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## L'HERMENEUTIQUE ET LA LOGIQUE DU DOUBLE SENS

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*La question de l'existence humaine ne signifie pas la mort du langage et de la logique; au contraire, elle requiert un surcroît de la lucidité et de la rigueur.*

*Ricoeur*

Comprendre c'est tant un mode d'être que de connaître mais cette perspective particulière à l'herméneutique de Ricoeur devient très importante en révélant la connexion intime de l'être historique de l'homme et de l'ensemble de l'être et par cela la possibilité d'une connexion plus originaire que le rapport gnoséologique de l'objet et du sujet. La démarche herméneutique de Ricoeur vise fond en comble la corrélation du plan sémantique et ontologique de sorte que toute compréhension (ontique ou ontologique) suppose le langage et toute référence du langage concerne l'existence. Conformément à ces exigences, il détermine la nature spécifique du discours sur l'existence: "c'est un genre de pensée conceptuelle, qui a ses propres règles de rigueur, son propre type de cohérence et qui requiert une logique propre"<sup>1</sup>.

Comme conséquence de cette manière d'aborder, le symbole et l'interprétation deviennent des concepts corrélatifs: il y a une interprétation là où il y a un sens multiple; en plus, l'interprétation dévoile la multiplicité du sens. Dès le début, la conception de Ricoeur se distingue des autres penseurs, par exemple Cassirer, l'auteur de la philosophie des formes symboliques. Pour ce dernier, le concept de la symbolique possède une application quasitotale, c'est-à-dire une amplitude équivalente aux concepts de la réalité et de la culture. Encore que par l'utilisation très large du symbolique, Cassirer

suprime la différence entre les expressions uniques et les expressions multiples; toutefois c'est le premier qui détermine la définition de l'homme et de sa distinction spécifique par la capacité symbolique comme fondement du progrès de la civilisation humaine.

Sans doute, la dimension rationnelle est inhérente à toutes activités humaines mais elle représente seulement une partie d'un ensemble plus vaste de sorte qu'elle seule ne peut nullement épuiser toute la richesse de l'univers culturel humain. Pour compenser ce déficit, il doit reconnaître, de pair avec Ricoeur, l'idée de la pluralité tant de la rationalité que du langage, implicitement l'idée de la coexistence du langage logique ou scientifique (conceptuel) et du langage poétique (émotionnel). D'ailleurs, le langage à l'origine n'exprime pas les pensées ou les idées mais les sentiments, les émotions ou, comme dit Cassirer<sup>2</sup>, les espoirs et les inquiétudes, les fantaisies et les rêves de l'être humain.

En vivant dans un univers symbolique, en réalisant une activité symbolique, l'homme n'agit pas proprement dit sur les choses mais sur le soi-même et ainsi la connaissance signifie en réalité la connaissance et la réflexion de soi-même, comme dit, depuis le commencement, Heraclit: "Je me suis cherché moi-même" (fr. 115) ou "La connaissance de soi-même et la sagesse sont permises à tous les hommes" (fr. 130).

La compréhension du soi-même est toujours réalisée par l'entremise des signes, des symboles, des textes et leur monde implique des contextes variables, implicitement des interprétations rivales. Dans cette situation, l'intégration de la sémantique et de l'ontologie, conformément à l'herméneutique de Ricoeur, engage la réflexion en tant qu'intermédiaire indispensable de la relation de la compréhension des signes et de la compréhension de l'Ego par lui-même<sup>3</sup>. Donc, le discours herméneutique devient le moyen de la compréhension de l'Ego, par une voie détournée, en usant de subterfuges comme la compréhension de l'Autre. La philosophie de même que l'herméneutique et la réflexion détermine la position du soi-même qui existe et qui pense "en récupérant l'Ego de l'*Ego cogito* dans le miroir des objets, des oeuvres et des actes de celui-ci"<sup>4</sup>.

En expression lapidaire, la philosophie réflexive (en valorisant les contributions de Descartes, Kant ou Fichte) est une variante herméneutique de la phénoménologie de Husserl relative à la possibilité de la compréhension du soi-même "comme le sujet des

opérations de connaître, de vouloir, d'estimer"<sup>5</sup>. Au surplus, la connexion de la phénoménologie et de l'herméneutique n'est pas du tout accidentelle puisque toutes les deux concernent une même question fondamentale: le rapport du sens et du soi, à vrai dire, l'intelligibilité du sens et la réflexivité du soi, mais la phénoménologie évalue surtout l'aspect cognitif et perceptif du problème du sens à l'encontre de l'herméneutique qui met en valeur les dimensions de l'histoire et des sciences humaines.

La réflexion, par le rapport du sens et du soi est contraire à toute intuition (psychologique, intellectuelle ou mystique) et d'autant plus à une philosophie de l'immédiat ou de l'instant. En même temps, elle présume le dépassement des limites de la philosophie critique, fixée obstinément sur la critique de la connaissance et de l'épistémologie. Or l'intérêt et la préoccupation de la réflexion concernent surtout la récupération de l'acte d'exister, la position du soi en toute épaisseur de leur oeuvre. Ainsi, la réflexion, après Ricoeur, est deux fois indirecte: premièrement par la découverte du sujet de *cogito* dans les témoignages de sa vie, et puis par la critique de la conscience falsifiée en signifiant l'ascension d'une mauvaise compréhension à une bonne compréhension.

Parce qu'il y a une connexion originaire de l'acte d'exister et des signes de nos oeuvres, la réflexion devient inévitablement l'interprétation, à vrai dire l'acte de récupérer les signes (opaques, contingents, équivoques) des différentes cultures. Ce repli herméneutique valide au fond tant la pensée d'un langage équivoque qu'une logique du double sens. De plus, Aristote se rend compte de cette situation bizarre en affirmant l'univocité du sens au sujet de la logique mais en refusant pour la métaphysique la possibilité d'une définition unique de l'être. La perspective d'Aristote concernant les significations multiples de l'être ouvre en fait une brèche dans la théorie pure logique et ontologique de l'univocité. Ultérieurement, par cette brèche, comme dit Ricoeur, l'interprétation légitimera la compréhension des significations aux sens multiples, au cours d'un procès de longue durée et de vivante controverse.

Les circonstances évoquées, notamment le recours au symbole, provoquent un véritable choc au discours philosophique – à l'idée de la philosophie comme science ou théorie systématique, méthodique — en justifiant le langage équivoque, la contingence culturelle et le conflit des interprétations. De cette façon, la

signification univoque exclut *ab initio* le symbole mais il devient indissoluble à une manière réflexive de la philosophie.

Le symbole suppose au juste dans sa propre constitution le double sens et encore une sémantique spécifique en considérant la dualité structurelle du signe (comme signe sensible et signification) et la dualité intentionnelle du signe et de la chose (ou de l'objet) désignés. Ainsi, le symbole superposé à ces dualités représente une *relation du sens au sens* dans la mesure où les signes possèdent déjà un sens primaire, littéral, manifeste et ce sens-même envoie à un autre sens. Pour cette raison, Ricoeur réduit délibérément la notion du symbole aux expressions en ayant un sens double ou multiple de sorte que leur texture sémantique est corrélative inexorablement à une activité de l'interprétation par laquelle le sens second ou le sens multiple s'éclaircissent.

Par l'interprétation, le problème du symbole s'inscrit dans la sphère plus large du langage en utilisant une sémantique spécifique qui révendique l'activité intellectuelle du déchiffrement et aussi la participation du sentiment pour articuler le sens. Le symbole n'est pas du tout un non-langage puisqu'il appartient au discours intégral par lequel l'interprétation dévoile justement la surdétermination du sens<sup>6</sup>.

Les paradoxes de l'interprétation sont en même temps les paradoxes de la réflexion puisque l'universalité du discours philosophique présuppose la contingence des cultures; puis, son rigueur est tributaire aux langages équivoques et enfin son cohérence nécessaire engage le conflit des herméneutiques. Toutefois, comme constate Ricoeur, la position de l'herméneutique est un sujet de dispute surtout à cause de l'engagement de la logique du sens double en tant qu'une logique non-arbitraire, complexe, rigoureuse et irréductible à la logique symbolique. Le discours herméneutique s'associe ainsi à une logique transcendentale concernant les conditions de la possibilité (et non pas de l'objectivité), c'est-à-dire les conditions de l'appropriation de notre envie d'être.

L'herméneutique est un sujet controversé tant extérieurement, par la logique symbolique qu'intérieurement, par les contradictions de l'herméneutique et aussi par la rivalité des interprétations, mais dans ce dernier cas, la contestation signifie en réalité l'incompréhension du rôle stimulateur du conflit sur la réflexion. En ce qui concerne la contestation du côté de la logique symbolique,

elle se justifie seulement dans les conditions de limitation ou de réduction du langage à la fonction qui sert à informer, en éliminant l'équivoque du lexique et l'ambiguïté de la langue commune. Pour la logique, l'utilisation du langage équivoque est inacceptable en causant la confusion du sens et les arguments incertains, mais pour l'herméneutique l'équivoque est, de contraire, une augmentation du sens. Par cela on valide tant la problématique de la réflexion que la logique du sens double comme l'a à priori de l'appropriation du soi par le soi, dans une activité réflexive qui réclame le cadre d'une logique transcendentale.

L'univocité est valable seulement pour le discours comme argument, or la réflexion n'argumente pas mais dit "dans lesquelles des conditions de possibilité, la conscience empirique peut être à égalité avec la conscience thétique"<sup>7</sup>. De cette façon l'utilisation réflexive des symboles aux sens multiples ne signifie pas l'ambiguïté puisque réfléchir et interpréter les symboles constituent une même activité. L'herméneutique implique les étapes argumentatives pour expliquer plus en vue de comprendre mieux et pour trancher entre les interprétations et les traditions rivales.

Les phrases argumentatives, chez Ricoeur, appartiennent à un projet plus vaste qui ne signifie pas de recréer une situation d'univocité en tranchant en faveur d'une interprétation privilégiée, mais son but est bien plutôt de maintenir ouvert un "espace de variations", en exprimant les dimensions de la liberté herméneutique. En ce contexte, "on pourrait dire que la tâche d'un art de l'interprétation, comparée à celui de l'argumentation, est moins de faire prévaloir une opinion sur une autre que de permettre à un texte de *signifier autant qu'il peut*, non de signifier une chose plutôt qu'une autre, mais de «signifier plus», et, ainsi, de faire «penser plus», selon une expression de Kant dans la *Critique de la faculté de juger* (*mehr zu denken*)"<sup>8</sup>. A ce point de vue l'herméneutique est moins proche de la rhétorique que de la poétique en appelant à une imagination productrice — dans sa demande d'un surplus de *sens* — et à une innovation sémantique. La fonction de l'interprétation, conclut Ricoeur, n'est pas seulement de faire qu'un texte signifie autre chose, ni même qu'il signifie tout ce qu'il peut et qu'il signifie toujours plus, mais de déployer ce qui s'appelle le monde du texte.

Après tout, l'interprétation suppose la fonction réflexive et un double mouvement de l'interprétation et du symbole. Ainsi la pensée n'est pas épuisée par une logique de l'argumentation et la validité



des énoncés philosophiques aussi n'est pas épuisée par une théorie syntaxique de la langue: la sémantique philosophique dépasse la logique symbolique, c'est la raison pour laquelle le langage indirect, symbolique de la réflexion est valable quoiqu'équivoque.

On solutionne la crise du langage, de l'interprétation et de la réflexion seulement ensemble, par l'action herméneutique de la récupération du sens et par la limitation des illusions de la conscience fausse ou falsifiée. Nous pouvons déterminer les limites, comme dit Eco<sup>9</sup>, tant de l'utopie des interprétations sémantiques que de la théorie de l'interprétation critique en saisissant les décodifications absurdes et les dogmatismes critiques qui consacrent une situation dans laquelle ne sont pas nécessaires le dialogue, la discussion et à la fin des fins la pensée, puisque un autre parle pour nous-mêmes. C'est la situation dans laquelle l'interprétation coïncide à une déconstruction, par ex. à Derrida. En répliquant à cette manière de destruction, nous considérons la réalité symbolique comme l'expression d'une solidarité d'action humaine, de la pensée et de la sensibilité qui assure l'ouverture vers soi et vers les autres.

A ces exigences, le même discours supporte une reduplication par forme de la question et de la réponse qui s'adresse au soi-même mais aussi aux autres — par le cercle du dialogue — en transformant la connaissance comme la connaissance de soi-même, comme la réflexion et l'interrogation de soi-même.

L'être interprété peut être atteint par le même mouvement de l'interprétation, par le cercle du travail de l'interprétation et de l'être interprété et en fin de compte par les herméneutiques rivales qui ne sont pas du tout "les jeux du langage" mais les actions justifiées par une fonction existentielle particulière. Dans ce cadre, l'ontologie "brisée en morceaux" devient la terre promise d'une philosophie ayant comme point de départ (et de déploiement) le langage et la réflexion. Ce n'est pas une exigence fortuite mais intrinsèque au discours philosophique de sorte que la question «Qu'est-ce qu'exister?» ne peut être séparée de cette autre question: «Qu'est-ce que penser?», mais la philosophie, nous rappelle Ricoeur, vit de l'unité de ces question et meurt de leur séparation.

#### Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> P. Ricoeur, *Philosopher après Kierkegaard*, dans le vol. *Lectures 2. La contrée des philosophes*, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1992, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man. An introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture* (trad. en roumain), Ed. Humanitas, București, 1994, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique I* (trad. en roumain), Ed. Echinox, Cluj, 1999, p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Idem, *De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud* (trad. en roumain), Ed. Trei, București, 1998, p. 53.

<sup>5</sup> Idem, *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique II* (trad. en roumain), Ed. Humanitas, București, 1995, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup> Idem, *De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud*, éd. cit., p. 28.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 64.

<sup>8</sup> P. Ricoeur, *Rhétorique, poétique, herméneutique*, dans le vol. *Lectures 2*, éd. cit., p. 490.

<sup>9</sup> U. Eco, *I limiti dell'interpretazione* (trad. en roumain), Ed. Pontica, Constanța, 1996, p. 34.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER ET LA DEDUCTION TRANSCENDANTALE  
DES CATEGORIES DE KANT

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Dans ce qui suit, nous essayons de surprendre la perspective phénoménologique heideggerienne sur la problématique exposée dans *La critique de la raison pure* de Kant, sous le titre *La deduction transcendantale des catégories*. Maintenant nous envisageons les deux premières sections de la déduction proprement-dite. Il s'agit d'abord des paragraphes 13 et 14 de la *Critique*, et puis, en suivant le développement du discours heideggerien, on envisage le type de déduction transcendantale présente dans la deuxième section de la première édition du livre. On tient en compte l'interprétation que les paragraphes 23 – 25 de *L'interprétation phénoménologique de la Critique de la raison pure de Kant* (1927 – 1928) et des paragraphes 16 – 18 de *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929).

L'abord en étant phénoménologique, car pour Heidegger, l'ontologie n'est pas possible que comme phénoménologie, les prémisses du discours seront complètement autres que celles assumées par l'ample exégèse neo- et post- kantienne en général. Comme *science de l'être l'étant* – selon l'opinion de Heidegger sur la Phénoménologie dans *la période Sein und Zeit* – elle envisagera d'abord l'être ontique-ontologique, le Dasein, qui est l'existence que peut interroger sur le thème de *l'être*. Sa qualité ontique réside en ce qu'il est / existe ontologiquement, qu'il comprend le fait d'être, et que dans sa constitution même il y a une façon de comprendre sa propre constitution comme être.

De l'autre côté au Dasein appartient essentiellement "le fait-d'être-dans-un-monde" que présuppose des existences différents. La compréhension de toute existence – dit Heidegger – se base sur la façon même d'être du Dasein, le résultat de la connaissance des existences en étant fondé sur sa structure intime. Ainsi, pour

Heidegger l'ontologie devait être un développement du comportement interrogatif du Dasein, et la façon de fonder une ontologie présuppose l'étude des structures profondes de l'humain. Dans les oeuvres mentionnées, il croyait que I.Kant, en examinant le transcendantal, a essayé en réalité la même chose, c'est à dire il a essayé de trouver les possibilités internes de l'ontologie, en révélant la constitution de l'être de l'existant humain. Or, la détermination de la possibilité de l'ontologie signifiait pour Heidegger le fondement de la métaphysique et pour cette raison, le philosophe essaiera d'expliquer *La critique de la raison pure* comme fondement de la métaphysique parce qu'il comprend la connaissance transcendentale comme connaissance ontologique.

Problématiser la possibilité de l'ontologie signifie philosopher transcendentalement, signifie dire que la connaissance transcendentale examine la possibilité de la compréhension préalable de l'être, signifie voire le Dasein comme fondement de la métaphysique, dans le sens que "la métaphysique survient nécessairement comme Dasein."<sup>1</sup>

En identifiant la connaissance transcendentale avec la connaissance ontologique et en comprenant par cela la compréhension préalable de l'être, Heidegger va interpréter la philosophie transcendantale kantienne avec l'appareil théorique de sa philosophie même. Ainsi il a en vue les jugements synthétiques *a priori* comme jugements concernant l'être du Dasein, jugements qui se légitiment en se rapportant aux principes que ne proviennent pas de l'expérience. Puis, il a en vue la connaissance ontologique comme présupposition de la connaissance ontique, réalisée au niveau des sciences positives. Cela part du fait que l'ontologie – comme science que fait possible l'objectivation de l'être – fait maître les sciences positives, ontiques. A son tour, l'ontologie s'appuie sur *l'ontologie fondamentale*, appelée aussi *la métaphysique du Dasein*, celle analytique ontologique de l'essence limitée de l'homme – comme Heidegger dit.

De plus, Heidegger fera la lecture de la *Critique* de Kant avec ses propres sens accordés à la finitude humaine et à sa relation avec la transcendance (dans le sens heideggerienne, elle aussi). L'intention de cette interprétation est de montrer que les concepts purs de l'intellect impliquent une référence à la intuition du temps, parce que le dasein est temporalité, la focalisation de la démarche se fait toujours sur l'imagination transcendantale.

Comment on sait, dans le paragraphe 13 intitulé *Sur les principes d'une déduction transcendantale en général*, Kant met en discussion la nécessité de démontrer la légitimité des concepts plus généraux de l'intellect, qui, bien qu'ils ne proviennent pas de l'expérience, considèrent qu'ils font part (sont constitutives pour) objets de l'expérience. Les concepts en étant purs, il s'agit d'une déduction a priori, transcendantale, déduction qui est en réalité une explication du mode dans lequel les concepts peuvent se rapporter a priori aux objets. Prenant comme point de départ la question de Kant: *Comment il est possible que des conditions subjectives de la pensée puissent avoir valabilité, c'est à dire qu'elles procurent les conditions de la possibilité à toute connaissance des objets ?* Pour surprendre l'indicible de l'oeuvre de Kant, Heidegger ne cesse jamais de se demander: *Comment sont possibles les concepts purs, les catégories, dans le sens de concepts ontologiques ? Quel type de concepts sont ceux-ci, pour qu'ils puissent avoir une réalité objective ? En quoi consiste l'essence ontologique des catégories ?*

Heidegger fait des reproches à Kant en relation avec son interrogation ontologique qui se réduit au problème de la validité objective des catégories et se demande sur la réalité objective de celles-ci. En conséquence la révélation des structures transcendantale du sujet doit être vue surtout comme une réponse à une telle question. Conform à cette interprétation, la légitimité des catégories doit être déterminée par la révélation de leur essence. Tout de même demander en relation avec la possibilité interne de l'essence ontologique des catégories signifie mettre en discussion la possibilité du rapport a priori entre la pensée et les objets, et les conditions de la possibilité du réel comme objectualité.

Heidegger dit que le fait que I.Kant a envisagé seulement le problème de la valabilité objective des catégories et non le problème de leur réalité objective est due à une compréhension inadéquate de la *transcendance*, la compréhension *de un a priori dépourvu de toute transcendance* dit Heidegger. Comment on sait, chez Kant, *le transcendant était mis en relation avec le dépassement illégitime des limites de l'expérience possible par la raison théorique*. Tout au contraire, chez Heidegger, le transcendant est compris comme détermination essentielle et originaire de la constitution ontologique du Dasein, signifiant l'orientation de la raison vers l'existant, orientation dans laquelle on voit projetée la détermination de son être. Dans l'horizon de cet être seulement l'existant peut devenir

l'objet de l'expérience. Dans son structure intime, il n'est pas quelque chose qui ressemble à l'existence mais il est chaque fois survenue, processus que s'instituit. La connaissance pure a en vue la transcendance du sujet qui ne signifie seulement le passage du sujet vers l'objet car elle ne serait alors rien que l'expression de un comportement ontique qui s'instituit entre deux existences. Au contraire, elle se trouve dans la structure même du sujet, dans la vertu duquel un tel comportement est possible.

Rélativement au paragraphe 14, on reconnaît la mérite de Kant d'avoir surpris tout de même l'essence ontologique des catégories et d'avoir relationé la problématique de la déduction transcendentale avec la dimension originaire du problème de l'ontologie fondamentale. Si on fait une distinction entre les deux possibles modes d'instituer le rapport sujet - objet dans l'acte de la connaissance:

- a) l'objet détermine la représentation dans le sujet épistémique, situation dans laquelle la relation sujet – objet est empirique.
- b) la représentation du sujet est celle que fait d'abord possible quelque chose comme objet, non en relation avec son existence réelle, mais concernant la possibilité de connaître l'objet comme objet.

Kant s'arrête sur le deuxième cas, en invoquant la connaissance pure comme connaissance déterminée a priori, ce qui fait possible la relation nécessaire sujet – objet. Pour cela, en plus des intuitions pures, l'appareil mental du sujet épistémique doit englober (contenir) nécessairement dans sa structure aussi des concepts purs, des représentations dépourvues de tout contenu empirique. Sans la présupposition de ces concepts purs - dit Kant – rien est possible comme objet de l'expérience. Ils représentent alors les déterminations nécessaires de l'objet comme objet. Cela signifie qu'ils constituent *l'objectualité de l'objet comme objet*, si on parle surtout dans le sens heideggerien. Ce qui est connu empiriquement doit avoir été déterminé en préalable par le caractère de son objectualité pour que ainsi il puisse être connu. L'objectualité est la détermination qui fait partie du contenu d'une notion. Lorsqu'on dit, par exemple, que *la pierre est* par cet *est* on ne dit pas quoi exactement appartient à cette pierre – comme pierre. On dit seulement que, ici, ce que appartient à la pierre existe. Dans ce

sens, Kant avait dit: *l'existence est seulement la mise d'une chose ou de certaines déterminations dans soi-même.*

Chez Heidegger, la problématique que la déduction transcendantale envisage se formule ainsi: « pour démontrer la possibilité de la connaissance a priori, pure, on doit montrer que l'essence ontologique des catégories réside en la constitution préalable de ce qu'on doit connaître dans sa propre objectualité »<sup>2</sup>. De cette façon, la représentation se rapporte créativement aux existences dans la sens que l'intellect crée la manière dans laquelle le contenu donné premièrement dans l'intuition est ramené à une unité valable pour plusieurs. Par conséquence, il ne peut pas s'en agir d'une capacité ontique – ontologique de notre intellect en rapport avec l'existence, en vertu des limites humaines. Tout de même il reste la possibilité d'accès aux existences par l'intermédiaire de la connaissance. La structure qui revient au sujet épistémique et qui fait possible cet accès au mode d'exister différent de lui même, fait en même temps possible que l'existence se manifeste comme objet c'est à dire qu'elle lui permet de se distancer comme quelque chose de différent du sujet. De cette manière l'existence s'objective et, par conséquence, il devient possible la possibilité de l'objet comme objet: l'objectivité. Ce mode d'accès à l'existence s'appelle *experience*.

La chose qui fait possible l'accès à l'existence est, en même temps, ce que fait possible la révélation de cette existence comme objet et ce fond de possibilité représente pour Heidegger la transcendance. Elle n'est ni le sujet, ni l'objet, si non le domaine d'accès réciproque de ceux-ci.

Comme je disais, dans l'interprétation de Heidegger, la tâche de la déduction transcendantale des catégories est celle de démontrer leur réalité objective. Cette démonstration ne regarde la formation des concepts au niveau ontique, formation qui se fait par comparaison, par réflexion et par abstraction ce qui ramène la diversité de l'apparence à l'unité. Le concept se peut ainsi appliquer à des autres objets empiriques, ce qui lui assurera la validité objective. Au contraire, le problème apparaît au niveau ontologique, là où on n'envisage pas la détermination des objets déjà donnés par des concepts, mais la détermination de la synthèse pure de la diversité par des concepts.

L'abord de Kant dans cette direction veut déterminer l'essence ontologique des catégories, c'est à dire de la réalité objective qui leur revient. Car *la réalité* ne signifie ici l'actualité, mais elle prend le sens

de la notion traditionnelle *d'essence*. La question est: pouvons-nous justifier ces catégories comme ayant accès à la structure d'être de l'existence à connaître qu'on doit connaître ?

Si on suit le fil de la déduction transcendantale dans la version de la première édition de la *Critique de la raison pure* que la démarche de Kant entame la discussion des principes a priori de la possibilité de l'expérience. La syntagme "la possibilité de l'expérience" est relationnelle avec le problème de la réalité objective des catégories. L'expérience est la détermination de ce qu'on est donné à travers de la perception en conformité avec la pensée. Alors, on doit établir la réalité objective de notre connaissance a priori en fonction de la possibilité de l'expérience. L'interrogation sur la possibilité de l'expérience – dit Heidegger – survient comme une interrogation en ce qui concerne la transcendance (*une problème qui reste insoluble chez Kant*). Mais la transcendance discutée ici n'est pas la transcendance ontique qui désigne la relation de fait (factique) établie entre le sujet et une autre existence. Etant donné que ce qu'on veut discuter est la relation du sujet avec l'existence en général, respectivement avec l'être de l'existence. Le problème se pose comme problématique de la transcendance ontologique qui fait tout transcendance ontique possible. La possibilité de l'expérience par laquelle se justifie la réalité objective des objets de la connaissance, engage dans la démarche kantienne le problème du mode dans lequel le sujet épistémique se rapporte aux objets en général. Pour cela, la démarche en discussion est centrée sur l'analyse de la synthèse, dans ses différentes modalités de réalisation, en rapport avec l'intuition, l'imagination et l'aperception. Dans cette démarche – apprécie l'interprète allemand – nous avons à faire, en réalité, avec des trois modes de la synthèse ontologique pure de l'imagination : la synthèse de l'appréhension, dans l'intuition, la synthèse de la reproduction dans l'imagination et la synthèse de la re-cognition dans le concept. Conformément à la lecture heideggerienne, les synthèses empiriques dans l'intuition, dans l'imagination et dans le concept se fondent sur les synthèses pures, qui, à leur tour, s'enracinent dans la synthèse pure de l'imagination rapportée au temps. À cause de cela, le but principal de l'interprétation de ces trois sections consistera en la présentation de la structure de base de la synthèse de l'imagination transcendantale, dans son rapport avec le temps, comme fondement a priori de la possibilité du rapport aux objets, en général.



Dans une observation préliminaire, Kant montrera que toutes nos représentations, de n'importe où qu'elles proviennent (empiriques ou pures) appartiennent, comme modifications de la sensation, au sens interne (au temps). Cela relève le fait que l'imagination transcendante est en soi-même le rapport au temps. En transgressant ce que Kant dit d'une manière explicite, Heidegger comprend par l'imagination transcendante le temps même comme temps originaire, qu'il appellera temporalité.

L'interprète rappela que I. Kant même avait dit que toutes nos représentations appartiennent, comme modifications de la sensation au sens interne et, par conséquent, toutes nos connaissances se subordonnent finalement aux conditions formales du sens interne qui est le temps. La synthèse de l'appréhension signifie la réunion de la diversité dans une représentation – comme représentation de ce qu'on est donné. Mais pour que le rapport à l'objet le fasse accessible comme ce qu'il est dans sa totalité, « la synthèse de l'appréhension réclame la nécessité de la synthèse de la reproduction »<sup>3</sup>. Au niveau empirique celui-ci se réfère à la capacité de la raison de passer d'une représentation à l'autre sans s'appuyer nécessairement sur une intuition directe des objets. Quelle est la base de telle possibilité ? Il s'agit du fait que les représentations même doivent être en préalable subordonnées nécessairement à une règle de la succession. Mais la succession renvoie au temps. Le rapport à l'objet est alors possible seulement en fonction de la capacité de mémorisation et de reproduction de ce qu'on a directement intuit quelque temps auparavant. Toute fois, cette possibilité de la reproduction empirique presuppose à son tour la présence dans le sujet de la synthèse a priori pure de l'imagination, c'est à dire l'imagination transcendante dans son rapport a priori à la forme pure de l'intuition qui est le temps. En suite, le fait que nous avons la capacité de retenir ce que nous avons intuit antérieurement et de revenir vers celui-ci signifie que nous pouvons reconnaître ce que nous avons intuit antérieurement comme étant *le même* que nous intuyons maintenant. La reproduction n'est pas possible si nous ne pouvons pas re-produire ce qui est déjà passé comme étant *le même* par l'acte de reconnaissance réalisé dans le présent. Ainsi l'appréhension réclame la nécessité de la reproduction et celle-ci prouve la nécessité de la re-cognition. Kant subordonnera la synthèse de la re-cognition à l'intellect, ce qui signifie que seulement les premières deux se rapportent d'une façon claire au temps. En se

référant à cela Heidegger reconnaît qu'il passera au-delà de ce que Kant avait dit explicitement et il commencera par contester la désignation de la troisième synthèse comme "recognition". Il s'agit, dit-il, d'un acte d'identification. Quelle est la nature de cette synthèse de l'identification ? En réalité nous ne commençons jamais à connaître quelque chose du présent, comme si antérieurement rien d'autre on nous ait été donné. Dans l'appréhension il existe pour nous une région des existences qui se trouvent en relation les unes avec les autres, quoique leur unité n'est pas clairement conceptualisée. « Toute identification demande que on nous a déjà donné une interrelation des existences dans sa totalité »<sup>4</sup>. En cette situation, l'identification présuppose "l'attente anticipative" de l'unité d'une région des existences. Cela signifie que la troisième synthèse est aussi rapportée au temps et que le temps est le fondement ontologique transcendantal de l'interrelation des trois synthèses. Le moment temporel auquel la troisième synthèse fait référence est le futur, ou *le-fait – d'avoir – quelque-chose-de-façon-anticipée*. Finalement, Heidegger considéra qu'il est plus raisonnable de appeler la troisième synthèse, *la synthèse de la pre-cognition*. Dans la mesure dans laquelle les trois modes de la synthèse se rapportent au temps (la première au présent, la deuxième au passé, la troisième au futur) et, attendu que ces trois moments temporels représentent l'unité du temps même, les trois synthèses maintiennent leur fondement unitaire dans le caractère unitaire du temps même.

Comme *synthèse dans le concept*, la synthèse de la pre-cognition est en relation avec l'activité du sujet. Si nous acceptons maintenant sa référence nécessaire au temps il résulte que l'intellect même est, par sa nature, en relation avec le temps et il n'est seulement l'expression de la spontanéité indépendante du temps, comme Kant l'a voulu, opposé de cette manière à l'intuition pure du temps, dans la substance duquel on renferme la réceptivité.

Or, si la synthèse de l'intellect comme synthèse de la recognition dans le concept se rapporte nécessairement au temps et si en outre, les catégories proviennent précisément de cette synthèse comme activité de l'intellect, si alors le rapport réciproque de ces trois synthèses est possible dans le domaine du temps, alors l'origine des catégories est le temps même. L'essence ontologique des catégories est de cette façon révélée.

Mais Kant même – dit l'interprète – avait établi l'essence ontologique des catégories dans sa doctrine sur le schématisme, une

doctrine dont le nucléus le constitue précisément le problème de la référence des catégories au temps. Il résulte clairement que, quoique d'une manière indirecte, le noyau de la déduction transcendantale se trouve, pour Kant, aussi, dans le temps. Alors, on peut affirmer que l'interprétation heideggerienne, que semble être hostile à l'œuvre de Kant, peut être justifiée et comprise seulement dans la perspective de la doctrine kantienne sur le schématisme.

Il est nécessaire en avoir une pré-conception, pour achever un acte dans lequel je joins ce qu'on offre avec ce que a constitué antérieurement pour moi ce fait. L'anticipation de la totalité régionale mentionnée fait pour la première fois possible l'identification des objets individuels de la région en question. La synthèse transcendantale de la re-cognition comme anticipation de la relation avec les objets en général, est, dit Heidegger, le fondement qui soutient l'unité des synthèses pures de l'appréhension et de la représentation.

Mais cela se passe grâce au rapport spécifique au temps, c'est à dire, au rapport de la synthèse re-cognitive au futur, chose qui ne se révèle pas chez Kant. Toutefois, dit Heidegger, Kant ne sera très clair autour du sujet sur la base de l'unité transcendantale (l'aperception transcendantale) dans son originalité, c'est à dire dans son rapport au temps. Pourtant Heidegger ne nous clarifie pas si l'aperception transcendantale est quelque chose d'ajoutée, comme liaison unificatrice, aux trois synthèses, ou si, au contraire, elle se base sur le fait que toutes ces synthèses sont par elles mêmes rapportées au temps, que sont unies, interrélacionnées et ainsi enracinées dans le temps.

On sait très bien que I. Kant a accordé la première place à la troisième synthèse. Pour cette raison – constate Heidegger – il va discuter l'essence de l'aperception transcendantale au relation avec l'essence de l'objet comme-objet. Quelles sont les présuppositions de l'idée d'objet chez Kant ? Au sujet de la distinction *chose-en-soi / phénomène* « comme distinction ... non entre une chose considérée comme apparition et la même chose considérée en soi même, si non ... entre la considération d'une chose telle qu'elle apparaît et la considération de la même chose telle qu'elle est en soi même »<sup>5</sup>, on sait que beaucoup d'interprètes (William Richardson, Henry Allison, Nicolas Rescher, Constantin Noica) ont souligné la nécessité de ne pas confondre les trois concepts qui diffèrent chez Kant : chose-en-soi, noumen, objet transcendantal. Le noumen, concept

épistémologique par excellence qui exprime l'indépendance autour de la subjectivité a un rôle limitatif. Comme objet de la pensée critique, le noumen est corrélé au concept transcendantal de *l'apparition* et ainsi il est intimement relationné avec la doctrine de la sensibilité. Au contraire, l'objet transcendantale a un sens objectif. Il est établi par la conscience pour que le monde ne reste pas un simple monde des représentations sans substrat. Il est corrélé avec l'unité de l'aperception pour la diversité de l'apparition sensible. La chose-en soi est le correspondant d'une certaine apparence, est la *spécification* de l'objet transcendantal. Pour cela Kant parle sur la chose-en-soi ou pluriel. Heidegger dit que l'idée *d'objet en général* doit être pensée comme la chose qui précède toute conception ontique des existences déterminées. Cela signifie que la connaissance ontologique aspire justement vers cette objectualité. N'étant pas existence, *l'objet-en-général* est ce qui fait possible pour une existence déterminée l'apparition comme objet dans l'acte de la connaissance. Pour Heidegger, l'objet transcendantal sera *l'horizon pur* qui est une condition nécessaire, parce qu'il fait possible que les autres existences peuvent apparaître et soient comme par le sujet épistémique comme objets.

La détermination des bases a priori de la possibilité de l'expérience fait que la démarche se contre sur la subjectivité du sujet, c'est à dire sur le discours transcendantal – ontologique de la aperception transcendantale, qui, chez Heidegger est en relation avec les trois synthèses et avec le terme de *catégorie*.

Dans la paragraphe 7 de *l'Antropologie*, cité par Heidegger, Kant détermine la notion de *l'aperception* comme *la connaissance de l'activité même du sujet*. Heidegger recourra à l'étimologie latine du terme où *ad-percipere* signifie l'activité de la conception de soi même, de la compréhension de soi même concernant les propres habiletés, capacités. Les capacités du sujet déterminent la manière d'être de celui ci. Heidegger apprend dans un passage de la *Critique* (A341/ B 399) que l'aperception transcendantale reçoit le qualificatif de *catégorie primordiale*. Quoiqu'elle n'appartienne pas aux catégories, l'aperception transcendantale est presupposée par chaque catégorie dans toute manifestation. Dans son usage, elle apparaît comme un *véhicule* des concept comme tels. Ainsi, les catégories ne sont pas de la simple *substance*, *causalité*, etc, mais plutôt, *je pense la substance*, *je pense la causalité*, et cela justement dans la mesure dans laquelle elles appartiennent à l'activité originaire de l'intellect.

L'aperception transcendantale guide la pensée entière, car elle appartient à la conscience, c'est à dire à la connaissance originaire de l'unité, à l'intérieur de laquelle toute synthèse est possible.

Le sujet dans son être intime se défine comme activité, et comme activité primordiale trouve son manifestation dans la fourniture anticipative d'un horizon de l'unité en fonction, duquel quelque chose est possible comme appartenant à un moi.

Les catégories – dit Heidegger – sont alors enracinées dans un projet qui anticipe l'horizon d'un a priori. La raison doit avoir devant ses yeux l'identité de ses actes. Mais l'acte de cette identification du moi-comme le même moi est possible seulement en fonction de la synthèse de l'identification. Ainsi, en même temps, les synthèses de l'appréhension et de la reproduction devient elles aussi possibles. C'est pourquoi la troisième synthèse se trouve dans une relation spéciale avec l'aperception transcendantale. Il faut ajouter tout de même que Kant entend l'identification du moi en partant exclusivement du présent, dans le sens que ce *moi* se peut identifier à lui même comme étant le même a chaque *maintenant*. Heidegger va plus loin en abordant le problème de l'identité du moi- comme soi même déterminé par *je peux* comme expression de ses libertés et possibilités. Ce renvoi du soi au soi en traversant toutes les dimensions de la temporalité constitue le concept existentiel authentique de l'identification du soi. C'est pourquoi Heidegger affirme: *L'échec de Kant est celui de n'avoir réussi à comprendre l'identification de soi même du moi comme phénomène originaire-historique. La condition d'être soi du soi n'est pas comprise dans les termes de l'entière extension temporelle du Dasein et, ainsi, le futur ne peut pas être compris dans ce sens comme extase primordial de la temporalité.*<sup>6</sup>

Mais l'intellect a été déjà désigné par Kant comme *la faculté des règles*. Qu'est ce que *règle* signifie dans ce contexte ci ? Pour Kant, la règle est la représentation d'une condition universale, conformément à laquelle une diversité peut être représenté dans son unité. La possibilité de l'intellect comme *faculte des règles* s'enracine dans sa spontanéité. Mais, dit Heidegger, la réglementation comme telle peut survenir seulement dans le cas d'une existence qui est en soi même ouverte vers celle-ci et don't l'essence est nécessairement la transcendance, c'est à dire la liberté. L'intellect présente à soi même ces règles et ainsi se configure devant soi l'horizon de l'unité de ces règles. La liaison interne de ces règles fait possible

l'association des synthèses. Le principe de la possibilité de l'association de la diversité, étant donné qu'il se trouve dans l'objet, s'appelle *affinité de la diversité*. Tous les phénomènes possibles appartiennent, comme représentations, à la conscience-de-soi-possible.

Tous les phénomènes, attendu qu'ils sont ainsi soumis à certaines règles (lois) nécessaires, entrent dans une affinité universelle appelée *affinité transcendantale*, à l'intérieur de laquelle celle empirique est seulement une conséquence.

À la suite de cette analyse, Heidegger va souligner la caractéristique nécessaire d'un rapport temporel spécifique aux trois modes de synthèse. En même temps, il comprendra l'aperception transcendantale comme étant une caractéristique du sujet dans lequel l'objectualité de l'objet comme tel est premièrement constitué. En outre, il a montré que la révélation des structures transcendantales du sujet offre une réponse à la question qui regarde la possibilité de la réalité objective des catégories. Une fois que la liaison intime fondamentale entre l'aperception transcendantale et le temps est rendue visible dans le domaine de la temporalité, dit Heidegger, on doit accorder inévitablement priorité à la temporalité – même.

### Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> Cf: Otto Pöggler; *Drumul gândirii lui Heidegger* (Der Denkweg M Heideggers), Humanitas, București, 1998, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> M. Heidegger; *Kant et le problème de la métaphysique*, Gallimard, 1953, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> M. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Indiana University Press, p. 240.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 245.

<sup>5</sup> Henry Allison; *Kant's Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense*, Yale University Press, 1983.

<sup>6</sup> M. Heidegger, *op.cit.*, p. 259.

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL  
DEDUCTION OF CATEGORIES\*

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1. Transcendental deduction of categories is almost generally considered nowadays as the very heart of the Transcendental Analytic and *Critique of Pure Reason* as a whole. Kantian research has not only shown the historical novelty but also theoretical value of this attempt, the origin of the so-called – beginning with Strawson – “transcendental argument”, being located here. In his interpretation to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Strawson himself appreciated Kantian transcendental deduction as being “one of the most abstruse passages of argument, as also one of the most impressive and exciting, in the whole of philosophy”<sup>1</sup>.

Not only Strawson but also all the interpreters of Kant notice the extreme difficulties we have to face when studying this part of Kant's philosophy. Difficulties can be at least partially surpassed by exactly defining the Kantian project and the conditions that determined its way of achievement. Identifying the presuppositions that lay behind Kant's argumentation can do this. In the present paper I will try to present and develop the results achieved so far in actual research on this subject.

To study the presuppositions of transcendental deduction of categories, actually means to apply Kant's own method of analysis in studying Kant. As well acknowledged, one of the essential components of transcendental method is the research that leaves from certain knowledge, which's truth we cannot doubt about, and looks for the conditions that make it possible. Yet in the Introduction to the *Critique*, starting from the existence of some synthetic a priori judgements within the pure mathematics and pure science of nature, the “true problem” of critic philosophy is considered to be expressed by the following question: how are such judgements possible? As we

intend to study the presuppositions of Kantian transcendental deduction of categories we are going to transpose the question concerning the conditions of possibility of certain cognitive act into a meta-theoretical level. Consequently in this paper by presuppositions we shall understand the usually implicit conditions of possibility of the transcendental deduction of categories<sup>2</sup>.

2. The first and, in a certain sense, the most important presupposition of Kantian argumentation is contained by the very term that Kant chose to signify it, that of *deduction*. Deduction is understood here not as logical derivation of a conclusion from a given premises (syllogistic inference), but in a sense that is very close to the understanding of Kant's contemporary lawyers. Distinction between transcendental deduction and the syllogistic one is essential for a correct understanding of Kant's attempt. The juridical source of his concept is suggested – true, without any explanation that would be indispensable for contemporary readers – at the very beginning of the corresponding section of the *Critique*: “Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right (*quid juris*) from the question of fact (*quid facti*), and while they demand proof of both, they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of *deduction*”<sup>3</sup>. It is clear from this passage that the term we are interested in is always bound to the idea of *litigation*, where we must distinguish the *question of fact* from the *question of right* and that argumentation of the claim in the last one is called deduction.

