea Parța/ Stelele Timișoarei s-au acoperit de tone de gunoi/ Orașul mizeriei (Von „Klein Wien“ nach „groß Parța“/ Die Sterne Temeswars wurden von Tonnen Müll bedeckt/ Die Stadt des Schmutzes)²⁶.

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Der Weg entlang der Traumata der Stadt führt endlich zu den lichterem Konnotationen „Klein Wiens“. Um das europäische Streben zu verstärken, bekommt Wien Unterstützung von einem Paris en miniature: D.V., „*Micul Paris*“ face casă bună cu Mica Vienă (*Klein Paris verträgt sich gut mit Klein Wien*)²⁷, in Zeitungen, die über die Lieferfirma „Micul Paris“ („Klein Paris“) aus dem Ausland gebracht und an einem Stand im Erdgeschoss des „Bega“-Geschäfts verkauft werden. Die schriftliche Kommunikation, sei sie auch noch so perfekt, kann nicht die direkte Begegnung mit der wienerischen Wirklichkeit ersetzen. Die von Frau Magdalena Mărculescu geleitete Fluggesellschaft Austrian Airlines schlägt eine unmittelbare kulturelle Luftbrücke zwischen zwei geschichtlich und geistig eng verbundenen Räumen: Florian Mihalcea, *Austrian Airlines – puntea dintre Marea și Mica Vienă (Austrian Airlines – die Brücke zwischen Groß- und Klein Wien)*²⁸. „Ein bestimmter Verlauf der Geschichte hat dazu geführt, dass Temeswar einen Teil der Fäden verloren hat, die es in einer alten Stickerei mit der kaiserlichen Stadt Wien verband. Lange ist es für uns her, dass die Geheimnisse der Wiener Kultur an der Bega von denjenigen entziffert werden konnten, die in Bécs studiert hatten und versuchten, hier, in Temeswar, die wienerische Stimmung zu erschaffen. Sehr schwer war dies nicht. In jener Zeit folgte einige Wochen nach einer Uraufführung an der Wiener Oper (die Rezension war schon am nächsten Tag in den Temeswarer Zeitungen zu lesen) die Uraufführung an der Temeswarer Oper. Derselbe – oft eigenartige – Lauf der Geschichte könnte uns jetzt jene geschlossene Tür öffnen, deren Schlüssel wir aus einer unverzeihlichen (erneut geschichtlich bedingten) Nachlässigkeit heraus vor 60 (vielleicht sogar 80) Jahren verlegt haben.“²⁹ Eine Fluggesellschaft spielt heute großartig die Rolle der Rückerstattung einer imperialen, von ungünstigen Umständen beeinflussten Temeswarer Identität.

Die Wortverbindung *wie in Wien* drückt die absolute Anerkennung aus, wenn etwas gut, konkurrenzlos und unzweifelhaft perfekt gemacht wurde. In der Erinnerung der Banater ist der Name der kaiserlichen Hauptstadt auch heute als ein Maßstab der Perfektion verwurzelt geblieben. Auch wenn dies nicht immer stimmt, wird der historische Bezugspunkt ein Bewusstsein festigen, das sich heute erholt: Toni Boldureanu, „*Vom face intrarea în Lugoj*

²⁶ Simona Vasil/ Radu C. Munteanu: *De la „Mica Vienă“ la „marea Parța/ Stelele Timișoarei s-au acoperit de tone de gunoi/ Orașul mizeriei*, in: „Prima oră“, Nr. 1785/ 2004, S. 1, 9.

²⁷ D.V.: „*Micul Paris*“ face casă bună cu Mica Vienă, in: „Ziua de Vest“, V. Jahrgang, Nr. 1498/ 2004, S. 1.

²⁸ Florian Mihalcea: *Austrian Airlines – puntea dintre Marea și Mica Vienă*, in: „Timișoara“, XV. Jahrgang, Nr. 3489/ 2004, S. 4.

²⁹ Ebenda.

dinspre Timișoara, la fel ca intrarea în Viena“ (Wir ziehen ausgehend von Temeswar in Lugoj ein, ebenso wie in Wien)³⁰.