A special study of juridical source of Kantian deduction has shown that in the specialized language of the time by *deduction* one understood the argumentation, in front of a court, of the legitimacy, that is, the conformity to law, of some claim, most times a patrimonial one<sup>4</sup>. The logical mechanism of argumentation was that of reduction to absurd, in Latin *deductio ad absurdum*. In time, the final part of the expression was omitted; so only the first has been kept, *deductio*, then in German *Deduktion* designed this kind of argumentation in a process.

We do not need to insist upon details. But argumentation by reduction to absurd is evident within Kantian theory of antinomies, where both thesis and anti-thesis are proved by the impossibility of opposed sentence. It is still not directly noticeable in the transcendental deduction of the categories. Though F. Ishikawa has discovered in the text of Transcendental Deduction some



contradictory oppositions designed to allow proving the truth of a proposition by determining the impossibility of its contradictory. Maybe the most general opposition of this kind is the distinction between empirical deduction and transcendental deduction: the impossibility of empirical deduction of categories proves the necessity of their transcendental deduction. But such an argumentation is not sufficient at all. It only proves that deduction of categories cannot be but transcendental; it says nothing about the way it could be made. So, whatever importance Ishikawa's study may have, it is not sufficient to explain Kantian transcendental deduction.

So far we only keep in mind for our subject the idea that Kantian transcendental deduction is the argumentation of the legitimacy of categories' claim to be applied to objects given within experience, in the context of epistemological transposition of juridical distinction between question of fact and question of right<sup>5</sup>. The first presupposition of the transcendental deduction can be thus considered the assertion that deduction is the argumentation of certain cognitive legitimacy.

3. The internal unity of argumentation is the second presupposition of Kantian transcendental deduction of categories. This sentence seems self-evident while the unity or internal coherence is a necessary logical condition of any argumentation validity. Things are not so simple as they look like. Paul Guyer<sup>6</sup> has proved that there are no less than six different strategies of transcendental deduction. Taking account not only the two versions of deduction, Deduction A and Deduction B, corresponding to the first two editions of the *Critique* (first edition in 1781 and second edition in 1787) but also the posthumous notes dating both from period anterior to *Critique* publication and from ulterior period, then it becomes hardly to speak of some unitary argumentation. For that reason the author just mentioned considers that there is a "fundamental ambivalence", an "uncertainty", even "some confusion" in the Kantian transcendental deduction, even in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. "Because of these uncertainties, it was inevitable that the deduction, which should have been the keystone to the triumphal arch of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, never amounted to more than a disjointed summary of significantly different strategies"<sup>7</sup>.

Paul Guyer finally reaches some more general statements whose doubtful character should have been sufficient to point the weakness of his interpretation. It is well known that the so-called

“patchwork theory”, once supported by Hans Vaihinger and Norman Kemp Smith, started quite from the supposed incoherence of the text of Transcendental Deduction in order to dispute the internal coherence of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a whole. Writing his work in a hurry, Kant would have put together the notes from different periods in the long time that separates the *Critique* from Inaugural Dissertation, without always noticing their incompatibility. Even if he recognizes as hopeless the tentative to distinguish within the text of Deduction the historical elaboration order of its different parts (its “layers”, as it used to be said), Paul Guyer asserts that whatever would be the historic order of their composition, the texts of Deduction (including Deduction B) express a “patchwork of arguments”<sup>8</sup>. As we see, the patchwork theory that we thought fully abandoned comes again under this restricted form within actual debates of Kant scholars.

I must say that my intention is far from contesting the value and importance of Guyer’s work. On the contrary, the thoroughness of his research upon both the works published by Kant himself and posthumous notes, as well as the information gathered concerning the internal tensions that determined Kant’s thinking evolution, all these are admirable things and deserve appreciation of any other Kantian researcher. The only thing debatable is, in my opinion, the interpretation of transcendental deduction that Guyer proposes.

There are two problems here, tightly connected though not identical. The first is that if there is a definitive version of the deduction. If yes, then the second problem is: does that version have an internal distinguishable unity?

I think the first question can with no doubt be answered yes. For, even if in his personal notes Kant studied the possibility of some different strategies for the deduction, after the publication of the second edition of the *Critique* (1787) he did not notably change the text of the Deduction in none of the three editions Kant published afterwards himself. The second edition had almost completely changed the text of the Transcendental Deduction. The fact that afterwards Kant kept it unchanged brings up the conclusion that Kant considered it as the final version of the argumentation. As well known, Kant was a very scrupulous thinker. He never left unexamined any possible way of research and preferred to take the risk of apparent contradictions instead of that of incompleteness. It is not wonder that even after 1787 he continued to meditate upon

transcendental deduction and look for different strategies to fulfill it. The fundamental fact that he did not modify the text of the Deduction must determine us to consider it as final version. There is, consequently, by Kant's indirect testimony, a *final version* of the transcendental deduction of the categories and that is Deduction B.

Starting with the well-known article of Dieter Henrich<sup>9</sup> the Kantian research has imposed an affirmative answer to the second problem. Against the older interpretations, which used to claim that in the Deduction B there are two different argumentations for one and the same idea of objective validity of categories, Heinrich has proved that the apparent two different proofs are in fact two parts or two steps of one and the same argumentation (*two-steps-in-one-proof theory*). It is true that Heinrich's interpretation raised some questions, some difficulties that cannot be passed over without several modifications. But these modifications can be done without changing the basic idea of the unity of argumentation in Deduction B<sup>10</sup>.

Consequently, the internal unity of Kantian transcendental deduction is real and can be considered as an authentic presupposition of the discussed argumentation. The internal unity of the deduction has important consequences: first, it remotes the doubts, so often expressed, concerning the success of Kantian argumentation; second, it makes possible a presuppositional research of the deduction. For it is obvious that an argumentation lacking the internal unity cannot be the object of such a research; at least, practically speaking and given the condition that we assume its interpretation not its demolishing.

4. In analyzing the next three presuppositions I will start from the research of Henry Allison, one of the best North-American knowers of Kant's thought and, as far as I know, the pioneer of presuppositional research of transcendental deduction<sup>11</sup>.

A simple and evident presupposition of Kantian transcendental deduction of the categories, third in our analysis, is the existence itself of the categories, that is, the existence of some pure original concepts of the intellect that, though originating in the intellect itself, claim to apply to the knowledge of things independent of the intellect. The epistemological status of the categories has generated many misunderstandings. For these concepts are *gained* not *innate*, specifically gained from experience. But, though obtained only *within* experience, they do not *come from* experience. The experience only offers, as Kant says, the occasional causes for their producing (*die*

*Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer Erzeugung*)<sup>12</sup>, through impressions of the senses that provoke the functioning of the faculty of knowledge. But their real cause is the intellect itself. Kant inherited this fundamental idea about the existence of some *a priori* concepts of the human intellect from the Leibnizo-Wolffian rationalism; it is not accepted by the empiricists so it cannot be considered as self-evident and out of any criticism.

Such a criticism has been formulated by Stephan Körner, not only an important philosopher of mathematics but also, as many of the contemporary philosophers of science, a brilliant interpreter of Kant. I will try to resume as briefly as possible Körner's objection<sup>13</sup>. Starting from the way Strawson characterized the transcendental argument, as an analytic or regressive argument that starts from given knowledge and establishes the *conceptual* or *categorical framework* it depends on, Körner objects that this attempt would reach its end only if it contained an demonstration of *uniqueness*; that is, if it could prove this framework as being the *only* one which could sustain the knowledge in question. Or, such a demonstration is more than not given, it is also impossible in principle because the categorial frameworks do have a historical character; they are, consequently, relative. What a thinker can prove is only the existence of his *own* framework but not the existence of a unique and universally valid one. Following the suggestive example of Körner, when we are thirsty we have to drink a liquid but not necessarily lemonade.

I do not intend here to discuss if Körner is right or not concerning the transcendental argument in its Strawsonian sense. Körner says that the mentioned lack belongs to Kant's transcendental deduction of categories itself, and he strongly asserts that Kant's transcendental deduction has failed".<sup>14</sup> Körner's argumentation seems convincing. But, as Manfred Baum has pointed out, it is grounded on the contestable supposition of the *analyticity*, that is, of the *regressive* feature of the Kantian transcendental deduction. So, it actually hits a wrong target. Anyway, in order to avoid misunderstandings, Baum proposes to use the expression *transcendental proof* in order to signify the Kantian argumentation, instead of *transcendental argument*.<sup>15</sup>

Körner's critique must also be rejected on a different reason that can be discovered by a careful reexamination of the Kant's project, of what Kant really aims to prove in the transcendental deduction of the

categories. It is right that the corresponding text in the *Critique* is extremely obscure and intricate; it contains so many different themes that it gives the impression of a jungle of ideas that admits any axe-cut all-directions road. Körner is a very well connoisseur of Kant<sup>16</sup>. But it seems to me that, keeping the same metaphor, the road he cuts in the jungle of the transcendental deduction does not lead us to the light of understanding. What does Kant propose, finally? Does he want to prove the *existence* of the categories? In this case, Körner is right and the transcendental deduction is a failure. But this is not what Kant aims to do. We too easily forget or purely ignore the fact that the transcendental deduction is preceded in the *Critique* by the metaphysical deduction. Here, starting from the analysis of the logical functions of the intellect in the judgments, the categorial structure of the thinking is discovered and fixed in the table of categories. Transcendental deduction *borrow*s, to say so, the list of categories from the metaphysical deduction. Its task is not to *discover* the categories or to argue their existence. Its task is a completely different one, namely to prove the objective validity of the categories; that is, their necessary applicability to the objects of the experience.

It is true that the problem that led Kant to the idea of a transcendental deduction of the categories arose into his mind before he even thought of the possibility of a metaphysical deduction. There is the question: "How it is possible a representation that relates to the object without being affected by the object?"<sup>17</sup> Or, in clearer terms, how can a representation that comes from our intellect not from the things have an objective value? Before he discovered the way the list of categories could be completely and definitively established, Kant asks the question concerning the ground of the objective validity of some pure concepts as *substance* and *causality*. But we are not referring here to the historical order of the two kinds of deduction; we are referring to the logical order, as it is shown in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

On the other side, it is possible to discuss about the success or the failure of the metaphysical deduction. There are numerous cautions expressed on this point. But we must say, as clearly as possible, that the objections that have been brought cannot be considered as decisive and, besides, they are not unanimously accepted. As well, it is disputable if there is an eternal categorial framework, an invariable deep structure of the human mind, as Kant seems to have thought or, on the contrary, there are only relative

conceptual frames, depending on different periods of the human intellectual evolution, as today historicism believes. Though it is necessary to point out that there is no decisive argument for the historicism and relativism; it is possible that they are simple theoretical fashions of our times and, consequently, they are not accepted by all the contemporary thinkers. Some of them, as Alvin Plantinga, even intend to write books “against the (relativist) current”<sup>18</sup>.

But these are not the things we are mainly interested here in. Our problem is a different one and can be expressed now in the following terms: is the *existence* of categories the *conclusion* or the *presupposition* of the Kantian transcendental deduction? Our option for the second alternative is based on the simple argument that the transcendental deduction of the categories is *preceded* and *conditioned* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* by their metaphysical deduction. In this sense we can say that the existence of the categories is a necessary presupposition of their transcendental deduction, the third within the order of our analysis. From here we have an important conclusion for the exegesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: the order of the two deductions, metaphysical and transcendental, cannot be inversed, as some Kant's scholars have proposed<sup>19</sup>.

5. Another presupposition of the Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories is the radical difference between sensibility and intellect. It definitively separates Kant by Leibniz and dogmatic rationalism he inspired. Indeed, for Leibniz there is only a gradual or logical distinction between the representations of the intellect and those of the sensibility. First of them are clear and distinct, while the second are obscure and confuse. It follows that there is a necessary accordance between them, between what is sensibly perceived and what is clearly and distinctly rationally thought. Consequently, for Leibniz and his followers, the problem of an eventual disharmony between them, or the problem of a necessary argumentation for their accordance, does not exist.

The same thing can be thought as valid, though from another reason, for Locke and empiricist philosophers. If our ideas come from experience by abstraction and, if complex ideas, no matter how remote from experience could seem, are, in a final analysis, nothing else than combinations of simple ideas, the application of ideas to experience given objects does not raise any problem. Hume even

made from the discovering of sensorial impression that stands at the basement of certain idea a method of the philosophical research. Any time an abstract idea creates trouble, we must reduce it by analysis to the impression it comes from. If such an impression does not exist, the idea has no cognitive value.

For both currents that dominated, as well known, the modern pre-Kantian philosophy of knowledge, the accordance between perceptions and ideas did not constitute a problem and this is the reason why philosophers representing these currents did not feel any need for a transcendental deduction, in the Kantian sense of the word. On the contrary, for Kant the sensibility and the intellect are two radically different faculties of knowledge, having different cognitive functions. So, their disagreement remains in principle possible. As he says, "phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought"<sup>20</sup>. Thus, the argumentation of the conformity of pure concepts with sensible intuitions becomes an emergency.

The presupposition just examined is important because it explains *why*, unlike all his forerunners, both rationalists and empiricists, had Kant to elaborate a transcendental deduction for the pure original concepts of the intellect.

6. In order to understand not only the reason that determined Kant to introduce this new type of argumentation but also the way this argumentation goes on, we must assume, following H. Allison, another presupposition: a concept or a principle can be legitimated only if it can be related, in one way or another, to the intuitive given<sup>21</sup>. This presupposition is a necessary complement for the anterior one. For Kant, the radical functional difference between sensibility and intellect, on the first hand, and respectively their cooperation in the cognitive process, on the other hand, is inseparable. They are the two faces of the same medal, to use an old fashioned metaphor.

In any case, this presupposition explains the main stream of argumentation in the B deduction: the first part of it will prove that the application of the categories to the intuitions is *necessary*, and the second part will prove that it is *possible*.

7. Professor Henry Allison has the opinion that the presuppositions so far discussed must be added with two more presuppositions in order to explain not only the necessity and the method of deduction but also its *feasibility*, that is, the possibility to be achieved, to be practiced. These are the new presuppositions: the

*spontaneous* character of our intellect, that is, its capacity to impose its proper rules, the pure concepts, on the sensible spatial-temporal manifold; and, the *inability* of the sensible data to offer by themselves a knowledge of the objects. The two “additional assumptions”, as Allison calls them, can be bound in a more general presupposition, concerning the *discursive character* of the human intellect. “To claim that our understanding is discursive is to claim that it operates by means of the conceptualization of given data. As Kant makes clear at the very beginning of his *Transcendental Analytic*, this is a fundamental presupposition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*”<sup>22</sup>.

8. Resuming what we have said so far, we shall retain that some of the presuppositions in the Kantian transcendental deduction of the categories are as follows:

- 1) Transcendental deduction is an argumentation of *legitimacy* (Juridical source of the term).
- 2) Transcendental deduction is a *unitary* argumentation and thus it has a *coherent set of presuppositions*.
- 3) Transcendental deduction presupposes the *existence* of the pure concepts of the understanding (categories).
- 4) Transcendental deduction presupposes the *radical distinction* between sensibility and understanding.
- 5) Transcendental deduction presupposes that human understanding is discursive, i.e. it operates by conceptualization of the sensible data:
  - a) *spontaneity* of the understanding, its capacity to affirm its own rules, expressed by categories, upon the sensible data;
  - b) *insufficiency* of sensible data in order to constitute knowledge on objects.

The presuppositions we have discussed allow us to better understand the Kantian project of a transcendental deduction, its character, necessity, orientation and its feasibility. They all relate, finally, to experience, categories being just the conditions of possibility for it. It is also true that the argument in the transcendental deduction refer to the categories in general, without giving any specific proofs for the applicability of every category in part or, at least, of every class of categories. Categories can be applied to the objects of experience only through their schemata and this application of the schematized categories is guided by some rules



that are the principles of the intellect. This is why the transcendental deduction of categories cannot be definitively separated from the theory of schematism and principles. The complete proof for the objective validity of the categories can be then obtained only by relating these three essential endeavors of the Kantian theoretic criticism.

### Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, (1966), Methuen & Co., London, 1975, p. 25. Strawson only speaks about transcendental arguments in another work: *Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (1959), Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> This mention is necessary because there is already a large amount of literature concerned with logic analysis of presuppositions, where this term is understood in different manners. For an exposition and a critical analysis of main logic theories of presuppositions, see: Gabriel Sandu, *Logical Analysis of Presupposition*, in "Analele Universităţii de Vest din Timişoara", Seria Filosofie, vol. IX, 1997, pp. 127-149.

<sup>3</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 84/B 116, English translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. The references to the German text and pages from edition I (1781) and II (1787) are made to Immanuel Kant, *Kritic der reinen Vernunft*, hrsg. von I. Heidemann, Philipp Reclam Jun., Stuttgart, 1966.

<sup>4</sup> Fumiyasu Ishikawa, *Zum Gerichtshof-Modell der Kategorien-Deduktion*, in R. Croitoru (ed.), *The Critical Philosophy and the Function of Cognition*, Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium of the Romanian Kant Society, Diogene, Bucharest, 1995, pp. 13-25. The term was also frequently used to designate the writings that used to describe such litigations with the corresponding argumentation.

<sup>5</sup> F. Ishikawa (*op.cit.*, p. 20) quotes the following Kantian note: "Quaestio facti ist, auf welche Art man sich zuerst in den Besitz eines Begriffs gesetzt habe; questio iuris, mit welchem Recht man denselben besitze und ihn brauchte". (R. 5636, Ak. XVIII, 267). Here indeed the mentioned transposition is obvious.

<sup>6</sup> P. Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (1987), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, part I and II.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 432, note 1.

<sup>9</sup> D. Heirich, *The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction*, in "The Review of Metaphysics", 22, 1969, pp. 640-659.

<sup>10</sup> I have argued on this point in *Concepts purs et intuitions chez Kant*, "Analele Universității de Vest din Timișoara", Seria Filosofie, vol. VIII, 1996, pp. 21-30.

<sup>11</sup> H. Allison, *Reflections on B-Deduction*, paper at the Spindel Conference, 1986, published in the same year in "The Southern Journal of Philosophy" and republished, with several important modifications in the recent book *Idealism and Freedom. Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 27-40; see also p. XVI.

<sup>12</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason*, A85/B118.

<sup>13</sup> I am referring to his work *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* (1969), Penguin Books, 1973, pp. 213-219.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 213.

<sup>15</sup> Manfred Baum, *Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason*, in P. Bieri, R. P. Horstmann, L. Kruger (eds), *Transcendental Arguments and Science*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1979, pp. 4-7. However, Baum admits that in some parts of the *Critique*, for example within the proofs of the principles of the intellect, Kant uses analytical arguments, that is arguments that suppose the experience and deduce the conditions of its possibility. I hope I will be able to deal on other occasion with the extremely interesting idea of the *transcendental propositions*, the only ones that require transcendental proofs.

<sup>16</sup> His little monographic work, *Kant*, published in 1955 at Penguin Books and reprinted manifold, represents one of the clearest expositions of German philosopher's ideas in the context of the modern theoretical debates.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *An Marcus Herz, in Werke* (Cassirer). Bd. IX, pp. 102-108. The Letter to Marcus Herz is dated on February 21, 1772; so the problem in discussion appears in Kant's mind after less than two years from the Inaugural Dissertation.

<sup>18</sup> A. Plantinga has referred to this intention in a conference held at West University of Timisoara in 1998, at the solemnities of according the title *Doctor Honoris Causa* of our University.

<sup>19</sup> See A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Methuen, London, 1938, pp. 66 sqq. Otherwise, this book is one of the best introductions in the study of *Critique*.

<sup>20</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 90/B 123.

<sup>21</sup> H. Allison, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE OR THE PROBLEM OF  
PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE  
(*Analitica posteriora*, 71a-77a)

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If we were to choose a specific syntagma for the philosophy of Plato, it would not necessarily be one referring to the Ideas and their reality. In some cases, more than classical doctrine of Ideas, Plato or other thinkers in the History of Philosophy could be adequately defined by a consequence, a critical point or concerning. Philosophizing begins with a concern (a wondering, if preferred), continues with a system of certitudes and ends with the very beginning. What about some particle of dust? Does it participate to any Idea, too? – seems to be an equally fundamental question like any other. It is, at least partially, the starting point of Aristotelianism, the moment of founding concern. Aristotle, it is said in classical treatises of philosophy, turned upside down some platonic representations. Still, none of them is far away from platonic meditation, having sprung from its very later tension.

Such a symptomatic overthrow made by Aristotle is the relation between being and knowledge. Plato was not very far away by Parmenides when, in the homonymous dialogue, he formulated the surprising argument: “*It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what is. Am I not right? - Yes. – And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?*”<sup>1</sup>. Though in the given context the argument will lead to an aporia, there is an isomorphism that represents Plato’s thought.

This way of representing the ideal of knowledge has the value of a *crisis point* even for Aristotle. Granted, there must be – Aristotle seems to be confident about it – an *absolute knowledge*; these kinds

of presuppositions form the solid inheritance that gives the continuity of Greek philosophical thought. The problem this presupposition gives birth to will imply, together with the changing of the epistemological perspective, an entire field of ulterior break-ups. From the very beginning, Aristotle would say: “the proper object of unqualified (*in general, absolute, undetermined – my note*) scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is”<sup>2</sup>. The complete and unitary science excludes the impossible.

Besides its immediate presuppositions like the existence of a necessary being, object of an absolute knowledge, or the fact itself that this necessary being *can be* known, this sentence contains some other presumptions that will become visible downwards in Aristotle’s text. Each of the two constructions: “absolute knowledge” (*aplos episteme*) and “something that cannot be other[wise] than it is” develop into two main meanings.

*Absolute knowledge* is not only the knowledge about the One, the Ideas or models. In another sense, it is the *true knowledge*, the doubtless, the well grounded one (epistemological sense). It is also the knowledge of the principle, so a special science, the supreme science judged by its object. The Platonism is quite visible, so far; Aristotle goes through the inheritance by understanding the presence of a third sense: absolute or true science must be understood as the scientific knowledge of the empirical reality, the knowledge of immanent causes or *proper principles*. Having acquired this, from now on, the knowledge can be rightly considered as a *whole*.

The second verbal construction, “something that cannot be other[wise] than it is”, refers in the first place to the “One”, the absolute principle, the universal. It also signifies the *immanent essence (to ti en einai)*. This immanent essence that appears in Aristotelian thought marks an important scission. It is not only a scission from Plato but, probably, even a tensioned moment in Aristotle’s stream of thinking. The necessity is not only a feature of the Supreme Being and not only a logical modality nor a single formal condition imposed upon relation between premises and conclusion; it is said also necessary about the attributes that belong by essence to their subjects and about that which corresponds to its *telos*<sup>3</sup>. All that excludes the impossible belongs to the immanence.

There is to be expected some kind of separation between the meanings of the absolute science, on one side, and those of its object, on the other side. Prime science is itself an absolute science

(this being the fundamental sense of absolute science) but it is also absolute (in the sense of unitary science, upside noticed) any particular well grounded science. Besides, the supreme being, universal *telos* are necessary, also the *telos*-es of the many countable things – the substances and their essential attributes.

From the first point of view, there are two fundamental requirements in Aristotle's epistemology. First Aristotle looks for the (absolute or whole, in the sense of complete and well-grounded) knowledge of the *specific cause* and conditions of *necessity* for every thing. Second, there is the necessity of an *absolute basis* being able to assure the *specific cause* (proper principle) and the statute of the knowledge itself. The premises (the causes of conclusion), it is said, must be better known than the conclusion and anterior (*protera*) to it<sup>4</sup>. Two distinct levels become thus visible: first, the level of knowledge itself (that allows intellect to have access to proper causes) and second, the level that grounds the specific causes, a level where genres are known (not easily, because they are *undemonstrable* and belong to the prime science).

We can talk so far about an *Aristotelian system of science*, where the conditions described at the beginning of *Second Analytics* define the main axioms. Thus, an Aristotelian science is system of terms (concepts) and propositions (judgements) that satisfy some conditions.

First of all we have the level of axioms, described in 77a. Demonstration (the main instrument of absolute knowledge) entails *the possibility to affirm as true the one about the multiple*<sup>5</sup>. Without this possibility the universal would be impossible. Second, *the enunciation about the multiple must not be homonymous but synonymous*, in the sense that had been defined in the *Cat.* 1a. In the third place, there is the axiom according to which *it is impossible to affirm and deny at the same time the same predicate about the same subject*, excepted the case when the major term is affirmed as true and denied as false about the middle term. In the fourth case, a predicate must be either affirmed, or denied about a subject<sup>6</sup> (the anterior axiom reformulated). These axioms are in fact principles of demonstration so they are common to all sciences; though they do not represent those "prime principles" (principles giving the necessary truths in every science) that Aristotle hunts.

Besides these axioms Aristotle gives, in the *Second Analytics*, some supplementary conditions that must be realised by an

apodeictic science. These conditions can be unified in what Willem de Jong calls “Aristotelian model of science”. In brief, we can say that *a science in Aristotelian sense is a system S of concepts and propositions (judgements) that satisfy the following conditions: (1) Every concept (judgement) in S refers to a specific set of objects; (1a) the objects (references) are ontologically necessary<sup>7</sup>. (2) In S there is a finite number of fundamental concepts; (2a) fundamental concepts do not need a definition or an explanation; (2b) any other concept in S can be defined or explained with the fundamental concepts; (2c) the concepts in S have a relation of synonymy with the realities they refer to. (3) In S there is a finite number of fundamental judgements (propositions); (3a) fundamental judgements (propositions) are necessarily true (self-evident) and must not be demonstrated; (3b) any other judgement (proposition) in S can be demonstrated with the help of fundamental judgements (propositions); (3c) judgements (propositions) in S must not be contradictory. (4) Any judgement (proposition) in S must be necessary<sup>8</sup>.*

From this model of science it is visible that these are not the principles Aristotle is looking for in constructing his science. These axioms establish a model for science but are helpless in identifying the principles that ground the body of knowledge. The hunted principles are in fact prime premises, fundamental enounces that could entail all other necessarily true propositions of particular sciences. Terms and fundamental propositions, needed in constructing the science, satisfy the conditions of a paradox: as prime terms and propositions, they belong (by necessity) to the science, but at the same time, as evident principles (excluding the possibility of their definition and demonstration) they do not belong to the science.

We notice there are two tensions within Aristotle’s epistemological discourse, within that discourse concerning the science of particulars.

The first tension refers to the relation between science and its principles.

a) Science must be “absolute”, well formed, grounded. There must exist, in consequence, an absolute perfect science of particulars, which presumes at least an ontological dignity of the particular: it has essence and being.

b) This absolute science does not possess its proper foundations. "Besides scientific knowledge there is its originative source which enables us to recognize the definitions"<sup>9</sup> - says Aristotle first, but on the other hand he notices that this principle does not belong to the science by its nature and that the grounding of knowledge, "Consequently a proof even from true, indemonstrable, and immediate premisses *does not constitute knowledge*"<sup>10</sup>. He is not speaking of conventional principles or axioms conveniently postulated in the manner of modern axiomatic systems. Aristotle is looking for something else: ontological principles, "antecedently known (as principles – *my note*), this antecedent knowledge being not our mere understanding of the *meaning* (that is, we notice, not only nominal, syntactical or semantical definitions – *my note*), but knowledge of the *fact* as well", in other words, the knowledge that it exists (71b).

Thus, the science of particulars needs principles it does not yet possess and does not even elaborate by itself. There must be a different source for these principles.

The second tension concerns the statute of principles. Aristotle seems to cover a difficult tract, a real phenomenology of knowledge in only a few pages of his *Second Analytic*. Concerning the statute of principles we were told that they belong to an ontological level, that is, they must assure us not only of the *logical sense* of what we say, but also of the fact that they refer to *something that exists*. In the second place, the principles must not be demonstrated but "primary and indemonstrable" (71b), otherwise they would not be principles anymore; they must be self-evident and known by themselves. In the third place the principles "must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it" (71b), that is, they must guarantee and make necessary any knowledge acquired by science.

We have so far some fundamental features of the principle according to Aristotle. Principles of science are real, indemonstrable, so they do not belong to the body of science they ground. They are known by themselves, ground the truth and the necessity of the premises of science; also the principles themselves have a necessary character. Finally, the principles are *prior* to the conclusion.

The problem in discussion at this point brings forward another tension within this phenomenology of knowledge of the terrestrial: in

what sense are the principles *prior* to the conclusion they ground? Here is the Aristotle's passage:

"Now '*prior*' and '*better known*' are ambiguous terms, for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man."<sup>11</sup>

Thus, after confining the statute of the scientific principles of any pragmatic or conventional priority (they must not be simple definitions of terms), it is strengthened the observation according to which the priority of principles can be understood in two ways: as epistemological priority and ontological priority. The distinction between "in the order of being" and "to man" brings further senses of principles.

"In the order of being" priority belongs to the prime principles, as they are independent of experience; these are the "remote" universal causes that, in Aristotle's view, "ask for belief". They belong to the *physis*, which is in fact the target of the whole knowledge. Target, we say, and this is the reason for which their priority is simultaneously *logic* and *ontic*.

"According to man" is said about the priority of particular (proper) causes, the most close to the sensibility, so *empirically* prior. This is an *epistemic* priority.

These are the four kinds of priorities: ontological priority (according to it, the principles talk about that *is*, in a universal manner), ontic priority (that of the principles as remote causes which we only rationally foresee but have not yet any expression of them) epistemological priority (principles that are evident but not demonstrable; they guarantee the truth of enounces) and epistemic priority (the "according to man" one, that is empirical priority).

As a culminating point, the conscience of this discrimination could throw a negative shadow n Aristotelian research. A perfect knowledge is able neither to unify the four apparently incompatible senses, nor to restrict itself to a single insufficient one.

First, the *prime principles* we are looking for guarantee the existence and have universal value (in all cases and all moments – *An. Post.* I, 4, 73a); they are desirable for a science that tends towards necessary truths. Yet they remain inaccessible for the moment. The nature of their source is different from that of the science of particulars and they cannot be a part of the research. The ontological principles in quest, which should have as reference that



that it is prior in the order of nature (the ontic principle), remain so far remote from our possibility of theorising them.

On the other hand, we have the epistemologically functional principles, those which should assure the coherence of scientific body; they should have at least the *evidence* of empirical principles – that is, of particular causes – but also their *validity* (as we are told: “nothing can be demonstrated except from its 'appropriate' basic truths “ – *ibid.* 9, 75b).

Though belonging to the science and satisfying the condition of accessibility (they are “prior and better known to us”), the particular causes are relative, they do not constitute real grounds: “the second form of demonstration, that which proceeds from truths better known to us, is not demonstration in the unqualified sense of the term” (*ibid.* 3, 72b). Knowledge needs to be transcended by its grounds, it cannot be built on itself.

In fact, these last kinds of principles are not real grounds. Taking them as such without demonstration we would postulate the principial character of empirical knowledge; but this knowledge satisfies neither the condition of *necessity* nor that of logical priority. Empirical knowledge has only temporal priority.

Empirical knowledge has only temporal anteriority. If we were to seek for a ground, this could happen in only two ways: either within the science itself (they would not be principles anymore but simple sentences belonging to the corpse of science, in which case we would be in need of further valuable principles), or outside the science, which would mean that we leave the science and deal with a different one. Consequently, the principles cannot be immanent to the science in neither case. The proper causes (those according to the human order, considered “for us”) could not be demonstrated properly but on the base of some higher epistemological principles that we unfortunately do not possess. What we possess is only their *conditions* of possibility or what we have called the Aristotelian system of science. In order to obtain them, Aristotle thinks it is necessary that scientific research itself must be transcended: “for basic truths from which they might be deduced would be basic truths of all that is, and the science to which they belonged would possess universal sovereignty (76a).

It seems that the Aristotelian research enters a difficult circularity. The context marks a critical point: science seems impossible to be achieved. Aristotle’s option to assume completely

the critique of the theory of Ideas seems not to be able to protect him by the teasing aporetic of the ultimate grounds, now doubled by an aporetic of Multiple, of the *Grounded* one.

The dramatic if no rhetorical conclusion is: "It is hard to be sure whether one knows or not; for it is hard to be sure whether one's knowledge is based on the basic truths appropriate to each attribute—the differentia of true knowledge"<sup>12</sup>.

It is also difficult – in fact, impossible – to ground the knowledge on the universal principles. Finally, the research seems to stop (and this is a temporary solution) with the principles of demonstration; more precisely, we are faced with a kind of meta-principle for the scientific research. According to it, what we must earn before all is not the knowledge that One *is* besides the Multiple, but *our* possibility to consider them together, according to their natural state. In other words, we must answer the question if the researcher can, with his instruments, rationally deal with the concordance between what is first according to nature (one) and what is first according to human order (multiple). „Demonstration does not necessarily imply the being of Forms nor a One beside a Many, but it does necessarily imply the possibility of truly predicating one of many“ (*hen kata pollon alethes eipein ananke*)<sup>13</sup>.

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In the beginning, Aristotle had doubted about the possibility of a science to be grounded on *prime principles*, where from there raised the necessity that some proper principles should be identified. The epistemological state of things is, as we have seen, a paradoxical one. Then there is found again the idea that “we believe to have a scientific knowledge if we have obtained conclusions from true and *prime* premises”, that is the remote ones.

The paradox is that in the first place we cannot directly have a science about universal. Essence is immanent, objects are known *first of all*, within human order, an order that asks, to say so, a special treatment just for the sake of the fact that the particular must be known. On the other hand, we cannot have a science about particular, species and genres. Proper principles must be grounded on universal. Here the order of nature imposes itself asking to be especially first considered because there is an inherent natural order of things.

It is also not possible to ground the proper principles of one science on the principles of a different science. The crossing of genres is an important error; “the conclusion must be of the same genre as the premises” (*ibidem*).

Such a prime evaluation of the problem of principle leads, we tried to point out, to a crisis moment. The perspective seems to be much more far away, the bridge needed is much too long. In an almost similar manner with Kantian “enlightening”, the moment of decision shows the necessity of an evaluation: evaluation of the possibilities the one who takes the journey has. There is a question he has to solve: “How it is possible to truly assert the One about Multiple?”

Questions like “is there the one?” or “Is there the multiple?” then “Does the one stand beside the multiple?” are, for the moment, out of the field of interest. Nor the problem of the principle of science is accessible temporarily. The tools perfected in the *Prior Analytics* do not allow yet a direct opening of the problems of knowledge; they must be forged further, by a superior research, and turned into a discourse upon the possibility (and limits, we would say) of their use. It is thus necessary to see whether the mechanism of *logos* (as it appears in the syllogistic), researched so far, allows the adequate expression (by true sentences) of the relation between one and many. The entire *Second Analytic* turns from now on (77a 5) into a real evaluation, from this perspective, upon the theory of syllogisms.

### Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Parmenides*, 161e. English translation by Benjamin Jowett.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *An. Post.*, I, 2, 71b 15-16. This is the definition of the necessity according to Aristotle. The fact that the science of what cannot be otherwise than it is is invoked here suggests the strong relation between the search for a prime science, as Aubenque called the metaphysical attempt of Aristotle, and the other search, for the science of the particulars. The English version of the quotations belongs to G. R. G. Mure.

<sup>3</sup> *An. Post.*, 74b. I insisted on the necessity in Aristotle in my study “Necesitate logică și necesitate ontologică la Aristotel”, in *Logică și ontologie*, (coord. C. Grecu and I. Lucica), Trei Publishers, București, 1999, pp. 191-204. An English version

with some few modifications has been published as “On necessity, Universal and Particular Truths in Aristotle”, in *Annales Universitatis Occidentalis Timisiensis, Philosophia*, Vol. X, 1998, pp. 93-104.

<sup>4</sup> *An. Post.*, 71b 29-31.

<sup>5</sup> *An. Post.*, 77a.

<sup>6</sup> This enumeration of the axioms of science can be synthetically expressed: (1) the possibility of inclusion in species and genres; (2) the establishment of a *real* and *essential* identity between words and things, not a nominal or accidental identity; (3) principle of non-contradiction. We notice that this list does not contain the three classical principles of logic but some different kind of conditions. The first condition refers to the possibility of a relation between first substance and second substance; the second condition states the existence of a relation between things and language. Only the third condition can be considered a logic principle.

<sup>7</sup> “Ontologically necessary” means, in Aristotle’s belief, that they cannot be otherwise than they are. That means, they cannot be accidents.

<sup>8</sup> On this “Aristotelian system of science” has Willem de Jong written two important studies (Willem de Jong, “How is Metaphysics as a Science Possible? Kant on the Distinction Between Philosophical and Mathematical Method”, in *Review of Metaphysics* 49 (December 1995), 235-274; and “Gottlob Frege and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Within the framework of the Aristotelian Model of Science”, in *Kant-Studien* 87 (3/1996), 290-324). Probably following E. W. Beth and H. Scholz (as he indicates the sources of this model), the author does not mention the conditions (1a), (2c) and (3c).

<sup>9</sup> *An. Post.*, 72b.

<sup>10</sup> *An. Post.*, 75b.

<sup>11</sup> *An. Post.*, 72a.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *An. Post.*, I, 9, 76a.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, 77a 5-7.

TWO CONVERGENT LOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES:  
EUGENIU SPERANTIA'S AND R.G. COLLINGWOOD'S

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In the following sketch I will try to identify some of the similar or convergent philosophical ideas professed by the Romanian philosopher Eugeniu Sperantia (1888-1972) and R.G. Collingwood which were elaborated simultaneously and absolutely independently, partly as a "reaction to the [same] narrow-mindedness... of logical positivism, then in full-blown European vogue, which reduced knowledge to sensory recordings and deduced logical constructions from sensory impressions." (1)

The aim of this short comparison is, first of all, to suggest the European dimension of Sperantia's philosophical thought, and even the pioneering character of some of his views. He was an encyclopaedist who dealt, during his long creative life, with "at least ten different domains, not to mention the interdisciplinary spheres situated at the borders between two or more of these." (2) His contributions to the development of logic and metaphysics will be compared with the very similar achievements elaborated simultaneously at the other extremity of our continent by R.G. Collingwood. Even at first reading, Sperantia's philosophical writings disclose surprising similarities with the philosophical ideas professed by Collingwood, especially with respect to the latter's theory of absolute presuppositions, logic of questions and answers and metaphysics. In what follows, I will confine myself to a simple inventory of Sperantia's ideas which seem to me relevant from the perspective of such a comparison.

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In the beginning of this outline, I mention the similar role played by Kant's philosophy in the two authors: thus, like Collingwood, Sperantia considered Kant as both a point of departure and an

inspiring source, and as a theme subjected to emendations and critical reconsideration. Similar to the way in which the English philosopher criticises Kant for the immobilism of his *a priori* forms, (3) Sperantia remarks that the German thinker “does not distinguish between static and dynamic *a priori* elements.”(4)

Another general similarity which can add a favourable premise to our comparison is the “gnoseological (epistemological) subjectivism” of the two thinkers; by their “gnoseological subjectivism” I refer here to the fact both philosophers place reality in a relation of dependence on the knowing subject: “A [segment of] reality can only be conceived for and by a living being” wrote Sperantia in 1934, (5) whereas Collingwood began, even since 1919, to assert that a study of the foundations of existence which is not tied to thought is impossible. (6)

As for the definition of metaphysics, the two philosophers use almost identical words. At the beginning of his book *Système de Métaphysique*, Sperantia writes:

Metaphysics, as affirmation of the existence in itself surpassing all empirical means of research, is inevitable for both current and practical thinking... Without resort to transcendence, we cannot talk either of *vérité de fait*, or of the possibility of any assertion about reality in itself because the whole faith and certainty *implies* the intervention of an *a priori* undemonstrable *terme*. (7)

Similarly to Collingwood, who holds that a realism based on the categorical (trenchant) separation between subject and object renders the metaphysical project unsustainable before the criticisms professed by analytical philosophy, the Romanian thinker believes that the categorical distinction between the subjective and objective types of reality implies a perspective incapable of taking into account the experience data and will proclaim as true assertions that are not only undemonstrable, but also paradoxical, for “it admits at the same time that the subject doesn’t represent anything unless it is a subject aiming at an object” whereas the object “cannot be thought of unless in relation to a subject.” This supposition of the initial separation of the subject from the object represents “a metaphysical view following from arguments against metaphysics.” Thus, if metaphysics raises difficulties akin to those regarding objectivity and subjectivity, “these difficulties follow, in their turn, from a premise struck by absurdity.” (8)

The general views on metaphysics proposed by Sperantia and Collingwood are also arguably convergent: thus, the former urges the

philosophers to renounce the construction of a world in itself and “receive the world of common-sense,” whereas the latter rejects any ontology that pretends to study the reality as separated from human experience, for between absolute presuppositions and reality there is an indissoluble connection which, if interrupted, would make even the term “truth” lose its cognitive value. And this would entail the disappearance of all factors which give a civilisation value. (9) At this point, I deem additionally illuminating an idea of a philosopher who exercised a notable influence upon Collingwood’s theory of absolute presuppositions, namely Michael Foster, who holds that the Christian religion which postulates the existence of a God who created the world *ex nihilo* led to a gnoseology within which we reach the knowledge of nature through examining objects of the natural world. Only in these circumstances the modern science of nature, characterised by the empirical investigation of evidence and by empirical experiments taking place within the natural world, becomes possible. (10)

Related to the above, another interesting suggestion of the Romanian philosopher appears to be extremely similar to Collingwood’s thesis regarding the *a priori* elements which constitute the object of metaphysics; what I have in mind is the implications of the assertion he made in his book *Apriorismul pragmatic* (Pragmatic Apriorism, 1912) that a subject which would renounce all *a priori* elements of knowledge would be condemned to remain at the level of the subconscious or unconscious. (11)

Both Sperantia’s metaphysical project and Collingwood’s have to face the same paradox: the possibility of philosophy (metaphysics) depends upon the suppression of appearances, of the sensory given, which excludes the world as subject-matter of investigation. The solution adopted by both thinkers is Idealism, the only view capable of conciliating the world of empirical data with that of Being or absolute truth without substituting one for the other or introducing one into the sphere of the other; for Being is not identical with the forms in which it appears, and the sensory given is in fact not explained in terms of transcendental essence, but in terms of our (systematising) concepts about it. (12)

Regarding the interrogatory logic he proposes - obviously his most widely acknowledged contribution to the logical-philosophical research - Sperantia stresses that it is radically different from the common formal logic due to its dynamic character, the only able to

correspond to the mobility of the human mind. According to him, every dynamic judgement of which human knowledge is formed represents an answer to a question. These judgements are the causes that explain the progress of the sciences. Their study, which is called by Sperantia “formal problematology” can account for the springs of knowledge and for the historical evolution of the human mind or spirit. (13) The similarity between this perspective and Collingwood’s logic of questions and answers is obvious.

Deeply related to his logic, Sperantia builds his view on the historical becoming of the human mind or spirit whose thought advances along the path traced by the dynamic of the interrogatory process, and answers to questions. Sperantia thinks that history consists in the succession of “situations” (which are composed of “ideas, beliefs and collective or personal aspirations which become norms or laws”) having a purely ideal nature; their occurrence is “necessarily the outcome of the situations laying inside the immediately previous moment.” (14) Similarly, Collingwood thinks that historian’s questions (preoccupied exclusively with the history of ideas) are addressed to a vanished past which yet has left certain significant traces within the present. Consequently, this past is not dead, for it lives, in a way, in the present; it follows that, properly speaking, historical processes do not begin and do not end but pass one into another. In fact, a historical process  $p_1$  never stops and a “subsequent” process  $p_2$  never begins. “There are in history no beginnings and no endings.” (15)

Back to Sperantia: one of the most comprehensive analyses of his logic, due to Constantin Grecu (to whose main study on Sperantia I have already referred) indicates the existence of certain *a priori* elements in Sperantia’s metaphysics which, though of a Kantian inspiration, nevertheless “don’t represent forms of sensible intuition or categories of the intellect” like in the German philosopher, but “interrogations and postulates of thought; on the other hand, [Sperantia admits] the existence of a transcendent spiritual reality, a world of the absolute truth which is yet rationally cognoscible, but only through the *a priori* elements.” (16) These elements are undemonstrable and irrefutable, consisting mainly in certain postulates of thought “accepted only in virtue of their consequences” and due to the fact that without them thinking would be meaningless. They represent a kind of “prejudgements or *parti-pris*” which predetermine thought’s content; their acceptance doesn’t require the



resort to experience or self-evident axioms, for the content they introduce into the sphere of thought has a transcendent character.” (17)

As for Collingwood’s own view on the matter, it is perhaps enough at this point to refer briefly to some of his (more or less implicit and known - expressed especially in his unpublished manuscripts ‘The Nature of Metaphysical Study’ (1934), ‘Method and Metaphysics’ (1935), and ‘Realism and Idealism’ (1936)) reflections on the transcendent spiritual reality and its relations to human knowledge. According to this perspective, “truth” is an “*a priori* idea or an abstract entity. Such an opinion has a double implication: firstly, [the absolute] “‘truth’ transcends any of its temporary expressions; secondly, the *a priori* idea of “truth” doesn’t exist by itself, [but each of its] historical expressions realises certain possibilities which inhere in [it]. That *a priori* idea of ‘truth’ is, for Collingwood, the *metaphysical* truth. (18) As Guido Vanheeswijck observes,

as a historical researcher, the metaphysician investigates how the *a priori* idea of the abstract entity called “truth” reveals itself in human thinking. That revelation itself is time-bound and differs culturally and temporally. By deducing the changing absolute presuppositions through logical/historical analysis the various, temporal forms of thinking, the metaphysician verifies in a *historical* way how the *a priori* idea of “truth” manifests itself in a different way over and over again. Only then can he continue his search for truth. In that sense, Collingwood’s metaphysics is not just a historical/descriptive study of opinions about being... but is also a logical/historical analysis of how being/existence appears at a certain moment. (19)

As for the similarities between the logical thinking *per se* in the two philosophers, I will only refer to the fact that, for Sperantia, the initial moment of knowledge is represented by problems. In convergence with Popper and Collingwood, he replied to logical positivism - continuing a tradition whose origins can be traced back to Aristotle and Socrates - that “any acquisition of knowledge, any progress of science and any elimination of error always departs from a problem and all problems are reducible to interrogative judgements.” Properly speaking, knowledge’s value is given by the value of the questions from which it departs. Moreover: “the true knowledge does not consist as much in answers as in the endless asking of questions and in the endless search for answers that will give birth to new questions.” (20) Similarly, in Collingwood, his interrogation: ‘to what question did so-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?’ has

exactly the same dynamic opening. Employing a genetic/historical pattern similar to Sperantia's, the English philosopher stresses that such a question can be reconstructed only historically by following the axis answers-questions. Thus, he will explicitly assert: "never think you understood any statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he means it for an answer." (21) For the well placed question as a starting point provides for the half of the act of knowing: "Information may be the body of knowledge, but questioning is its soul." (22)

It is also true that in many respects Sperantia goes further than Collingwood in terms of technical systematisation of the interrogatory judgements: thus, since the very beginning of his logical investigations he established as object and directions of research of his 'problematology' "the analysis, characterisation and classification of interrogatory judgements (analytical investigation); the establishing of the kind of adequate answer required by each species of interrogatory proposition (the investigation of adequation); the investigation of the conditions of possibility of a complete solution to each category of questions (the investigation of exhaustion); the investigation of the possibility for certain elements of the answer to be anticipated in the terms of the question (the investigation of implication)." (23)

But the place where the two philosophers meet again is the passing they make from the interrogatory logic to fundamental presuppositions, both being convinced that the analysis of the significance of questions necessarily leads to the analysis of its presuppositions. As Grecu observes, according to Sperantia, some of the questions' presuppositions have a very general character and constitute the subject-matter of natural metaphysics: among them, the most important are the ones about the "confidence regarding the existence of truth and the possibility of its attainment." (24) Not different was Collingwood's thought when he wrote that

[the] most characteristic features of a civilization [like the European one] had for many centuries been based upon the predominance, among those who shared it, of the belief that truth was the most important thing in the world, and that consequently scientific thinking, systematic, orderly thinking, theoretical and practical alike, pursued with all the energy at his command and with all the skill and care at his disposal, was the most valuable thing man could do. In such a civilization every feature would be marked with some

peculiar characteristic derived from this prevailing habit of mind and not to be expected in a civilization differently based. (25)

And, also surprisingly convergent, the two contemporary adversaries of logical positivism resort to the Socratic principle of knowledge as means of elucidating the knowledge the subject, to a certain extent, possesses. Sperantia talks, when defining one of the interrogatory terms of his logic, namely *terminus quarens*, about the fact that this doesn't signify the presence of a cognitive void, but only the lack of a definite content, for every question contains a certain knowledge and forecasts, to some extent, the new cognitive achievement which will play the role of its answer. This idea is very similar to Collingwood's view on the implicit knowledge that requires an explicit expression. For example, in a letter to J.A. Smith he wrote:

[T]hat which is to be known... is already known, not in general, but in its concrete actuality, and yet this knowledge is somehow disguised or concealed or confused... The task of thought here is to disentangle this knowledge from its integument or alloy of error. (26)

As it has been already suggested, the parallelism between the thoughts of the two authors is also illustrated by the ways they present the self-contradictory character of neopositivism. Thus, Sperantia thinks that

asking a question... implies... believing in the existence of a truth and in the possibility to attain it... The one who denies the possibility of finding out something about something has no justification in formulating questions, for they unveil his attempt to [answer or] solve them, in other words, to know. Similarly, it is implicitly forbidden to the one who denies the existence of a truth to formulate any affirmation or negation, for he will fall into a contradiction with himself. His assertion succumbs, by committing suicide." (27)

In his turn, Collingwood wrote, only two years before Sperantia, that by not acknowledging the absolute presuppositions and by acknowledging propositional logic and not the logic of question-and-answer as the unique valid logic the scientific value of the neopositivist analyses is discredited; for

the disentanglement of presuppositions is precisely what distinguishes scientific thought from unscientific; so any attack on the doctrine that thought has presuppositions is a direct attack on science itself, and involves an attempt, whether conscious or unconscious, to reduce all thought to the standard of thinking at its most confused and unscientific level. (28)

In the end of this very brief survey I will add a few more details about the similar perspectives on the relation question-answer proposed by

Sperantia and Collingwood. For Sperantia the answer to a question is an enunciatory proposition which gives the information requested through the question. On the other hand, every knowledge is an answer to a question; all knowledge is determined by the fact that its units are answers to precise questions, and are meaningful only to the extent they answer precisely these questions.

The next problem, which is entailed by the above argument is the problem of adequation: in order to solve it, Sperantia distinguished between the formal adequation and the material validity of an answer. And just like in Collingwood's opinion, for him "a question can be given a true answer in terms of its content which is not adequate [or *right* if we are to use Collingwood's term], and, similarly, it can be given an adequate [right] answer, although false in terms of its content." (29) "To investigate the conditions of an answer's adequation means to ask not which is the truest *given*, but which is the *kind of data* that can meet the requirements of an interrogatory proposition. And this, in its turn, means asking yourself which are the themes or contents that belong to the corresponding *a priori form*." (30)

For Collingwood, the fact that we permanently obtain answers to questions doesn't at all imply the absolute truth of what one holds to be true. For

[e]very science has its historical development, although the fundamental or general problem remains unchanged, in which the particular form in which it introduces itself from time to time changes, and the general problem never exists in its pure or abstract form, but always in the particular or concrete form, determined by the present state of knowledge or, in other words, by the development of thinking so far. This is a universal rule for all forms of human thinking: there is no reason why metaphysics would be an exception to that. (31)

As for the historical openings of the two doctrines, they are also very similar, although Sperantia insisted less on this aspect than Collingwood. Nevertheless, as his logic suggests, its dynamic character offers the perspective of processuality, which, if projected over the succession of "situations" - that form the substance of history in Sperantia - can arguably account for the mechanisms of historical change, while the same interrogatory logic foreshadows itself also as a methodological chance of analysis and interpretation of the foundations of this spiritual history. And it is not impossible to imagine it as a natural continuation of Collingwood's logic of

question-and-answer and even of his theory of absolute presuppositions. The great compatibility between the metaphysical and epistemological views, as well as between the logics professed by the two philosophers can make the attempts to make them complete each other fertile, placed as they are in a rare and surprising harmony.

**Notes:**

- (1) This characterisation, applied to Sperantia's interrogatory logic belongs to Constantin Grecu (C. Grecu, 'Un inceput in logica interogativa', in Andrei Marga (ed.), *Cunoastere si actiune*, Cluj, Editura Dacia, 1986, p. 168) but it obviously corresponds to Collingwood's own relation with logical positivism.
- (2) Achim Mihu, 'Eugeniu Sperantia. In memoriam', in *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai*, Series Sociologia, Cluj, 1972, p. 117.
- (3) Cf. R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, OUP, 1946, pp. 93-104, 122, 128.
- (4) Vasile Musca, 'Eugeniu Sperantia. Coordonate ale conceptiei filosofice', in A. Marga (ed.), pp. 140-1.
- (5) E. Sperantia, *Legile si formele gandirii ca proiectiuni ale proprietatilor vietii* (The laws and forms of thinking as projections of life's properties, 1934), quoted by Musca, p. 142.
- (6) Cf., for example, James Connelly's discussion of Collingwood's study 'Reflections on Realism' made in 'Prefata la editia in limba romana a *Autobiografiei* lui R.G. Collingwood', Bucharest, TREI, 1998, p. 25; this idea can also be found in Collingwood's unpublished manuscript 'Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God. Written December 1919 for delivery Hillary Term 1920' for example at pages 11 and 32.
- (7) E. Sperantia, *Système de Métaphysique implicite dans les postulats de toute connaissance possible*, Sibiu, "Cartea romaneasca din Cluj", 1943, p. 1.
- (8) *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- (9) R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 133.
- (10) M.B. Foster, *Creation, Nature and Political Order in the Philosophy of Michael Foster* (ed. C. Wybrow), Lewinston, Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, pp 71, 133; cf. also J. Connelly's convincing demonstration made in 'Natural Science, History and Christianity', in D. Boucher, B. Haddock (eds.), *Collingwood Studies*, vol. 4, Llandybie, Dinefwr Press, 1998, pp. 103-8
- (11) Cf. V. Musca, p. 143.
- (12) Cf. E. Sperantia, *Apriorismul pragmatic*, quoted in V. Musca, *op. cit.*, p. 144; R.G. Collingwood, 'Function of Metaphysics in Civilization' 1937-38, Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Dep. Collingwood 19, pp. 41-4.
- (13) Cf. V. Musca, p. 151; E. Sperantia, *Système de Métaphysique...*, pp. 305-6.
- (14) I.M. Danciu, '[Eugeniu Sperantia] Axiologie si antropologie', in A. Marga (ed.), p. 162.
- (15) R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, OUP, 1978, p. 98.

- (16) C. Grecu, p. 166.
- (17) *Ibid.*, pp. 166-7; E. Sperantia, *Système de Métaphysique...*, p. 310.
- (18) Guido Vanheeswijck, 'Metaphysics as a Historical[ly Based Discipline], unpublished manuscript, Collingwood Society Archives, undated, Swansea, section VII;
- (19) *Ibid.*; Cf. R.G. Collingwood, 'Method and Metaphysics - Paper read before the Jowett Society, 19 June 1935', Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Dep. Collingwood 19/3, pp. 2-31.
- (20) C. Grecu, p. 168.
- (21) R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, p. 74.
- (22) Idem, *Speculum Mentis or the Map of Knowledge*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924, p. 78.
- (23) Cf. E. Sperantia, 'Remarques sur les propositions interrogatives: Projet d'une "Logique du problème"', p. 306 (representing the paper Sperantia delivered at the First International Congress of Scientific Philosophy, Sorbonne, - Paris, 1935 and published as 'Apendice I' of Sperantia's, *Système de Métaphysique...* (pp. 305-18),); the profound originality of this text was noticed by important logicians and philosophers of logic such as J. Hintikka, *The Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics*; L. Åquist, *New Theory of Interrogatives*; T. Kubinski, *An Outline of the Theory of Interrogatives*). The second 'Apendice' entitled 'La métaphysique implicite dans les postulats de toute pensée possible', is also a paper delivered by Sperantia, at the IXth International Congress of Philosophy (Congrès Descartes), Paris, 1937, and represents the nucleus of his future monumental *Système de Métaphysique implicite dans les postulats de toute connaissance possible* (published in 1943).
- (24) C. Grecu, p. 172.
- (25) R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 133.
- (26) Idem, 'Letter to J.A. Smith', 16 December 1933, J.A. Smith papers, Magdalen College, III, MS 1026, p. 3.
- (27) E. Sperantia, *Système de Métaphysique...*, pp. 320-21.
- (28) R.G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, pp. 170-1.
- (29) C. Grecu, p. 173.
- (30) E. Sperantia, *Système de Métaphysique...*, p. 323
- (31) R.G. Collingwood, 'The Nature of Metaphysical Study - two lectures, opening a course of 16 lectures on Metaphysics by various speakers... January 1934', Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Dep. Collingwood 18/2, pp. 14-15.

## RATIONALISATION ET RATIONNALITÉ

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Dans cet essai, je veux discuter le problème de la rationalisation et de la rationalité. Entre les deux il y a, je crois, un lien conceptuel, parce que au moyen de l'opération de rationalisation nous arrivons à donner un contenu à la rationalité. Celle-ci n'est pas possible sans celle-là. Mais, nous discuterons ce rapport plus tard. Maintenant, nous devons commencer avec le problème de la rationalisation.

La définition de la rationalisation par Robert Audi.

Qu'est-ce que la rationalisation ? Certaines fois nous sommes questionnés pourquoi nous avons fait ce que nous avons fait. En répondant, nous donnons une raison ou quelque chose que nous considérons comme étant une raison pour ce que nous avons fait. Certaines fois, nous donnons une raison pour une de nos actions même si personne nous n'a pas demandé d'explication. Nous pouvons penser qu'une explication est nécessaire, parce que notre action a été peu conventionnelle; ou, un observateur peut nous regarder un peu embarrassé par ce que nous avons fait. Dans ces cas, notre explication est décrite comme étant une rationalisation. Une claire implication est le fait que ce que nous avons dit n'explique pas complètement pourquoi nous avons fait la chose en question. Pourquoi la rationalisation n'est pas regardée comme étant une explication ? En général, l'attitude des philosophes de l'action est très mauvaise envers celle-là. Robert Audi<sup>1</sup> est l'auteur de l'un des plus consistantes travaux sur la rationalisation. Il embrasse une position forte sur la rationalité, comme tous ceux qui rejettent la rationalité des rationalisations. Moi j'embrasse une position plus faible, qui accorde une certaine rationalité aux rationalisation. Audi

affirme que la rationalisation est nommée comme telle justement parce qu'elle montre que l'action est rationnelle, même si cela seulement d'après les standards de l'agent. Je suis d'accord avec lui, même si je ne suis pas d'accord avec les conséquences qu'il tire de cette affirmation. Nous présenterons sa théorie sur la rationalisation pour voir d'une meilleure manière le cadre conceptuel dans lequel il discute la rationalisation tout en présentant ma vision sur la rationalisation, qui part du même point que celle de Audi, mais arrive à d'autres conclusions, plus positives et, je crois, plus significatives sur la rationalisation et son rôle dans l'économie de notre pensée. Nous pouvons nous demander, dit Audi, si l'action rationnelle peut être comprise comme étant l'action pour laquelle nous pouvons donner une rationalisation. Sa réponse à cette question sera négative, parce que Audi explique la rationalisation en l'opposant à l'explication, comme explication échouée. Ma réponse, à la suite de l'analyse, sera positive.

Le trait distinctif de la rationalisation, d'après certains auteurs, est l'échec évident de l'explication : une rationalisation est une explication échouée. Beaucoup des explications d'action échouent à cause du fait qu'elles sont seulement des rationalisations. Mais, s'il est ainsi, alors comment explique-t-on l'utilisation de la rationalisation ? Est-elle seulement un instrument par lequel nous nous montrons notre stupidité ? Audi nous dit que le succès d'une rationalisation d'une action hypothétique dans l'établissement de sa rationalité ne dépend pas de l'explication qu'elle en donne; la rationalisation ne doit pas être conçue comme étant un essai échoué de produire une explication. Audi mentionne le fait que Donald Davidson a introduit une utilisation stipulaire du mot "rationalisation", qui propose de nommer "rationalisations" les explications d'une action par les raisons de l'agent parce que "la raison rationalise l'action". Mais, parce que, d'habitude, les rationalisations des comportements sont opposées aux explications de ceux-ci, cette utilisation n'a pas été adoptée d'une manière générale.<sup>2</sup> La suggestion de Davidson n'a pas été prise en compte, donc, parce que tout le monde oppose les explications et les rationalisations. Pourquoi ? Je crois qu'on peut répondre de la façon suivante : l'explication est vue par ceux qui l'opposent à la rationalisation comme une sorte de liaison *effective* de nature causale entre ce qui explique et ce qui est à expliquer.<sup>3</sup> La suggestion de Davidson ne vise pas ce présupposé ontologique, mais seulement quelque chose d'épistémologique : c'est-à-dire, tout



énoncé (ou description) qui explique un fait (action, croyance, etc.) en termes de *raisons*, est une rationalisation. Pour Davidson, l'explication concerne seulement le type de description en termes *exclusifs* de cause et effet. Par exemple, quand je dis que Gérard a bu un litre d'eau à cause de la chaleur qui a produit une puissante déshydratation dans son corps, j'*explique* pourquoi Gérard a bu l'eau *exclusivement* en termes de cause (la chaleur) et d'effet physiques (la déshydratation). Mais, je peux présenter le même fait de la façon suivante : Gérard voulait tant à boire une bière fraîche ; mais parce qu'il n'a pas encore 18 ans, il ne peut pas acheter de la bière et il a été si frustré que seulement un litre d'eau a réussi à le calmer. Ici, il ne s'agit plus des choses «physiques » ; j'*explique* le geste de Gérard, boire un litre d'eau, justement parce qu'il est son action. J'*explique* en disant pourquoi il a bu *tant* de l'eau, quelle est *la raison* de son geste. Son action est *décrite d'une manière différente, mais il s'agit de la même action*. Donc, du point de vue ontologique, rien n'a pas changé, seulement du point de vue épistémique : la première description présente l'action comme un fait physique, la deuxième comme une action humaine. D'un point de vue ontologique, elles peuvent être, toutes les deux, confirmées ou infirmées, une fois que la distinction n'agit pas au niveau ontologique, mais au niveau épistémologique. Je crois que nous pouvons utiliser cette stratégie de Davidson, parce qu'elle peut prouver beaucoup plus d'avantages que l'autre.

Si la rationalisation est une explication échouée, comme peut-elle être distinguée d'autres tentatives échouées d'explication ? Pour répondre à cette question, Audi essaie à faire une distinction entre la rationalisation et l'excuse :

« si S rationalise (plutôt qu'il donne une excuse), il doit donner une raison (d'une telle sorte), pour son action (même si elle n'est pas bonne), non seulement une raison pour laquelle il a fait cette action. S'il offre seulement une explication possible (ou même actuelle) en termes de quelque chose qui n'est pas une raison, comme par exemple une post-hypnotique manipulation de son cerveau par des martiens démoniaques, alors il ne rationalise pas son action. Il peut fournir une excuse, mais pas une rationalisation. Certaines rationalisations sont aussi

des excuses ; mais, les premières ne sont pas en général les dernières, et les excuses ne sont pas typiquement des rationalisations. »

Nous pouvons voir de cette citation les difficultés auxquelles doit faire face Audi pour déterminer une différence signifiante entre la rationalisation et l'excuse : en dernière instance, la seule différence entre les deux est le fait que la rationalité utilise une *certaine* raison, pendant que l'excuse donne simplement une raison qui n'est pas une raison (voir son exemple) ! La vision sur l'excuse est assez confuse : présenter ses excuses semble être plus faible que la rationalisation. Mais, cela est contre-intuitif : je ne sais pas qui acceptera comme étant une excuse véritable l'explication de la manipulation post-hypnotique du cerveau par les Martiens, même s'il était ainsi ! Et nous savons de J.L. Austin que l'excuse est un acte performatif, c'est-à-dire il est *réalisé* seulement s'il est *accepté comme tel* : je présente mes excuses seulement quand elles sont récéptées comme telles. Si quelqu'un refuse d'*accepter* ce que présente *comme* excuse, alors je n'ai pas présenté mes excuses. Je suis d'accord avec Audi que pas toutes les rationalisations sont des excuses et *vice versa*, mais pas pour ses raisons, simplement parce que les rationalisations tiennent plutôt des actes connotifs que de ceux performatifs comme l'excuse.<sup>4</sup>

Une prime exigence pour avoir une rationalisation, qui est donnée par Audi et avec laquelle je suis d'accord est la suivante :

« La raison que S offre, doit représenter son action, au moins en apparence (*prima facie*), comme étant rationnelle, dans le sens qu'elle représente au moins une certaine raison, égoïste ou non, morale ou immorale, conventionnelle ou non, etc., pour celui-là dans le contexte relevant de cette action. »<sup>5</sup>

En vérité, on ne peut pas avoir une *rationalisation* sans une *raison* ; c'est un point qui pèse beaucoup dans la faveur de la rationalisation. C'est une exigence qui, d'après mon opinion, Audi traite avec une certaine aisance. Pourquoi ? Parce que cette exigence a des conséquences importantes sur la vision sur la rationalisation : si une rationalisation doit, *toujours*, comprendre une raison, c'est-à-dire quelque chose (une croyance, un désir, une intention, etc., toutes *rationnelles*) qui peut causer ce qui doit être

expliqué, alors, au moins du point de vue épistémique, il n'y a aucun raison à n'accepter pas la rationalisation comme étant rationnelle. Nous devons noter le fait, significatif, que Audi parle de *raisons* et pas de *motifs* ; donc, lui aussi est d'accord que la rationalisation donne une raison (possible) de l'action (ou de la croyance, etc.) et pas un motif<sup>6</sup>.

Maintenant, nous devons nous arrêter au point qui représente le principal motif de désaccord. Ce point est négatif :

« la rationalisation n'est pas, pour personne, une raison réelle à faire cette action. Cela n'implique pas que l'agent a réalisé l'action ayant une raison ; il peut rationaliser une action non-intentionnelle, par exemple, l'omission d'un nom dans une liste ce qu'explique actuellement l'action de S ce n'est pas une rationalisation de son action, ni une base pour une telle rationalisation. »

Ce passage mérite une discussion plus détaillée, parce qu'il s'agit des choses importantes. Premièrement, Audi semble partager un *point de vue réaliste* sur la raison : il nous dit que la rationalisation n'est pas, *pour personne*, une raison réelle à faire cette action. S'il est ainsi, alors la rationalisation nous ne donne aucune raison. Si *personne* ne croit pas que la raison présentée dans la rationalisation n'est pas la raison de l'action, alors il ne s'agit pas de la raison de cette action, mais cela signifie qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une raison tout court. Je suis d'accord avec la possibilité qu'un sujet peut présenter une raison qui n'est pas, *sa* raison, mais, s'il veut rationaliser son comportement, alors il doit donner quelque chose que, au moins dans d'autres cas ou pour d'autres sujets, apparaît comme étant la raison de ce comportement. Donc, pour être une rationalisation, il est nécessaire qu'au moins une personne soit convaincue que la raison de la rationalisation est la raison de l'action en cause.

Encore, Audi suppose que la raison peut exister indépendamment du fait qu'il y a ou non quelqu'un qui la voit comme raison, il parle de la raison *réelle* de l'action. Cette manière de parler est pleine de lourdes présupposées ontologiques : il y a une raison ; cette raison cause *réellement* l'action ; cette raison est *évidente* dans son rôle causal ; au moins, certains d'entre nous ont le pouvoir de

voir cette raison ; etc. Si nous partons de l'idée que dans tout comportement rationnel nous avons à faire avec des *descriptions en termes de raisons* plutôt qu'avec des *faits empiriques, observables, etc.*, alors tous ces présupposés n'ont aucune valeur. Aux niveaux des descriptions, il n'y a aucune différence ontologique : si une description fait appel aux motifs pour justifier un tel acte et si une autre fait appel aux raisons, cela n'est pas justifié par une différence ontologique entre les motifs et les raisons, mais seulement par une différence de *buts* entre les deux types de description : la description du comportement en termes de motifs *explique* le comportement (sans assurer, nécessairement, sa *compréhension*, pendant que la rationalisation peut être assez déficitaire sous le rapport de l'explication (si elle est vue, notamment, comme justification), mais elle *assure* la compréhension du comportement en cause. En revenant à l'exemple antérieur, l'explication du fait que Gérard a bu un litre d'eau ne permet pas de *comprendre* pourquoi a fait-il cela. Quelqu'un peut dire : « Bon, je comprends que Gérard avait soif, mais pourquoi devait-il boire une telle quantité d'eau ? Cela, je ne comprends pas ! » La rationalisation vise justement ce que notre objecteur ne comprend pas : pourquoi *Gérard* a agit de *cette* manière. La différence est encore plus marquée s'il s'agit d'un comportement irrationnel : l'explication peut nous permettre de connaître la cause du comportement irrationnel, même s'il n'y a aucune possibilité de rationaliser une tel comportement, c'est-à-dire aucune possibilité de *comprendre*; quelqu'un qui dit : « J'ai tué ma femme, parce qu'elle était une espionne des Martiens » ne fait aucune rationalisation, parce que personne ne comprendra pas un meurtre qui a été fait pour une telle « raison ». En échange, on peut produire une explication du fait, en disant que dans les cas de paranoïa, les malades sont hostiles à cause du soupçon d'être espionnés. Alors, d'après mon opinion, connaître la cause du comportement ne signifie pas *le* comprendre.

Audi a, je crois, une vision *réaliste* et *reïste* sur la raison : il pense que la raison est quelque chose, une sorte d'entité mentale et pas seulement un élément de notre appareil conceptuel d'interprétation et de compréhension du comportement humain. Moi, je suis plutôt *nominaliste* et *relationniste*, et je soutiens que la raison n'existe pas au dehors des nos descriptions et indépendamment de ses relations avec les autres éléments propositionnelles de la description qui ont comme but *la compréhension* du comportement.

Pour moi, quelque chose est une raison en vertu de ces rapports et jamais en elle-même, comme semble supposer Audi. Si, dans le cas des motifs, on peut supposer, avec une certaine justification, tirée de la psychologie expérimentale, que leur existence est assez probable, dans le cas des raisons, rien ne prouve leur existence. Audi ignore complètement ce point, quand il discute de la différence entre la rationalisation à la première personne par rapport aux rationalisations à la deuxième et à la troisième personne qui, celles-ci «sont différentes en cela qu'elles n'échouent pas nécessairement dans l'explication pourquoi S a agi comme tel. »<sup>7</sup> Il est évident que, pour Audi, la raison principale pour laquelle les rationalisations à la première personne échouent *nécessairement* dans leur démarche d'expliquer le comportement du sujet, est le fait que le sujet («s») soit dans une double position : il construit la rationalisation, mais en même temps, il est l'agent qui produit le comportement à expliquer. Nous rencontrons ici avec le présupposé cartésien de l'accès privilégié du sujet à ses états mentaux. Si la raison existe réellement dans la tête du sujet et si la rationalisation introduit dans la même tête une autre raison, il sera assez difficile pour le sujet rationnel de ne pas remarquer qu'il a *deux* raisons *différentes* pour le même comportement, l'une *réelle*, l'autre *irréelle*, rationalisatrice. Audi parle des «rationalisations illusoires» (*deceitful*).<sup>8</sup> Dans le cas de la rationalisation à la troisième personne, cette possibilité disparaît et avec elle aussi, la possibilité de l'échec de la rationalisation. Je ne partage pas l'idée d'Audi d'une différence de ce type entre les rationalisations à la première personne et les autres. Si nous les traitons strictement comme des descriptions, sans aucune arrière-pensée chosiste, alors il n'y a rien de différent entre elles. Je reviendrai sur ce point plus tard, quand je vais discuter un exemple de rationalisation donnée par Audi.

Mon désaccord avec Audi devient plus grand quand nous arrivons à sa définition de la rationalisation appliquée aux croyances :

« Une rationalisation à la première personne, par S, de sa croyance que p est une approche intentionnelle de cette croyance donnée par lui, qui (a) offre une ou plusieurs raisons pour sa croyance que p, (b) représente la croyance comme *prima*

*facie* rationnelle étant donnée la raison ; mais (c) n'explique pas pourquoi S croit p. »<sup>9</sup>

Le point (c) de la définition fixe comme but pour la rationalisation d'expliquer la croyance, même si Audi a reconnu que les rationalisations ne sont pas des explications. Mais, il semble que, pour lui, cette assertion doit être comprise de la manière suivante : les rationalisations ne sont pas des explications parce qu'elles ne réussissent pas à expliquer, et pas parce que leur rôle n'est pas d'expliquer. Donc, d'après Audi, la rationalisation est une explication échouée. Je ne suis pas d'accord avec lui, simplement parce que, dans ce cas, comment peut-on distinguer une rationalisation d'une explication fautive ? Parce que, d'après Audi, toutes les deux ont, dans *la même mesure*, l'apparence d'une explication, mais la différence entre elles est plus importante : pendant que l'explication fautive est vraiment une explication, mais qui est falsifiée dans ce cas-là, la rationalisation, même vraie (au moins en partie, parce que Audi accepte la possibilité qu'au moins partiellement, les raisons des rationalisations soient des raisons vraies du comportement en cause), n'est pas une explication.

Ce qui reste une énigme pour la vision d'Audi est comment explique-t-on cet échec systématique ?<sup>10</sup> Audi essaie de donner une réponse en liant les rationalisations de l'image de soi du sujet. Donc, pour lui, leur rôle n'est pas épistémique, mais il s'agit d'un mécanisme qui seulement *semble* être rationnel : c'est-à-dire la rationalisation est utilisée par le sujet pour cacher soit le fait qu'il n'a pas des raisons pour justifier son comportement, soit que ses raisons ne sont pas convenables à présenter comme telles. Cette justification est valable, notamment, pour les rationalisations à la première personne, mais pour les autres types il est assez difficile de comprendre que chaque fois que quelqu'un fait une rationalisation qui concerne un autre sujet, il la fait pour tromper : tromper qui ( le sujet du comportement, soi-même, un troisième ?), et pourquoi (à quoi bon essayer de tromper le sujet sur la raison de son comportement, une fois qu'il *sait* laquelle est sa raison, donc il ne peut pas être trompé; ou pourquoi essayer de me tromper sur la raison de son comportement, une fois que je ne peux jamais être *absolument* sûr que le raison que je soupçonne *soit* la raison « réelle » de son comportement<sup>11</sup>; pourquoi essayer de tromper le troisième, si ni moi ni lui nous ne pourrions jamais être sûrs sur la

raison réelle du comportement du sujet). Donc, la vision d'Audi sur la rationalisation doit affronter des questions et des doutes qui la mettent en difficulté. En échange, la vision introduite par Davidson nous permet de justifier la rationalisation sans aucun présupposé ontologique et sans toutes ses difficultés.

Donc, Audi propose l

*vraiment* la raison qui explique l'action, la croyance ou toute autre attitude propositionnelle<sup>12</sup>. L'échec est le trait fondamentale de la rationalisation, parce que lui c'est responsable du fait qu'elle n'est pas une explication, lui est aussi responsable pour *l'apparente* rationalité de la rationalisation. Le rôle de la rationalisation est d'entretenir une certaine image du sujet par rapport à ses raisons, c'est-à-dire la rationalisation fournit au sujet (ou à un autre) les explications qui permettent de maintenir une certaine image (de soi, dans le cas du sujet lui-même) sur le sujet. La rationalisation apparaît, donc, chaque fois que l'explication donnée à une attitude propositionnelle quelconque (par le sujet de l'attitude ou par un autre) affecte, d'une façon ou d'une autre, cette image, et le producteur de l'explication la modifie pour refaire l'accord. D'une façon ou d'une autre, la rationalisation suppose l'explication « *réelle* » de l'attitude. Sinon, c'est-à-dire si son auteur ne sait pas laquelle est la raison « *réelle* », il ne peut produire qu'une *pseudo*-rationalisation, parce que, par hasard, il peut donner comme raison de l'attitude, justement cette raison réelle. Une autre conséquence de cette vision sur la rationalisation est que nous avons à faire avec une rationalisation seulement quand nous avons un *conflit* entre l'image sur le sujet de l'attitude (son image, mais aussi l'image qu'un autre a sur le sujet) et l'explication. Si ce conflit ne se produit pas, alors nous n'avons pas une rationalisation. Mais, dans ce cas, on voit mal pourquoi on parle d'une « *rationalisation* » : qu'est-ce qu'on *rationalise* quand on remplace, dans une explication, la raison *réelle* avec une raison qui est en accord avec l'image sur le sujet ?

En conclusion, on peut dire que, d'après Audi, la rationalisation est une *pseudo*-explication (dans le sens présentée plus haut) d'une attitude propositionnelle qui a comme but de *maintenir* une certaine image sur le sujet de l'attitude *quand et seulement quand* il y a un *conflit* entre cette image et l'explication de l'attitude.<sup>13</sup>

La rationalisation du comportement de Ted.

Pour assurer une meilleure compréhension de ses vues, Audi discute un exemple de rationalisation. Je veux présenter cet exemple parce que je crois que c'est, pour lui, l'occasion d'introduire des éléments supplémentaires pour « fortifier sa vision sur la rationalisation :

Ted est professeur et il doit corriger les travaux de ses étudiants. Il ressent une puissante attraction envers son étudiante, Lynn, et il aime à lire le travail de celle-ci. À cause de ces deux faits, il lui note le travail avec un B. Maintenant, imaginons nous que l'assistante de Ted, Sue, lit elle aussi le travail et, sur la base de son contenu, elle pense qu'il mérite C. Elle demande Ted pourquoi il l'a noté avec B. Il relit le travail et dit qu'il a trouvé des exemples très instructifs. Maintenant, supposons qu'il y a, dans le travail de Lynn, effectivement tel exemples et que, pour cela, il a eu un bonne raison à le noter avec B. Mais, Ted rationalise parce qu'il a noté le travail avec B avant d'avoir pris connaissance des exemples et seulement parce qu'il a certains sentiments envers Lynn et (par des motifs non-académiques) le travail lui a plu. Notre question est si, en vertu de la rationalisation, ou de la raison à laquelle il appelle, l'action de Ted est rationnelle.<sup>14</sup>

L'opinion d'Audi est que non, elle n'est pas rationnelle, et il cherche à prouver pourquoi. Une réponse plausible, dit-il, est qu'une fois que la rationalisation indique une bonne raison pour Ted pour le noter avec B, elle montre que son action est rationnelle. Mais, Audi croit qu'une telle affirmation est erronée. Il dit que nous devons distinguer deux types différents de choses qui peuvent être rationnelles : des types, comme l'action-type, ou un genre d'action, noter le travail de Lynn avec B; et occurrences (*tokens*), comme l'action-occurente, ou une action particulière, la notation *initiale* faite par Ted du travail de Lynn avec un B. Une façon de faire la différence est de distinguer entre le fait que *la notation* avec B du travail *est une chose rationnelle* étant données les circonstances et le fait que Ted note, *rationnellement*, avec un B, étant données les circonstances. Il y a ici, toujours, une petite néclarité : même si Audi nous montre que, dans chaque cas, l'accent est mis sur un autre élément, la différence n'est pas si évidente, si on se demande s'il est possible une situation quand une action rationnelle est réalisée



*irrationnellement*, étant données les circonstances. Cela signifie soit qu'une action peut être rationnelle en soi-même (comme type), mais irrationnelle comme occurrence, soit qu'il y a quelque chose qui intervient au niveau de l'occurrence et qui change la signification de l'action, qui, en des conditions normales, serait rationnelle. Audi semble être attiré par la première alternative, moi par la deuxième. Je veux insister un peu sur ce point. Si on compare les deux situations, le type et l'occurrence, on peut voir, chaque fois, que l'action est qualifiée comme rationnelle ou irrationnelle, *étant données les circonstances*. D'après Audi, les circonstances restent, dans les deux cas, inchangées. D'après moi, elles changent, en déterminant, pour cela, le changement de signification de l'action. Quand on dit « la notation du travail avec B est une chose rationnelle, étant données les circonstances », on envisage des circonstances habituelles, *typiques*, objectives (dans un sens faible, non ontologiques); quand on dit « Ted note rationnellement avec B le travail de Lynn, étant données les circonstances », on n'envisage plus des circonstances habituelles, mais les circonstances mêmes de la notation : or, l'une d'entre elles est le fait que Ted a certains sentiments envers Lynn et qu'il aime à lire (pour cela) son travail. Pour Audi, ces choses-ci tiennent de l'occurrence, pour moi elles tiennent des circonstances. Je crois que la plus forte raison en faveur de mon opinion est le fait que, dans cet exemple, les deux faits, que Ted a certains sentiment envers Lynn et le fait qu'il lit avec plaisir son travail ne sont pas des *raisons* (et Audi est lui aussi d'accord avec ça) de la notation avec B du travail de Lynn (même si on peut les considérer comme étant des *motifs*), et s'ils ne sont pas des raisons dans quelle qualité peuvent-ils appartenir à l'occurrence qui concerne le fait que « Ted a noté le travail de Lynn avec B » ? Ni le type, ni l'occurrence ne sont pas rationnelles ou irrationnelles en elles-mêmes, mais seulement par rapport aux circonstances. C'est quelque chose circonstanciel que Ted a certains sentiments envers une certaine étudiante et qu'il aime à lire son travail. Le caractère de l'occurrence peut changer d'une façon dramatique, si nous changeons une de ses circonstances; par exemple si on pense que Ted demande à ses étudiants de n'écrire pas leur noms sur leur travaux, mais des nombres et que, quand il lit le travail de Lynn, il ne sait pas que c'est son travail. Il a toujours des sentiments envers elle, il lit avec plaisir son travail, il note son travail avec B parce que c'est un bon travail. L'occurrence est rationnelle, à la différence de la

première, à cause d'un changement dans les circonstances (d'habitude, on ne demande pas aux étudiants de remplacer leurs noms avec des nombres), pas à cause d'un changement dans les « raisons » de Ted pour la notation du travail de Lynn. Audi est, probablement d'accord avec cela, parce qu'il peut dire que ce qui fait que l'occurrence soit irrationnelle n'est pas la présence des motifs, mais le fait que Ted ne donne pas la raison réelle de sa notation, parce qu'il donne une raison *différente*. Mais, je doute qu'il soit ainsi, parce que, d'habitude, Ted note avec B les travaux qui sont bons, le travail de Lynn est noté par lui avec B et la raison qu'il donne est que le travail est bon, c'est-à-dire *la même (vraie) raison pour noter un travail avec B*. Audi peut répliquer, qu'il ne s'agit pas de la raison *donnée* par Ted, mais de la raison à laquelle est-il pensé quand il a noté le travail de Lynn avec B : le fait qu'il a certains sentiments envers Lynn et qu'il aime à lire son travail. Mais, malheureusement, tous les deux (Audi et moi) ont été d'accord qu'elles ne sont pas des raisons. Il ne s'agit pas là d'une discussion stérile, mais il est important de savoir si l'occurrence soit irrationnelle (elle-même), étant données les circonstances (la position d'Audi), ou si l'occurrence soit irrationnelle (par rapport aux) circonstances données.

Mais, on peut laisser ces différences pour plus tard, pour avancer un peu la discussion. D'après Audi, les rationalisations évidentes n'expliquent pas des attitudes-occurrences (au moins, seulement en partie), mais il semble avoir un sens dans lequel une rationalisation peut – du fait qu'elle donne des bonnes raisons pour le type d'attitude en cause – expliquer ce type. Telles rationalisations expliquent pourquoi un type est un sorte (kind) de chose adéquate à faire étant données les circonstances, et elles peuvent certainement le rendre intelligible dans ces circonstances. Voilà comment Audi exécute un petit détour, en reconnaissant, au moins comme possibilité, un certain rôle positif aux rationalisations. Donc, la rationalisation, en donnant des raisons possibles de l'attitude en cause peut *expliquer* ce type d'attitude.<sup>15</sup> Alors, où échoue la rationalisation ? Evidemment, au niveau de l'occurrence. Et, ici, Audi introduit des éléments nouveaux et importantes pour sa vue sur la rationalisation.