Die Entwicklung Temeswars nach der Wende wurde von der westlichen Presse als günstige Gelegenheit für ausländische Firmen eingeschätzt, sich beständig in der Produktion der gesamten Region einzurichten. Die imperiale Klassifizierung ist in diesem Fall ein Grund, stolz zu sein, denn sie weist darauf hin, dass der äußere Rand des Kontinents nicht mit Außenseitertum gleichzusetzen ist: D. Baranga, *România este noul El Dorado pentru transferul producției/ „Le Figaro” notează că Timișoara, „Mica Vienă” a țării noastre, este în plină dezvoltare (Rumänien, das neue El Dorado für den Produktionstransfer/ „Le Figaro” vermerkt, dass Temeswar, das „Klein Wien” unseres Landes, sich inmitten des Entwicklungsprozesses befindet)³¹.*

Wenn Austrian Airlines sich durch den Transfer von geistigen Gütern, Enthusiasmus und Personen zwischen zwei verwandten geschichtlichen Entitäten den kulturellen Vorzug sichert, so versucht die von Maestro Corneliu Murgu geleitete Temeswarer Oper ein Gleichheitszeichen zwischen Groß- und Klein Wien zu setzen. Das alljährliche Wiener Neujahrskonzert vom 1. Januar wurde in Temeswar am 2. Januar zur Tradition, genauso wie Strauss' *Fledermaus* in beiden Städten am 31. Dezember das Jahr beendet: S.P. Donici, *Concert de Anul Nou, ca la Viena (Neujahrskonzert wie in Wien)³²*; Simona P. Donici, *Mica Vienă va avea din nou, precum cea mare, un concert extraordinar Johann Strauss de Anul Nou/ Maestrul Corneliu Murgu dorește să întemeieze o tradiție la fel ca a Liliacului de Revelion (Klein Wien wird ebenso wie Groß Wien zu Neujahr ein außergewöhnliches Johann Strauss-Konzert haben/ Maestro Corneliu Murgu möchte eine Tradition wie die der Fledermaus am Silvesterabend begründen)³³.*

Immer, wenn die Rede von etwas im Vergehen Begriffenem ist, das ehemals der ganze Stolz der Gegend war, assoziiert die Vorstellung die Situation mit der Formel „Klein Wien”. Vielleicht erscheint ein verborgener Reflex der imperialen Erinnerung immer dann, wenn die Zeit mit dem Vergehen droht: Tiberiu Szöke, *Meserii pe cale de dispariție/ Pianele din Mica Vienă la ... urechea unui Timișorean (Gefährdete Berufe/ Die Klaviere aus Klein Wien an ... dem Ohr eines Temeswarers)³⁴.* Der 72-jährige

³⁰ Toni Boldureanu: „Vom face intrarea în Lugoj dinspre Timișoara, la fel ca intrarea în Viena“, in: „Focus Vest“, VI. Jahrgang, Nr. 228/ 2004, S. 2.

³¹ D. Baranga: *România este noul El Dorado pentru transferul producției/ „Le Figaro” notează că Timișoara, „Mica Vienă” a țării noastre, este în plină dezvoltare*, in: „Agenda zilei”, IX. Jahrgang, Nr. 2444/ 2004, S. 2.

³² S.P. Donici: *Concert de Anul Nou, ca la Viena*, in: „Agenda zilei”, IX. Jahrgang, Nr. 2498/ 2004, S. 1.

³³ Simona P. Donici: *Mica Vienă va avea din nou, precum cea mare, un concert extraordinar Johann Strauss de Anul Nou/ Maestrul Corneliu Murgu dorește să întemeieze o tradiție la fel ca a Liliacului de Revelion*, in: „Agenda zilei”, IX. Jahrgang, Nr. 2504/ 2004, S. 5.

³⁴ Tiberiu Szöke: *Meserii pe cale de dispariție/ Pianele din Mica Vienă la ... urechea unui Timișorean*, in: „Prima oră”, Nr. 1675/ 2004, S. 16.

Klavierstimmer Gavril Fodor bekennt, in 55 Dienstjahren über 20.000 Klaviere gestimmt zu haben.

Ein anderer Text, als Bericht konzipiert, zählt diszipliniert die wegen Modernisierungsarbeiten vorgenommenen Veränderungen in den Fahrplänen der Temeswarer Straßenbahnen auf: Vali Corduneanu, *Transportul în comun, înaintea unor mari schimbări (Der öffentliche Verkehr vor einigen schwerwiegenden Veränderungen)*³⁵. Der sehr umfangreiche Text hat die Form einer Reportage, die nur die zerwühlte Geographie der Stadt zwischen den verschiedenen Etappen im Modernisierungsprozess des öffentlichen Verkehrs identifiziert. Straßen, Routen, Stahlprofilstäbe, Graphiken, Umleitungen usw. füllen das Papier und bringen den Leser-Fußgänger zur Verzweiflung.