Quelqu'un, dit-il, peut objecter que même une action particulière peut être montrée comme rationnelle par une rationalisation quand elle cite une raison qui est non seulement une

bonne raison pour l'action, mais aussi une que l'agent ait à ce moment. Pour cela, on peut soutenir que si Ted ait noté le caractère instructif des exemples de Lynn avant de lui donner le B, alors même si cela n'a pas fait partie de sa raison qui l'a déterminé à lui donner actuellement le B, le fait qu'il lui a donné le B était rationnel.<sup>16</sup> Comment répond Audi à cet argument ? Il change la cadre de la discussion en introduisant le problème du raisonnement pratique :

« la vision naturelle sur les actions rationnelles est que, soit elles soient la conséquence d'un raisonnement pratique soit, au moins en étant prises ensemble avec ce qui les motive et avec les croyances qui guident, elles appliquent (*instantiate*) un bon argument pratique, un dont les prémices assurent une bonne raison pour sa conclusion. »<sup>17</sup>

En revenant à l'exemple, il doit être envisagé de ce point de vue : premièrement, que signifie donner un B pour refléter la qualité du travail comme conclusion d'un *bon* raisonnement pratique ? Il peut apparaître de ou au moins correspondre à

- (i) Je veux, avec ma notation, refléter la qualité actuelle du travail corrigé;
- (i) En donnant ce B, il va réfléchir sa qualité actuelle; donc,
- (iii) Je dois donner ce B (I should give it a B)

pendant que donner un B pour de mauvaises raisons résultera du ou, au moins correspondra à quelque chose comme :

- (a) Je veux donner une bonne note aux étudiants dont les travaux m'ont procuré (pour des raisons non-académiques) un plaisir en les lisant;
- (a) En donnant ce B à ce travail, il va accomplir cela; donc,
- (b) Je dois donner ce B à ce travail (I should give this paper a B.)<sup>18</sup>

Le second argument n'est pas bon, dit Audi, parce qu'il contient une prémisse non raisonnable<sup>19</sup>, (a), qui exprime un désir qu'une personne rationnelle, adéquatement informée, ne l'aura ou ne l'acceptera pas; et, plus important, le but exprimé n'est ni rationnel ni

tel qu'il peut rendre l'action en question rationnelle. Je dois m'arrêter un peu sur ces deux raisonnements. En quoi consiste ici la rationalisation ? Audi ne donne pas une réponse claire à cette question. On peut présumer qu'elle consiste dans un tour de passe-passe : Ted donne le premier raisonnement (qui est un bon raisonnement pratique) comme étant la prémisse de son action, même si le raisonnement qui a causé l'action est le deuxième, le mauvais. D'après Audi, le premier correspond à la rationalité des types, pendant que le deuxième correspond à la rationalité des occurrences. Et, alors, le fait que le Ted donne le premier comme raison de son action ne fait aucunement que celle-ci, qui est une occurrence, soit rationnelle. Mais, la différence entre les deux raisonnements pratiques est située seulement au niveau de la première prémisse. Au reste, ils sont identiques. Pourquoi, alors ne pas supposer que la rationalisation remplace une prémisse rationnelle avec une autre qui est irrationnelle ? Parce que Audi veut, toujours garder, pour la rationalisation, une apparence de rationalité. Or, si on conçoit le travail de la rationalisation de cette façon, alors son irrationalité est si évidente qu'on ne peut plus soutenir la thèse d'Audi. La distinction entre *deux* types de raisonnements laisse ouverte cette possibilité. Les autres distinctions, entre l'action-type et l'action-occurrence, entre la rationalité-type et la rationalité-occurrence, contribuent, elles aussi, à maintenir cette possibilité d'une rationalisation qui utilise une *raison*, sans pour cela, impliquer la rationalité. Mais, cela avec le prix de contester toute finalité épistémique de la rationalisation.

Rationalisation et rationalité.

La finalité de la théorie d'Audi est de produire un instrument théorique assez sensible pour distinguer entre les explications qui nous donnent seulement les raisons *typiques*, principielles d'une attitude propositionnelle (les rationalisations) et les explications qui nous donnent les raisons *particulières* de cette attitude propositionnelle, qui d'après lui, sont les explications proprement-dites. Vraiment, c'est pas suffisant de dire ce qu'il *faut* dire sur les raisons de ton action, pour que celle-ci soit rationnelle; tu dois *montrer* les raisons *effectives* qui t'ont poussé à agir. Mais, le critère qu'il soit produit est trop fort, même pour ses exigences, en reléguant la première catégorie des explications dans le domaine de

l'irrationnel ou très proche de celui-ci. Le lien causal supposé par Audi entre la raison et l'action est responsable, en partie, des difficultés qu'il rencontre quand il soutient que la rationalisation donne une raison sans pour cela donner de la rationalité à l'action, même si cette raison peut causer l'action.

La thèse d'Audi est que la rationalisation n'implique pas la rationalité.<sup>20</sup> Cette affirmation peut être comprise de deux façons: soit que l'action en cause n'apparaisse comme *plus* rationnelle à la suite de la rationalisation qu'auparavant, soit, simplement, que la rationalité apportée par la rationalisation est plus petite par rapport à celle produite par une explication rationnelle. Audi ne nous donne pas des détails sur ce point. Mais, si on tient compte de sa vision sur la rationalisation, on peut supposer qu'il ne fait aucune distinction entre les deux. Pour lui, l'échec de la rationalisation est complète et sans degrés. Ainsi, il souligne le fait qu'il soutient la négation d'une implication et non l'implication d'une négation. C'est-à-dire il ne soutient pas que les actions rationalisables ne pourraient pas être rationnelles, mais seulement que leur rationalisations ne produisent pas de rationalité. Mais, s'il est ainsi, alors comment peut-on les présenter comme étant rationnelles ? Comment peuvent-elles être confondues avec les vraies explications rationnelles ?

Pour accepter l'idée qu'elles sont *pseudo*-rationnelles, Audi doit expliquer d'où provient et en quoi consiste ce *pseudo*, cette apparence de rationalité. Autrement, il ne s'agit que des gens assez fous qu'ils croient qu'ils peuvent cacher leurs vraies raisons d'actions sous des motivations penibles que personne ne prenne pas en compte. Pour cela, il sépare la rationalité en deux, une rationalité de type et une autre de l'occurrence. La rationalisation est l'explication qui est rationnelle seulement comme type, mais qui, comme explication de l'occurrence est irrationnelle. Donc, l'échec de l'explication se produit au niveau de l'occurrence. L'apparente rationalité est, ainsi, justifiée par cette rationalité de type. Mais, si nous retournons à l'exemple d'Audi, alors le premier raisonnement est fourni par Ted comme cause de son action, en réalité le deuxième en étant la cause. Mais le deuxième, Audi le dit lui-même, n'est pas un bon raisonnement et l'action qu'il cause n'est pas une bonne action (parce qu'elle est immorale, dit Audi). Dans ce cas, nous avons *deux* actions, l'une bonne (le type), l'autre mauvaise (l'occurrence), causées par *deux* causes différentes, une raison et un motif, et soutenues par *deux* raisonnements différents, l'un bon,

l'autre mauvais. A quoi bon parler, alors d'une et même action ? Il n'y a aucune raison à interdire de supposer que Ted veut présenter son action *particulière* immorale, injustifiée et irrationnelle – en dernier cas – (parce qu'il sait que ses motifs sont irrationnels et que son raisonnement est faux) comme étant une *autre action particulière*, morale, justifiée et rationnelle. Pourquoi supposer qu'il s'agit de la même action, mais aux niveaux différentes ? Pourquoi pas supposer qu'il s'agit de deux actions *particulières* ? Étant donnée la façon dont Audi présente les choses, d'après mon opinion, rien n'empêche d'accepter une telle supposition. En d'autres mots, si les raisons (dans leur qualité des *causes*) sont celles qui *individualisent* les actions, alors si nous avons des raisons *différentes*, cela est suffisant de conclure qu'il s'agit d'actions différentes. Et même les raisons *typiques* ne produisent que d'actions particulières, simplement parce qu'on ne peut pas *causer* des types d'action, mais seulement d'actions. Donc, Audi ne justifie la distinction type-occurrence que, autrement, est très importante et utile.

Nous devons conclure que tous les essais de Audi visant à démontrer l'irrationalité de la rationalisation sont voués à l'échec. Mais, cela signifie, au contraire, que toute rationalisation est un signe de rationalité, même s'il s'agit d'une fausse raison? Dans ce cas, nous devons affronter une conséquence terrible : pour être rationnel, il est suffisant à *paraître* comme tel. Il n'y a aucune différence entre la rationalité véritable et la simulation. Comment peut-on garder la différence sans, pour cela, éliminer la rationalisation du champ de la rationalité ? La réponse est, je crois, la suivante : la rationalisation n'est pas le signe de l'irrationalité, mais la manière dont la rationalité humaine se manifeste. Cela ne signifie, bien sur, qu'on nie la possibilité des fausses raisons, mais seulement leur caractère irrationnel. Dans le cas des fausses raisons, nous sommes confrontés avec un effort de l'agent de rester rationnel, c'est-à-dire d'être *raisonnable*. Donc, toute tentative à formuler des raisons pour nos actions doit être considérée comme raisonnable, même si ces raisons ne sont pas les raisons *véritables* de l'agent.

#### Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> Rationalization and Rationality, *Synthese* 65 (1985) 159-184.

<sup>2</sup> Audi, *op.cit.*, p.160.

<sup>3</sup> Audi lui-même embrasse cette conception : « Le point important est simplement que, quand j'utilise "explique", un facteur n'explique pas une action s'il n'y a pas

une connexion réelle entre lui et l'action, tel que l'action se produit à cause de lui. » (*op.cit.*, p.161)

<sup>4</sup> On peut donner une rationalisation comme excuse, par exemple, s'excuser du retard en disant qu'il avait *espéré* de n'être pas en retard, mais il a *oublié* quelque chose... Mais, formellement, on ne peut pas donner une excuse comme rationalisation. Excuser est différent de comprendre ou interpréter.

<sup>5</sup> *op.cit.*, p.162.

<sup>6</sup> D'après lui, il semble que l'excuse donne des *motifs* de l'action et, dans une certaine mesure, il a raison : les actes qui représentent l'objet des excuses sont, dans leur majorité, soit irrationnels (par exemple, demander des excuses pour un retard causé par l'embouteillage), soit irrationnels (demander des excuses pour grossièreté).

<sup>7</sup> Audi, *op.cit.*, p.163.

<sup>8</sup> «...en beaucoup de tels cas, S sait ou croit qu'il sait que la raison à laquelle il fait maintenant appel n'est pas la raison qu'il avait au moment de l'action. » Il admet qu'un tel conflit peut n'apparaître pas mais seulement si « Sa un échec de mémoire ». (*op.cit.*, p.164). Il arrive, ainsi, à rapprocher ce type de rationalisation des cas d'irrationalité comme s'illusionner (*wishful thinking*) et de la duperie de soi-même (*self-deception*). Ce rapprochement est assez contestable.

<sup>9</sup> *op.cit.*, p.165.

<sup>10</sup> p.168. Donc, pour lui, leur rôle n'est pas épistémique, mais il s'agit d'un mécanisme très proche de celui de la *wishful thinking* et de la *self-deception*.

<sup>11</sup> Or, Wittgenstein disait qu'on ne peut pas se tromper que sur les choses où on peut être sûr. Socrate, à son tour, disait que seulement celui qui *sait la vérité* peut *mentir*.

<sup>12</sup> voir la définition conclusive pour toute attitude propositionnelle, *op.cit.*, p.169.

<sup>13</sup> Bien sûr, cette définition ne peut pas être trouvée chez Audi, mais elle soutient tout son discours.

<sup>14</sup> *op.cit.*, p.170

<sup>15</sup> à la page 177, il définit, par exemple, de ce façon la rationalisation d'un type de comportement : « Une rationalisation (comportementale) de type est une tentative de représenter une action-type comme rationnelle, comme justifiable, ou comme adéquate, en citant une ou plusieurs raisons dans sa faveur. »

<sup>16</sup> *op.cit.*, p.171.

<sup>17</sup> *op.cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>18</sup> *op.cit.*, p.174.

<sup>19</sup> Ici, je crois, est le point le plus faible de la théorie d'Audi, parce que si cette prémisse n'est pas raisonnable, alors est ainsi parce qu'elle ne contient aucune *raison* et, alors, soit ce raisonnement pratique ne correspond pas à une rationalisation, soit la rationalisation n'offre aucune raison, mais seulement un motif.

<sup>20</sup> *op.cit.*, p.176.

ON HOHFELDIAN LIBERTIES

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§1. One of the views commonly held nowadays as to the character of rights is often put by saying that rights correlate with duties--meaning thereby that a right always implies or has attached some closely related duty of others.<sup>1</sup> There are, I think, serious difficulties in the way of holding a thesis of correlation in precisely this form.

The most interesting arguments against correlations of this sort derive from Wesley Hohfeld's classification of rights. On his view a legal right could be constituted by any one of four elements: by a claim, but also by a liberty, by a power, or by an immunity. Let me be more specific here. Hohfeld identified four basic types of rights, each type having a unique second-party correlative. For a legal *claim right* the correlative element is a legal duty of some second party. Analogously, the legal *liberty* to do X - which consists in the absence of any duty on the agent's part to refrain from X - is matched with other people's lack of a claim that X not be done by the agent. A legal *power* to do X consists in a person's legal competence to perform an act which will create, or at least bring to bear, certain legal consequences for a second party - and the situation of the second party constitutes that party's liability (or susceptibility) to this particular power. Finally, a person's *immunity* from X is necessarily correlated with a lack of power on the part of others to do X, and thus the correlative of an immunity is a disability. (Hohfeld, 1964: 36, 39.) The four italicized elements were thought by Hohfeld to give legal "advantage" (Hohfeld, 1964: 71) and their correlates legal "disadvantage." Now, an example developed in terms of Hohfeld's classificatory analysis might help to indicate the difficulty in the way of the thesis that rights always correlate with duties. Take the



constitutional right of Americans to free speech. This right does not create an area of free speech by imposing obligations on others; instead it does so by imposing a normative disability or lack of authority on Congress. The first amendment "deprives Congress of the authority... to enact laws requiring or prohibiting speech of certain kinds." An attempt by Congress to legislate in this area could presumably be challenged successfully in court and declared null and void. Thus, although the right to freedom of speech has a conceptual correlative, "it is not an obligation; it is a legislative disability..."<sup>iii</sup>

We are not saying here that Congress has a constitutional duty not to pass such laws and, hence, that it *should* not; rather, we are saying that Congress is constitutionally unable to legislate in this area and, hence, that it *cannot*. By analogy, we might say that a person cannot legally contract two marriages over one and the same stretch of time; for one of the marriages, the second, is necessarily invalid. This says something quite different from the injunction that one should not have two same-time marriages, for this suggests merely that such a course would be legally wrong (and not that it would be--or would also be--in some sense legally impossible). Hence, duty and disability are distinct notions in law and some legal rights imply legal disabilities, not legal duties.

Of course, it may still to be said that Congress has a duty not to make laws "abridging... the freedom of speech"; but this particular duty cannot be fully stated (as I indicated above) without bringing in the notion of a disability, or "no-power" as Hohfeld called it, nor is it enforceable along the lines of most duties but requires instead the "sanction" of nullity. There is considerable bite, then, to the contention that a normative disability or lack of authority rather than a simple duty may sometimes be the main correlative of a given right.

It seems, therefore, that arguments based on the existence of rights of the sort we have been discussing--immunity rights--are telling against the view that every right is necessarily connected to a closely related second-party duty. We can still accept the important point that a right which doesn't guide anyone's behavior is no right at all; but to do this we should add that this guidance need not involve a duty--a disability or liability will do as well in some contexts.

The truth, which the rights-correlate-with-duties thesis skews, is that any genuine right must involve some significant normative direction of the behavior of persons other than the holder. It is this

truth about normative direction, crucial to the concept of rights, which I want to endorse in the present paper. The idea that all rights attach to certain directives for the conduct of others is weaker than the claim that they are necessarily linked to specific and closely correlated protective duties, but it is, I believe, a sounder and more defensible notion.

§2. There is, however, a serious problem in holding even this weaker thesis, that all rights involve normative direction of persons other than the rightholder. For it seems to run up against the authority of Hobbes, one of the founders of rights theory, and of Hohfeld himself, as we shall see.

In his account of natural rights Hobbes appeared to argue roughly as follows. A natural right is a liberty; such a right specifies a way of acting that is rational for anyone in the state of nature and, on reflection, we determine that it would be rational for persons in such a state to do anything to preserve their own life and substance. Hobbes's account here is specifically intended to endorse as rational, hence as a natural right, each person's following a policy of first-strike violence. But the conduct of other people was in no way normatively directed by these liberty rights. True, they had what Hohfeld would call a no-right (or no-claim) against any exercise of a natural right, but this amounted simply to saying that others could call on no duty of the rightholder *not* to do the thing he or she was doing. But beyond this there was no positive normative direction that could restrain their conduct, not even given by such other duties as might exist in a state of nature. In this respect their responsive conduct towards another's exercise of a liberty right was completely ungoverned normatively: just as the rightholder could (normatively) do anything that the holder was physically able to do so all other individuals could in anticipation or in response do literally anything, presumably in virtue of *their* natural right. Hence, we could say for Hobbes that no person--no second party--is afforded any normative constraint on how that person is supposed to act in virtue of the natural liberty rights possessed by others. And we conclude, then, that for Hobbes at least, a right *qua* right involves, can involve, no normative constraint on the behavior of others. For if he had *conceived* rights differently, as always involving second-party obligations or directions of some sort, he would simply have been unable to talk in the way that he did of rights in a state of nature.

Now, Hobbes stands at the very beginning of the tradition of

talking about rights with which we are concerned in this paper. He wrote at a time when the concept of rights was actually being molded. The development of rights theory has tended to go against Hobbes and to side with Locke. For Locke did see normative direction attached to all rights, even rights in a state of nature. Thus, on the Lockean view, rights as rights (and hence as natural rights or human rights or constitutional rights or civil rights, what have you) always correlate with some significant normative direction of the conduct of others (the so-called second parties); and in the absence of such directives one could not speak of rights. A consensus has developed (as I suggested at the very beginning of the present paper) that rights have a normative character and, among other things, have the normative force of implying (or, if not that, of always being correlated with) significant normative directions for conduct incumbent on second parties.

It is important to see that the issue we have been briefly considering is in no way special to Hobbes's thinking about rights. Rather, it applies to the whole category of Hohfeldian liberty rights (with respect to which Hobbes's account of natural rights is but an example).

In saying this we should note here that Hohfeld, unlike Hobbes, actually subscribes to the basic thesis of the consensus, at least formally; for he does appear to believe that every proper right logically entails some normative direction for the conduct of second parties (but varying, of course, from case to case, depending on what *kind* of right we are concerned with). Thus, a liberty right of an agent  $X$  implies a "no-right" of others. And a no-right is the total absence of a claim on that agent to forbear. Thus, the second party, in the case of a liberty right, can claim no duty of the rightholder *not* to do that action respecting which the holder is said to have a liberty.

One of Hohfeld's classic illustrations of a liberty so conceived is the right of someone to eat a salad. Here the others at the table can call on no duty of the rightholder not to eat it. Presumably, they would be unjustified, then, in simply restraining the eligible eater from proceeding in due course to eat the salad, or by otherwise making that eating physically impossible. But, interestingly, Hohfeld specifically denies this. His point here is a rather technical one. He wants to emphasize that the *one* thing specified as certain that these others cannot do is point to a duty, on the rightholder's part, to forbear eating. Indeed, in Hohfeld's actual example, this is the only

normative direction that relevantly pertains to *their* conduct. So we are free to imagine a number of scenarios: thus, the others might feel perfectly free to put their forks into the rightholder's salad and help themselves to portions of it as the holder nibbles along; or (in the scenario Hohfeld actually cites) one of them might feel free to grab the bowl away from the rightholder.<sup>iii</sup>

I should add that some of the curious features of Hohfeld's analysis can be traced back to questions of ownership. However, if we specify that no one of the people at the table owns the salad or the bowls or the table, and add that the actual owner has left only a very loose set of rules for behavior at meals and each agrees that each has a liberty right (as Hohfeld understood that term) to eat a bowl of salad, then something very chaotic (rather like a Hobbesian state of nature--without the mayhem) could result within the confines (such as they are) provided by a Hohfeldian liberty, given his emphases.

If this is a paradigm example of a liberty right, such a right is indeed an odd one. Why so? Not because *no* normative direction is involved but because no *significant* normative direction is involved. If, perhaps, the relevant duty had embraced at least two explicit features in particular - the Hohfeldian no-claim *and* a duty of second parties not to interfere directly with a proper exercise of the liberty (and maybe to restrain themselves in other ways as well) - that would be all right. But the Hohfeldian correlate to a liberty right does not require this (and Hohfeld goes out of his way graphically to point that fact out); rather, only the first of the these directives on conduct is actually entailed in Hohfeld's view.

It would follow from the analysis I have been developing, then, that those liberties (in Hohfeld's sense) that provide *no significant* normative direction to the conduct of others (in being correlated with mere no-claims, for example) would be bracketed off from the class of rights. They would simply be licenses or mere liberties or "privileges," as Hohfeld called them, but they would not properly be called rights.<sup>iv</sup>

**§3.** Can anything more be said in defense of Hohfeld's basic account of liberties as rights? We might begin this brief reprise on Hohfeld's behalf by noting a simple fact.

Some liberty rights may be specifically identified by name, and even spelled out, in a constitutional or legal document (as was the liberty to travel, which was mentioned in the U.S. Articles of

Confederation [1781], though not in the Constitution [put into effect in 1789]). Here we can assume that the liberty in question is specifically protected; its exercise is allowed or even encouraged and people (including governments) are explicitly forbidden to interfere directly with any proper exercise of that liberty.

But many liberties, perhaps most liberties, are not like this. For many liberties, such as the right to dress, or not dress, as one pleases in one's own living room or to paint one's house purple, if that's what the individual wants, or the right to scratch one's left ear (or Hohfeld's right to eat a salad, from section 2), are not formulated or named in legal rules at all. Rather, these unspecified liberties are more like authoritative conclusions drawn on a particular occasion.

One notable feature of these unspecified liberties is that they consist in the mere absence of any (legal) duty to do or not do that particular thing--e.g., paint one's house purple--on the part of the agent, coupled with the absence of a legal claim on the part of others that it not be done by the agent (which would imply, of course, that they had no duty to prevent it). Since such liberties exist in all areas where there is such an absence of legal inhibition they are apt to be rather numerous. More important, there may be in most of these cases no duties which *specifically* protect the particular liberty in question.

In sum, many determinate liberty rights have the rights character of being, at least on their face, mere liberties. For both the liberty to do that thing and any direct normative requirements on others respecting the liberty are wholly unspecified in law, or largely so. (At the least we can say: their being specified in law is not a necessary condition of their counting as liberties under the law.) Since the law makes no explicit statutory (or constitutional) recognition of the liberty in question (or oftentimes even of the main headings under which it could conveniently be lodged) and affords no protections per se, we can call these *weak* liberty rights. Thus, weak liberty rights (and the fact that they are so prevalent in law) would appear to reinstate Hohfeld's notion of liberty rights as an authentic "fundamental legal conception."

In particular, competition rights, a special case of liberty rights, are thought by some to provide a peculiarly strong illustration of the analysis just given in support of Hohfeldian liberties. So, before I criticize this analysis, I'd like to spell out a bit more the support that competition rights are said to afford.

Such rights of competition occur in many places, often in games. A specific example might help fix attention. In a baseball game, a runner is at third base with no outs; a sharp ground ball is hit between second and short. The runner is free to run and heads for home. Now the catcher, guarding home base, has no duty to allow the runner to score. Indeed, the catcher has a right to try to stop the runner. Thus, the catcher can, if he has the ball (or, perhaps, even if he is awaiting the throw), stand athwart the base path and block the runner.

But it is an illusion (I would add) to think that there is, in these cases, no normative direction at all afforded the competitors in their responses to the other side. For the catcher cannot stand there at his pleasure, without the ball or without awaiting the throw on the instant. Why not? Because the rules of baseball do not allow these things. Although the catcher has no liberty-protecting duty specifically correlated with the baserunner's right to run home and has himself a right to prevent the runner from scoring, the catcher's conduct towards the baserunner is, nonetheless, normatively directed by the rules of baseball.

A number of duties, institutional duties, are built into the playing of the game and these duties govern this case insofar as it comes under the relevant rules. No competition right, in baseball or in any other game, is wholly free of such constraints.

By the same token, the catcher cannot pull out a gun and shoot the baserunner. For this would violate not only the rules of the game but also the laws of the land.

I realize that not every reader will be familiar with my example. Accordingly, it might be helpful simply to state my main point directly here. It is an error to think that in cases of competition we have a small-scale state of nature. Competitors should not be imagined as standing toward one another, on the model of gladiators, wholly bereft of obligations that correlate, if only loosely, with each other's right to "win, score, or advance." There is, in sum, no such thing as a completely uninhibited competition right, a liberty toward which there is no significant direction afforded second parties whatsoever. In the case of structured games (like baseball), normative direction of the players' conduct is provided at two distinct levels: in the rules of the game, in the laws of the land.

Even in relatively unstructured cases of competition, some of these constraints nonetheless apply. Thus, they would apply to two

persons both rushing to pick up an unclaimed five-dollar bill or to people fishing who are angling for the same trout or to business competitors in a contest to obtain a contract or to put a new state of the art personal computer on the market. For no one of them could shoot the other or do unallowed violence to them. Thus, the laws provide normative direction to the conduct of all competitors, for all are citizens or subjects of the laws. So, by attending to what seems the strongest version of Hohfeldian liberty rights - the rights of competition--we reach in the end an interesting conclusion. There may be no normative direction--of others' conduct - directly and specifically correlated with a given liberty (a directive designed to protect that liberty and specified either in the rules of the game or in law of the land or in both) but there is, nonetheless, significant normative direction for the conduct of these second parties in the case of all (or almost all) competition liberties. For, at a minimum, standing duties designed to provide security to persons surround the playing of games (such as baseball) and other, less-structured forms of competition (recall the example of two people rushing to pick up the unclaimed banknote)--just as they surround a whole host of situations in life, circumscribing all liberties in the process.<sup>v</sup>

Thus, to go back to an earlier example, standing duties prohibit such things as trespass and violence against persons or property and effectively restrain the neighbors, who detest the house's purple color, from stopping the owner or from repainting it themselves. These unspecialized, standing duties - which tell people the sorts of things they cannot do - constitute a sort of "perimeter" (in Hart's term, 1973: 180-1) upon which any number of unspecified liberties could rest for legal support and protection.

In short, such things as dressing as one pleases (in one's own home) or painting one's house purple or scratching one's ear can count as legal rights because they can be seen and officially accredited as special cases of very general legal categories - like property or privacy. Or, more crucially, they can count because significant normative direction of the conduct of other persons toward the liberty in question is provided by standing legal duties, which are themselves standardly enforceable by governmental action.

Ultimately, as we have seen, the matter is no different with the liberties of competition (or, as they are often called, competition rights). I do not, of course, want to say that competition rights are, flat out, legal rights. For their implication in the network of laws and so on

is for the most part a peripheral one. Under their proper names, so to speak, such liberty rights are never or only rarely mentioned in law or in judicial proceedings. But they are legal rights - or, better, they can come to be involved in legally valid claims and hence count as legal rights - simply insofar as relevant normative direction is provided by a perimeter of standing legal duties, duties made effective by the action of government.

Competition rights can be seen to conform, then, in the same way as all other liberties do, to the general analysis of rights that I set forth in the very first section of this paper, where it was said that all rights involve significant normative direction of the conduct of second parties (that is, of persons other than the rightholder). Absent all such significant direction, we might still call any one of these a liberty (meaning a *mere* liberty) but not a liberty *right*. For rights are protected ways of acting or of being treated. Or so my analysis is meant to suggest.

§4. So far in my paper I have been criticizing Hohfeld's account as an account of *rights* - specifically of liberties as rights. Now I want to turn directly to a criticism of it as an account of *liberties*.

Two points need to be noted here, in our discussion of Hohfeldian liberties, for both of them have evoked considerable discussion and criticism. The first is this: for Hohfeld legal rights are radically atomistic. They always involve a single pair of correlatives (for example, a single specific liberty matched with a single specific no-claim) that holds between two, but no more than two, determinate people.<sup>vi</sup> Second, Hohfeld's conception of a liberty can usefully be contrasted with what Hart called a "bilateral" liberty (Hart, 1973, pp. 175-6). In the case of a bilateral liberty the agent is free both to do *X* and not to do it--that is, there is an absence of any duty on the agent's part either (1) to do *X* or (2) to refrain from doing it. Hohfeld, it will be recalled from sections 1 and 2, meant by a liberty only part (2), as Hart notes. So we can, following Hart's lead, refer to Hohfeld's conception of liberties as "unilateral."<sup>vii</sup>

I want now to explore more carefully some of the ramifications of Hohfeld's "unilateral" conception. Let us begin by considering what appears to be a relatively simple example. The law might allow people to make right turns at a red light, after stopping; let us suppose, next, that they are sometimes *required* to do so. Does this make sense?

On Hohfeld's account it does. If one has in mind what Sumner



calls a "half liberty" (Sumner, 1987: 34), the reasoning would go as follows. One has no duty *not* to do A (that is, where one has a proper Hohfeldian liberty, one has no duty to refrain); thus, one *may* do it. But nothing is said at all as to whether one might have (or not have) a duty to do it (for this is left open in Hohfeld's account). The governing intuition, then (in the case of both Hohfeld and Sumner), is that it is not inconsistent to say that one can have a duty to do what one is permitted to do. Or, in a famous but shopworn phrase, ought implies can (here the 'can' in question is a normative one, a permission or "half liberty"). Thus, a Hohfeldian (half) liberty, a liberty to do A, is compatible with a duty to do it.

I am reluctant to accede to this claim, for I do not fully share the governing intuition. I think the notion of a bilateral liberty captures an important insight. Here one is said to have a liberty when one is normatively able either to do something or not do it. On this view, then, a requirement that an agent do something (say, the action A) would be incompatible with a "full liberty" (in Sumner's phrase) respecting the doing of A. In short, where one has a Hartian bilateral liberty (that is, one has no duty to do A and no duty to not do it), one cannot, *logically* cannot, be required either to do or not do the relevant action A.

Are we simply at an impasse here, at loggerheads in our intuitions? Let us consider a further case or two in point, using this time the notion of a right to explore the ground a bit more. In doing so, we would hope to resolve the impasse, or at least weaken its grip.

Some might find it strange to say that someone has a right which that person is *required* to exercise. One might even urge that these two notions, of having a right and of being required to exercise it, are incompatible.

But we are in fact familiar with rights whose exercise is required. The right to an (elementary) education is one example. In many modern societies schooling – education in that sense – is thought to be a right of children and its exercise is required. Indeed, the UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) couples these two ideas closely when it says, "Everyone has the right to education. . . . Elementary education shall be compulsory" (article 26). It might be contended in response that it is the parents, not the child, who are being compelled here. But this rejoinder seems rather hollow when we consider that the school-leaving age in many

societies is as high as sixteen. The requirement would seem to be on the child or teenager as well as on the parents. In any event, there are other examples.

The right to vote is one whose exercise is required, in some contemporary societies (e.g., Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica), without losing the name of right. In some countries the requirement is even enforced, with a fine for those who do not vote.

There is, of course, more to the right to vote than whether it is exercised or not. One wants to vote for whom one wills, one wants to have one's vote counted, and so on. Let us, nonetheless, focus for now simply on the requirement that one vote.

The right to vote (as we are construing it here) involves, admittedly, something that the rightholder does or can do. It is a right to a way of acting. But, where it is required (as it is in some countries), it is still a right, though arguably not a right to a *liberty* of conduct.

Some rights are not rights to a way of acting at all; rather, they are rights to a way of being treated (at the hands of others). Such rights may concern the avoidance of injury at the hands of others (e.g., the injury of torture) or concern the receipt of beneficial services (e.g., an education, medical care, or social service benefits).

And among rights of these two kinds (avoidances of injury, receipt of services) we may find some that are compulsory with respect to the rightholder. Education, I have already suggested, is one such.

Clearly, there is no incompatibility in being required to receive a service that one has a right to or in being required to avoid an injury, like the injury of torture, where one is said to have a right to such avoidance. (By required to avoid here, I have in mind the simple claim that one could never be allowed to waive the right in question, the right not to be tortured.)

It is difficult, however, to regard a right to a *liberty* of action as a right that one is required to exercise. Here there may be a genuine incompatibility. Where requirements are imposed on conduct--imposed on a way of acting--that the agent has a right to perform (as in the case of the right to vote), we might prefer to call such a right a power or a competence, rather than a liberty.

A similar device could be employed with our earlier example of making right turns "on a red." Where such turns are required, one is said to have right to make such turns, but not a liberty. One could even say, in such cases, that one is permitted to make right turns at

a red light (or that one has the privilege so to act); one could add, then, that one is normally permitted to make such turns but here one is required to do so. But if one were *always* required, on each and every occasion, it would strain language (and ordinary understanding) to describe this as a permission (or as a privilege), let alone a liberty.

Nonetheless, I must concede that it would not be logically contradictory to say that one is permitted to do that which one is required to do--though I hope I'm permitted to add that this is a simple and obvious (and fortunate) matter of consistency in law and not a deep truth about liberties (even legal ones). It serves to establish that we are in a deontic system and not in Alice's Wonderland.

But it would, I repeat, be overstraining the point to say that one has a liberty to do A where one is required to do it. If we have in mind a liberty of conduct, we typically or paradigmatically have in view a "full" or "bilateral" liberty; and the notion of liberty here resists the idea of a duty or requirement so to act.

There is, however, one thing that could not be said under either of the main headings we have introduced, be it that of "full" liberty or only "half." A person could not say that one has "a moral right to do A and still have a moral duty to not do A" (contrary to the author of the passage just cited).<sup>viii</sup> For this is inconsistent not only with a full liberty but even with a Hohfeldian half one. It is equivalent to saying, in the Hohfeldian context, that one has no duty to refrain from doing A, on the one hand, and that one has a duty not to do it (a duty to refrain from doing it), on the other. And these claims are logically incompatible.<sup>ix</sup>

### Notes:

i. This thesis has deep roots in the philosophical literature on rights and has been advocated, without commitment to the parallel thesis that duties logically entail rights, by MacDonald (1946-47), Hart (1955), Mayo (1965), Feinberg (1970, 1973), Sumner (1987: 8, 12, 15-17, 35, 36), and Rawls (1971). For a discussion of Rawls, in particular, on this point see my book *Rawls and Rights* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1985), ch. 2, sect. 2.

ii. The two passages quoted are from David Lyons (1970: 50-51). In this interpretation of the constitutional right of free speech Lyons is actually following Hart closely (see Hart 1961: 242, note to p. 64).

iii. For the wonderful salad example, see Hohfeld (1964: 41-42). Hohfeld took the

example, but added all the interesting refinements on his own, from John C. Gray's classic *The Nature and Sources of the Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1909), sect. 48.

iv. Indeed, Hohfeld's preferred term here is 'privilege.' See Hohfeld (1964: 36; also 38-50, esp. 42).

v. The term 'competition rights' is taken from Rawls (1971: 239n). The rules relevant to the baseball example are rule 2.00 and rule 7.06. The example of competition over an unclaimed bank note is from Hart (1955: 179; see also 1968: 126-127, for a related example).

I am indebted to Gerry MacCallum for forcefully bringing the notion of competition rights to my attention, in an unpublished paper on competition (since published, in MacCallum 1993, pp. 203-223), and for suggesting that such rights pose a challenge to my account. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning in this regard that if one regards competition rights as liberties and if one means by liberty roughly what MacCallum meant by freedom (in his essay [1967] on that topic) then such rights will necessarily direct the conduct of others at some point, at the point where it is specified what the freedom is a freedom *from*.

vi. For discussion, see Campbell (1997). The term 'no-claim' I have taken from Carl Wellman.

vii. The careful reader may have noted, however, that in section 3, where I was defending Hohfeld's analysis, the notion of liberty used there was a "bilateral" one.

viii. Rainbolt (1993: 105) says this thing. The context of Rainbolt's passage, as quoted here, is provided in the following example: a member of the Ku Klux Klan (a virulently racist organization) is on the ballot in Rainbolt's state.

I could readily make sense of the contested passage here if Rainbolt had said: one can have a *legal* liberty right to do A and still have a moral duty to not do it. So, to make sense of the alleged right in the passage quoted, Rainbolt will have to take the path just suggested or, failing that, to deny that the right is to be understood as a liberty right at all. He appears to do the latter (pp. 105-6), but the move is not convincing.

ix. I have used earlier writings of my own, sometimes verbatim, as sources of the present paper. Thus, one source of section 1 is "Recent Work on the Concept of Rights," with James W. Nickel (co-author), *American Philosophical Quarterly* 17 (1980), 165-80, esp. pp. 165-7. And for sections 2-4 I have used, as sources, chs. 2, 3, and 11 of my book *A System of Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, in paperback 1997).

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PATIENTENAUTONOMIE UND ETHIK

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Die Meinung, dass ein gesunder Menschenverstand und eine eigene Erfahrung zur Entscheidung ärztlicher und psychologischer Ethikfragen genügen würde ist längst nicht mehr ausreichend für den existierenden Entwicklungsweg dieser Wissenschaften. Der humanrechtliche Charakterzug der angewandten Ethik ist nicht zu überschauen. Sie verfügt über einen logischen Hintergrund der die allgemeine Vernunft überschreitet.

Bereits Wittgenstein hatte vom Weltbild als dem übereinkommenden Hintergrund geredet, durch welchen Menschen zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheiden (Wittgenstein 1970). Und alle Prüfungen bzw. Argumentationen geschehen innerhalb eines Systems. Die traditionelle medizinische Ethik hat nur einige der in der Ethik vertretene Grundprinzipien ausgewählt. Sie besteht im wesentlichen aus zwei Grundtypen von Hintergrundrechtfertigungen:

Dem *paternalistischen hippokratischen Ethos* mit seiner Verpflichtung zu helfen und zu heilen, zumindest aber nicht zu schaden, und dem aus der Rechtsprechung entlehnten Prinzip der *Einwilligung nach Aufklärung* ("informed consent"), das in der Medizinethik allgemein als Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Kranken bekannt ist.

Ohne Zweifel hat sich das medizinische Handeln im letzten Jahrhundert gewaltig gewandelt, so dass sich die Frage stellt, ob das ärztliche Ethos noch ausreicht, all diese weltverändernden Entscheidungen in verantwortbarer Weise zu treffen. Vieles, was früher nicht beeinflussbar war, der sogenannte Lauf der Natur oder vorausbestimmtes Schicksal, wird nun zum Gegenstand der menschlichen Entscheidung einer auserwählten Gruppe.

Vielleicht ist unser Problem das traditionelle Standesethos und die Vernachlässigung der pragmatisch orientierten Philosophie.

Darum habe ich buchstäblich das Gefühl eines Entdeckers während ich diese Reihen schreibe, denn in Rumänien gab es bis jetzt noch keine diesbezüglichen Beschäftigungen. Dazu fehlte eben das aufgeführte Problem. Niemand hat jemals daran gezweifelt, dass die existierende medizinische Ethik unzureichend sei. Ich gehe aber von der Voraussetzung aus, dass ein Problem aufgeworfen werden kann, auch bevor die implizierten Bestandteile dieses zur Kenntnis nehmen, oder dazu bereit sind. Vielleicht hilft eine solche Auseinandersetzung den ersten Keim einer Überbrückung der momentanen Lage zu setzen. Es ist wohl eines Philosophen würdig den ersten Schritt zu tun.

Stellen wir also die Ethik zuerst vor. Der Begriff *Moral* stammt von dem lateinischen Wort 'mos' (Sitte) ab und bezeichnet die gelebte Überzeugung einer Gesellschaft oder Gemeinschaft, also das, was faktisch als sittlich verpflichtend angesehen wird. Er umfaßt Güter und Pflichten, die das Zusammenleben einer Gemeinschaft garantieren. Probleme treten bei Wertkonflikten auf und sind innerhalb der *Moral* nicht zu lösen.

*Ethos* – abgeleitet vom griechischen Wort 'ethos' (Verhalten, Sitte) – meint eine spezifische sittliche Lebensform, die von Grundhaltungen und einer gewissen praktischen Rationalität geprägt ist. *Ethos* bezeichnet die sittliche Einstellung eines Menschen, einen Typus von Sittlichkeit oder sozialetisch die Lebensform einer gesellschaftlichen Gruppe oder eines Berufsstandes, wobei eine spezifisch akzentuierte Werthaltung im Mittelpunkt steht (Funke 1972). Es kennzeichnet die besondere Art und Haltung eines Menschen, seine Überzeugungen, Gepflogenheiten und Verhaltensweisen, die in der angeborenen Naturanlage zu Vernunft und Freiheit begründet sind, aber durch Gewohnheit, Übung und Anpassung gemäß dem Herkommen ausgebildet und gefestigt werden können.

Von beiden zu unterscheiden ist die *Ethik* als wissenschaftliche Reflexion auf *Moral* und *Ethos* mit dem Ziel, Verhaltensvorschriften, sittliche Verpflichtungen und Handlungsregeln für Entscheidungen argumentativ auszuweisen und zu rechtfertigen (Irrgang 1995). Während das Wort 'Ethos' der griechischen Alltagssprache entlehnt ist, ist der Begriff *Ethik* ein Kunstwort, geprägt von Aristoteles. Dieser bezeichnet mit dem Wort "ethische Theorie" (Aristoteles, Zweite Analytik), kurz mit "Ethik" (Aristoteles, *Politeia*), die Wissenschaft, die das Problem reflektiert, welches von Sokrates und Platon in der

Auseinandersetzungen mit der Sophistik aufgeworfen wurde. Es besteht darin, dass die Legitimierung der Sitte und die Rechtfertigung der Institutionen der griechischen Polis durch die Herkunft von den Vätern, also durch Tradition, fragwürdig geworden ist.

Begründete moralische Entscheidungen sind aber schwer zu treffen, insbesondere in einem Gebiet, wo die Begriffe von Leben und Tod zu den Arbeitsstoffen gehören. Der Gegenstand der Ethik muss offen bleiben, denn moralisches Handeln und Urteilen wechselt seine leitenden Prinzipien zusammen mit Geschichte, Entwicklung und Zeit. Was heute allgemein als moralisch gilt, kann morgen schon fragwürdig werden und übermorgen ungültig oder sogar unmoralisch. *Alles fließt* und die medizinische Ethik dürfte hier keine Ausnahme machen. Doch eben dies tut der Standesethos für den die Ärzte hier nicht einmal plädieren müssen, denn es ist durch ungeschriebene Regeln tief in der Psyche der Teilnehmer verwurzelt.

Die neuzeitliche Regel- und Prinzipienethik ist aber von der Dynamik ihrer Entwicklung gekennzeichnet und es wäre somit naturwidrig zu behaupten, dass sie zu einem Gruppenethos führen könnte. Identitäten sind in der heutigen Gesellschaft und Politik nicht mehr tonangebend, denn Migrationen, ökonomische Krisen und Konflikte verwandeln diese in zeitlich wechselnde Begriffe. Darum wurde auch das Ethos als identitätsvermittelnde moralische Größe in Westeuropa durch zwei Formen der Rationalisierung abgelöst: durch Methoden der Verallgemeinerungen im Anschluss an die Transzendentalphilosophie und die Folgenabschätzung im Fahrwasser des Utilitarismus. Die Form der Rationalisierung vermittelt uns einen anderen Zugang zu unserem Handeln als unser unmittelbares Selbsterleben, nämlich über ein Interpretationskonstrukt.

Die im Gesundheitsbereich Handelnden sollten über eine problem- und anwendungsorientierte Ethik verfügen, die ihnen erlauben könnte ihr eigenes Handeln kritisch zu überprüfen und gegebenenfalls zu rechtfertigen. Was bei uns aber nicht der Fall ist. Die Kommunikation Arzt-Patient existiert nur insofern sich der Erste bequem eine oft unverständliche Diagnose mitzuteilen, ohne ausführliche Erklärungen, oder sogar einer Frage nach dem Gesichtspunkt des Kranken, denn man geht von der eingefleischten Annahme, dass die Patienten (da sie keine medizinische Ausbildung genossen haben) ihre eigene Lage zu verstehen. In dieser Art dargestellt mag es uns wohl grotesk und lächerlich vorkommen, aber



die Wirklichkeit und ihre Situationen entbehren jedwelcher Komik, sie flößen nur Trauer, Leid, Unsicherheit und Tragik ein.

Hans Lenk unterscheidet vier Dimensionen der Verantwortung im Gesundheitsbereich:

1. Handlungsergebnisverantwortung,
2. Aufgaben- und Rollenverantwortung,
3. universal-moralische Verantwortung und
4. rechtliche Verantwortung.

Eine jede dieser Kategorien läßt sich ihrerseits aufgliedern wie folgt:

### **1. Handlungsergebnisverantwortung als**

*individuelle Handlungsverantwortung* als positive bzw. negative **Kausalhandlungsverantwortung** (für bestimmte Handlungen bzw. Unterlassungen) und als aktive **Verhinderungsverantwortung** (Präventionsverantwortung),

(a) *Mitverantwortung* bei kollektivem, korporativem Handeln,

(b) Verantwortung von Korporationen als *institutionelle Handlungsverantwortung*.

**2. Rollen- und Aufgabenverantwortung** umfaßt neben den generellen Aspekten der Fürsorge – und Vorsorgeverantwortung und der Haftungs – und Entschädigungsverantwortung:

(a) *Verantwortung zur Rollenerfüllung* (Erfüllung von formellen, informellen, legalen Rollenpflichten sowie von repräsentativer als institutioneller Rollenverantwortung),

(b) (berufs-) *spezifische Aufgaben - (Erfüllungs-) Verantwortung*,

(c) *Loyalitätsverantwortung* und

(d) *Korporative Verantwortung* von Institutionen (gegenüber Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft usw., und zwar organisatorisch, legal und moralisch).

**3. Universal-moralische Verantwortung** besteht aus:

(a) *direkter situationsaktivierter moralischer Handlungsverantwortung* für die von den Handlungen direkt betroffenen Partner, Personen und Lebewesen (moralische Fürsorge- und Vorsorgeverantwortung),

(b) *indirekter* Handlungsverantwortung für Folgen von Handlungen und Unterlassungen im Sinne einer moralischen Mitverantwortung (Gruppenverantwortung, je nach Einwirkungs- und Mitwirkungsmacht),

(c) *Selbstverantwortung*,

(d) Höherstufiger (individueller) Verantwortung zur Erfüllung vertraglicher oder formeller Pflichten im Sinne einer individuellen Verantwortung zur Einhaltung von Ethikkodizes sowie Verantwortung für die öffentliche Sicherheit, Gesundheit und Wohlfahrt und

(e) Moralischer Verantwortung von Institutionen bzw. Korporationen.

**4.Rechtliche Verantwortung** verpflichtet zur Einhaltung rechtlicher Regelungen. (Lenk1978)

Das traditionelle hippokratische Ethos ging von zwei Grundsätzen aus. Der Erste verlangt vom Arzt weitmöglich niemandem zu schaden. Er findet sich neben dem hippokratischen Ethos in vielen Pflichtethiken und im Regelutilitarismus (Beauchamp 1989) und verlangt Sorgfalt bei der Vermeidung von Nebeneffekten und gilt Verwandte, das Pflegepersonal, Ärzte, aber auch für den Patienten selbst, z.B. wenn er eine ansteckende Krankheit hat, die man nicht leicht erkennt (Irrgang 1995).Tatsache ist aber, dass das Vermeiden eines Schadens, andere nach sich zieht,die weitaus grösser sein können und da existieren objektive und subjektive Standards. Da wird aber auch nichts vom möglichen Schaden den der Arzt erleiden konnte, wenn auch seltener und unter besonderen Umständen.

Der zweite Grundsatz verpflichtet die Handelnden zum Wohltun, zum Nutzen, zum Heilen und zum Retten, sowie dies in ihrer Macht steht und keine unbillige Härte bedeutet. Sicher könnten dabei verschiedene logische Schwierigkeiten erscheinen wegen der Allgemeinheit des Begriffes 'Wohl' die verschiedene Determinationen zulässt. Eine generelle Verpflichtung zum Wohltun könne es allerdings nicht geben, denn damit wäre jeder Handelnde überfordert. Jedenfalls fällt dabei die Betonung auf das Handeln des Arztes, wobei die Persönlichkeit des Patienten in dessen Schatten gelangt, wenn nicht gar vollkommen annulliert wird durch die *Verpflichtung zur Entscheidungsfreiheit* des Arztes. Das kann man in

Rumänien insbesondere bei Psychiatricfällen, aber nicht nur, wo die Determinierungsfähigkeit des Kranken durch die Natur der Krankheit selbst in Frage gestellt wird und dazu kommt noch oft die zwangsausübende Entscheidung des Arztes. Sicher wäre da zu überlegen, dass oft ein zwanghaft auferlegtes Wohl ein Schaden werden kann, welcher vielleicht den Krankheitsprozess selbst beschleunigt.

Die an Wunder grenzenden Erfolge der psychischen Kräfte sind jetzt wohlbekannt. Ich denke dabei an Fälle von Krebskranke welchen der hoffnungsberaubende Fachurteil nicht mitgeteilt wurde, und die so nicht in Kenntniss gesetzten, wurden ohne ärztlichen Beitrag geheilt. Autosuggestion kann Wunder bewirken, so wie es unsere ganze Psyche imstande ist, eben weil sie uns unbegrenzte Entdeckungsmöglichkeiten bietet. Dieser Beitrag kann aber auch in entgegengesetzter Richtung vernichtend wirken, wenn der Arzt dem sowieso unstillen Gleichgewicht der Psyche eines Kranken, durch einen Zwangseingriff schadet (wenn auch ungewollt oder unbewusst).

Die Frage bleibt somit offen und ich habe gar nicht daran gedacht, eine Antwort zu finden, sonder, wie Karl Popper hervorhob, ein Problem aufzuwerfen, dass bis jetzt ignoriert wurde von den rumänischen Fachleuten. Lösungswege zu finden bleibt aber eine Teemaufgabe, und es wird schon etwas Zeit dauern, bis wir bereit sein werden, auf interdisziplinäre Forschung einzugehen.

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A GAME-THEORY IN POLITICS: PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*, BOOK ONE

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If Plato had written the first book of his *Republic* only, it would have had the shape and content of any other Socratic dialogue, eventually having the name of a character as a title and an ethical subject, namely justice. Some scholars have argued that the division of the text in ten books is due to restrictions of book editing and has nothing to do with the internal structure of this text. So that the first book isn't really an ordinary aporetic dialogue, if we take into consideration its bounds with the whole mammoth dialogue. On the other side, the content of the first part calls for further development of the question. So that my attempt to isolate the first book from the rest is merely a question of interest. In the following lines I will attempt to prove that Plato held a fully developed theory of politics build-up on games paradigm; this tenet will occupy the most part of my paper. Secondly, I will show that, even if this theory would have prove itself satisfactory for the goals of politics, Plato rejects it for the sake of an unchanging political life.

Justice is in turn defined as "to speak the truth and to pay your debts"<sup>1</sup> and as "the interest of the stronger"<sup>2</sup>, definitions emended by Plato's defence of justice: "justice is doing one's own business, and not being a busybody" (433 a)<sup>3</sup>; that is "the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just" (441 e). At the moment, my opinion is that *politics* is a unique kind of *game* (*ludus*), having all its basic features. Ascertaining that politics in general fits the game-pattern does not require a special proof, giving that the political competition – where a civilization allows its existence – was often successfully maintained as having the same shape. But if we argue that Plato himself conceived the politics as merely a game, then we should prove this cautiously. The real hindrance is to distinguish the playful feature of the dialogues from the same feature

of politics. “Die Schriften nur ein Spiel sind”<sup>4</sup> – is the aphorism of Tuebingen School, later confirmed by other advocates from outside the School<sup>5</sup>. The syntagma does in fact only to recall Plato’s remarks about writing in *Phaidros*<sup>6</sup>. As a literary species, the dialogue would become an adequate form for political competition; that is because it is a technique, initially employed by Megarians and sophists, thought to ensnare the opponent.

In the first book of the *Republic* there are some young and old people who are in a polemical dialogue on the wide subject of *justice*. The final goal of their meeting is to find a satisfactory answer to the question “what is just and what is justice?”. Although the discussion takes place in a private area, the subject is politics. It would have been practically impossible to trace all playful features of politics without the excellent theoretical support provided by the classical book of Johan Huizinga, *Homo ludens*<sup>7</sup>. Almost at random, I decided to follow its scheme closely.

The dialectical game, political and ethical as well, puts face to face the characters of the dialogue, each of them challenging his own view about the just man and justice itself. From two reasons at least, the actors deserves our attention; first, because every dialogue is a unique event<sup>8</sup>, the subject and the arguments being adapted to characters and situations; secondly, because the rudimentary doctrines defended here find their echo in the following books, those concerning Plato’s theory about the forms of government. Cephalos, the master of the house, a rich citizen of Syracuse is not able to define justice apart from financial interest: “to pay your debts is just” (331, b-e); here is the creditor attitude of the oligarchics! Polemarchos (in Greek, “the leader of the battle”), the son of Cephalos, from which he inherits the tenet also, agrees that “the repayment of a debt is just” (331 e), adding that “justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies” (332 d). This second definition is at the same time more *abstract* (to owe does not refer to goods only) and more *politicized* (friends and enemies) than the definition offered by old Cephalos. Next character, Thrasymachos, holds the stage playing tyranny. For him “justice is nothing else that the interest of the stronger” (338 c). Ascribing such words to a sophist, Plato’s aim was to disclose the secret bounds between rhetoric and tyranny, although the truth is that rhetoric emerged together with democracy. In this part Socrates holds the role of a question master.

These are the main actors of the contest, giving up their common lives for a while and soberly taking part to a political competition which none of them thought to be just a ridiculous game. This “escape” from the patterns of everyday life is the first feature that Huizinga ascribes to all games (*op.cit.*, p. 48). Thus conceived, a game proves itself to be a kind of celebration or ceremony, contrasting the prosaic monotony of everyday life. Not fortuitous, the time of the debate is simultaneous with a religious festivity. Here is the first sentence of the *Republic*: “I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess, and also because I wanted *to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival*, which was a new thing” (327 a, *my italics*). Then Socrates meets the others, “who had been at the procession” (327 c). They decided to follow their own dialectical ceremony, setting up the team of players. The moment of their meeting lies a real challenge<sup>9</sup> behind the gently voice of an innocent joke: “and are you *stronger than all these?* For if not, you will have to remain where you are” (327 c, *my italics*). Socrates tries to avoid compulsion by resorting to persuasion, only that Polemarchos suggests that they could be immune from it. Facing the force, Adeimantos’ group holding physical superiority, Glaucon gives up.

Few lines above Plato introduced a game symbol, which reveals the manner of the following discussions. *Lampadophoria* is the name of the game which Socrates speaks about, a “torch race on horseback in honour of the goddess”, where “horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race” (328 a). For those gathered in Cephalos’ house this game would not begin, but they will have instead their own *lampadophoria*, a contest where discourse-torches will be passed one to another.

The last sentence of the *Republic* refers to another playful symbol: “Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, *like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts*, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing” (612 c, *my italics*). Hence, the whole book is confined by a twofold image of a game, suggesting that all was an agonistic movement; is it possible that the city detailed depicted could be no more than a concoction<sup>10</sup> inspired by an utopian reason?

All games stand apart from the everyday life, having their own time and place (cf. Huizinga, *op.cit.*, p. 50). Plato carefully selects the moment of the day and the place where the debates are supposed to take place. The majority of dialogues are played in the daylight and also in a public place (e.g. *agora*, arenas); not merely by coincidence, just these dialogues are the *critic* or *aporetic* ones. When leaving his familiar places Socrates is having an obvious different behaviour. Outside the city walls of his native city, as in *Phaidros* or *Republic*, in the night, as in *Phaidon*, *Symposion* or, again, *Republic*, Socrates becomes more *constructive and playful*. Andrei Cornea, in his introduction to *Republic*<sup>11</sup>, speaks even about a stand-in of Socrates, now a metaphysician and artist. But these “playful” activities are performed, as I said, only at night.

Despite the tension inherent in every game, and despite his irresistible will of winning, the player must obey the rules<sup>12</sup>, which are absolutely compulsory and indisputably. As concerning the dialectical proceedings<sup>13</sup>, the rules are relatively easy to understand, although not that easy to abide by: there is always someone who asks and another one who answers, these roles being settled from the beginning so that nobody could change it by switching to the opposite. The presuppositions of this rule are the innocence of those who ask and the liberty of those who answer<sup>14</sup>. But in a real debate things may look different. At one moment, Thrasymachos was annoyed by the fact that Socrates insisted to be the only one who asks: “you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many one who can ask and cannot answer” (336 c)<sup>15</sup>. Facing the risk of breaking the game in pieces, Socrates finds it reasonably to hinder him from encroach upon the rules.

As he couldn't succeed in renewal the game by modifying one of its rules, Thrasymachos gives up, resigning all hope because he ceased to trust these rules. He cannot understand how he could answer the questions before questioning himself the presuppositions and examining the interrogational context. And yet, from now on, he will only “assent with a good deal of reluctance” (342 c; cf. also 346 c). Few times, he attempted to contest some propositions once more, but finally he acquiesced.

The inventory of game features repertoire could easily go further. Polemarchos fully confirms Huizinga's theory about the playful (*agonion*) character of politics<sup>16</sup>; making clear his belief, he

asserted that “a friend ought always to do good to a friend and never evil”, and as concerning the enemies, “they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him – that is to say, evil” (332 a). This implies, of course, that justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies<sup>17</sup>, in situations like war, alliances or contracts. Leo Strauss, quoting the *Cleitophon*, usually considered an apocryphal dialogue, reminds us that this definition is the only one belonging to the real Socrates<sup>18</sup>. If justice is an art, and giving that it always refers to friends or foes, than it may be compared with the *art of war*<sup>19</sup>.

Leo Strauss argues that the first fundamental mistake that Polemarchos did was not through maintaining the idea of identity between justice and art of war. Strauss is convinced that Polemarchos' statement may be further held despite Socrates' counter-arguments, because justice in peace times stands for the behaviour of the allies towards the neutrals – the absolute peace does not exist<sup>20</sup>. Or, giving up his definition, Polemarchos allows Socrates to eliminate every competition from political life, thus establishing the absolute peace in his Ideal State ruled by philosopher-kings. *To be a friend* and *to be an enemy* are not necessary to be taken literally, their proper meaning being a political one as well. Indubitable marks of such an attitude towards the Other abounds in this section of the dialogue: Socrates willing to fight together with his companions to refute a statement, Trasymachos' charge against him that he is just setting traps and he argues like an informer (341 b), and later, eager to speak, thinking that he has an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself (338 a) – are just few of them.

All these elements, and probably many more, are counting for a game theory about politics, its main features being the spatio-temporal apartness, the complement of the common life, inherent tension within teams, necessary presence of the rules, gratuitousness (although not entirely lacking good reason). All teams involved in this debate are acting very similar to modern political parties. Which are these teams anyway? There might be distinguished three groups at least. Cephalos and Polemarchos voice the general opinion of *oligarchy*, Thrasymachos expresses the interests of *tyranny*, and Glaucon together with Adeimantos are the advocates of a contractualism with a democratic shade of meaning.



Each one represents a faction within the society and obviously, every little victory counts for the entire group.

But the opposition between these three factions is, I think, less relevant than the concealed backward antagonism, true political, between all groups together and Plato's "totalitarianism"<sup>21</sup>. In the first book of the *Republic* there were two voices that definitely were discontent with such a game. First is Thrasymachos, who disputes the existing rules, and the other voice, the great absentee of the dialogue, is Plato himself, who imagines a non-conflictual and immobile political system, his Ideal City, depicted in detail in the following nine books. Within the Ideal State, justice will prove itself to be attained by means of class division and firmly maintaining it<sup>22</sup>. The immediate consequence of this attitude is ceasing every political competition. In Karl Popper's view, Plato's rejection of the political challenge is determined by his innate fear of change; or, competition means change, alternation, periodical variations, whereas the State has to be immobile. Popper defines Plato's political attitude by a metaphysical statement: "Stop every change. The change is ill-fated, the repose is divine!"<sup>23</sup>.

Within the Ideal State, the political clashes and competition issue from the tension and challenge between its parts (leaders, guardians, and workers), and, consequently, between the parts of soul (*nous*, *tymos*, and *epithymia*). Therefore it is not legitimate at all, simply because it gives birth to injustice. But there is always this conflict, which is even more real than the Ideal State itself. To this objection Plato only would have answered that the whole sensible world is far removed from the perfect, ideal model. A good leadership has to emend, to diminish as much as possible this remoteness. That is why Plato is more preoccupied with finding means of achieving the Good than with solving ideological conflicts about what this "Good" could mean. Hence, Plato would not tolerate the existence of factions which disagree the *State policy*<sup>24</sup>.

## Notes:

- <sup>1</sup> *Republic*, 331 d, transl. by B. Jowett; the definition belongs to Polemarchos.
- <sup>2</sup> Thrasymachos, at 338 d
- <sup>3</sup> In other words, "the one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted" (*ibidem*).
- <sup>4</sup> Hans Krämer, *Platonbild*, p. 198, *apud*. W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. V: *The later Plato and the Academy*, Cambridge University Press, (1975), 1989, p. 421.
- <sup>5</sup> Düring (Krämer's strongest ally), G. Watson, G. Reale, and J.N. Findlay, for example; for further details see *Les Etudes Philosophique*, no. 1, 1998, especially the "Presentation" by Luc Brisson (pp.1-9) and Hans Krämer's "La doctrine non écrite de Platon" (pp. 31-56). A reasonable summary of the theories concerning the Unwritten Doctrines until seventies may be found in W.K.C. Guthrie, *op.cit.*, vol. V, pp. 418-442.
- <sup>6</sup> See *Phaidros*, 276 d.
- <sup>7</sup> The full title is Johan Huizinga, *Homo ludens. Încercare de determinare a elementului ludic al culturii*, traducere de H.R. Radian, cuvînt înainte de G. Liiceanu, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998.
- <sup>8</sup> "Separately considered, each dialogue neither represents a chapter from an encyclopaedia of philosophical sciences or a part of a philosophical system, nor a relic of a stage in Plato's evolution", says Leo Strauss, *Cetatea și omul*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 71; he argues that every dialogue concerns only a fragment, revealing its truth. See also W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. IV: *Plato: The Man and his Dialogues – earlier period*, Cambridge University Press, (1975), 1989, p. 67.
- <sup>9</sup> cf. Leo Strauss, *op.cit.*, p. 73; he specifies that voting replaces the battle, although the vote is convincing only when it reminds the danger of the battle; that is why the discussion about justice is resulting from a combination between compulsion and persuasion – justice itself is such a blending, compulsion and persuasion, duty and conviction.
- <sup>10</sup> "If we look with the eyes of mind at the birth of the city..." (369 a) – thus starts the description of the Ideal State.
- <sup>11</sup> The historical time of *Republic's* script remains an enigma.
- <sup>12</sup> "As concerning the rules of a game, no scepticism is ever possible", said Paul Valery.
- <sup>13</sup> An exhaustive description of Plato's dialectics may be found in Gilbert Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- <sup>14</sup> See Andrei Cornea, *Platon. Filosofie și cenzură*, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1995, especially chapter VIII, "Dialogul", pp. 162-182.
- <sup>15</sup> Here are two more samples of his grievance: "...that's your ironical style!... whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering" (337 a), and "... then Socrates will do as he always does – refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else" (*idem*).

<sup>16</sup> “all true political relations between peoples and states are dominated by this principle: The Other group is either your friend or your foe” (Huzinga, *op.cit.*, p. 315).

<sup>17</sup> See *Republic*, 332 d.

<sup>18</sup> Leo Strauss, *op.cit.*, p. 79.

<sup>19</sup> *Republic*, 332 e. For Plato's political analogies, see Renford Bambrough's article from *Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays, II: ethics, politics, and philosophy of art and religion*, Edited by Gregory Vlastos, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1971, pp. 187-205.

<sup>20</sup> Leo Strauss, *op.cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>21</sup> Mihai Spăriosu understands this opposition as a natural movement from a pre-rational to a rational mentality; the first is characterized by customary, unwritten laws, following the interest of the stronger, whereas the second approves written law only, neglecting customs; thus, justice replaces the use of sheer force. *Agon* and *paidia*, which had become synonyms, stand, in Plato's writings, for the *non-violent cultural game*; the values of co-operation and concord are less subordinate to competition and the foundation of authority is the force and cunning intelligence no more, but knowledge and truth (Mihai Spăriosu, *Resurecția lui Dionysos. Jocul și dimensiunea estetică în discursul filosofic și științific modern*, Editura Univers, București, 1997, pp. 11-36).

<sup>22</sup> See Karl Popper, *Societatea deschisă și dușmanii ei*, vol. I: *Vraja lui Platon*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1993, pp. 104-139.

<sup>23</sup> Karl Popper, *op.cit.*, p. 104.

<sup>24</sup> My conclusion is true if and only if we “define as political any activity, institution, or issue that pertains to a division of opinion and aspiration within a population that has some dealings with one another despite that division” ( Wayne A.R. Leys, “Was Plato Non-Political?”, *Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays, II: ethics, politics, and philosophy of art and religion*, Edited by Gregory Vlastos, Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1971, p. 168); this definition expresses the modern spirit of politics (i.e. “the distinction between friend and foe is the essential political distinction”, *ibidem*), following the tradition of Machiavelli and Hobbes, which culminates in the writings of Carl Schmitt.

LOGIC OF CIVILISATIONS

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The aim of the present work is the study of the cultural phenomena from the perspective of integration function of them. In order to achieve this purpose, we have examined the main perspectives upon the notions of culture and civilization. Before that we have underlined the idea that the notions of sociology are essentially typological. From this point of view we prefer to talk about "types of culture" or "types of societies" instead of calling them as "cultural systems" or "social systems".

The analysis of the phenomenon of social integration from the perspective of culture supposes a step that could permit a certain clasification of cultures and societies. Though the notion of "type" (the same with these of "structure", "system", "function" etc) may contain some ambyguity, however, at least beginning with Durkheim, the procedure of establishing" the types " or "social species" proved productive enough for an analysis of the social organization.

The notion of culture is used in a great number of acceptions. With all these, the conceptual dimension may be systematize and therefore clarified if we take into account two principal aspects: 1) the references of notion of culture; 2) the plan of analysis of the notion. Referring to the first aspect, which forms a kind of "external structure" the main references that we can identify in the conceptual analysis of culture are nature, civilization, society, personality and value.

Taking into account that these references can work in any plan of analysis (philosophical, sociological, anthropological etc) we have to subordinate this criterium to the above-mentioned one, that is, the plane of analysis of the notion of culture.

In this way there appears the main perspectives for analysing culture: philosophical, anthropological, historical, informational and sociological. The investigation of these perspectives leads us to the conclusion that while the studies of philosophical, anthropological,

historical and informational types tend to accept the notion of culture in a generalizing way, coextensive to human or history, the sociological perspective expresses rather a restrictive tendency, of specification especially in relation with the social group and with the field of values.

After the clarifications in the field of concepts concerning the notions of culture and civilization, we analyse the ways of classifying cultures. The step from the previous chapter allows us to notice that, usually, the choice of the criteria of classification depends on the perspectives in which culture is studied. So, in the philosophical perspective, in theories like those of Spengler, Toynbee, Berdiaev, Northrop, Kroeber, Danilevski, Schubart and others, there dominate the organicist models of classification. The anthropological, ethnological, ethnographical studies use their own classifications (as criteria being technical, religious etc. factors), the historians use, too, varied classifications (based on geographic or temporal criteria) and from an informational perspective we can find attempts of typology of culture according to the changes, which occur in the field of means of communication.

As concerning the sociological perspective, an important problem having connections with the classification of cultural phenomena is that of the dimensions of the group which should be taken into consideration in order to be able to talk about a specific culture. At the same time it is necessary that the typology upon culture should be correlated with the attempts of classification of the societies. In this context some specifications in connection with the notions of "social reality", "society", "social system" and "social structure" are necessary. Then we insist upon the possibilities of typologising the society on external criteria of social organization analysing concepts as those of Comte, Marx, Tonnies, Max Weber and others. On the other hand one can see the attempts of classification of the societies on the internal criteria of the social organization, like the theories of Spencer, Parsons and others.

In what follows, we propose a macromodel for analysing cultures and civilizations. In making this model we use especially W. Balzer's suggestions from the structural analysis which he is doing upon the social institutions.

Starting from the hypothesis that in order to understand the logic of the civilizations as well as the possibilities to typologize we have to follow the aims of the cultural creation, that is the relation

between the cultural tradition and the cultural innovation. The cultural traditions represent both guides of direction for the social actions and sources of identification. In its turn innovation holds a fundamental importance in the evolution of the society. The relation between tradition - innovation should not be regarded to a rigid, determinist scheme, the relationship between these two terms does not involve a rupture, as there are many cases in which the innovations prove to be progressive reasons of some traditional practices.

The first element we need to build a macromodel centred on the relationship between traditional – cultural innovation is that one of cultural influence. This is a rather neutral term and at the same time supple enough to explain the complexity of the socio-cultural relations. Usually by influence means any efficient action of a person or groups of persons orientated in the direction of changing the option and manifestation of other persons or groups. Even if the notion of influence is sometimes associated with the relations of power and social control, it is different from this in a more elaborate sense, just by the fact that it does not use coercion but to the capacity of persuasion, in this way being associated with the socialization and communication processes.

Without doubt that the talk concerning the cultural influence exercised by the tradition can be stressed according to the context that is to be analysed, but at a macrosociological level it is enough to take into account the factor “tradition” as a kind of “agent” or “corporative actor”. Namely, we may conceive “tradition” - in the Durkheimian way – as a factor of solidarity, as a form of cultural organization whose functionality can be expressed (manifested) similarly with the solidarist ethics of the professional corporation.

After these specifications we may try a more exact formulation to the question “how tradition (T) acts as a factor of cultural influence”.

*1. Tradition (T) exerts an influence by means of its manifestations (“m”) upon the social actors (“a.s”) so that these do the actions (“n”).*

We use the term “social actors” correlated with that of cultural tradition in order to present the circumstances in which the individuals or the groups act according to the roles prescribed for them. Respectively, this conduct is a reproductive one for a given society, one based on tradition. Then when the actions of the

individuals or of the groups are opposite to the functions of the system, creating new effects being emergent and against tradition, we use the term “social agents”. This term is associated with the transforming type actions and with the notion of cultural innovation.

2. *Innovation (“I”) has influence by its manifestations (“m”) on the social agents (“s.ag”) so that these ones do the actions “n”.*

Naturally, in a society the different actors and social agents have actions based on tradition, and other groups may have characteristic actions corresponding to the needs of changing, of innovation. That is why for creating the macromodel we need a characteristic function, too.

3. *We call a characteristic function (“ch”) that one which arranges each social group (“g”) (actor or social agent) on a lot of types of actions (t1,...,tn):*

$$ch(g) = (t1, \dots, tn)$$

We have to consider the fact that among the different groups of the society, as well as between the cultural standards and the cultural values of any society there is a certain hierarchy. The position of a person to a group or a cultural value in a hierarchy is expressed by the notion *status* and by the *relation of social status*.

4. *A relationship of status (“st”) should be: a) transitive and b) of only one univocal determination.*

So far we have given shape only to the outer side of the macromodel:(T,I,ch,st). We will have to consider the inner side of it, too, as well as a relationship of representation which could connect the outer and the inner medium.

Both the individuals and the social, groups create their own, inner models, by means of the processes of socialization and of cultural influences. But these inner models are not simple “reflections”, simple “images” of the outer medium but they are active entity, of which we have to keep in mind a few aspects: a) the ability of inner modelling maintains in time tradition and the stability of the cultural institutions; b) the existence of intentions, of the actions directed according to certain purposes; c) inner models, beliefs and people’s ideas can act causative; d) inner models are component parts of social systems.

As the inner models are built in a relationship with the outer medium, there is a certain symmetry of the structures both in the inner and outer mediums. Respectively, tradition (T) of the outer mediums corresponds to an inner model of the traditional belief (T\*),

to the innovation (I) has a correspondent of the inner model of the transforming ideas ( $I^*$ ) and the characteristic function (ch) has a correspondent function ( $ch^x$ ) in the inner model whose mission is to arrange mentally the actors or the social agents on the multitude of types of the represented actions. As far as the relation of status (st) it should be associated rather to the third part of the macromodel, respectively to the representing relationship whose mission is to mediate between the two media. So we will obtain the following structure for the inner medium:

$$(T^*, I^*, ch^*)$$

In the way how for the outer medium the characteristic function (ch) arranges each social group "g" based on the multitude of actions ( $t_1, \dots, t_n$ ), there is a characteristic function ( $ch^*$ ) which arranges the representations for the inner medium:

$$Ch^*(g^*) = (t_1^*, \dots, t_n^*)$$

Specifying that  $ch^*$  is an internalized characteristic, that is, it represents an arrangement within the inner model according to the represented actions of  $g^*$ . In order to connect the outer and the inner media we should introduce a coordinating function by which the inner model ( $T^*, I^*, ch^*$ ) should correspond with the social groups (g) of the outer world. For this we introduce:

*5. The coordinating function "x" is that one which coordinates a social group "g" (social actors or agents) with its inner model which is coordinated by the characteristic  $ch^*$ .*

$$X(g) = (T^*, I^*, ch^*)$$

(that means that a group "g", of the outer medium has and uses an inner model of forms  $\langle T^*, I^*, ch^* \rangle$ ).

Until now we considered only the need to coordinate a social group (social actor or agent) with its inner model. But it is necessary to consider too the fact that the different social groups create representations not only about themselves but also about other social groups, and culture depends very much upon these images which "the others" have about a certain "we". That is why in our macromodel we should introduce another component, that is, the relationship of representation. With this relationship our own representations and those of the others will be coordinated.

*6. The relationship of representation ("rep") is that one which puts into correspondence the social groups ("g"), the types of actions ("t") and characteristic functions ("ch") with their representations*



$g \{ \text{rep } [g'] \} g^*$  ( $g^*$  expresses the representation of the group  $g$  in the inner model of the group  $g'$ );

$t \{ \text{rep } [g'] \} t^*$  ( $t^*$  expresses the representation of type of action  $t$  in the inner model of the group  $g'$ );

$ch \{ \text{rep } [g'] \} ch^*$  ( $ch^*$  expresses the representation of the characteristic function  $ch$  in the inner model of the group  $g'$ ).

Naturally, if we pass to another group, let's say  $g''$ , then we have  $\text{rep } (g'')$  and so on. Now, if we agree to symbolize the multitude of the inner models  $\langle T^*, I^*, ch^* \rangle$  with the letter "M", we can express our analyzed macro model under the following form:

The macro model =  $\langle T, I, ch, st, M, x, \text{rep} \rangle$

As this model of analysis is created we may pass its application to the study of civilizations and of the significant cultural phenomena. We consider that at the macrosociological level we cannot speak strictly of a clasification of the civilizations but no more than a typology of them.

Normally we deal with a clasification when the distinction can be achieved based on unique criterium. But when more criteria are used we deal with typologies, these being a particular form of systematization.

Actually, to the apllied model in order to typify the civilizations we used as a fundamental criterion the relationship between tradition-inovation (T-I), regarded from the perspective of the result of the cultural achievement. Included into this basic criterion we use a set of subordinate criteria, the same as the report between the cultural unity-and cultural diversity, the ways of imagining the sense of becoming and the space-time horizons shaped in the imaginary collective. In estabilishing these criteria we have taken into account a series of the ideesas of M.Weber, P.Sorokin, T.Parsons, Ch.Moraze, L.Blaga, C.Noica and others. The estabilishing of typology was not done in a normative way but by extracting the different characteristics of the semnificative studies regarding the great cultures and religions wich we find within the frame of civilizations as well as from the studies referring to collective mentalities. So we have come to the forming of the following image of civilizations:

| The Type of civilization according to its orientation of cultural creativeness | The conception of the sense of becoming                      | The report between unity and diversity | The spacial horizons                     | The temporal horizons   |
|--|--|--|--|---|
| I. Civilizations with orientated creativity prevalent conservative             | Identical cycles<br>Infinitely repeated                      | The repetition of the unity            | Close, stagnant spacial horizons         | The turning to account of the present                                       |
| II. Civilizations with orientated axio-traditional creativity                  | Regressive orientated cycles(great fidelity for the origins) | Unity in multiplicity                  | Spacial horizons as concentric receptive | The turn into account of the past   |
| III. Civilizations with a policentric oriented creativity                      | Non uniform cycles and often non orientated                  | Unity and multiplicity                 | Diverse spacial and competitive horizons | The turn into account of the past in the perspective of the future possible |
| IV. Civilizations with a pragmatic rationalized creativity                     | Progressive orientated cycles                                | The multiple unity                     | Unlimited, open spacial horizons         | The turn into account of the future   |

In the frame of the first type of civilizations are included those societies and cultures which are often called archaic or “tribal” etc. Tradition is predominant in these societies, facing the innovation manifesting fear, as in front of any unknown. The repetition of the unity is so constraint that within the potential diversity or even the present one are not separately perceived, with the statues of differentiating and innovation, but in the existing context, in the traditional context. The innovation is quasiannulled, thus our macromodel may have the following form for this type of civilization.

< T, ch, st, M, x, rep >

For the second type of civilization we keep in mind, especially, the Chinese and Hindu cultures. These cultures have a remarkable continuity from the cultural antiquity up to our days due to the fact that, in principal the creative finalities in the cultural level are often centred on the axiotraditional valoric nucleus. Unlike the first type of civilization, in the second one the initial unity is not repeated indefinitely, but it permits a certain heterogeneousness, that is it permits the birth of some cycles which are reabsorbed. Marking with “C” the temporal cycle, and with  $t_0, t_1, \dots, t_n$  the successive phase the becoming in these cultures is of the following form:

$C=(t_0 \vee t_1 \vee \dots \vee t_n) \& (t_0 \vee t_1 \vee \dots \vee t_n) \& \dots$

As the innovation is done by juxtaposition, the time and space appear in these cultures as a kind of concentric horizons.

Keeping in mind the fact that, beginning with these cultures, the connection between tradition-innovation becomes more flexible, we introduce in our analysis an indicator of cultural influence, namely, *the coefficient of cultural influence depending on stability*. Respectively, according to the way in which the social actors and agents turn to account the situations of stability, of social and cultural order, they will give more or less importance to tradition and innovation. If we consider the social stability as a sum of tradition and innovation, and the vocation towards tradition and innovation as relationships between the variation of tradition and that of stability, and, respectively, between the variation of innovation and that of stability, we can write:

$$S = T + I$$

$$\Delta S = \Delta T + \Delta I$$

$$t = \frac{\Delta T}{\Delta S}$$

$$i = \frac{\Delta I}{\Delta S}$$

From where it results that:

$$t+i = \frac{\Delta T}{\Delta S} + \frac{\Delta I}{\Delta S} = \frac{\Delta S}{\Delta S} = 1$$

$$t = 1 - i$$

$$i = 1 - t$$

where: S = stability, T= tradition; I= innovation;  $\Delta S$  = the variation of the stability;  $\Delta T$  =

the variation of the tradition;  $\Delta I$  = the variation of the innovation; t = inclination towards

tradition; i = inclination towards innovation.

The inclination towards tradition (t) shows how much the importance of tradition will increase when on a scale of the social groups' subjectivity the stability increases with a unity, and the inclination towards innovation (i) expresses the progress of innovation when the stability increases with a unity.

As both tradition and innovation are variable sizes (being considered, relatively, at a certain moment of reference) consequently we will be able to express the coefficient of cultural influence with a report between the relative sizes of the tradition and innovation and the relative size of the stability:

$$K.if.c.t./S = \frac{\frac{\Delta T}{T_0}}{\frac{\Delta S}{S_0}} = \frac{T_1 - T_0}{T_0} : \frac{S_1 - S_0}{S_0}$$

K.if.c.t./S = the coefficient of cultural influence of the tradition depending on stability ;

T<sub>0</sub>= the tradition of the moment of reference; T<sub>1</sub>= tradition in a later moment; S<sub>0</sub>= the stability at the moment of reference; S<sub>1</sub>= the stability in a posterior moment.

Similarly we will have the formula for the coefficient of cultural influence of the innovation:

$$K.if.c.i./S = \frac{\frac{\Delta I}{I_0}}{\frac{\Delta S}{S_0}} = \frac{I_1 - I_0}{I_0} : \frac{S_1 - S_0}{S_0}$$

Concretly talking about the cultural cores of the Chinese and Hindu civilizations we can appreciate that tradition has constantly exceed the innovation, that is:

$$T > I$$

In this way our macromodel will have for this type of civilizations the following expression:

$$\langle (T > I), ch, st, M, x, rep \rangle$$

The third type of civilization of our classification includes a series of spread ancient cultures, according to Ch.Moraze, from Indus to the Atlantic. Though much different, the cultures as the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Persian, Hebrew, Greek and Roman have

in common the fact that the cultural innovation obtains more and more position, more liberty of manifestation. The cycles of becoming very often do not seem uniform, the spacial and temporal horizons begin to be competitive and the connection unity-diversity act under the scheme of unity *and* multiplicity. Generalizing we can say the cultural innovation can often equalize the tradition:

$$T \geq I;$$

and our macromodel will have the form:

$$\langle (T \geq I), \text{ch, st, M, x, rep} \rangle$$

In the end, the fourth type of civilization includes, by excellence, the modern occidental cultures. Within these cultures the innovations are especially reported to the temporal dimension of the future, with the stress on rationalization and efficiency. Here the diversity is the first, the unity being in fact a multiplicative one, the cultural scheme being the *multiple-unity*.

These cultures put innovation in front in all the compounds of life, so that:

$$T < I$$

and the adapted form of our macromodel for this type civilization becomes:

$$\langle (T < I), \text{ch, st, M, x, rep} \rangle$$

But for a sociology of the civilizations, as for as the applied research in field of culture, the subject of study is the cultural phenomena. That is why we have to deal with the content and the structure of the cultural phenomena. The work assumption is that one that the cultural phenomena present both integrative structures between the own elements of the cultural universe, and the integrative structures between the elements of the cultural system and those of the social system.

In a sistematic treating we consider that the main elements, which are part of the cultural phenomena, can be grouped into three categories: the values, the norms, and the symbols. In connection with the values, in our work we draw the attention that the sociological study of these, as H.Mendras underline, can be in a delicate position. While the study has to relate the values to the groups, to communities and individuals, the individuals who live these values confer them the dimension of the transcendence and of the absolute.

As we are particularly interested the integrating function of the cultural phenomena, as regarding the classification of the values we choose a classical typology: the scope-values and means-values. The former have by excellence a creative and integrating function and those belonging to the means-value open way to the norms found in the society.

Under a sociological aspect, the values are irrelevant if they are not connected to the norms. As the values can be "aim "or "means", the norms of the society can be divided into "final norms" and "means-norms". So the scheme of accepting the judgement of value within the normative arguments should take into account the hierarchy of the values and the norms on the "scope-means" axis. If we note  $N_0$  the final norms, with  $N_m$  the norms with a role of "means" and with  $V^+$  the universe of the positive values, then the scheme of the reasoning of accepting a judgement of value " $X \in V^+$ " will have the following form:

$$\begin{array}{l}
 X \in V \text{ as } N_m \\
 N_m \text{ as } N_m - 1 \\
 \hline
 N_1 \text{ as } N_0 \\
 \hline
 X \in V^+ \text{ as } N_0
 \end{array}$$

This scheme points out the fact that there is a distribution of the values by norms, a value transfer which makes possible an integration from the cultural standards towards the actors' or social agents' conduct.

The socio-cultural integration of the type of conformity to the standards was especially studied by the functionalist orientation in sociology. But there is also a line of searching suggested by H.Mead and then continued by Goffman, Garfinkel, Cicourel and others, a direction which draws the attention on the integration by cooperation. In this case we underline the idea that the social groups and the individuals do not merely act within the frames of a rigid conformity but their comportment can also have an innovating, creative character with possibilities of negotiation.

Another very important resource for the integrating function of culture is the symbols. The prestige, the power, the rank and their symbolic signs are criteria used to hierarchize the social life. The function of the society cannot work, as P.Bourdieu says, in the absence of the symbolic capital. The fight between the individuals

and groups for obtaining the symbolic capital leads to the conversion of the force relationships of the society into relationships of semnifications. Then the society can be analysed in the terms of "cultural field" and "simbolic field".

The idea of simbolic integration implies the fact that there is a simbolic efficaciously, an investigation of the different cultures and civilizations shows us that the simbolic efficiency can be especially obtained by means of technologies of making actual. By means of these technics there are recreated, reedited happenings or texts whics schould often be present in the collective memory.

But the cultural components in order to be able to carry out its integrative function should be organized in certain structures. Most of the analysts (sociologists and antropologists) scem to agree that the cultural elements are usually organized in a structure which includes a "hard core" (with an integrating force), on one side, and a "fluide zone", an area in which we can find series of alternatives, on the other side.

Within the cultural core are included those elements which are reciprocally adapted, so that they constitute a cultural unity with a certain degree of integration, of coherence. The identity cultural core acts-according to R.Benedict- as a way of language, that is it is learnt, it has its own rules and carries a certain vision about the world. The core is that one which confers a general orientation of a certain culture. This cultural core can be an "ethos" (M.Weber), a "factor of synthesis" in history (N.Iorga) or an "intellectual continuation"(A.D.Xenopol), a "cultural style" (L.Blaga) etc.

The other important part of the structure of the cultural phenomena is represented by the fluid zone. In the fluid zone there are included some cultural elements which can be called options or alternatives in relation with the general orientations instituted by the core (R.Linton). Here we can find different cultural innovations, the new literary and artistic trends, the new ideologies, etc.

While the core is homogeneous and integrating, the fluid zone has a differentiating function, bringing in front the diversity of the alternatives. According to the way in which the two structural components act, one in report with the other, the forms of cultural integration in the different human societies and collectives depend.

The final part of the paper tries to systematize those forms of cultural integration and to point out the main concepts and indications

by means of which the forms of integration can be expressed. The specific logic of the integration is that one of totalities.

Keeping in mind the types of structures established by R. Boudon, as well as some of Kant's suggestions referring to the classification of the connections, in our work we have chosen a quaternary typology of the integrations, as seen in the table below.

|                                  |                  |           |
|----------------------------------|------------------|-----------|
| Elements (parts)<br>Relationship | Of the same type | Different |
| Of the same type                 | Uniformity       | Unity     |
| Different                        | Multiplicity     | Diversity |

The uniformity expresses conservative integration, a *repetition* of the same, the unity renders a subordination of the diverse to the same structure, being *one in the multiple*, the multiplicity reflects a structure of the one *and* of the multiplicity, and the diversity expresses a very dynamic integration, of the type *one – multiple*.