Die letzte Spalte der Seite beinhaltet einen anderen Artikel mit der Überschrift *Groß Wien*, ein Zitat aus dem 1928 von Saşa Pană veröffentlichten Band *Născut în '02 (Geboren '02)*. Das Buch enthält die Wiener Reiseindrücke des Autors. Wien hat den Reisenden ausnahmslos fasziniert, doch haben ihn einige Dinge „aus der Fassung gebracht“: der chronometrische Verkehr der Busse, die Zuvorkommenheit der Fahrgäste und die Sauberkeit der Straßen. Nebeneinandergestellt wägen diese beiden Artikel Klein und Groß Wien (selbst jenes von 1928) nach europäischen Maßstäben gegeneinander ab. Der Unterschied ist groß, doch größer noch ist die Hoffnung.

Wenn Temeswar sich der Vergangenheit zuwendet, um sich in ihrem gegenwärtigen Status zurechtzufinden, so hat auch Wien ihre Nabelschnur nicht durchtrennt und lebt weiterhin die kaiserliche Faszination zwischen barocken Palästen und der habsburgischen Mythologie. *Temeswar – Klein Wien* wurde mit der Zeit zu einem lokalen Begriff, der immer dann aufgerufen wird, wenn es gilt ein Streben, eine Enttäuschung oder eine Auflehnung zu versprachlichen. Das Große Wien hat einen nationalen Begriff entworfen, *Alt Wien*, der es unwiderruflich an die kaiserliche Hauptstadt fesselt: „Dem Mythos *Alt Wien* gemäß ist der Ursprung für die einzigartige Stimmung der österreichischen Hauptstadt in ihrer Vergangenheit zu suchen. Eine faszinierende, bis zum 28. März [2005] im Künstlerhaus geöffnete Ausstellung versucht, die Bedeutungen des Begriffs *Alt Wien* zu ergründen. Vorgestellt wird eine 200-jährige städtische Geschichte, die oft vom Konflikt zwischen den Anhängern der Modernisierung und ihren Gegnern geprägt ist. Gleichzeitig werden die Stereotypen wienerischer Nostalgie vorgeführt. Die Ausstellung *Alt Wien – die Stadt, die niemals war* stellt Kunstwerke, Dokumente der Architektur, Medienbilder und „Relikte“ vor, die verschwundene Aspekte der Stadt widerspiegeln. Die Ausstellung ist zugleich eine Einladung zum Nachdenken über die Identität und die Zukunft der österreichischen Hauptstadt.“³⁶

³⁵ Vali Corduneanu: *Transportul în comun, înaintea unor mari schimbări*, in: „Agenda“, XV. Jahrgang, Nr. 732/ 2004.

³⁶ A.M.G.: *Vechea Vienă*, in: „Agenda“, XVI. Jahrgang, Nr. 789/ 2005, S. 4.

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Im geographisch und historisch zersplitterten Banater Raum hat die österreichische Anwesenheit der Gegend – durch einen über Jahrhunderte hinweg im kollektiven Gedankengut erhaltenen imperialen Transfer – Einheit verliehen. Österreich widerspiegelt sich im Banater Bewusstsein als Identität und Wunschbild, als ein in Krisensituationen angerufenes Vorbild. In der Banater Presse besteht ein reales, gegenwärtiges Österreich und ein kaiserliches und prunkvolles, oft ins Imaginäre entrücktes Österreich.

Das Verlangen nach Identität in der *Übergangszeit* genannten Gegenwart rückt den axiologischen Inhalt des Banater Raums in den Vordergrund. Wir befinden uns jetzt in einer postkolonialen Epoche, in der die Großmächte sich zurückgezogen haben und wir allein in einer von verschiedenen und oft unzusammenhängenden Erscheinungen übersehenen Region geblieben sind. Dazwischen bewegen sich die aus den Jahrhunderten der Fremdherrschaft übrig gebliebenen Mentalitäten. Durch ihre Läuterung bildet sich jetzt eine Existenzformel heraus, die das Maß kommender Ereignisse sein wird.