A classical reference in the typology of the integrations is Werner S. Landecker's study "Types of integration and their measurement" in which to speak about the cultural, normative, communicative and functional integration

Considering this classification we may have the following remarks: a) Landecker's typology is based on the criterion of the integrating domain, which implies an open series of the types which can be established; b) the established types are not independent as, for example, it is difficult to sustain that the communicative integration is not a cultural one, and vice versa.

The typology proposed by us is more general and its advantage is that it simultaneously takes into account the elements which are object of integration (values, norms, symbols, etc) and the relationships in which these elements are included. In the case of integration of "uniformity" type, at the limit and in a similar way with the mechanical solidarity of Durkheim's classification there is no differentiation or, more exactly said, the differentiation is very much blurred. In our typology regarding cultures and civilizations the integration of the uniformity type can especially be found in the civilizations with a cultural orientation conservatively orientated.

Uniformity can be considered the simplest form of integration, namely an aggregation, a collection. But aggregation, too, should have a minimum unity, this "minimum" can be the territory, the need



of a common defence, but also a common tradition, certain beliefs, values etc.

With the integrating form called “unity” we are in the position of keeping the same structures but in the presence of a certain heterogeneousness of the component elements. The type of relationship is “form one to more”, being a co-homogeneous relationship, of superiority or inequality. Under the social-cultural aspect, this form of integration can especially be found in the cultures with an axio-traditional orientated creativity. But it can also be found in the groups with a strong hierarchy, where the same structure that integrates functionally the different components is kept, as in the case of the army, in the job relationships based on a strict hierarchy, in the religious hierarchy etc.

In order to express this type of integration the notion “pattern” is used in the Anglo-Saxon sociology and anthropology. This notion “pattern”, renders an integration based on certain cultural constants and the principle of reductive identity. In the integrations of this kind the stress is laid on what is typical. But according to R.Benedict’s intuition, a cultural pattern should achieve (have), in order to deserve this name, the condition of consistency. This condition points out the fact that the pattern has on one side a distributive function, by means of which it subordinates the diversity, and on the other side, the function of a “filter”, as what appears as an innovation as a new, different element, will have to be taken to the state of compatibility with the existing facts, so preserving the structure.

When speaking about the integration of the “multiplicity” type, the relationships are from the “multitude to one”, that is from different structures towards parts of the same kind or being in the same situation, in the same position etc. Suggestive for this type of integration is, for example, the intersection of two classes or of two multitudes, the elements of the intersection being in the same situation (as common elements of the two multitudes, but belonging to different structures). From a cultural – historical point of view, this form of integration can be found in its typical expression with the civilizations with a creativity polycentrally directed. As an example in the Egyptian culture, the institution of the Pharaoh represented the articulation of two different orders, the sacred and the secular ones. In the Mesopotamian civilization, the cultural integration had the mission to correlate two parallel, geminate orders, the order of the Heavens and the order of the Earth. The Persian Zoroastrism should

answer in an integrative way to a generalized dualism. The Hebrew religion constitutes of an implicative relationship of the different orders, implying a transference and an intersection between the two registers. The ancient Greeks accept without any reserves the multiplicity of the structures, and the Romans continued this opening, the tradition and the innovation manifestating themselves with the same power.

But the integration of multiplicity type is not present only in certain historical cultures. In this form of integration are included all the situations in which, for example, the same individual belongs, at the same time, to more groupal structures. This integration may be best expressed by means of the relationships of status, respectively by the consistency and the inconsistency of the status.

For the integrations in a group, inclusively for the relationship of status, the sociological analysis was especially developed in the frame sociometry. A more and more important position in the contemporary sociologic studies have the integrations of the network integrations. If the pyramidal integrations imply the assimilation of the elements, the integrations of the network type imply the reciprocal exchanges, the communication. The analyses done in this direction can be subordinated to three types of models of theories regarding the integrating into the structures or multiple groups: a) the model of the election; b) the model of the balance; c) the model of the domination.

The model of the election starts from the premiss that the actors or the social agents can choose for the different alternatives, for certain cultural values with the view of the integration in some groups or structures. Though the logic of choice, of the elections is very important for all the socio-humane sciences, it has remained according to von Wright's appreciation "not enough studied". In this logic the "subjective probabilities" work called by von Wright "degrees of confidence". At a microsociological level, in order to point out these degrees of confidence, respectively the interest regarding the groupal structures one can use some indexes as:

a) the index of interest for the own group:

$$I = \frac{n}{KN}, \text{ where}$$

n = the number of elections emitted for the members of the group;

N = the number of the members of the group;  
 K = the number of permitted elections;  
 b) the index of interest for other groups:

$$I = \frac{n}{K(N - N_1)}, \text{ where}$$

n = the number of elections for the members of other group;  
 K = the permitted number of elections;  
 N = the total number of the population;

$N_1$  = the number of the members of the own group;

But at a macrosocial level, the application of these indexes is difficult. The suggestion of the economists can be used at this level. In the way how the consumer of economic goods, has in view that by his choice to obtain a maximum of usefulness, the consumer of symbolic goods too, tries to obtain a maximum utility (of status, of prestige, etc) So we can use the formule for utility in analysing the elections:

$$U = u(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n), \text{ where}$$

U = total utility

u = individual utility

$x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n$  = the elections

The second model of the balance starts from the principle that each participant will try to obtain from the organization a payment at least equal with the contribution he considers that he has. Here, the same in the theory of election, a utilitarian logic works. The sociological analysis in this field has as a reference M.Olson's attempt to point put the costs and of the gain based on the formula:

$$G_p = P_p - C + R, \text{ where}$$

$G_p$  = the gain of the participant;

$P_p$  = the public profit obtained;

C = the cost of participation;

R = the reward offered by the organization;

If  $R > C$ , the individuals will be more interested to take part at it and to integrate in the new structure, and if  $R < C$ , then the participation is minimum.

As concerning the third model, that of domination, the multiple integration is analyzed through the notions of power, dependence and

exchange, emphasizing the idea that any integration into new structures is not only a question of choice and equilibrium of the costs and gains, but especially a negotiable one depending on the power which the negotiator, individuals or groups, has.

Finally with the integration of diversity type we have come to the most complex correlation, as it permits both the multiplicity of the structures and of the constitutive elements. From the point of view of history we especially find this type of integration within the civilizations with a pragmatic – rationalising creativity, where the innovations are not related only with the past, but especially with the future. If in the previous form of integration the unity stands side by side multiplicity, in the present case the unity must be multiplier by itself, as it is a matter of a cultural synthetical scheme, of the one – multiple. This form of cultural integration can especially be found in the modern occidental civilization.

With diversity-integration, sociology, through the sociology of culture, demonstrates, in our days, that the notion of conflict abandons its “pathological” character for an integration of diversity type and the conflict becoming a “natural fact”. The contemporary sociologists have to admit more and more clearly that not only cooperation but also the conflict has social functions. So there appeared the thesis that the societies, the organizations and the groups without conflicts do not necessarily presume a more stability but, on the contrary, the more the internal conflicts have a larger possibility to express themselves, the stronger the integration is. Therefore, the conflicts are functional as long as there are institutions that can reabsorb them.

We uphold the idea that the integration-diversity (with alongside consensus, can assimilate the conflict too) expresses itself more properly by the notion of “field”. This notion has a long history, today it is used both in nature studies and in the social ones, and in the field of culture it has a good career by phrases of “cultural field” or “stylistic field” (with Blaga).

For a better understanding of the context in which the need of the notion of “field” in the social domain is felt, we have to consider the affirmation of two traditions in the history of sociology. On one hand it is about Durkheim’s tradition, according to which the social reality should be considered as an ensemble of “faits” and “objects”, and on the other hand, we have Tonnies’s tradition where the stress should be put when conceiving the social as a “relationships” as a

“network” of significations. For the idea of “field” the second tradition is interesting.

One could notice that Tonnie’s ideas are protean for a sociological research especially when his notion of “community” is used with the meaning of a “network of significations”, of “cultural network”. In this direction the idea of field is used now by the French sociologist P. Bourdieu. This notion competes with other notions as those of “system”, “context” and “pattern”. If the notion of “system” better corresponds to the needs of generalization, that “field” better corresponds to the needs of individualizations. It is not accidental that the ideas of “social field” and “cultural field” are mainly used from the perspective of the ethnomethodological and ethnocentrist orientation in the social sciences.

In the case of “field” the parts can neither be reduced between themselves and cannot be strictly separated either. The core of a “field” fulfils, on one side, a “generative function”, and on the other hand, an “integrative function”. While the generative function has generalizing effects (e.g. the function of the gift studied by M. Mauss), the integrative function has individualizing effects, of specification.

We consider that by a more intensive use of the idea of field, the research in the social science can advance in at least the following principal directions:

a) to reveal the identity, the typology of some social phenomena according to the subiacent symbolic field; b) the analysis of the cohesion of the human collectivities through the meaning and significance which the social actors confer to the interactions; c) the analysis of the mechanism of constitution of the dominant collective representations in the concret historical and social situations.

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## THE ONTIC STATUTE OF BINARY LOGICAL OPERATORS

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### *1. Introduction*

This paper aims to offer some explanations concerning the attribute of logicity and also to identify the existential area it is determined and preserved by. Therefore, we have to circumscribe the concept of logicity.

Referring to logicity means an implicit reference to the manner in which people logically think. In other words, logicity is strongly connected with a mental order that is characteristic to any human rational individual. Logicity's situation inside of human reason is a thesis that can not be substituted by anything nor extended out of it. Thus, we can not speak about an "objectual logic" (J.Piaget, Mero L.), nor about "a logic of feelings" (T.Ribot) or a "logic of living" (F.Jacob) using in the same time a proper sense of words.

"The objectual logic" has no justification from an ontic point of view, as long as there are only some different means to conceive the existential order, means that are determined by various assumptions. That is why a "logic of objects" can't determine a mental one, without producing an unlawful extension of the reasons' domain to the whole existence. As concerning "the logic of feelings" and "the logic of living" concepts, we consider them simple metaphors for the order and the regularity in the existential sphere of feelings and, respectively, of living individuals.

As concerning mental's inherent logicity, we have to discuss about a possible psychologizing interference upon logic. The science of logic has passed over many difficulties when discussing the problem of the inferences separated from mental, thus by psychological facts. This happened because inferences' research from a formal point of view means our ignoring of their content. Paradoxically, stating an inference is impossible without resorting to



a certain determined or abstract content. As a consequence, the dependence of any inference to the person who formulated it implicitly inserts some psychological elements. These are to be considered only connected to their cognitive specificity, ignoring other psychological determinations. Therefore, the logician who studies the inferences from a formal point of view has to be, at his turn, endowed with a mental order, called logically order, "functioning" through some psychological means. That is why, any total torn between the logical and the psychological aspect would equate with the full torn between the formal and the content aspect of an inference. This might be compared with the study of any syntax without referring to semantics. Therefore, any full torn between logical and psychological aspect seems to be an infertile idea.

### *2. The Sources of Logicity*

As long as being logical is the attribute of a privileged sphere of our existence, that is, as long as logicity is not "diluted" into the whole existence, it is not to be a universal giving of the existence. Its privileged sphere is set into mentality. But there is not placed starting with someone's birth. Thus, logicity is to be obtained.

The possible sources of logicity can be identified in non/mental forms of existence. They are determining our logical becoming. What kind of elements can be part of this non-mental sphere?

On one side, there is what we can call the sphere of objectual existence. This is the spacio-temporal infinity of things, being characterised by a certain order and regularity. These order and regularity are different from the order and the regularity we can logically describe. Therefore, we can suppose this sphere to be a possible source of logicity. Its infinite diversity turns to be impossible to imagine a universal logicity, as a consequence of objectual's interference upon the becoming mental. Infinite diversity can't generate but an infinite universality. The last would no longer be universality, but an infinite row of singularities while human logicity is characterised through its very universality. That is why we may say that Piaget's point of view concerning the source of logicity and its placing among the "objects' logic" is not to be sustained. Such a source can't be but an accidental one.

On the other hand, as soon as the mental logic reconstructs the objectual order and regularity through its own means, than there is to identify the existential sphere it comes from. This is the privileged

sphere of inter-mentalities. The essential means is language. Here is the social aspect. Language is the main means of socialising. Therefore, the second identified source of logicity is language. We have to admit this quinean idea. (W.O.Quine) The process of learning a language as well as acquiring the basic co/ordinates of the human universal mental logic is extremely complex and unclear. This is due to the in/existence of a census of those logical forms that are offered by the inter/mentality through language. Taken as already given, from the point of view of the singular human person, they have an ontic statute.

Let's try to identify those social offers of logical forms that determine mentality's becoming in a logically descriptive form. Such a complete census passes beyond a single researcher's possibilities. All can be understood through the metaphor of the ocean and the drop of water in it. We may find a lot of things about the ocean by studying the drop.

### *3. Social Distribution of Logical Forms*

A logical form is an inferential one that is described by means of truth functions. Therefore, the following analyses will try to inventory those social offers that make people assimilate human logicity, using all means of the logic of sentences.

There are a lot of difficulties in the process of choosing the linguistic expressions that stay for logicity and should become our object of study, because we may appeal to any written or oral linguistic text. A logical analysis of text raises some problems, as it requires for a text's transcription by means of symbolisation. As long as any text consists of a lot of sentences, it would ask for a great number of propositional variables. Besides, it's quite hard to discover that logical operator that is hidden between the full stops that separate the sentences. On the other hand, logic does not have - up to now - a unanimous accepted modality to treatise the linguistic and cultural context of a text. As a consequence, we have to create artificial a-contextual linguistic situations or to find out those natural linguistic expressions that are socio - cultural saturated without having a linguistic context. The second situation is the best, because it contains a social offer of logicity with an ontic statute. Our requirements are fully satisfied by proverbs because they are briefly formulated, in few sentences, do not have a linguistic context and are fully socio-cultural saturated. Therefore, they do have an important

part in logical individual becoming. This is why we shall study the proverbs. What are they?

First, proverbs are connected to the history of human knowledge. Although they do carry a lot of human experience deposited in a linguistic form, they had not been studied very much. Some sociologic and anthropologic points of view were outlined only after there had been realised a lot of studies about cognition producing, its storage and organisation, and too, about language and social spreading of information. This is the way in which sociology of cognition started. It dealt with the every day facts, so with proverbs, too, offering them a peculiar part. Therefore, this sociology can be considered a common one. It has a phenomenological origin namely an interpretative one. Some of its famous representatives are A.Schutz, P.Berger, T.Luckmann, H.Garfinkel and A.Cicourel (Karacsony s., 1995; Stăncilescu E., 1996). They consider proverbs to be of great importance as means of communication and interpretation of daily facts.

We do not intend to analyse the details of phenomenological trend in the sociology of cognition, but a clear conclusion is to be underlined. Social distributed knowledge are taken into consideration exclusively from the point of view of their content, their coherence and consistence, their fitness to reality and their part in social building of this reality. This operation does not depend on the theorization level (it might be the elementary assimilation of a language, the level of common cognition or the one of scientific theories)! There hasn't been realized any *approach to knowledge from the point of view of their logical organization*. This will be the starting point of our paper.

We are to consider proverbs as linguistic expressions that had crystallized human experiences connected to nature and society. We shall analyse the proverbs from *Istvan Voo's Romanian and Hungarian Dictionary of Proverbs*. Why a dictionary of proverbs? Because this is the way we shall be able to do comparative analyses of logicity in these very different languages. We shall take as criteria the key words through which proverbs are identified in that dictionary and around which the experience is thematized. These key words are spoken about and they create the situation that validates the affirmation. There is a large fan of key words containing the truth, the time, the neighbour, the hand, the rabbit, the children, the woman, the female, the drink, God, the knowledge, the head, the talk and so

on. In fact, all the proverbs speak about the every day life of traditional society (Gal L., 1994). It is said that the one who knows and applies them gains some more understanding and wisdom because he has a guide helping him to manage, offering him moral support and calls his attention to some phenomena, facts, characteristics and attitudes. Perhaps the most important thing is that proverbs offer solutions and resignation. Solutions, not efficiency! There is only the post-traditional society that needs this concept to name its essence.

Once with the disappearance of traditional society, proverbs' importance decreased very much. Other forms of thematization came to take its part while the means of communication do completely change. The experience of modern and post-modern man is grounded on successive generalizations and too, a very abstract concept of individuality, that submit to some criteria of scientificity or to some social macro-groupal validation criteria.

Let's see the results! As long as symbolization of all proverbs in the given dictionary would have asked for too much work without any significant difference from our results, we marked a sample of proverbs. The criteria we based on were the presence of at least five proverbs connected to a key word and, among them, we choose the two or more sentence proverbs. If the Romanian proverb connected to a key word were a single sentence one, we would take into consideration and symbolize the Hungarian translation formed – of course – from two sentences. There was the same manner we solved the situation of a two sentence Romanian proverb and a single sentence Hungarian one.

The resulted sample contains 576 Romanian proverbs and 711 correspondent Hungarian proverbs. Thus, there is a sum of 1287 proverbs in both languages. The difference comes out from the fact that the author of the dictionary often offers more Hungarian variants for the Romanian proverb in order to get a translation as faithful as possible. Where he couldn't find a Hungarian correspondent for the Romanian proverb, he formulated his own translation.

There is to notice that proverbs are seldom containing three or more elementary sentences. We found only 19 (3,2%) Romanian examples and only 11(1,5%) Hungarian ones. This situation is due to the fact that we affirm the full truth when enouncing a proverb. Having a sententious character, this truth does not need the linguistic

context of the given proverb. The context is out of it, somewhere in the place and situation it was first pronounced.

Here are the appearance frequencies of logical operators in all the 1287 proverbs we had analyzed:

Table no.1. *Appearance frequencies of the logic operators in the 1287 proverbs:*

| Number of order. | Operators with no negation (1102)  | Operators with negation (1482) |
|------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1.               | &                                  | 43,72%                         |
| 2.               | →                                  | 15,38%                         |
| 3.               | ←                                  | 6,47%                          |
| 4.               | $\bar{p} \supset q$ (postpendence) | 1,14%                          |
| 5.               | $p \supset \bar{q}$ (prependence)  | 4,25%                          |
| 6.               | ↔                                  | 2,90%                          |
| 7.               | +                                  | 0,26%                          |
| 8.               | ↓                                  | 0,13%                          |
| Total            |                                    | 99,97%                         |
| 9.               | ~                                  | 25,64%                         |
| Total            |                                    | 99,89%                         |

Here comes that the largest amount in any operation with the information in proverbs belong to conjunctions (&). This finding is valid for both calculus we made, with and without negation. On the second place is the implication (→) and the conversed implication (←) that have together an amount of 29,39% in report with a non-negation total and an amount of 21,85% in report with a total containing negation. On the third place is the negation (~). Its amount is 25,64%. After it come the postpendence ( $\bar{p} \supset q$ ) and the prependence ( $p \supset \bar{q}$ ). Their added amount is 7,25% without negation and 5,39% with negation. Next, there is the equivalence (↔) with an amount of 3,90% without negation and 2,90% with negation. Finally, exclusion (+) and rejection (↓) appear with an amount less than 1% in both variants of calculus.

From the given table we can conclude that in proverbs we have 4-5 logical operators used. What explanation might there be? We think that in the case of every day style, ~ as A.Schutz said ~ *it is sufficient to use only these operators, while any shading is to be realized "inside" the frames of their use.* It may exist a typology of

these operators related to some proverbs, while proverbs are typical for a given comprehensiv-actional situation.

Let's follow now the distribution of logical operators in Romanian compared with Hungarian.

Table no. 2. *Appearance frequency of logical operators in Romanian variants*

| Number of order            | Operators without negation |     |        | Operators with negation |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----|--------|-------------------------|
|                            | 1.                         | &   | 320    |                         |
| 2.                         | →                          | 124 | 22,87% | 16,95%                  |
| 3.                         | ←                          | 34  | 6,27%  | 4,64%                   |
| 4.                         | ┌ q (postpendence)         | 13  | 2,39%  | 1,76%                   |
| 5.                         | p ┘ (prependence)          | 28  | 5,16%  | 3,82%                   |
| 6.                         | ↔                          | 20  | 3,69%  | 2,72%                   |
| 7.                         | +                          | 1   | 0,18%  | 0,13%                   |
| 8.                         | ↓                          | 2   | 0,36%  | 0,27%                   |
| Total (without negation)   |                            | 542 | 99,96% |                         |
| 9.                         | ~                          | 189 |        | 25,85%                  |
| Total (including negation) |                            | 731 |        | 100%                    |

Table no.3. *Appearance frequency of logical operators in Hungarian variants*

| Number of order            | Operators without negation |     |        | Operators with negation |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----|--------|-------------------------|
|                            | 1.                         | &   | 329    |                         |
| 2.                         | →                          | 104 | 18,57% | 13,84%                  |
| 3.                         | ←                          | 62  | 11,05% | 8,25%                   |
| 4.                         | ┌ q (postpendence)         | 4   | 0,71%  | 0,53%                   |
| 5.                         | p ┘ (prependence)          | 35  | 6,25%  | 4,66%                   |
| 6.                         | ↔                          | 23  | 4,07%  | 3,06%                   |
| 7.                         | +                          | 3   | 0,53%  | 0,39%                   |
| 8.                         | ↓                          | -   | -      | -                       |
| Total (without negation)   |                            | 560 | 100%   |                         |
| 9.                         | ~                          | 191 |        | 25,43%                  |
| Total (including negation) |                            | 751 |        | 99,96%                  |

The first notice we have to make refers to *the striking similitude of the logical operators distribution in both languages*. The differences between logical structures in the two languages – so far as they were statistically set – are negligible. This means that logical

meaning of the proverbs in this two languages is identical. In other words we can say that *the social distribution of knowledge in an almost homogenize medium, so as the every day life's one is, that is the logical meanings are distributed in an identical manner*. This is a valid observation even for two so different languages as Romanian and Hungarian are. As long as every day life is similar, it would be necessary for the theorization in proverbs' form to be similar from the logical meaning's perspective.

We know that making up a dictionary of proverbs does not mean making their translation from a language to the other. There are to be found those cultural equivalents because of which a Romanian proverb has one or more correspondents in Hungarian. In other words, when Voo Istvan made up this dictionary he tried to make correspond a given Romanian affirmation together with its discourse universe, to a similar one in Hungarian. Thus, this dictionary did not had any translating intention, when Voo started his work. Therefore, the dictionary is characterized by a sort of spontaneity and it reflects the social given reality. There are some exceptions, too. These are the 83 proverbs for which the author did not find any Hungarian correspondent. This was why he translated them. Here there was an explicit intention of translating. Let's see how the logical operators are distributed in these translated proverbs:

Table no. 4 *Appearance frequency of logical operators in translated proverbs*

| Number of order | Logical operators  | Absolute frequency in Romanian | Relative frequency in Romanian | Absolute frequency in Hungarian | Relative frequency in Hungarian |
|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1.              | &                  | 54                             | 47,78%                         | 49                              | 45,37%                          |
| 2.              | →                  | 20                             | 17,76%                         | 22                              | 20,37%                          |
| 3.              | ←                  | 4                              | 3,53%                          | 4                               | 3,70%                           |
| 4.              | ⌈ q (postpendence) | 5                              | 4,42%                          | 4                               | 3,70%                           |
| 5.              | p⌋ (prependence)   | 4                              | 3,53%                          | 6                               | 5,55%                           |
| 6.              | ↔                  | 1                              | 0,88%                          | 1                               | 0,92%                           |
| 7.              | ~                  | 25                             | 22,12%                         | 22                              | 20,37%                          |
| Total           |                    | 113                            | 99,99%                         | 108                             | 99,98%                          |

There is to be noticed that there are some differences between Romanian and Hungarian as connected the logical meaning

similitude. We can also be more exactly. Taking into consideration the differences between the logical meaning in Romanian proverbs and their Hungarian correspondents (see tables 2 and 3), we shall find out a cumulated difference of only 3,03%. The same calculus started from table no. 4 will bring a difference of 9,68% between the Romanian proverbs and their Hungarian translation realized by Voo Istvan. The last difference is tree times bigger. This means that translator's intervention did stronger modify the logical meaning similarity than the simple finding of corespondents between the two languages.

#### *4. The Typology of Conjunctions and Implications*

According to A. Schutz, the first theorization level, typical for everyday life is language assimilation. The second one deals with proverbs and adages. Proverbs as a whole do offer an image of world, especially of everyday' one. They are even part of it. The elements that populate this world are very different. Being different linguistic expressions, the proverbs can be concentrated, unified around some common constituents.

There are of great help the results we had already gained by applying the meta-language of the logic of sentences to the natural, object language of proverbs. We call this an "atomar" approach and we'll try to go further. Now, we shall try a "molecular" analysis, concentrating not only on constant linkages between the sentences that compose a proverb, but, too, on the sentences part from a given logical structure. Besides, we shall try to identify the common meaning of proverbs. This will be done with the help of conjunction (&) and implications ( $\rightarrow, \leftarrow$ ) because they are the most frequent logical operators.

We have to mention, from the beginning, that to any proverb, more exactly, to any sentence that is part of a proverb can't be attached but the logical value of true. Wherever and whenever the proverb had been formulated, it was not with the intention of saying something false. There are some situations when proverbs do not respect the principle of excluded middle or that of non/contradiction. Leaving aside this aspect, it is incontestable that a proverb formulation in any comprehensive/ acting situation requires for the truth and only for it. Therefore, any proverb, indifferently if it affirms or deny something, will have as truth value the true.



Aren't there any false proverbs? We did not notice such a thing in any linguistic formula we studied. Everyday life is impossible without false. Even the logical value of truth would have no sense without the existence of the logical value of false. Therefore, the only solution we can imagine is to say that a false sentence is not worth to be formulated, linguistic expressed. Although the adjacent logic in proverbs is a bivalent one, we have only truth in concrete comprehensive/acting situations.

This is the explanation of the almost total lack of any expressions that might require getting out from bivalent logic, even in the form of some modal expressions. (We refer, of course, only to the proverbs in the quoted dictionary!) We could find a single exception. Here are the proverbs:

1191 *A mânca și din barbă a nu mișca, nu se poate;*

symbolically:  $\sim M(p \ \& \ \sim q)$

Eating without moving one's chin is impossible.

(No fire, no smoke)

Orrot fujni, levest is horpinteni lehetetlen

symbolically:  $\sim M(p \ \& \ q)$

(The symbol  $\sim M$  is used in modal logic for *impossible*)

Although in this case we might read "nu se poate"(no smoke) as "impossible", suggesting a trivalent logic, this would be a wrong interpretation. What we consider to be more correctly is considering the expression to be false. In other words, the point is not that there is impossible "to eat without moving one's chin", but the fact that we got a false conjunctive sentence annexing the affirmation of "eating" with that of "unmoving the chin". *The false* is assigned here to the conjunctive affirmation as a unique alternative to *the truth* that is always assigned to proverbs. Here is nothing about *the impossible* assigned to the affirmation as an alternative to *the truth* and to *the false*.

### 6.1 *The typology of conjunctions*

There are two main things that interest us: the typical conjunctive logical structures and, connected to the contents of sentences, their synthesis.

The most frequent logical structure is that of a simple conjunctive annexation of two sentences. That is symbolically:  $p \ \& \ q$ .

But everyday life uses a lot the possibilities offered by negation. So, we may find all the logical structures being denied, that is all those possibilities where negation is to be found close to affirmation ( $p \& \sim q$ ,  $\sim p \& q$ ), respectively the negation of both terms of the conjunction ( $\sim p \& \sim q$ ). Quite seldom is to be met a conjunction made up of tree sentences. There is extremely rare the negation of the whole conjunction, in a proverb. We have found only tree such situations:

545. Nincs olyan hosszú nap, hogy estéje ne vona.

946. Nincs senki akinek tanulnia ne kellene és senki akitől tanulni ne lehetne.

1409. Halat száka nélkül, embert hiba nélkül nem lehet találni.

All of them appear in Hungarian variants. The adjacent logical structures are:

$\sim(p \& \sim q)$  for proverb number 545 and

$\sim(\sim p \& \sim q)$  for proverbs number 946 and 1409.

Proverb number 545 is connected to the following law of sentences' logic:

$$\sim(p \& \sim q) \Leftrightarrow (p \rightarrow q).$$

If we reformulate this proverb in natural language, according to the logical meaning from the right side of the equivalence, we shall get a natural, familiar expression.

The other two proverbs are connected to De Morgan's laws in the logic of sentences:

$$\sim(\sim p \& \sim q) \Leftrightarrow (p \vee q).$$

Their eventual reformulation in natural language according to this logical meaning would be something unusual.

As concerning the second point of our interest, that of a synthesis of the sentences' contents, there is the problem of their large diversity. Therefore, we couldn't use but a grate of ad hoc concepts. These are the resulting categories:

a) Proverbs consisting of a *simple annexation* of two affirmations. For example:

394. *Câinii* latră, caravana trece.

The dogs bark, but the caravan goes on. (366)  
A kutya ugat, a karavan halad.

Or

731. Din afară *frumos* și înăuntru găunos.

Fair without, false within. (512)

Kivul fenyés, belül ferges.

Proverb number 394 is, perhaps, the most significant. Annexed affirmations about dogs' barking and that about caravan's passing are irrelevant one to another. Here is where the significance of useless comes out, meaning the impossibility of someone's interfering in the given destiny of things. It is expressed by means of a conjunctive annexation. The irrelevance is not implicit in proverb 731. There, it is based on the pair "without/within", thus on the relation "inside/outside". This relation is a doubtful one, because the inside is hidden.

The formulations of these two proverbs in Romanian and Hungarian have the same logical and natural structure, being almost identical.

b) Other proverbs express conjunctively too, some given *situations*. For example:

560. Au scăpat de *dracu*, au dat peste tată-său.

They have left the devil and found his father.

A kakastol elfut, orozlanra tatal.

Or

1388. Cine nu deschide *ochii*, deschide punga.

Lack of attention is to be paid.

Aki nem vigyaz, rafizet.

As these situations are conjectural, they'll be always introduced by pronoun "who"/"the one". Its part is to familiarise us with the situation and to create the context for the truth of affirmation to be valid. By substituting "the one" with any name of person we shall get a clearer form of the proverb: "John is not attentive, so he has to pay". This is the way we can get the concretise of the situation and we move a truth from the supra/individual level in a given comprehensive/acting context.

c) Other proverbs category is created by *emphasising a feature of the state*. For example:

1370. Tunde *oaia*, dar nu-i lua și pielea.  
When every hand fleeceth, the sheep goes naked. (1404)  
Juhot nyirni, nem nyuyni kell.

Or

1166. *Cap* mare, minte puțină.  
Big head few mind.  
Feje mint egy hordo, esze mint egy dio.

In these proverbs, a particular element of the state (shearing the sheep/ her skin, head/mind) is the ground for truth affirmation. The chosen feature is significant for the state, while its negation draws our attention on the possibility of some irremediable damages to be provoked.

d)Some proverbs hint at the *space*. For example:

1162. *Minciuna* umblă prin lume, iar dreptatea stă pe loc.  
A lie is walking all over, while justice is staying still.  
A hazugsag vilagot kerul, az igazsag egy helyben ul.

Or

2090. *Vorba de rău* se duce ca glonțul, iar cea de bine înămolește.

An ill saying about somebody is quickly spread, while a fair one sticks in the mud.

A rossz hir szamyon jar, a jo hir alig kullog.

Some of these proverbs speak about travelling.

e)Temporality is expressed in analyzed proverbs either as *simultaneity* either as *succession*. For example:

1079. *Vorbești de lup* și lupul la ușă.  
The wolf is never far off.  
Farkast emlegettunk, a kert alatt jar.

Or

2037. Să bei *vinul*, dar să nu te bea.  
Drink the wine, be not drunk by it. (1286)  
Ki a bort megissza, ura legzen.

Proverbs that hint at successions, thus at a dynamic time are more frequent. It's quite interesting to find out which are the temporal coordinates refereed to. We can identify proverbs that refer to temporal physical cycles as: morning/evening, day/night, summer/winter, yesterday/today. There is another category that

refers to man in report with physical time: going to bed/sleeping/getting up, living/dying, working/eating, ploughing/reaping, father/son, youth/old. Finally, we can remark temporal cycles connected to some activities or social events: buying/selling, giving/taking, promising/ carrying out, love/marriage, once/never. All these cycles show us that the temporal horizon we usually refer to is a closed, repeatable and constant one. There are no ample projects in these world because they might need years and formidable resources. The everyday life's resources are restricted to the individual and to his capacities to act and understand. This is the traditional society. Modern rationality has no part here, as well as world wars or all/inclusive economic crisis. From a logical point of view, there are here all those instruments that being used in another context, with a slight movement of accents to other logical operators make modern society possible..

### 6.2 *The typology of implications* ( $\rightarrow, \leftarrow$ )

We shall analyse the implications in report to the criteria already enounced, because they have the second amount in table number 1.

The notice we made connected to conjunction as concerning the use of expressing possibilities in logical structures with negations is valid for implications, too. We met both implications with all possible combinations of denying its terms. So that the logical meaning is distributed on the following structures:  $p \rightarrow \sim q$ ,  $\sim p \rightarrow q$ ,  $\sim p \rightarrow \sim q$ ,  $p \leftarrow \sim q$ ,

$\sim p \leftarrow q$ ,  $\sim p \leftarrow \sim q$ . this distribution does not mean that implication without negation might not be present. On the contrary. Searching for a privileged logical structures we have to stop on the following tree structures:  $p \rightarrow q$ ,  $p \leftarrow q$ ,  $\sim p \rightarrow \sim q$ .

As concerning the categories proverbs are part from, we can identify the following:

a) proverbs expressing *causality*. For example:

26. *Apa când se umflă și pe munți îi scufundă.*

When water fills, it dips the mountains.

Ozonviz ha tombol, hegyeket lerombol.

Or

269. *Capul până nu se sparge, creierii nu se văd.*

As long as the head is not broken, one can't see the brain.

Mig a fo be nem torik, az agy ki nem latszük.

b)proverbs referring to *space*. For example:

1203. Unde *mănâncă* doi, mai poate mânca și al treilea.

Where two people are eating, there's place enough for the third one.

Ahol ketten jollaknak, ott a harmadik sem marad ehen.

Or

1516. Când ai o *pisică* blândă, șoarecii-n casă fac stână.

A blate cat makes a proud mouse. (368)

Ha nincs otthon a macska, tancolnak az egerek.

c)Although we expected most proverbs referring to *temporality* to be formulated in an implicative logical structure, things are different. Conjunction is primordial to express temporality. There is no other explanation than the fact that conjunction being the most frequent logical operator comes to express theorization of everyday life.

d)A great deal of proverbs with implicative structure express a large sort of *circumstances*. For example:

119. *Bărbatul* zice din fluier, muierea plânge de foame.

Man plays the flute while his wife starves.

Hol az ember egész nap csak furulyal, ott az asszony csak ehessen sirdogal.

Or

404. Nu-i vinovat *câinele*, el intră unde vede ușa deschisă.

At open doors dogs come in. (1008)

Nem jön be a kutya a pitvarba, ha beteszük az ajtot.

The role of "if" that introduces the antecedent of implication ~ even in a non/explicit manner ~ is to familiarise us to the circumstances that validate proverb pronouncing. Due to their circumstantiality, these proverbs do not express descriptions, but actions.

### 5. Conclusions

1. Logical operators being atomary token as well as molecular logical structures are differently distributed. The non/homogeneity of the social distribution of logical meaning justifies an analyses as this one in the frame of sociology of cognition. We consider this distribution as already given, as it constitutes the social offer of logicity.

2. We found out that the differences concerning the logical meaning between Romanian and Hungarian in an homogenise type of everyday life's acting ~ are few. There is the same observation connected the search of cultural corespondents of proverbs. Translators' intervention did modify logical meanings too, otherwise very similar.

3. Negation has a particular part in proverbs, but it never affirms the false. Proverbs do not belong the same world with paradoxes as that of the liar.

4. The only logical value is that of truth. False is accepted as a logical value, but it is not worth to be expressed.

### Notes:

1. The numbers placed before proverbs are their identification numbers in Istvan Voo's *Romanian/Hungarian Dictionary of Proverbs*;

2. The numbers placed after the English versions of some proverbs are their identification numbers in Virgil Lefter's *Romanian/English Dictionary of Proverbs*, 1978, Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucharest. All the other proverbs are translated into English by the translator of the whole text (Laura Gheorghiu).

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SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF LÖWENHEIM–SKOLEM  
THEOREM

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Within the framework of logic, there has been moot the question of a strictly syntactical approach of the problems concerning the language, but such a project was not fulfilled. In spite of all axiomatizing attempts that followed, there couldn't be avoided the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the language. Last years logic, for example, has attached a special importance not only to the rules or conditions on which the expressions' correctness depends on, but also to the tacit content of logical constants. So, logic has been defined and developed as an explicitation of what is implicit in logical constants. A good example for such an evolution may be found in J. Barwise' s papers as well as in those of the group round about him.

Besides, it has been found out that the formal system might not work without semantic rules and principles, although in algebraic approach it had been formulated strictly syntactically. Its use calls for attention upon a series of phenomenon with pragmatic charge, as recursivity or even foundationism. More precisely, the algebraic school – among whose representatives we can mention Löwenheim and Skolem – this school stands as a ground for semantics or models theory, the one that imposed the plurality of interpretations for the expressions of a formal system. Such a perspective that sets the expressions and the axioms before the structure meant for Frege and his disciples an overturn of the natural order of things [Largeault, J., 1998, pp.11.13].

The main goal of this study is not to point out the changes of outlook that are taking place in logic nowadays, but it represents the object of its approach. In fact, no step concerning the logic of (justifying or developing) science – as this one aim to be – can ignore such changes. The main object of this paper – as its title also



underlines - is to point out some philosophical implications of the manner in which Löwenheim – Skolem theorem has been understood by those researchers who were fond of the logical statute of a scientific discourse, especially by H. Putnam.

Therefore, we are going to analyze the definitions formulated for modeling in science and logic, and then, we shall verify the way these definitions prove their functionality. We shall also identify the so-called “Löwenheim–Skolem effects” involved by the scientific language. Before all these, we shall raise for discussion some of the classical controversies of epistemology and of the ontology of science (realism – Platonism, realism – instrumentalism, realism – relativism ans., shortly, realism – antirealism), that are already very well known for their relation to the problems of truth, of modeling and of reality.

The realists assert that being given a theory as a class of sentences or beliefs, each element of this class is true or false, depending on the way the world is. The world is “outside”, independent of us, so the task of science – and of knowledge, too – consists in the exact description of this world. The truth implies an agreement between the description of world and its existence. At one time, it won't be true and completed but a single description (according the available evidence). In order to support this thesis, realists propose two theories (the theory of corresponding truth and the theory of models). It follows that there are two kinds of realists: the extreme realists and the minimal ones).

The extreme realists affirm that a theory might be given a realistic interpretation only if it offered or it had an associated model to describe the reality that is the theory's object as something that can be described through analogy with the objects of common experience. The minimal realists practice an ontological employment, removing the analogy requirements. They say that as soon as they have proves in the favor of the (approximate) truth of the sentences or beliefs of the theory, they also have proves for the existence of *something* on the ground of which the sentences or the beliefs are true (or almost true). Both ones and the others conceive the scientific knowledge as been affected – from the point of view of evaluation or of justification – only by constituent, proper – called scientific, rational factors. These factors have to be related only to some aspects of the given theory and also to aspects of the relation between the theory and the available evidence: consistency, simplicity, verifiability and so on.

The anti-realists consider that external, non-rational factors (such as psychological, social, economics or of any other kinds than scientific ones: propagandistic abilities, social climate of a certain period, research tradition) do essential interfere in science thus, in the manner world is described, too.<sup>1</sup> There are a lot of types of antirealism. We shall briefly present here only two of them: instrumentalism and relativism, as they have an important philosophical and cultural impact upon the image of science.

Both are grounded on the theories of prediction and coherence-truth. Instrumentalists deny the relevance of theories' evaluation using the categories of true and false, doubting on the applicability of these notions to the theories. Relativists recognize the possibility to apply these notions, but they deny their viability as soon as they doubt on the standard interpretation that is offered these notions.

Instrumentalists consider that theories are true or false, but irrelevant, as they play no part in the effort to understand the nature of science, in its work or in the development of scientific knowledge. These things are not depending on the fact that the theories have the statute of some instruments, tools or calculus procedure trough which one obtains predictions about the world and not scientific truths or references. So, as the theoretical enunciation have no significance, the role of theories might be to correlate the observation enunciation and to systematize some of them as being already given, in order to derive from them, other sets of observations as predictions.

On the contrary, admitting the theories' truth or false, relativism considers that what is true depends, fully or partially, on the social perspective of the researcher subject, on the conventions, on the culture and on the conceptual schemes he is working with. As a result, the dates of knowledge coming out from experience are conceptually contaminated, that is, modelated by our concepts. Therefore, we can't stay "out" of our perspective through which we are looking to the world, as it really is. [Newton- Smith, W. H., 1994: 46-65; Misak, C., 1988: 151-152].

The point is that relativist "modelation" is a metaphor that has generated a postmodern vision when it was used to justify both the methodological anarchism (based on the principle "all's working") and non-rationalism (saying that science is a "problem of taste", not an explaining "logical-mathematical armor". The type of science we get this way is so "weak" or "diluted" that does not allow us to detach science from the other domains of culture (aesthetics, religion etc).

The realist acceptance of “modeling’ promoted by the analytical philosophy aims to trace the science’s one, but it does not always succeed. Therefore, the analytical model of science seems to be often too “strong’, because it reduces the scientific rationality only to the relating of constituent explicative (logic- mathematical) structures and identifies it with the only cultural ideal to be reached. [Kun, P., 1998, p.6].

There were some attempts to transpose mechanically the analytical exigencies of defining a model into a model of science. These have imposed a “strong” image on the scientific domain. All subsequent trials to “soften” this image have outlined a “weak” pattern of science. This one had to admit too, the explanations through external factors when the phenomenon can’t be understood using the constituent ones. The limits of ontological relativism that might be admitted from the point of view of analytical philosophy can be fixed as it follows: 1) there is senseless to point out which the objects of a theory are. It is rather significant to interpret or reinterpret the given theory in terms of another theory. 2) Anything that exists (or the way it exists) does not depend on the language, but the manner in which what a theory says to exist, this manner depends on the language. 3) The theory does not assert the dependence of existence towards the language and does not offer any specification concerning the real condition of things. It emphasizes the ontological presuppositions admitted in science. 4) Any theory is logically employed in order to determine the types of entities that can and have to exist if its enunciation are true [Clitan, Gh., 1999].

But in the framework of the dispute between realism and antirealism it does not matter only the part and the meaning one affords to modeling or ontological commitments (although they are essential). This was why the dispute has had several forms up to now (some of them with a lower share). One may find it, for example, in mathematics. Here, there are the misunderstandings between Platonists and naturalists. The first group considers our mind to have miraculous faculties able to detect the concepts or to perceive the mathematical objects. Naturalists (whatever kind of realism they join to: verificationism, moderate realism) speak about the truth of the sentences used in demonstrations concerning the objects’ properties and existence.

Some of the explanations that have been given to these misunderstandings emphasize the incapacity of mathematical theories

to “fix” their terms in their own language (as for example, the incapacity of the set’s theory to “catch” or “fix” the intuitive notion of set). When they are produced, the theories “fix” only the understanding of those who formulate them, and by no means the phenomenon they aim to explain – as the Platonists say. From a naturalistic point of view, they do not hint at the procedure of defining terms (the formal aspect), but the informational content of the enunciation or the truth of the sentences that generate this content (substantial aspect) [Putnam, H., 1988, p.70].

Returning to the problem of defining a model, we may say that – for logicians - it is strongly connected with the definitions given to a formal system. Some of them refer to the formal system as to an already constituted reality: the set of formulas - axioms and theorems – arranged in a demonstrative order. Other definitions conceive it in a constructive manner: the ensemble of signs and rules obtained from a symbolic language by retaining only the syntactical rules. Adding semantic rules is considered to be an interpretation of the system while its objects become expressions in a formalized language. [Enescu, Gh., 1967, p. 205-206].

In this extend, interpretation is identified with the totality of correspondences between a system of formal objects  $\mathbf{S}$  and a not empty domain of signification  $\mathbf{D}$  (meaning that to each element or finite sequence of elements from  $\mathbf{S}$  correspondents a determined element in  $\mathbf{D}$ ). As soon as the  $\mathbf{D}$  domain is given in a  $L_D$  language,  $\mathbf{S}$ 's interpretation is to be defined as an ensemble of correspondences between  $\mathbf{S}$  and  $L_D$ . As it results,  $\mathbf{S}$ 's interpretation is relative to  $L_D$ , asking for an interpretation of this language. An expression, or better said a formula  $\mathbf{A}$  from  $\mathbf{S}$  is considered to be interpreted if there has in  $\mathbf{D}$  a corresponding system of signification that turns it into a true formula. (For the ontological implications, see next, the concept of veri- functionality). This system of signification that makes it true is called “model”. Therefore,  $\mathbf{M}$ , the model, can be defined in its turn, as the interpretation or the subdomain of  $\mathbf{D}$  that transforms  $\mathbf{A}$  formula into a true sentence. [Lucica, I., 1998, pp. 197-199].

The same conclusions can be obtained when we approach the truth in terms of implication’ logic. According to these, the truth is the relation between a  $\mathbf{p}$  sentence – token as a semantic object – and the domain of signification that makes it non/contradictory in the  $\mathbf{S}$  system of sentences. As we have already seen, the model has been defined as the sum of signification in a domain that make the  $\mathbf{p}$  sentence to be

true. In addition, a  $p$  sentence can be defined as a logical consequence of a  $S$  set of sentences only when  $p$  is true in any  $D$  domain where all sentences from  $S$  are true. Therefore, it is said that  $p$  is logically deriving from  $S$  or, that  $S$  logically implies  $p$  [Keenan, F.L., 1971, pp. 45-46].

Any violation of these definition conditions generates some paradoxical situations from a linguistic point of view. The need of rejecting language paradoxes imposes us to exclude - from the very beginning - the expressions with multiple meanings that have no linkage between them, i.e., the expressions with semantic (or lexical) ambiguity. We say that an expression is “systematically or logically ambiguous” when there are well-defined logical relations between its meanings. There is not only the “model” term under this qualification, but also those of “truth”, “validity”, “function”, “structure”. [Lucica, I., 1997, p. 191] or, as we shall see, those of “veri-functionality” and “realizability” (“satisfiability”).

Trying to eliminate the “paradoxical” connotations involved by the term “model”, we say that  $D$ 's description in  $L_D$  is possible if and only if the expressions in  $L_D$  relate true or false to  $D$  (see next, for ontological implications, the concept of realizability or satisfyable). The same note is valid for  $M$ , too, as a subdomain of  $D$ . It follows that  $M$ 's description asks too, for a true or false relation of the expressions in  $L_D$  to a subdomain of  $M$  and so on. Adding new relating conditions (“having a sense in  $D$ ” = “being interpretable in  $D$ ” and “taking place in  $D$ ” = “being true in relation to a certain interpretation in  $D$ ”) seems to let the problem unsolved. It points to the term “interpretation” as the best candidate for the discursive engagements that are responsible for the semantic turn to ambiguity and for the discursive relativization.

As it follows from the explanation above, we may appreciate that language is projecting on our knowledge acts some specific conceptual grids, turning them into significant ones. They also transform them in real discourse acts, that is, in enunciation that suppose not only a locutor and an interlocutor, but also the intention of the locutor to influence the other. Besides, the multiple relations that language mediates have ontological charges because the process of relating supposes some relates. These relates (whatever their nature is ontic, linguistic, scientific, philosophical) have a certain existence manner, that we may find in a way or another, in conceptual signification that are assigned to them.

Briefly, the relationings concerning the way of relates' existence will be called ontological models. We shall distinguish two kinds of them: intentional and unintentional. The intentional models are those in which a sentence having as subject an intuitive notion is "captured" or "fixed" (in other words: "demonstrated" or "inferred" thus *implied*) as a theorem by the system of sentences concerning to that notion or to what it is designing through the postulates it admits. The unintentional models are those in which the fact that is *presupposed* to be designed by that notion is, in reality, something else than what it is enunciated by the system of sentences concerning that notion, using the admitted postulates.

In any approach, the discursive "inclusion" or "packing up" of the sentences takes place tacitly, once with the systematization of the concepts they contain and with the relating systems in theories, of the theories among themselves or in meta - theories, thus once with their discursive rationalization. Therefore, the result for science as well as for any other approach is the tacit or explicit constitution of an ontological discourse that is unavoidable as long as it is supposed to refer to *something*. The scientific concepts have referents (the individuals or individual and divided references) the existence of which is supposes, in a way or another, from the very beginning. Scientific enunciation, too, as soon as they are admitted to be true or false, suppose *something's* existence (like facts, situations, processes and events ans.). These enunciations get truth-value through their relation with these *some-things*. [Grecu, C., 1983, pp.171-179].

The phenomenon of unintentional transmission of suppositions has been surprised in the specialized literature using Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. This theorem is considered to be an antinomy not so much for the formal logic as for the philosophy of language. Initially, it was formulated for the relativity of the set-theoretical notions in mathematics and was pointing out a new and unusual feature of formal systems, at the most an apparent paradox. According to the theorem, no theory can have only uncountable models; if it has one uncountable model, it will also have some infinite countable models, but this is a contradiction. Finally the theorem asserts that a consistent theory of first order (being given in a countable language) has a countable model, and this fact seems not to be contradictory at all.

As soon as it is reformulated, this theorem points out more clearly the antinomical aspect of the problem: a set that represents a countable one for a given model can be an uncountable set for

another model. The notions: *finite*, *infinite* are relative to an axiomatic theory of sets. The antinomial charge is coming out from the language in which the reformulation takes place, because this one is doing a tacit transfer of "intention": what it is *presupposed* to be uncountable sets are, in reality, countable ones. This transfer of intention is better emphasized by the analyses of the strong form of the theorem: a first order theorem in a countable language has a countable model that is a sub-model of any given model. [Putnam, H., 1988, pp.66-88].

From a strict logical point of view we can say now that the theorem raises no other problems. In the science of logic, it is formulated as it follows: if an **A** formula has a model in an infinite (uncountable) domain, it will also have a model in a countable domain. It was demonstrated using the normal forms and the decision Skolem functions, proving that its form is a realizable one. So, the theorem would be considered to be demonstrated, if there would be possible to emphasize the realizability (satisfiability) conditions of its normal form. [Enescu, Gh., pp.345-358]. The problem of this theorem is its application to the notions of realizability (satisfiability) and veri-functionality, in fact its application to two of the main notions that define the logical rationality.

The definitions that were given to the notions of realizability (satisfiability) and veri-functionality in the terms of models theory can't avoid Skolem's turn because of the tacit admission of some "interpretations" even for the terms *model* and *truth*. Here are the definitions: 1. A propositional expression **A** of a propositional function is realizable (satisfied) a) either generally, if it exists for it a **M** model, b) or for a **D** domain, if there is at least one **M** model for it in the **D** domain. 2. A propositional expression **A** is true veri-functionally) in **D** if it is true for any model, **M<sub>n</sub>**, in **D**. In what way do they produce "skolemizing"?

Using the already adopted symbolism or language, if we have a countable **M** model of a theory (being a sub-domain of **D**), we can find an **M'** countable model of the same theory. The predicative symbols of this model (**A** expressions) stay for the same (correspondence) relations. They are, however, restricted to smaller sub-domains (where **A** expression becomes true) for which they also stood in the original model **M** or **D**. The only difference between **M** and **M<sup>2</sup>** is that the universe of **M<sup>3</sup>** is a set belonging to the universe of **M** (and to the universe of **D**, too).<sup>4</sup>

One of the philosophical significations of the theorem consists on the distinction between “intentional” and “unintentional” models. In the mathematical theory of sets, the intentional models are – as we have already said – those in which the intuitive notion of set is “captured” or “fixed”<sup>5</sup> as a theorem by the formal system, through the axiom it is just admitting. The unintentional models are those in which what it is *presupposed* to be uncountable sets represent the real countable ones. The included reasoning<sup>6</sup> can be extended to the whole science or to the whole knowledge, even culture. Here is what it comes out “if a formalization of science or of all beliefs<sup>7</sup> exists or might be obtained, this formalization will never remove the unintentional interpretations or models implied by these notions”[Putnam, H., 1988, p.69].

Hence, philosophically speaking, the following feature of formal systems is pointed out by the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem and, too, it is set above the whole science: the formal systems can not capture the intentional interpretation<sup>8</sup> supposed by a theory, better said, they can’t fix a single intentional interpretation. They can, however capture or fix the “understanding” of those who use the theory or its language. This capture builds together with understanding, one of the fundamental coordinates of rationality. Here is not the traditional rationality<sup>9</sup>, but a “weak” or “soft” one, as a way to save<sup>10</sup> the subjectivity, together with all its elements. [Newton – Smith, W.H., 1994; Boudon, R., 1990, pp.56-58].

According to this “weakening” of rationality, it is spoken about the “choosing axiom”. This one is linking in a scientific perspective *the rational* (science or knowledge) with the *non-rational* (beliefs or opinions/ convictions) adding new exterior axioms to the system and “softens” the concepts of knowledge and rationality. This linkage, meaning this belief’s rationalizing can be performed using the main logic/linguistic operations that are responsible for the correct functioning of a theories’ interpretations or models (non-intentional ones - presupposition –or intentional – the implication).

Another philosophical signification of the theorem, connected with the preceding one, can be found out as concerning the choosing axiom. What kind of rationality corresponds to the expressions that formulate such axioms? Is there still valid the distinction between the “strong” and the “weak” rationality? If so, in what manner does it work? These are only a few problems raised by the choosing axiom, connected to which the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem reveals new signification. More precisely, the theorem makes us to doubt



concerning the “strong” rationality of the expressions of the reminded axiom’s type when they are accepted in a formal system, respectively in a formalized theory.

Suggesting an assimilation of veri-functionality with “strong” rationality and of realizability with “weak” rationality, this theorem indicates a veri-functional unacceptance of the expression of this kind<sup>11</sup>. It is also suggested an acceptance according to the capacity of being realized<sup>12</sup>. In other words, veri- functionality admits only the intentional interpretation of the given expressions, while realizability admits also an unintentional interpretation.

Here there are two special semantic properties of veri-functionality, respectively, of realizability, in order to support the preceding ideas: 1. A propositional function is realizable or satisfied (intentional, i.e. veri-functional) if and only if the general corresponding sentence is true or false, based on its methodological presuppositions and 2. A propositional function is realizable or satisfied (unintentional) if the corresponding existential sentence is true based on its ontological presuppositions.

After the type of enounce’s employment (or of the theory) in relation with the world and, too, after the entities that are related to the reality<sup>13</sup> it was distinguished between existential presuppositions “of first order” and “of second order”. The truth of the sentences in the first group leads to the existence of the first order entities (physical objects, persons), while the truth of the others suggests the reality of the second order entities (events, processes, states of things) [Martin, R., 1976, pp.48-52; Lerat, P., 1984, pp.83-88].

“Existence”, “unicity” and “stability” are terms expressing the first order presuppositions<sup>14</sup>, while those of second order are formulated using terms as “movement”, “development”, “space”, “time”, “quantity”, “quality”, “causality”, “legality”, “systemicity”, “unicity”, “infinity”. As a consequence, it seems that in the scientific language of nowadays, is taking place a discursive super turn to ontology or a meta-ontologysation, meaning a population of the discourse with conceptual entities that remind us the linguistic ghosts, Plato’s beard or Occam’s razor. [Clitan, Gh., 1998, p.242].

Besides, there have been emphasized the so-called “functional” (methodological, lexical) presuppositions. Among the methodological ones, the strategic presuppositions<sup>15</sup>, the local ones<sup>16</sup> as well as the interrogative presuppositions<sup>17</sup> have a particular part in the scientific researching (justifying and discovering) logic or in the rationality theory

connected to it. For example, in the spirit of games' theory, it is accepted that the truth of quantified<sup>18</sup> sentences can be conceptualized only in the terms of the available strategies for the one who verifies. These strategies are technically embodied in the form of Skolem functions. [Hintikka, J., 1999, pp. 54-69].

Returning to the admission of the expressions in theories, we may explain it through the existence and function of sub-models that allow these expressions become false in a theory, but to be accepted as true in another one. These sub-models can be called "presuppositional backgrounds". Existential sentences are tacit or explicit, but only the first ones - when they are admitted as indubitable truths - represent the presuppositional background that functions as an unintentional model. Although epistemologists have proposed a language out of the dichotomy between observational and theoretical terms, the scientific discourse is constantly recording the trend to embody a meta-theoretical dimension.

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### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> By the way, postmodernists will find enough anchor points in some of these theses: there is not only a single reality, related to which a theory to be true or false; the reality is partially constructed

<sup>2</sup> This observation is true for **D** and **M**, too.

<sup>3</sup> We mean here the totality represented by the domain of quantification variables, respectively by the totality of signification for which **A** becomes true.

<sup>4</sup> This is valid both for the intuitive notion of set and for the proper-said notion of set.

<sup>5</sup> In other words, it is "demonstrated", "inferred", thus, "implied".

<sup>6</sup> If the intuitive notion of set exists, it will be never captured by any formal system

<sup>7</sup> Even they are considered or not to be science

<sup>8</sup> Here there are the already exemplified notions of set and model

<sup>9</sup> We mean here scientific objectivity, thus a "strong" rationality, as a relation between inner factors

<sup>10</sup> Using external factors in their relation with inner ones.

<sup>11</sup> These are true expressions whatever the theory that integrates them, is.

<sup>12</sup> These expressions are true only for the sense they get in the theory that integrates them and they can be false for one of the senses they might get in other theories.

<sup>13</sup> These relations are supposed to be manners of getting a true value

<sup>14</sup> The supposition of existence is called "the suppositions' supposition", because it assumes all the others.

<sup>15</sup> They function as rules or "strategic" principles that govern abductive inferences

<sup>16</sup> These are rules or "defining principles", "step-by-step", governing the deductive or inductive inferences.

<sup>17</sup> These are belonging to different types of questions.

<sup>18</sup> Universal quantification or/and existential one.

English version by Laura Gheorghiu

NOICA'S PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL

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Bearing a utopian mark (when it comes to recruiting disciples) and much too elitist, the *school of Păltiniș* has become, however, one of the most important landmarks of the young intellectuals' refuge, who, just as Noica, tried to resist the communist regime by means of culture. The ascetic spirit, the cultural fanaticism, the feeling that there was an alternative to the depersonalising official culture, all these have drawn many youths there.

Even those who have vehemently criticised the nicasian<sup>1</sup> 'collaborationism' cannot help admitting, as Adrian Marino does, that '*due to the fact that it was unofficial, that it was not centrally directed, that it did not promote the Marxist-Ceaușist propagandistic values in the least, but, instead, the classical, humanist ones, this parallel culture has indirectly been an opposition and even a resistance one.*'<sup>2</sup>

Leaving aside the cultural techniques that he has learned from Constantin Noica, explaining the full nothingness of the school of Păltiniș, Pleșu speaks about what he has learned from him on within the field of HOW. First, he learned how to *wait*, how to be drawn into crisis, then how to harness the negative, the limit, the obstacle, he also learned something about rhythm, about the full undertaking of a daily programme (it is widely known how much importance Constantin Noica gave to the daily geometry). He also learned about *mediation* (the philosopher had actually said that the great mistake of previous philosophies seemed to be that they tried to find out the being *directly*, and not *medially*) about self-instrumentalisation (which means becoming the tool of your own design), about the *epic feeling* – the ability to relate an idea –, as well as about the celebration feeling, the celebration of making a celebration out of anything.

There are many justifications to be found in support of the enthusiasm that sprang from Noica's school. To begin with, as also

Katherine Verdery has indicated <sup>3</sup>, it is explained by the *alternative* that those whom the formal philosophy and cultural institutions had cast out imposed on the official Marxist philosophy. Since this alternative had a professional touch, rather than a political one, the official philosophy was not alarmed before the threat that this 'school' represented despite its marginality. '*It represented,*' says Katherine Verdery, '*the strategy of an intelligence that was turned away from power and wishing to maintain its elitist status by claims to competence and moral*' [2:273].

In a world that was affected with fear, systematically maintained by the powers in charge, in an epoch of alignment on every level, this *alternative*, even though culturally hued, has seduced many a mind, but it has also given rise to tempestuous envy. These were originated in the fact that, despite the impression of accessibility, Constantin Noica had surrounded himself with very few disciples (also fuelled by the pilgrimage to Păltiniș, that anyone could partake in). There was talk about *exclusion*, inside the *school*, of the kind, who was, or was not, apt for philosophy, who was, or was not, a good philosopher, about the criteria that were valid for classifications about who had the right to be considered cultivated, what fields of culture mattered and which had to be disavowed?

Adrian Marino wrote on the school of Păltiniș: '*A certain atmosphere of a closed circle or club, which has marked the disciple group forever, has also granted it an "elite" awareness which was not favoured by all. Sometimes – such an attitude seemed "infatuated" to some*' [1:95].

There was more and more frequent talk about the *elitism* of the school of Constantin Noica and the blame for this was diversely divided: some blamed it all on the disciples, especially Gabriel Liiceanu<sup>4</sup>; others spoke about a fanaticism<sup>5</sup> process of the disciples, about a far too barbarous, and actually non-philosophical, selection of the aspirants to the status of disciple. Amongst those partaking of this latter category, Sorin Antohi would comment: '*Becoming, certainly, yet not at random, but into being (the first limitation); which was only possible through the human (the second limitation); however, not any kind of human, but only the cultural, invested by culture (the third limitation); and precisely (the fourth limitation) a philosophically invested culture, sustained by sophia and by sophoi, is it not so; of these, it necessarily yields I and not you, not the others.*'<sup>6</sup>

The school of Păltiniș formed the object of certain critics not only on the account of its elitism, but also due to its political non-

involvement, which equated, for the post-decembrist critics, a pactisation with the power, on the basis of the idea that everything that is not denied is thus approved. The same Sorin Antohi wrote, *'To me, it seems that precisely this mimetic servitude was too great a sacrifice, which Constantin Noica should have understood, without committing it.'* [5:179]

The reductionism that Constantin Noica practised had been criticised by all those who found themselves excluded from the circle of those who were chosen for the great culture. These voices came from outside philosophy, in the first place. *'His refusal may aim at art (but also poetry, criticism, etc.) – in the name of philosophy; or civilisation – in the name of culture; or the rest of the world – in the name of Europe'* – wrote Ion Ianoși [E:266]. His attachments were looked upon as discriminations, cultural fanaticism even. Given his system of verbal opposition, reckoned Alexandru Paleologu, which quickly turned into alternatives, and consequently, exclusions, Constantin Noica would ignore more values within culture, within moral, and life, than he asserted, which led to the denial of any discipline and study other than those which were imposed by himself, admirable up to a certain point, yet extremely limiting, especially for a person who considers, as Constantin Noica did, that limits existed only in order to be overcome.<sup>7</sup>

*'As a matter of fact, wrote Alexandru Paleologu, 'his structure is a dictatorial one; transforming nature, rationalisation, planing, denial of freedoms in the name of freedom, ignoring individuality in the name of the individual, and "the activity reports" and the sommun to "judgement" of Sorel, of Andrei... all these pertain to this typology.'*<sup>8</sup>

Constantin Noica considered that the paradise of culture was restricted to the circle of his chosen ones, also reckoned Mariana Șora, whom he brandished an arrogant attitude along with, an attitude of self-sufficiency and disdain for everything that escaped the pattern imposed on philosophy and, moreover, for everything else. *'His hypertrophic and imperialist personality outstretched tentacles to enchain those whom he had accepted around him.'* [E:193]

There was also cause for saying that, except the disciples, Constantin Noica's philosophy has only had an echo amongst *'the verbally euphoric, giving rise to a worrying Noician idolatry<sup>9</sup>, favouring an alarming semidoctism.'* [6:89]

N. Steinhardt's subtle remarks on the school of Păltiniș, collected under the representative title *Cățarii de la Păltiniș* rejoin the above-mentioned opinions. *'Certainly, at Constantin Noica's school, the fully*

*sincere and committed apprentices try to acquire the proper methods to find the truth, but philosophy alone is sovereign. The rest is but nothingness, waste of time, flaw of the spirit. A real vanity is thus reached: the philosophers alone are the salt of the Earth. What about the others? Useless people. The seniors, the Cathars, the perfect – they hold the keys to all of the secrets. It is only at Păltiniș that there is saviour.*<sup>10</sup>

The disciples have defended the school and the master, maintaining that obedience is no shame in the thought's school. No matter the master's sophisms, his rights or wrongs, his excesses or his absurdities, says Gabriel Liiceanu, but the extremely important fact of learning to think on one's own, for, at the end of the day, this is what they learned at from Constantin Noica. *'The disciple is not a person who – dulled by his master's tutelage to eternity – repeats his words, but one who is freed from it after long slavery, towards the scope of his own thinking. Then and only then can one speak about separation. And it is all the more beautiful, as the slavery was more beautiful.'* [E:53]

On the other hand, Constantin Noica's school enjoyed a large audience for the fact that that it encouraged an *initiative* apetence, as well: the topic of intellectual training, of the daily programme, the esoteric life and reading recipes, the promise of wisdom, and even the organisation of the disciple's living, all these represent, in the opinion of Pleșu, *'a very intelligent captatio, a rhetoric trap destined to convert all the living breath around to philosophy.'*<sup>11</sup>

In order that the miracle of his school should rise a lot of envy, in order to emphasis the fact that there was something *seething* there, in Păltiniș, something that everyone should be dreaming of, Constantin Nica pointed out that he had used several artifices: *'I decided, along with a friend who has settled here (4000 feet above mankind) for life, too, to welcome so artfully any potential guest that anyone who did not live in Păltiniș, should feel exiled.'* [JI:388, excerpt VI-349]

Generally, the opinions that disfavoured the school of Păltiniș range along two directions: they either praised the disciples, preserving their reserve regarding Constantin Noica (e.g. Augustin Doinaș [E:130]), or they considered the disciples mere intriguants, praising the master (e.g. Geană), both situations speculating on doctrine differences between them.

One first difference is provided by the *raw material of philosophy*. Although Constantin Noica clearly showed that the basis of philosophy can repose only on the philosophical thinking inheritance from the

ancient Greeks and the recent European one, reduced to several names, he found highly relevant raw material in the Romanian tradition, too, a direction which was not followed by the disciples.

It is precisely the tapping of the native wisdom background which determined part of the critics to consider him *an annex of the official propaganda*. They failed, nevertheless, to state the fact that Noica wrote on the Romanian background between 1930 and 1940, too, before he could have been forced by the political context (e.g. the article *The efficient knowledge*, in *Revista Fundațiilor Regale* (*The Royal Foundations Revue*), October 1<sup>st</sup> 1936).<sup>12</sup> Even though certain critics of his nationalism were aware of the existence of a certain continuity (as is the case of Zigu Ornea), the accuse that he was looked upon as a collaborationist by the communist regime kept pointing at him. *'Constantin Noica has never denied his ideas of younger age, as in fact he has really believed in them – wrote Zigu Ornea. This was this the reason he was almost officially associated with Ceaușist nationalism, and the philosopher has taken great steps in welcoming this new nationalism in writing. These kinds of nationalism had been identified with a reconciliation of vision and faith.'*<sup>13</sup>

The firm separation between spirit and soul, between life and culture, between the world and the thought, was not shared by his disciples, either, and this situation provided the critics' efforts with grounds for a dissociation of Constantin Noica and his disciples. *'Constantin Noica and Gabriel Liiceanu represent two opposite poles... wrote Ion Stroe. One is a dialectician... Gabriel Liiceanu missed the lesson he could have learned from Constantin Noica: the lesson of dialectics.'*<sup>14</sup>

It is very interesting to examine Gabriel Liiceanu's viewpoint, which makes the dissociation yet more obvious: *'Pathetic, fanatic, and brilliant, Constantin Noica serves a dead viewpoint, that of culture being transformed into supreme superstition, of culture not willing to take psychology... of the poor author into account, nor the time, the events or the people; dilettante and reluctant, we serve the viewpoint of the authentic, of the truth of life in the acceptance of sovereign projection of the self, ready to be unashamed of the "simple joys things of life", of the suffering and the fear of death... In order to function culturally, I had to turn culture into a fact of life...' [E:119]*

Upon the whole, the echoes of Constantin Noica's school, especially after the works of Gabriel Liiceanu have been published (i.e. *Jurnalul de la Păltiniș* (*The Diary of Păltiniș*) and *Epistolar* (*Epistolary*)),



suggest the interest and the sympathy that the increasingly numerous and heterogeneous public has shown, an interest which was aroused, amongst others, by the missionarism they practised.

Regarding the Messianism of Constantin Noica's school, one fact ought to be mentioned, and this is that it teamed up with the daily despair of the Romanian intellectuals, providing the chance of salvation by culture. Thus it is not haphazard at all that such concepts have been circulated, as: *salvation, urgency*, and so on.

Salvation through art reaches in reality far wider than the philosopher has provided for it. He considered that, among all domains of culture, philosophy *alone* is the one that can lead to salvation, and not even the entire philosophy, but only that which is preached and learned in Păltiniș. Katherine Vedery has immortalised the situation in a suggestive manner: *'Both Constantin Noica and his disciples were prone to viewing philosophy as "hard industry" of the cultural production, industry that uses raw materials of other fields, and creates machines (theoria) that are essential to the production of other fields... The irony of the Gabriel Liiceanu-Noica solution, however, was that they proposed the way of building this heavy machinery by means of home production, on a mountain peak, employing but a few workers, and avoiding the most important philosophical manufacture urban centres.'* [2:344-345]

Noica saw culture as a refuge, either away from reality, or from sentimental infusions, or yet from formalisation excess. This threefold nicasian abandon was criticised, to various extents, even by his own disciples. Denying life in the name of culture, abolishing any civic dimension to personality for the use of a creative egoism, these are all attitudes which have been invoked in the attempt to demystify the philosopher.

It was not only Noica's exile<sup>15</sup> in culture that was criticised, but also the manner of his viewing culture. Privileging philosophy to the detriment of other components, was viewed either as a 'principle supremacy' of the philosophy, which has the aim of providing the *theoria* of the other cultural areas, or as a consequence of the philosopher's preference for the concept (which is supposed to pertain to philosophy) as compared to judgement and reason (which pertain to other fields). In both cases, as Virgil Ierunca showed<sup>16</sup>, Noica condemns himself to philosophy. His cultural fanaticism is, ultimately, a philosophical fanaticism.

His ideas concerning the relationship between Romanian and occidental culture are no less impervious to criticism. Suffering from the complex of 'the unnoticed brother', which he extended to the level of the whole of the Romanian culture, Noica would try to impose the idea of our superiority, were it for the mere reason that, within our space, the cultural facts are being judged on the scale of the possible and not on that of the real. Very few commentators missed the chance to criticise such a display of the Romanian culture, and many of them have found reason in it for justifying their picture of Noica as a fervent nationalist.

The maladies that the philosopher traced as affecting spirituality and, implicitly, culture have caught the attention of those who aimed at the deconstruction of his philosophy to a lesser extent. The reproach was made, however, that he would not focus on the maladies that deeply blighted the Romanian society of the communist times, and only pictured those of the spirit (although the philosopher had mentioned the fact that those were maladies of the reality as well). Everybody agreed on his self-diagnosis as an *ahoretic*<sup>17</sup>, invoking his being severed from reality, even Andrei Pleșu, the only one who had wondered, rhetorically we believe, if Noica could be identified to the ahoretics.

Despite all evidence, we believe that Noica cannot be considered an ahoretic., at least not totally. If the symptoms of this malady seem to have acted in his life (even here, not wholly<sup>18</sup>, for even when he chose to settle in Păltiniș, when, consequently, he refused a certain predicament, he refused it in order to take up another one, and when he refrained from criticising the communist regime, he was taking the context into account), there is no evidence of any refuse of predicaments in his work. To the contrary, he gave the determinations the most important part in the IDG triad. Where there is no harmonious association of the determinations of the individual and those of the general, there can be no holomer, or general-individual. If he was not so lacking in determinations in life, as to be diagnosed an ahoretic, then he is so all the less in his work.

We believe that the diagnosis of Constantin Noica's maladies (both in his life and in his work) is much more difficult a task. One may find, as pointed out by Nicolae Manolescu, *totetitis*, as well as *atodetie*, but this does not complete the inventory of his illnesses. We could add another malady, which we termed, according to his terminology, *apatholitis*<sup>19</sup>.

This malady of the spirit, that wills to know nothing about the *pathos*, *apatholitis* grants the nicasian philosophy a characteristic which

was very well remarked by Andrei Pleșu: the lack of a tragic dimension. Regarding his *apatholitis*, we found it necessary to make some observations<sup>20</sup>. If he was not interested in living at the level of ordinary life, if he was, consequently, an *apatholitic*<sup>21</sup>, this did not prevent him from being – certainly – a passionate, a fanatic of reason (in the positive sense of the term).

Also, we tried to focus on the dysfunction of the maladies' picture as proposed by Noica. Since illnesses act primarily in the spirit, and this is the unity of sentiment, will and intellect, that reason is added to, the maladies should have been flaws, either of one of these components (sentiment, will, intellect and reason), or of the whole. However, Noica does not analyse maladies from such a perspective, which seems most adequate, but starting with the flaws of one of the three fundamental ontological terms: IDG. From this perspective, even the denominations of the illnesses appear to be improper, when they are applied, as they truly are, to the spirit.

The suggestion that Noica should be seen as a cultural trainer is a different dimension of his culturalism. Bearing a utopian mark (when it comes to recruiting disciples) and much too elitist, the school of Păltiniș has become, however, one of the most important landmarks of the young intellectuals' refuge, who, just as Noica, tried to resist the communist regime by means of culture. Even those who have vehemently criticised the nicasian 'collaborationism' cannot help admitting, as Adrian Marino does, that '*due to the fact that it was unofficial, that it was not centrally directed, that it did not promote the Marxist-Ceaușist propagandistic values in the least, but, instead, the classical, humanist ones, this parallel culture has indirectly been an opposition and even resistance one.*'<sup>22</sup>

#### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Noica was called by his friends and disciples «Nicasius». From here we have constructed some other terms like "nicasianism", "nicasian" etc.

<sup>2</sup> Adrian Marino, *Politică și cultură. Pentru o nouă cultură română*. Editura Polirom, Iași, 1996, p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> Katherine Vendery, *Compromis și rezistență. Cultura românească sub Ceaușescu*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994, pp.270-271.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Gheorghiuță Geană, Paradigma freudiană a paideii, "Viața Românească", no. 8/1987, pp. 84-96.

<sup>5</sup> The original term used by the author is "nostrificare" (Rom), which does not have an exact English equivalent.

<sup>6</sup> Sorin Antohi, *Civitas imaginalis. Istorie și utopie în cultura română*, Ed. Litera, București, 1994, p. 189.

- <sup>7</sup> Alexandru Paleologu, *Ipoteze de lucru*, Editura Cartea Românească, București, 1980, p. 89.
- <sup>8</sup> Alexandru Paleologu, *Ipoteze de lucru*, Editura Cartea Românească, București, 1980, p. 89.
- <sup>9</sup> The original term used by the author is "iconodulie" (Rom), which does not have an exact English equivalent.
- <sup>10</sup> Nicolae Steinhardt, *Catarii de Păltiniș*, in the *Familia* magazine, 1983, p. 91.
- <sup>11</sup> Andrei Pleșu, *Limba păsărilor*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1994, p. 219.
- <sup>12</sup> Constantin Noica, *Cunoașterea spornică*, in the *Royal Foundations Revue*, no. 10/October 1<sup>st</sup> 1936, pp. 156-169.
- <sup>13</sup> Zigu Ornea, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1996 p. 219
- <sup>14</sup> Ion Stroe, *Un personaj pretext*, *Luceafărul*, no. 27/March 31<sup>st</sup> 1984, p. 10
- <sup>15</sup> Speaking about exile, in *Răspuns al unui prieten îndepărtat (The answer of an outcast friend)*, Noica wrote that the exile of those who had left the country to go to Western Europe was relatively unimportant, as compared to 'our subtle exile, amongst one's own folk, sometimes at home, in your world, and still suddenly emptied of it. Sometimes, when we refine, this appears rather interesting, and then we write diaries or works of genius – destined to the drawers. Tout compte fait, it is better here.' (cited work, p. 157)
- <sup>16</sup> Apud Sorin Vidan, article *Două forme de nemulțumire*, in the magazine *Dilema*, no. 256/December 19<sup>th</sup>-25<sup>th</sup> 1997:8
- <sup>17</sup> From *a-horos* (Greek).
- <sup>18</sup> Noica can be considered an *ahoretic* in life, only referring to will and sentiment, yet not on the intellectual level.
- <sup>19</sup> From *a-pathos* (Greek).
- <sup>20</sup> These observations are connected to the distinction between emotion, sentiment, and passion.
- <sup>21</sup> See 18.
- <sup>22</sup> Adrian Marino, *Politică și cultură. Pentru o nouă cultură română*. Editura Polirom, Iași, 1996, p. 94.

**SYMBOLS:**

E – *Epistolar*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1987

Jl – *Jurnal de idei*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1990

ON THE SEMIOTIC HYPERCUBE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL  
DISCOURSE

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1. Philosophical meditation, especially the metaphilosophical one, seems to have reached one of those instances of assessment nowadays, which are capable of helping us reckon the general picture of the philosophical, beyond the concrete faces of various philosophies, schools, currents, or philosophical directions. Semiotics seems to provide the instrument which is apt to offer the theoretical and methodological opportunities which are required from such an enterprise.

*'Semiotics and philosophy have long been considered two opposite intellectual options, articulable perhaps, yet hardly reconcilable' since 'semiotics was reduced to exercising the structural analysis, while philosophy was taken for no more than the hermeneutic trend.'*<sup>1</sup> Although we have mostly left this 'quarrel of the universals' behind nowadays, the ruining perception that the above-mentioned reductionist opposition reposes on (for neither is philosophy a mere 'spirit of finesse' and interpretation, nor is semiotics a mere 'geometrical spirit' and structural analysis) is not, however, that easily banished from our theoretical *pre*-conception.<sup>2</sup>

Within the field of the *spoken-being*, many of the assumed theoretical differences or even oppositions have proved, so many a time, but expressions of some jealous partitions of a common fundamental presupposition capital: *'behind the polemic appearances,'* the same author writes, *'hermeneutics and semiotics respond to the same epistemological option, which is neither the only one nor, necessarily, the most felicitous one, in order to account for the signification phenomenon. Ever since the beginning, this option locates signification under the sign of equivalence or substitution (a = b): there is one content (b: semantic structures, world) behind any*

*sign or any configuration (a: discourse), necessarily placed on a different level of knowledge' [1a:2].*

2. *'Philosophy comprises semiotics, not only in the dialogue between semiotics and hermeneutics, but also, and to the same extent, within its very ontological fundamentals' [1a:3]. This is why semiotics can be considered a sui generis epistemology. 'Its statute cannot be but exceptional, as an epistemology of the qualitative individual. The term "epistemology" is given a paradoxical application here, but it serves saying that the field of applicability of semiotics consists of "all" of the levels of individual qualitative phenomena treatment, ranging from the simple description up to general considerations concerning the conditions of signification, through discussion on models and practices' [1a:4-5].*

Petre Botezatu pointed out the fact that *'it is not semiotics that lies at the basis of the philosophic issues, it is philosophy that upholds semiotic research.'*<sup>3</sup> Accepting the fact that semiotics is invested by philosophy, but also that a semiotic movement takes root *sine qua non*, at the very heart of the strictest philosophical approach, *let us conclude that* the interest in the semiotic study of the philosophical is still precarious. This fact is proved true not only by the small number papers which are strictly and exclusively dedicated to these issues, but also by the existence of a rather limited capital of theoretical perspectives involved in the achieved studies. Scanning the results so far but partially and non-systematically, one can easily find out that disciplines such as *semiotics*<sup>4</sup> or *meta-logic*<sup>5</sup>, *hermeneutics*<sup>6</sup> or *rhetoric*<sup>7</sup>, *linguistics*<sup>8</sup> or *semiology*<sup>9</sup>, *meta-philosophy*<sup>10</sup> or *pragmatics*, *logic*<sup>11</sup>, *speech philosophy*<sup>12</sup> or *epistemology*<sup>13</sup>, do not cover, however, the whole range of the possibilities of approaching the philosophical from the perspective of the *spoken-being*, which could also comprise: *semantics*, *text theory*, *reading theory*, *narrative grammar*, *stylistics*, and so on.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, the systematic semiotic study of discourse / philosophical speech – inaugurated, as it is well known, by M. Guérout (*in 1953!*) – has only been developed since 1986 – when Ivan Almeida published, in Urbino, the paper concerning the connections between semiotics and philosophy, between semiotics and hermeneutics, under the title *Sémiotique et interprétation*.

Thirdly, the topic reached recognition only in 1996, when a whole colloquy was dedicated to it, at the International Centre of

Semiotics and Linguistics of the famous university mentioned above. At the colloquy, renown researchers in the field of semiotics have presented a series of studies concerning the philosophical discourse – such as: Frederic Nef – *La dimension figurative et narrative du discours philosophique et son enjeu argumentatif*; Augusto Ponzio – *Il carattere dialogico del discorso filosofico*; Filippo Costa – *Agrammaticalità interdisciplinare: poesia e filosofia*; Ivan Almeida – “And yet, and yet...” *Une philosophie sans énonciation? (Borges et Wittgenstein)*; Per Aage Brandt – *Une page de philosophie analytique*; José Maria Nadal – *Les limites du discours philosophique*, and so on.

This is why the semiotic approach of the philosophical discourse proves not only to be opportune, but also necessary, as it engages not only meta-philosophical, but also meta-semiotic meditation.

3. On of the features of the contemporary culture is seems to be precisely the obsessive meditation on the relationship between **being-as-such** (*the instance of being*) and the **spoken-being** (*the instance of being said or written*). ‘If we were to outline a matrix image, the development of which – at its complex current stage – were represented by semiotics,’ wrote Ivan Almeida, ‘we could evoke that of the equivalence of the book and the universe’ [1a:5]<sup>15</sup>.

Multiplying the semiotic perspectives on the world which have been advanced, leads to multiplying the selection grids of what is significant *as-such*, and thus to a double *vectorial functioning of the conscience as related to the world*.

*‘In the first approach, the sense of the equation is drawn from the universe to the book. It is this epistemological bet of Galilei: the Universe is like a book: it is closed; it is a decipherable system; it has a structure and a code; it can be read according to certain levels of pertinence. First philology and then linguistics thus become the mandatory paradigm of any type of world comprehension... When applied to the significant phenomena, this epistemological option corresponds roughly to that semiotics which is called “structural”.* So it is all about a ‘deductive’ semiotics, which yields to the consideration (and use) of ‘structural’ as a synonym of ‘deductive’.

*‘The second approach reads the equation the other way around: the book is like a universe, and the universe consequently preserves its indefinite and labyrinthine nature. So does the book.*

*Thus, it is not the world that will display the systematic finitude of a text, but also the text will take on the infinite form of a universe of worlds. The logical notion of a system will give way to thegnoseological notion of a “device” of knowledge; decoding will give way to the inferential activity: this will be cognitive semiotics’ [1a:5]. It is what the above-mentioned Danish author will systematically approach and develop under the name of ‘deductive’ semiotics.*

The different orientations of the researching thought will generate different preoccupations and paradigms: *‘if the former option is ensemblist in nature, the latter, preoccupied with the interpretation of the qualitative individual, is confronted with the paradigm of medical diagnosis and with that of aesthetics. Thus, it also inherits all the suspicion which, ever since the Renaissance, the official epistemology has surrounded these disciplines with’ [1a:5-6].*

We can consequently approach a *strong disjunctive* semiotic research of the horizons and levels of philosophical discourse in two ‘opposite’ ways: either from the perspective of structural (deductive) semiotics or from that of cognitive-aesthetic (abductive) semiotics.

*‘Anyway,’ Almeida wrote, ‘pure structural semiotics has never existed, and if the reference – left more metaphorical than real – is corrected according to the generative and ensemblist patterns, the practice of greimasian analysis – based on the concepts of narrative and figurative approach – adjusts basically rather well to the presuppositions of the piercean oriented semiotics. It would be more useful then to speak about the difference between the two idealities: a) “linguistic” semiotics have the concept of ensemble as a starting point, as well as the assimilation of any sign with the linguistic sign and b) “cognitive” or “aesthetic” semiotics having the individual figure, as a place for knowledge, for a starting point’ [1a:6]*

4. This ‘ruptured’ nature of semiotics (resembling perhaps that which Nichita Stănescu referred to in his *Antimetafizica* (*Antimetaphysics*), while relating to the specificity of ‘philosophy’) has its consequences on the semiotic research of the philosophical. The philosophical discourse, for instance, as a coherent ensemble of philosophical texts of a philosopher, or of one philosophical school, could be *semiotically* studied either by emphasising its confinement, its *limits*, or its openness, its *limitations*.

Accepting the fact that philosophy is also a subtle game<sup>16</sup>, we could invoke here the remarks of James P. Carse, who wrote that:



'here are, above all, two kinds of games. Some of them can be finite, the others infinite. A finite game is played in order to win, an infinite one in order to keep playing. While finite games are defined on the outside, the infinite ones are defined on the inside.' For this reason, 'players of the finite play within the limits, while players of the infinite play with the limits.'<sup>17</sup> We cannot help noticing the similarities with the words of Constantin Noica when he pointed out the difference between limit and limitation. As a matter of fact, it is the same idea of *non-generic universality*.