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BOOK REVIEW

THE MEANING OF "BEING RECENT"¹

What are the specific features of recent times? How do they influence our way of living? In order to answer these questions, one must set himself apart from the object of the questions. This distance can only be achieved by rational means, via discursive thinking. This taxing endeavour is worth it because the stakes themselves are valuable and can transfigure the spiritual status of the person.

Horia-Roman Patapievici makes such an attempt in his book *Omul recent*. The book is addressed to people interested in politology, sociology, philosophy and even students. The readers must be intellectuals as the book contains specialized bibliographical references.

The book is structured in a variety of relatively small chapters dealing with a few main ideas. These special issues being addressed are: modern versus postmodern, the essence and the manifestation of the political phenomenon, the recent human nature, the problem of liberty and political correctness, tradition, democracy, desacralization and the death of God. All these aspects are discussed keeping in the background the idea that God was banished from our world, initially by being deprived of his attributes and ultimately by being proclaimed as dead.

Recent man, the same being who irreversibly lost God, lives under the sign of Proteus. Man, as a highly spiritual being, transfigured in extreme situations by the transcendence of the divine world, can temporarily or permanently lose his openness towards the spiritual, by "falling" into the comfortable and material aspects of life. One can become petty and enclosed animality, at the same time obedient, tamed and dumb. In order to underline the characteristics of recent man, the author

¹ Horia-Roman Patapievici, *Omul recent* ed Humanitas, Bucuresti 2005

enumerates various types of human ideals. The man of the classic ideal is unitary, hierarchical, contemplative and resigned. In modern times, man desires to be complex, egalitarian, contradictory, restless and scientific. The Christian ideal is a man that is complex, contradictory, inquisitive, hierarchical and restless. The recent modern period envisions man as leveled, reclusive, simple, technological and relative: "mutant imprezibil și lipsit de lege internă"². Recent man cannot find his visage, lost under the multitude of masks he assumes when running from his vocation or from destiny's challenges. He is a hedonist, lost in the Impersonal, diluting himself with the endless stream of compromises he accepts. Recent modern period man repudiates Tradition, wishes to equalize everything due to the fact that he feels himself to be inferior, detests culture, has a vivid yearning for power and thinks of himself as a god. This man bows to technology, tries to suppress the discourse of culture and religion using the arguments of verification, performance, demystification etc. Man has become "un artefact amenajat și umplut: uzat, folosit, întrebuintat, datat"³. He is a victim of power games, configured by a major inferiority complex, haunted by the specter of a injustice he want to avoid. He lost sight of the fact that we have to make arrangements not here, in the ephemeral world, but in the world after death, in the kingdom of God. Recent man is condemned by his own choice not to see the face of God.

The author chooses to use the terms late modern time and recent modern time for that period of time commonly refereed to as postmodernism. Recent modern time is a delving into modernity, in the sense of relativity and nihilism. Postmodernism has two principles: the exhaustion of modernity and the theory of the generalized ontological simulacrum, completed by the epistemological perspective of relativity. Horia-Roman Patapieviici has the following thesis on recent times: "teza mea este că postmodernismul nu este decât o formă exacerbată de modernitate și că, în esența lui psihologică, postmodernismul este un fenomen post-traumatic."⁴. It is an era of nihilism, prophesized by Nietzsche, a reaction against God and unifying science. It imposes the strictness of the new, the current, and all that does not satisfy this criteria is anathematised from the officially accepted discourses. Postmodernism promotes the multi-cultural aspect, weak thought, difference only for difference's sake and also claims globalizationist expectations. It marks the end of the great sagas and rejects vehemently the greatest among them, namely Tradition. It proposes equality as the main principle, this principle suffering from the problem of considering all things as having the same value.

Postmodernism has different manifestations, depending upon one's point of view. The author states that postmodernism can track its ancestry from the Marxist system. While discussing the meaning of the political right and left, Horia-Roman Patapieviici writes that the differentiation between the two is possible only by going outside tradition. The political left tries to accomplish a rejection of tradition while the right tries to achieve a return to traditional values. During postmodern times, there have been attempts to reduce the political aspect to an engineering approach based

² Horia-Roman Patapieviici, *Omul recent* ed Humanitas, Bucuresti 2005 pag 163, "unpredictable mutant lacking any internal law"

³ Horia-Roman Patapieviici, *Omul recent* ed Humanitas, Bucuresti 2005 pag 396, "an artifact arranged and filled: used, utilized, dated"

⁴ Horia-Roman Patapieviici, *Omul recent* ed Humanitas, Bucuresti 2005 pag 117, "my thesis is that postmodernism is nothing but a hyperbolized form of modernism and that, in its psychological essence, postmodernism is nothing but a post-traumatic phenomenon"

on technology's power. The central aspect of the political phenomenon is the political correctness, defined by the author as: "decret de comportare socială, pe care o minoritate luminată îl impune unei majorități înapoiate".⁵ The postmodern democracy advertises leisure and entertainment.

The author claims that morals and ethical rules do not exist anymore. Moral has lost its general aspect while becoming a private matter. Only by living inside and being faithful to a true religion can one have morals. The current world is the world that has left behind all absolute moral references. The prerequisites for the survival of morals are life in that same moral environment.

Postmodernism, despite claiming to be free and egalitarian, rejects all phenomena that do not conform to its rules. Private space tends to shrink while public space tends to grow. By practicing extreme welfare policies, the state risks transforming its citizens into vegetables capable of performing only a passive role. The media has a vital importance, being a main influencer on the opinions of common persons. The abundance of laws regulating the private and personal spaces, we risk losing those characteristics that make us unique individuals. Even the concept of liberty is mocked, it becomes a simulacra that can manifest itself only within well established limits.

The ability to differentiate ("discerne") is the procedure through which something is discriminated in relation with something else, being associated with a value. It is a key ability of moral equilibrium. This ability is a human trait, it cannot be estranged and is apparent in judgments of value. It does not imply any special knowledge but manifests itself inside the communication space opened by tradition. The debilitation of this capacity led to the invasion of a new breed of barbarians into culture. The phenomenon betrays the fact that "ne protejam de lucrurile profunde"⁶. Through this capacity we can all become aristocrats and we can understand what culture really means.

Tradition represents what any Christian understands to appropriate without adding or subtracting anything to it. In recent times it was forgotten and expelled from the cultural environment. Tradition was consecrated following a lengthy and strict social selection. This selection was done in time and took place among cultural concepts and models that were competing with each other. A cultural reaction from traditional positions, to any kind of phenomenon, can be proven to be extremely hazardous to the one having the reaction.

Horia-Roman Patapievicu proposes a solution to the issues mentioned above. The solution is based on recuperating the spiritual Christian dimension for each individual. It became clear that one cannot escape from modernity but it can be rebuilt on the principle *Nihil sine Deo*. Only by re-orienting ourselves towards God can we obtain redemption and this only after we have set ourselves apart from the hassle of recent things.

The information contained in the book and the author's style betray his erudition. The book is written from the perspective of an authentically assumed Christianity and also showing the conservative option embraced by the author who declares himself to be an *Old Whig*. The book represents an excellent synthesis for understanding the complex and heterogeneous phenomena described within, but it

⁵ Horia-Roman Patapievicu, *Omul recent* ed Humanitas, Bucuresti 2005 pag 305, "social behavior decree imposed by an enlightened minority upon the primitive majority "

⁶ Horia-Roman Patapievicu, *Omul recent* ed Humanitas, Bucuresti 2005 pag 395, "we protect ourselves from profound things"

is also a dangerous synthesis because by putting the occidental history from the last half millennium under the sign of the rejection of God and tradition, it can offer a warped understanding of these varied phenomena: politics, culture, philosophy, arts and ethics. Moreover the text is vulnerable to strong critics based on scientific, technological and philosophical arguments. The book is a positive presence in the Romanian cultural environment but an explicable one because this space, newly estranged from tradition and on its way towards European and universal integration, is more susceptible to accepting these types of text. Such a text in an occidental environment would have caused much stronger reactions than the ones it aroused here. While writing a lot about postmodernism, the bibliographical references seems strangely lacking in references to classical authors of the period such as Jean Baudrillard, Jürgen Habermas, Jean François Lyotard etc. It also seems that the references to Michel Foucault, one of the most important authors of the era, are sparse and superficial.

Faced with a text like this one, before summarily dismissing its thesis, presuppositions and arguments, one should ask himself what if all this is real. If it is not, the text can be dismissed as just another fundamentalist Christian writing but if that is not the case, then our entire spiritual being is about to be transfigured.

Dana Dömşödi