Despite all appearance, the heuristic resources of 'classical' semiosis, of a structural-deductive nature, are not exhausted. He fact has been proved not only by the multitude of studies dedicated to the dimensions of semiosis, but also by the possibility of systematising them using the generous frame of the hexadic generalised model of the semiosis – that of the semiotic hypercube.

The tripartition of the semiotic universe – as it appears in the works of Peirce<sup>18</sup>, Frege<sup>19</sup>, Morris<sup>20</sup>, Carnap, E.S. Johnson<sup>21</sup>, Ogden & Richards or St. Ullmann<sup>22</sup> – does not only represent one of the strongest theses in semiotics, but also one of the most resistant to change. Accepting this reality, it is due to insistently point out that since the latest papers of Morris<sup>23</sup>, since the semiotic conception of Georg Klaus<sup>24</sup>, since the 'semiotic quadrilater of of A.J. Ayer,' since the 'Saussurean model of signification'<sup>25</sup>, since the 'semiotic quadrilater of Gardiner', since the 'tetradic mode-I of Peirce himself'<sup>26</sup> or since 'Morrissian model – since 1946 – of semiosis', the 'classic' triadic models of semiosis give way to tetradic models, that are followed by the pentadic models, the hexadic ones, or even by the heptadic ones. On the other hand, it is our due to mention that, as illustrated by Petru Ioan, the attacks on the classic tripartition of the semiotic process have been neither few nor unimportant. Nowadays, especially since the hexadic<sup>27</sup> model has been advanced owing to Petru Ioan we have completed another step in the process of eroding this real *principium semioticum*<sup>28</sup>.

5. The generous idea of a scale of semiotic object complexity supports the newest tendencies in structural semiotic research. For proper illustration, we ought to mention that, to these ends, the structural-deductive semiotic frame seems to be permissive to the idea of a hexadic model. *Following it through the end*, we could get interesting reconsideration of the conceptual space of the

philosophical – of the *spoken-being* in general – capable of raising the interest of other fields of philosophical meditation, not only of those that are directly linked to these issues.

A first deductive-hexadic model of the semiotic space of the philosophical discourse is obtained if we consider, besides the *emitter* and, respectively, the *recipient* of the philosophical thought, the dimensions, the horizons, the levels and the fields of the philosophical:




*Figure 1. The conceptual and deductive-structural hexadic semiotic frame of the philosophical*

Such an analytic instrument could be used in order to discriminate between the different ways of approaching the history of philosophy, according to the predominant emphasis laid on one pole or another of this hexad – thus continuing the virtues of F. Plett's suggestions concerning the possibility of proceeding similarly in the space of literarity [24a:14 sqq.]. According to *the way this complex graph is read*, we can obtain as many *types of perspectives on the historical evolution of philosophy*. It could also be varied by discriminating amongst different types of emitters, recipients, fields, dimensions, horizons, or levels of the philosophical, which leads to higher chances of analysis of specific philosophical forms.

It could be said, on the other hand, that, *given the complexity and the richness of the structural-deductive semiosis of the philosophical, the hexadic model itself can be improved*. For this, we could place it in a *tridimensional frame*, so that *the 6 poles of the hexad should become the sides of a cube*. We would thus get *the ideal model of any philosophical discourse* (and maybe any kind of

discourse, to the extent that we concede on its pertinence as a generic semiotic frame). If we operate combinations (readings) of the six sides (poles) of the semiotic cube, *as allowed by the Rubik cube*, we can obtain quite quickly models of the various types of discourse. The *variations* of this 'canonical' form could be generated in a similar way to that of the famous cube. Thus, it would become obvious *why there are no generating rules of a specific type of philosophical discourse*, starting with the general semiotic model (or with one model, at least), but only prohibited transformation rules. The free forms obtained from the 'rotations', which could be associated here to semiotic meta-operators – 'motley' sided cubes –, could be associated to particular types of philosophical discourse / philosophical discursivity / philosophical speech.



**Figure 2. Generalised hexadic model of the philosophical discourse semiosis**

This type of generalisation of the hexadic model of semiosis brings forth one of the most interesting of its features: *its ability to mitigate between generic and non-generic universality*, of not obeying classic deductive rules, specific to the generic universality and thus the ability of being permissive to the idea of *endless, yet controllable* (even though only partial) *pluralisation*.

**Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> a. Ivan Almeida: *L'interprétation abductive et les règles du raisonnable. Sémiotique et philosophie*; in *Documents de Travail et pré-publications*, no. 197-198-199/1990, series A, Centro Internazionale di semiotica e di Linguistica, Urbino, 1990, p. 1. Also cf.:

b. Ivan Almeida: *Sémiotique et interprétation*; in *Documents de Travail et pré-publications*, no. 153-154/1986, series A, Centro Internazionale di semiotica e di Linguistica, Urbino, 1986.

<sup>2</sup> As it was seen during the debate of the in international colloquy the topic of which was *The Semiotics of the Philosophical discourse* held in summer 1996 in Urbino.

<sup>3</sup> Petre Botezatu, *Interpretări logico-filosofice. 1937-1981*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1982, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup> a. Charles Morris, *Writings on the General Theory of Signs*, Mouton & Publishers, Paris, Hague, 1971, (ed. Th. Sebeock). See also:

b. A.J. Greimas, *Despre sens. Eseuri semiotice*, Editura Univers, București, 1975.

<sup>5</sup> R. Carnap, *Semnificație și necesitate. Un studiu de semantică modală*, Editura Dacia, Cluj, 1972.

<sup>6</sup> A se vedea și: a. Michel Philibert, (editor și antolog), *Paul Ricoeur ou la liberté selon l'espérance*, Éditions Seghers, Paris, 1971, or:

b. Paul Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action. Essais d'herméneutique, II*, Seuil, Paris, 1986;

<sup>7</sup> Chaim Perelman și L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Traité sur l'argumentation*, E.U.B., Bruxelles, 1983.

<sup>8</sup> a. M. Guérout, *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons, II*, Édition Mouton, Paris, 1953; *apud*: Dominique Maingueneau, *Genèses du Discours*, Pierre Mardaga Éditeur, Bruxelles, 1984, p. 81; *apud*: Ioan Petru [7: 187]. A se vedea și:

b. Ioan Oprea, *Lingvistică și filozofie*, Editura Institutului European, Iași, 1992; sau:

c. Ioan Oprea, *Terminologie filozofică românească*, Editura Științifică, București, 1996.

<sup>9</sup> a. Especially: Filippo Costa, *Strutura e genesi dell'enunciato filosofico*, E.T.S., Pisa, 1996, but also:

b. Filippo Costa, *La totalità differita*, Angeli, Milano, 1988.

<sup>10</sup> Also: a. Lucian Blaga, *Trilogia cunoașterii; Opere*, vol. VIII, Editura Minerva, București, 1983;

b. Constantin Noica, *Despre Unu și Multiplu la Platon sau Ce înseamnă o demonstrație filozofică ?*; in: "Revista de filosofie", nr. 3/ 1977; and:

c. Constantin Noica, *Jurnal filosofic*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1990;

d. Gabriel Liiceanu, *Cearta cu filozofia*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1992;

e. Valeriu Gherghel, *Introducere la o tipologie a discursului filozofic*; în: "Revista de filosofie", nr.2/1979.

<sup>11</sup> Dar și: a. Petre Botezatu, *Constituirea logicii*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1983; sau:

b. Petru Ioan, *Perspective logice: Contribuții fragmentare la reconturarea unui profil disciplinar*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1987; or, yet:

c. Petru Ioan, *Educație și creație în perspectiva unei logici "situaționale"*, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1995.

<sup>12</sup> Gilbert Hottois, *L'inflation du langage dans la philosophie contemporaine. Causes, formes et limites*, E.U.B., Bruxelles, 1979..

<sup>13</sup> <sup>13</sup> a. Gilles-Gaston Granger, *Pour la connaissance philosophique*, Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1988; și:

b. Bogdan-Mihai Mandache, *Filosofia. Aventura unui discurs*, Editura Cronica, Iași, 1996.

<sup>14</sup> In a free enumeration of disciplines focused on the *Being-as-word*.

<sup>15</sup> To the Almeida's opposition (Book as Universe / Univers as Book) we can respond by another and another other oppositions (See: Traian-Dinorel Stănculescu, *Între world as text / discourse, world as text / nondiscourse and even world as nontext / nondiscourse*; in: *Miturile creației. Lecturi semiotice*, Editura "Performantica", Iași, 1995, pp. 218-220.

<sup>16</sup> See the idea of *homo ludens* and the *free character* of the philosophical demonstration (See: Constantin Noica, *Despre Unu și Multiplu la Platon sau Ce înseamnă o demonstrație filozofică ?*; in: "Revista de filosofie", nr.3/1977.

<sup>17</sup> *Jeux finis, jeux infinis. Le pari métaphysique du joueur*, Seuil, Paris, 1988, p. 15.

- <sup>18</sup> a. *Semnificație și acțiune*, Editura Humanitas, București, 1990; anthology, realized by Andrei and Delia Marga. See frg. 5.290 - p. 87 or frg. 2.274 - p. 285.  
 b. Concerning the Peirce's semiotical model, Petru Ioan observe (in *Educație și creație din perspectiva unei logici situaționale* - Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1995, p. 86) that it is not effectively realized, but can be reconstructed .
- <sup>19</sup> a. *Scrieri logico-filosofice*, Editura științifică, București, 1986, p. 55.  
 b. See Eliseo Veron, *Semioza socială*; in: the anthology *Semnificație și comunicare în lumea contemporană*, edited by Solomon Marcus, Editura Politică, București, 1986, p. 167.
- <sup>20</sup> a. *Sign, Language and Behavior*, Mouton & Publishers, Hague, 1971, p. 67.  
 c. It is enough difficult to find on the Internet, a site for Charles Morris. See Eugene Halton, *Charles Morris*: URL:<http://www.nd.edu/~ehalton/Morrisbio.htm>
- <sup>21</sup> *Apud Adam Schaff , Introducere în semantică*, Editura științifică, București, 1965, p. 239.
- <sup>22</sup> Like Petru Ioan demonstrate it [19b: 87].
- <sup>23</sup> Especially after 1946 – *apud* Petru Ioan , în: *Adevăr și performanță. Pretexte și contexte semio-logice*, Editura științifică și Enciclopedică, 1987 , p. 17.
- <sup>23</sup> a. Heinrich Plett , în: *Știința textului și analiza de text. Semiotică, lingvistică, retorică*, Editura Univers, București, 1983, pp. 48-49.  
 b. See: *Semiotik und Erkenntnistheorie*, ed. a 2-a, Berlin, 1969; *apud*: Heinrich. F. Plett, *op. cit.*
- <sup>24</sup> a. Heinrich Plett, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.  
 b. See: *Semiotik und Erkenntnistheorie*, ed. a 2-a, Berlin, 1969; *apud*: Heinrich. F. Plett, *op. cit.*
- <sup>25</sup> Umberto Eco, in *Tratat de semiotică generală*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1982, p. 27.
- <sup>26</sup> Discovered by Petru Ioan [19b: 91-92].
- <sup>27</sup> See Petru Ioan [1b: 72-144]. (Gary Shank and Don Cunningham were detected, in 1996, 6 modes of abduction at Peirce. See: *Modeling the Six Modes of Peircean Abduction for Educational Purposes*: <http://www.cs.indiana.edu/event/maics96/Proceedings/shank.html>
- <sup>28</sup> The first explicit presentation of the hexadimensional model of semiosis was proposed by P. Ioan in 1992. See: *Reperete "situației semiotice" prin analogie cu "situația pedagogică"*, în: "Analele Universității «Al.I.Cuza» Iași", nr. 1-2/1992, pp. 93-97.

A POSSIBLE PATTERN OF THE AUTHENTIC TIME

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*“Time is the best syllogism”<sup>1</sup>*

In spite of a postmodernist trend of nowadays, it seems that a full need of authenticity, of real, of truth comes out of the hiding place where it was placed. It was proved that the absence of some “traditional” criteria could not become criteria itself, but it asks again and again for some new orders of things and ideas, for synthesis and classifications. This seems to be the dominant study of our times, the one of formulating some new interpretations both in the sphere of ideas and in the socio-political practice. The incapacity of a full setting out the problems, the need of working in teams as well as the dynamic of meta-theories are here to confess for it. We need an order as much as we need a vital space. We are looking for some new paradigms, for their dominant idols; we are frenetically trying to sketch some new domains so as each idol to have its own sphere. These all seem to be limit trials in our search for our new identities. We need a sense as much as we need a quickly vertebration of our world of ideas.

**A. Introduction**

“The thinking builds the being’s shelter, shelter that, as a sense-giving (*Fuge*) to the being, really gives it to the essence of man (*verfügt*), according to its destiny. This is how it makes man’s essence to live in the inside of being’s truth. This living is the essence of <the fact-of-being-in-the-world>.”<sup>2</sup> The world of man’s essence is a world that comes into being while getting out-of-the-shelter. Man is, by its nature, a being that gives names – meaning sense giving, places and values, generating an ontological hierarchy that he assumes and with the help of which man has the chance of

getting out of himself. The ego has to transcend himself in order to notice and insert things in his world. "The world being understood as a "whole", "is" not a sort of an existence. On the contrary, it is that certain thing starting from which the Dasein leads himself to the existence to which it can relate himself and to the manner it can do it"<sup>3</sup>. This world is not a sum of existences, but a value-giving synthesis. This synthesis will help us mark the difference between ontic and ontologic levels. This mark comes to be necessary once with the notice of a fundamental difference between being and existence. It will ask for a more exact formulation of our question about being, grace to a more exact observation of the ontological statute of the essence of things. Only after it, while an actual obtaining of ec-sistence, we will be able to start the discussion about the being's language as well as its decodification. "Each ego starts with a fissure and with a revelation"<sup>4</sup>. The fissure is the clear sign of the presence of a question. It can't be but the moment of self-consciousness genesis, meaning the moment in which the ego understands himself as an Ego-in-the-world. The fissure starts once with the acknowledgement, it is the very formulation of the first question. By dissociating between what-is-showing-itself and what-is-not, between the manners something shows itself, the fissure makes possible our noticing of the change, of the temporality. The initial situation:  $T_1 = T_2 = \dots = T_n$  is substituted by  $T'_1 < T'_2 < \dots < T'_n$ . Here comes the question: on what ground can we decide whether  $T_k$  or  $T'_k$  describe the being? What is the direction suggested by the succession  $T_1, T_2, \dots$  and what are the differences between the two possible lines?

For the beginning, let us note that the duration appears as a notice of the change and, that this is the reason why "being's comprehension finds its ground in temporality"<sup>5</sup>.

In order to avoid the vicious circle that seems to be sketched<sup>6</sup>, we shall start from another point. If we have a continuous substitution trough  $T_k$ 's succession it means that at least some of the units that substitute others do not represent the being. Much more, as long as being can't be discontinuous, everything that substitutes and what is substituted do not belong to the being. As they are something else than being, it means that they carry the incompleteness sign at least in our gnoseological order if not in the ontic one, too. They take part to the being through what they are, but they can not be part of being. They belong to the existence. We identify the nothing between being

and existence<sup>7</sup>. There is fear through which we observe the nothing, so that it does not have any relevance for our study. Therefore, we ask ourselves what is the way we can ignore or place the nothing between brackets so as all that it is to offer itself in its non-hiding position? So would be how we'll get back the identity of temporal instances. If temporality is the possibility condition of comprehending the initial failure, will there be any manner to realize the rising road, the one that gives access to Time? "The time is not a thing so that it does not belong to existence. Still, it remains settled in its passing away without being temporary, like the existences are in time. Being and Time determine each other"<sup>8</sup>

How can we recover this lack-of-being that separates us from the time? The first answer –almost a common-sense one – would be bringing the being into presence. "The truth implies, according to its essence, a relation with some sort of ground. Than, the problem of truth leads us necessary "close" to the problem of ground"<sup>9</sup>. There is where the sense-giving thinking can reveal real senses because there is where the rebuilding of the whole world starts. The pass from ontic to ontologic, the fissure as well as the essential link between the two semantic levels is constituted by that very thing starting from which things do connect themselves, confessing their profound inter-determination. Man, as a sense-giving being, is just the messenger asked to understand this vein and, by raising it to its real rank, to set it in the position of a dictionary for the rest of being. Of that being that exists but is still not here as it waits for its chance to enter the world. There was nothing valid in archaic or traditional thinking without having a ground! In the same manner, nothing can be part of a modern scientific theory without a previous definition of concepts and of entering domain. As it follows, Dasein's being in the world means that it is in the middle of a constellation of significations and correlations that he has constituted for himself while recovering the truth, step by step. Nothing that does not belong to Dasein's world can be thought as authentic, nor can be placed in the horizon of being as in the geometrical place of any ground. Therefore, we may say once with Heidegger that: "there is no time out of man ... The authentic time is that opening of his that opens the unifying proximity of a settled presence"<sup>10</sup>.

There, in this settled presence of being that can't be thought out of essences, here is the place where human hope of wholly understanding can come true. But the *eidetic*\_noticing is just the



object of any science that aims to be a rigorous one (in a husserlian acceptance, of course). In fact, all perspectives time was studied up to now had one and the same main problem: the search for a manner to “catch’ being’s time. So, to recover its truth. Since this truth is a unique one, all the researches of ancient or modern thinkers should propose the same line. We are interested to identify it and, much more, its effect!

Our study started from the supposition that, in spite of the diversity of premises or of the working instruments, the pattern obtained in each case is isomorphic to the others. In other words, we have several shades of a single portrait of truth, so of authentic time, either. Whether there is “nothing new under the Sun” than it means that the Same thing is told in different ways. In order not to overload this paper, we have chosen from the multiplicity of possible examples, some which seemed to be complex enough and, explicit, in the same time. Thus, we try to obtain a sketch of true, authentic time, so as it comes out of some systems. We believe that any other research may complete it, may bring some necessary shades, but can not generate substantial changes. What we try to do looks more like a utopia - aiming to determine something that can’t be determined, but the need of an orientation inside this so complex field of ontology is stronger than any hesitation. One may argue that any attribute we may find is only a pill to cure the earthquake that is the whole of absolute time. The answer will be, by paraphrasing Noica: “not this, nor this is the absolute time”. We start being aware of the limits of our understanding and of the fact that these limits will be reflected in the dimensions of the image we get.

Being in the proximity of the ground, we shall let it lead us as the best guide might do. Therefore, it seems to be useful to resume Heideggerian’s distinction of the founding manners as effects of the ground’s entering the world. Here it comes:

- “The foundation as a process of building (*Stiften*);
- The foundation as getting-a-firm-field (*Bodennehmen*);
- The foundation as a justification (Begründen).”<sup>11</sup>

Relating with the moments we have already chosen, these type are distributed as it follows:

- The foundation as a process of building will correspond to archaic mentality;

- The foundation as a justification is specific to Newtonian paradigm;
- The foundation as getting-a-firm-field seems to be the essential feature of phenomenological thought.

As a consequence, the three “types” of reading we have in search hint at:

- The sacred time, founded through the presence of *Ganz Andere*;
- “Mathematical” time of Newtonian mechanics but also the “physical”, Leibnizian time;
- Phenomenological time of the intentional consciousness and of Dasein.

We shall try to point out their defining characteristics and, afterwards, to put into brackets the contingent ones, that are connected to their functions in the given systems in order to find out if and in what way we can obtain the searched pattern.

## **B. The elements**

### **1. The sacred time as a building instrument**

There is a dominant of the archaic mentality the fact that nothing can exist without a previous getting of a sense. Any natural, real thing is the one that - in a way or another – takes part to the being. Only those things that had get an ontological statute can take place to world’s building. Out of this group full of sense, we shall find what is not acted, what is not known, the chaos. But man can’t live in a chaos, its spirit can’t function without the believe that something that is irreducible real, exists in the world”<sup>12</sup>.

Since the metaphysics of this reality is strongly tied to cosmogony, the reality, its criteria come out of cosmogony. At start we may find a mythic ancestor, a God or a principle – like in presocratic texts. Anywise, for the ancient man, the One who settled the tribe, the community *is* a sacred being, something different, some who carries all the possibilities and the real understanding of world, some who knows all the inner laws and too, the group's destiny. This is why his facts are resumes each time when people need to return to their origins. This need is to be found at each start of a year, of a month, of a week. In order for the start to be able to act, meaning to revise the plenitude of originarry time, of *illo\_tempore*, people act

again the founder's gestures as for a bringing into presence of that God itself. None will consider this presence to be a fictive one! On the contrary, the ritual's efficiency operationality consists just in *de facto* taking part of the community and of each one, to the ontological change asked by that act. The ritual is a bringing into presence of *illo tempore*, of that God and, through it, of the initial plenitude that lead to the Creation. The point is not quite the God itself, but all its characteristics! Any kind of temporal start is a loading with senses and possibilities as well as any kind of end is a "time getting old" - as Mircea Eliade called it.

There is no time out of God's existence, even it is a real or revised one "because this sacred time when the party takes place did not exist before divine *gestures* that it reminds to us. By creating the different realities that form nowadays World, God were founding *the sacred time* too, as long as the contemporary time of a creation was necessary sanctified by the divine presence or activity"<sup>13</sup>.

Latter on, any ageing or damage marked a deterioration of time that, in order to be set back in its place, needed a sacred' reinstitution. As it follows, the sacred time is a reversible one, able to be brought into presence wherever and however only under the condition of an affective taking part to the ceremonial. This one represents a signification setting up, since any part of the ritual properties becomes a semantic correspondent of reality.

On another hand, the sacred time "is, through above all, a Parmenidian one, always equal with himself; it does not change, nor end"<sup>14</sup>. Thus, it may represent an occurrence of the stability we are searching for! As Parmenidian time, it follows being in all its determinations. Being equal with himself, it will be able to formulate the measure of the things it sets up. Using comparison, we shall find out the distance to which the concrete things are placed. This equality with himself could be a new fissure: the one between the unequal, mental or, at least, subjective time, and, the sacred one. Since a recognized concept already exists we shall say that the recessive term to the sacred time is the profane one. We will find it quite at the opposite to the sacred one as an unequal time, irreversible, discontinuous, accepting insertions of the sacred time – while the least is a continuous one; any fissure might annul it as a time of being.

Through these insertions in profane time man becomes a partner to Creation. He gets creative virtues just by his situation

beyond the concrete present. The time that Marcel Proust, the main personage in the novel *Researching the Lost Time*, so that, the time he spent in Combray and reminded in the last book as a rediscovered time was never felt as an actual time, but it was created by the conscious. It belonged and belongs to the consciousness as something very intimate to it.

The sacred time, as a starting one and a time of Creation is the time when the rules were founded: the most common ones, connected to everyday life to destiny, cosmogony, universal becoming. We must note that, as a following of its assimilation with these creations that it made possible, the time became their sign. Much more, there is no need to ask for the rules. Sacred time's presence is enough to institute a new reality, complete different from the profane one, in order to insert again the power of these laws.

As a conclusion, the sacred time is a time of being, a perfect one, identical to itself. It is a permanent presence, any might be the forms of this presence. It is a static time, without being passive. We can't speak about standing stone still. It is a Parmenidian time, but a time of Creation. Above all, it is a recovering time, reversible. It belongs to the consciousness that institutes another ontological level in its world.

The same manner is how liturgical time acts inside of Christianity. This is the time in whose presence the community meets the Holy Trinity and, as a consequence, Jesus brought in an immediate presence. It is obvious that these time forms are efficient only by continuity. This feature sends us back to the continuum of the intentional flux, a continuum that assures the phenomenological validity of the objects that constitute our conscious. Once this continuity being broken, the phenomenological Datum has to be recovered, reformulated, it needs a new bringing into presence of its ground. This will be not a revision, but another world, created from the very beginning. This is how the sacred time becomes the world's ground grace to its continuity.

## **2. The time as a justification**

The Renaissance implied some crucial transformations in our way of interpreting the world. It will be enough for our study to point two characteristics of this change, quoting from Alexander Koyré:

- a) “the Cosmos’ destruction and, as a consequence, the disappearance from our science of all the considerations grounded on this notion;
- b) space geometrization – meaning the substitution of the conception about a concrete space, qualitatively differentiated that was proper to pregalilean physics by the one of an abstract, homogeneous space of Euclidean geometry”<sup>15</sup>

In this context, mathematics substitutes metaphysics as a manner to explain the world, putting aside the multilevel structure of antic and medieval ontology. Man confiscates from the sacred the whole space that is accessible for his senses trying some explanations above all the interrogations that had generated the fissure I’ve already spoken about. God remains the only sacred instance, but having a reduced part in the new cast. Out of His statute of a stable and settled being that is omnipotent and is the residence of the absolute truth, God has no other active part. He knows the inner laws of nature, but He is not asked to explain them! Those laws are formulated and verified with the pride of a novice. Because science, as a domain just “liberated” from metaphysics, was truly a starting domain!

**Isaac Newton** in his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* fixes from the very beginning the significance of some terms like space, time, and movement. Each of them is defined through two of its forms: the absolute and the relative one. As long as their relative form depends on things, on their position and utility, the absolute form is independent from any exterior thing. Here is the so-called *substantialist conception* of time and space that have – in this way – intrinsic properties. “The absolute time, true and mathematical in itself and through its nature passes in an equal manner without any link with something exterior and, with another name we call it duration ... All the movements might be accelerated or delayed, but the flux of absolute time can’t be changed. The duration or the perseverance of things’ existence is the same, even the moves are quick or slow or absent.”<sup>16</sup>

A first differentiation from the relative time is the absolute one’ situation in the transcendence of things. It is not a time of things, but a model they will perhaps, never realize. “It is possible not to exist any equal movement in order to be a precise measure of time”<sup>17</sup>. As

any pattern, it is an intellectual construct. We also have to note its mathematical feature. Much more, it is mathematical in itself and through its nature. This means that, although it is an intellectual construct, it does not owe its attributes to our intellect, but to our intuition. Being mathematical in itself we may conclude it is not mathematical for himself. So, it is not conscious of itself, but he has a mathematical structure. We may conclude that our intuition is the one to confer this character. This conferring is an obvious one as soon as the dominant paradigm was mathematics. The wish of a *mathesis universalis* on a mathematical ground as well as the dissolution of a finite, perfect ordered Cosmos into an infinite universe, an “indefinite one, governed by the same universal, unitary laws”<sup>18</sup> – all these circumstances lead to the imperative of some frames conform to the mathematical exigencies. The very absence of a dependency to the physical, concrete space sends to the above-mentioned intuitive character of absolute time. This is a feature very hard to describe in material terms. The time of clocks, subjective and unequal both in its units and between them is a recessive fact. It is the time of material world, the time of physics, belonging to ontic truth.

On the opposite, the absolute time keeps its transcendent character in its relation to concrete world. Much more, we identify feature like the equality to itself, the constancy. Here is a difference of ontological level, confessing the need of a guide mark but also of a rigorous foundation of knowledge.

While the sacred time was instituted through the *presence* of God, now there is to be noticed the insertion of *mathematical principle*. Apparently, there is a difference of existential register. In fact, Newton tried to realize “an agreement between science and his religious belief”<sup>19</sup> God is presented as a perfect being, the “superior intelligence”<sup>20</sup>. He created everything from the very beginning, but He does no longer interfere. While the antic God had an active presence and was felt this way, Newton’s God is recognized in connection to the results of His insertion in the material world. From a theological point of view, God had created the absolute time as well as any absolute instance. The ground of the ontological difference is the mathematical character. Newton justifies thus, the ground of any method on mathematics as well as he justifies mathematics at all. The mathematical ground is transcendent to people because man is not its creator. He realizes –at the most – to understand and to know it. The absolute time is a continuum of the rigorous order face to face

to the discontinuum of the relative time. The latest is perfectible and it just has to be helped – from time to time- to come close to the truth. It does not allow the insertion of the absolute time – in the same manner that the sacred time could come into profane time's faults. That thing was possible because the difference was founded on some accessible criteria, while mathematics passes beyond this threshold.

**G.W.Leibniz** – It is well known the change of letters between Clarke – who sustained Newtonian points of view – and Leibniz. They intended to clarify some fundamental problems of that time, connected to space, time, soul, God, ground or movement. The point started from the contestation of the sufficient ration principle as a ground of all things.

Leibniz spoke about the best of the possible worlds. This would be our world, the world of ideas and object around us. No relation is perfectible because there is no better one (everything being the best!). Leibniz defines the time as “an order of successions”<sup>21</sup> This is expressed “in terms of possibility”<sup>22</sup> Therefore, we can't speak about an actual time! Only relating to two co-existing objects we can speak about time, therefore it is a relative one. Leibniz proves that only this relative time exists, using reductio ad absurdum. He says, “God did a thing for which there is no sufficient ratio to prove why it was done so and not in another way”.<sup>23</sup> We believe that this argument looks like what Heidegger called the ignorance of the nothing by science. Meaning that under this absence of a sufficient ratio, there is ignored any possibility different than the actual one.

Leibniz adds the following: “the moments taken separate from the things are nothing and they do not consist but in the successive order of things”<sup>24</sup>. This is to remind us the troubles of Greek ancient philosophy! First of all, if there is no time out of objects than time started once with these objects. Up to now there seems to be like the sacred time that starts with the foundation. We have to ask what was before objects started to exist? Did objects exist forever? Leibniz chooses the second idea, perhaps. But, while time is as an order of succession, what will happen if we have a single object? What is his pair to form a relation? If we put aside the possibility of a guide mark out of things and contingency, are we to conclude that each monade has its own time? No, as long as time is an order of succession. It

would be much more difficult whether only God would have existed before its decision to create. He is, practically, out of time. Where is He?

After a new set of letters, Leibniz will answer the critics Clarke had formulated: "time's or space's parts *took in their own* are ideal things; this is how they are perfect similar to two *abstract units*. It will not happen in the same way to two *concrete units* or to two effective times or, to two *full spaces*. Meaning, true actual ones."<sup>25</sup> He accepts the possibility of some:  $T_1 = T_2 = \dots = T_n$  times that belong to another / other possible worlds. In this case, the principle of sufficient ratio is the one that dissociates the possible worlds; not only the qualities of time, but also the possibility of their existence. Here there is the third fissure of worlds, fissure that allows the existence of several temporal types. There was a first case – the sacred time- of the occurrence of times in the same world, having insertions possibilities; than, the co/existence in a world without the possibility of living in the real time, thus without its insertion chance in the concrete time. Now, the difference is bigger as it separates them in two worlds that do not communicate between them.

### 3. The Phenomenological Time as getting-a-firm-field

#### Edmund Husserl - the time of intentional consciousness -

It is known Husserl's plan to ground the philosophy as "a rigorous science", expected to "fully satisfy the highest theoretical needs and thus, making possible from an ethic-religious point of view, a life guided by the pure norms of ratio"<sup>26</sup>. In order to settle this science, Husserl needed some certainties, of course. Therefore, he will propose a new method, the phenomenological one, coming to postulate the attribute of absolute that is given by the consciousness to the things it hints at and, on the contrary, the contingency of all the other objects.

On a first level there is a thinking that grounds, a world, the foundation taking place in the very world of this thinking. The perceived and "thought" object will become a *phenomenological datum* that will be the basement of the new science. We shall find ourselves in the "immediately" of the object, that is no longer a material object, but a new objectivity. This one is instituted by the active -intentional presence of consciousness. Here there are two different plans: a transcendental one, containing the real things and



the second that is immanent to the consciousness, the level of its feelings.

A first observation is that “we are interested only of the experiences of time”<sup>27</sup>. Therefore, we have to get on the second level – the one of apprehension’ contains. Here there is another type of absolute time, different from any form that the history of philosophy has already familiarized us. The time of consciousness does not satisfy the traditional tasks of an absolute time, but grace to his constituting manner, the phenomenological time might be considered like that. It is the real time inside this world, even there is no transcendent implied. It is a transcendental element.

On the other hand, this experienced time, phenomenological one has, on its turn, a grounder: the *now* of the perception. Speaking about a certain sound, Husserl notes the following: “during the whole consciousness flux, I have the consciousness of a single and the same sound that lasts, that lasts *now*. Up to now, as I did not hear it, I did not have any consciousness.”<sup>28</sup> We can say that the *now* acts like a Platonic Idea, every experience being validated if it takes part to *now*, in the way it confesses it, either as a part of it, either recovering it in a way or another.<sup>29</sup>

On the strict level of this new science, the only one that *is*, is the *now*. All the other temporal instances are existing as his hypostasis, as forms of his presence in the field of consciousness. “What is accepted is not a chosic time, but a time that appears, the duration that appears as it is. Here is the immanent time of the conscious’ course”<sup>30</sup>. This is a continuous flux, that assures, grace to his inner, constitutive continuity, the maintenance of now as a guarantee of belonging the flux. The unity of phenomenological consciousness is given by the sensation of unchanging, by the “temporal, absolute situation”<sup>31</sup> that stands for the qualitative difference in the interior of a temporal object. The traditional relation continuous /discontinuous becomes, in the case of phenomenological objects, the relation continuous- transcendent or, continuous – alterity. Out of time we can have either the absence of any flux or another flux, different grace to his immanent features. On this level of the inner structure of flux, the category of continuous places in an exclusive disjunction all the rest. It is a confessor for the change, for the pass from identical to something else, even if in reality, in the material meaning, we may have continuity and alterity in the same duration. “That what is in time, is continuous in time”<sup>32</sup>.

Here it comes that what is not continuous in time, is not time. So that, anything that fissures the time, is not time. We allow us the following question: That what has fissured the time of being was time? Or what?

Husserl dissociates between the real and the phenomenological time. We can't have access to the real time and, therefore, it does not interest us. The rigorous science, suspected to save the crises of contemporary rationality will ground on the flux of consciousness that being inserted in the world, builds for him, a proper world. Inside of this, "there is a rigorous simultaneity in the immanent level"<sup>33</sup> Any constitutive element of the flux is either a moment of present, or, through retention and reminding, brought into present. The continuity of these now -s stays for grounding. This fissure that Husserl proposes to us takes out time from the things in order to offer him all to the consciousness. It is no longer a perfect time, but it is grounded, it bears the stamp of confirmation. Grace to the attribute of simultaneity, it seems to be the closest form to the sacred time, thus, to the opening of being.

**Martin Heidegger – time as a manner of being** / Any discourse on Heideggerian perspective on being has to start from the Dasein's manners of being. A first level would be the one of being-in-the-world. Dasein being in the world means that it creates its proper world and lies in the middle of it asking and aiming to open it. It is a great need of the self-offering to the world and of its attempt to insert in this world. "Being in the world represents a name to call existence. Existing is "undertaking the being", watching over it, and being its shepherd. This is the way through which man becomes he by realizing an informational change with the being. He gets to his very proper being.

A second level would be that of *care*. "Care contains simultaneously three elements: being-before-you (existentiality), in-the-fact-of-already-being-into (facticity) as a fact-of-being-to (being a prey to)"<sup>34</sup> This unity can be exceeded through temporality. It is the unit of several modalities. Heidegger says<sup>35</sup> that Dasein exists in future horizon, fulfills starting from future. Therefore, existentiality "call the self to himself"<sup>36</sup>. Here starts the fissure between a Dasein that accepts the return to him taking care of the being shepherding with a view to its fulfillment and, on the other side, an "inauthentic"<sup>37</sup> Dasein.

“Future makes ontological possible an existence that is in a certain way and grace to its understanding of the world, it exists in its possibility to exist.”<sup>38</sup> Understanding seems to be the main term. Any understanding is the sign of an active watch, and “the watch means bringing to fulfillment the possibility of being’s acting.”<sup>39</sup> Watching means not to let something be forgotten. That is, falling into past. If being is brought to its possibility *to be*, that is, it is brought and maintained into present. “Nowhere among things can we find the being. Each thing has its own time. But the being is not a thing, is not inside of time. In spite of these, the being acts like a settled presence, that is, as a present. It remains determined by something of time’s kind.”<sup>40</sup> The being is determined by the time means that, as the being can’t be out of time, in its total ignorance, being does circumscribe itself to the moments of time. It passes over the risk of past hinting to an actual moment from the perspective of a future it will never touch, but that is always possible. It is and is not a stone-still being. We do believe that Heidegger did shade very well his position in this problem but also the Parmenidian definition of being. The latest is usually considered a static being. The Heideggerian continuous present is a present that fulfills through endeavor. It *is* through endeavor. The will to fulfill keeps in *now* each moment that it validates and adds it tacitly to a flux. This flux *is* as far as it *is continuous*. In order to be continuous, it has to contain and to receive only units of the same kind, that can’t be expected to realize a qualitative and then, an ontological fissure. “We call *temporary* something that is in time and is determined by time”<sup>41</sup> As a consequence, being is temporary, meaning it is determined connected to time and starting from it. It is not in time – Heidegger says –but it hints to the time through the manner-of-being-in-presence.

By understanding the world starting from future to the present as a present, we assist to the generation of the *situation*. The experience of situation represents the disposition that places us into the existence. It is the feeling that guides us into the world. This feeling existentially implies an orientation that reveals the world and, starting from which it is possible to meet an existence. In this sense of grasping an existence and of trying to understand it, Dasein belongs to temporality that “uncovers itself as the proper meaning of an authentic care”<sup>42</sup>. Being authentic, any care of this type pushes us to our self in order to make possible for an existence to break out. This will be that existence expected to meet and to understand the

being. During this process, the route meets and leaves aside the existence in order to build, step by step, the proper world of a Dasein that has the being close to it.

The recessive term would be “the state of waiting”. If the care places us into a situation and the situation reveals us both the being and the hidden, the rising road and the down one, leaving as our point to chose, to exceed temporality towards a settled present, the state of waiting is a non/problematical one. It is inside of time and is determined by its pass. Instead of a dialogue susceptible to bring the being out of its hidden place, the state of waiting leaves itself in the will of temporality, of alteration. Instead of a presence, the state of waiting supposes a continuum of changes. This is beings’ forgetting! Meaning, forgetting its horizon, thus, substituting the state of watch with a passing to nothingness to which nothing is opposed.

As for a conclusion, the authentic time is the manner of being of Dasein when it fulfills its opening to understand the being. It is a continuous and present settled time. It belongs only to the decision, that is much more than “the simple” Husserlian intentionally. While for Husserl there was “only” a world constitution, here is also the need of exceeding it. In the first case the being appears in the consciousness’ experience, the one that hints to the experience, for Heidegger the being is hidden and reveals for you while you overpass it. As the being’ self is hidden, the process of overpassing it is virtually infinite. Even the Husserlian flux is virtually infinite, it starts from the present of consciousness. For Heidegger, everything fulfills starting from future and, being before all, a fulfillment of the whole being.

### **C. The possible pattern**

The authentic time is that time’s modality that makes possible the intuition of being’s essence and, in the end, the meeting of being itself. We have seen that in different periods and under several mentalities, the authentic time had different variants and names. If we believe Aristotle who says that the name reveals the essence of a thing, we would conclude that these “authentic times” are different, having no common essence. But we believe that behind these different names there is a functional isomorphism and, why not, a common value. Every European cultural or scientific paradigm has modified the signification of this time. We do believe that the history of philosophy is nothing but a shaded articulation of the same

problems that have different names because of the different levels of understating.

We have already seen that the problem of time, of the duration starts once with the first fissure, with the ontological differentiation between being and nothing. While the being's revelation generated the feeling of plenitude's proximity, the nothing reminds of fear, of loosing the guide marks that will have either to be validated again, epistemological and anthropological or, to be rediscovered.

A second fissure appears once with Newtonian system and clearly separates the two spheres. The first will be a mathematical, perfect one, the other will be concrete, empirical, where the authentic time will never be recovered.

It comes Leibniz' system with a third delimitation. The real time belongs to an actual world, while all the rest constitutes a virtual world. The actual world is different and does not communicate by any means with the virtual one/ ones.

Closer to us there is Kant' synthesis that will transfer the discussion on a transcendental level, considering time as an *a priori* form of sensibility, out of which no knowledge can be settled. Once with phenomenology, the transcendental level becomes "the home" of authentic time, either as a time of knowledge (Husserl) or as a time of authentic existence (Heidegger)

Since we call transcendent something that is beyond our world and transcendental what belongs to the flux of thinking, than the successive "falls" would be the followings:

- a) On the transcendent level:
  - i. falling from communion;
  - ii.
  - iii. falling from communication;
  - iv. falling from the unity among worlds: authentic vs. real;
- b) On the transcendental level, time is a:
  - i. form of sensibility (lacking from physical world):
  - ii. condition of constituting the consciousness flux, apart from sensibility;
  - iii. a manner to reveal the essence of existence.

We assist to a gradual withdraw from the sensible world into the "little infinite". On the ground of these "falls" there were

reformulated the grounds of existence, of values and of knowledge, thus the grounds of the authentic time. Here are some of them:

- 1) The presence of sacred and the guarantee of taking part to transcendent;
- 2) The mathematical criteria. Here starts Popper's distinction between "the three worlds", where only the third, the world of ideas and principles is a mathematical one;
- 3) The criteria of the sufficient ratio, a divine one that chooses between the possible worlds;
- 4) The transcendental criteria, of the occurrence as an experience of the consciousness flux;
- 5) The criteria of Dasein's authenticity, as an entity that is related to the future and revises both present and past from this point of view.

It is easy to observe that the time we are looking for is a *grounding time*, that is a time that *generates a world*. According to the senses we offer to the term *world*, this can be a sacred or a profane one, an eidetic or a concrete, real world, a hinted, signified world or a hinted and placed into project one. The ground of the absolute time is *the ground of world* that we are looking for. It is a true ground because it is formulated grace to our conscious relation that considers it a possible pattern of the world and gives it the attribute of dominant value. It is a continuous and true time, since the experience of several fissures lead to the definition of authenticity as something that can't be broken. It is not to be broken without losing just the attribute of authenticity. It is a ground and, therefore, it is an active presence in that world. "Only the present exists. The synthesis of time constitutes the time as a living present, while past and future are only dimensions of this present"<sup>43</sup>. As a true time, it *is* and is *real*. This way, it becomes an axis of the ontological genesis. Its perfection might be considered an effect of our fear from fissures. No syllogism can work with fissures and we do need valid logical operations. And only valid operations.

#### Notes:

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<sup>1</sup> Vasile Băncilă, Foreword to Nae Ionescu's course *The History of Logic* (1929-1930), Bucharest, The Official Gazette & State's Printing Office, 1941, resumed in *Nae Ionescu in the Consciousness of His Contemporaries*, Bucharest, Criterion Publishing, 1998, page 46 (in Romanian).

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, in *Marks on the Thinking's Road*, Bucharest, Ed.Politica, 1988.pge 337 (in Romanian).

<sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger, *About the Ground's Essence*, in the quoted edition (q.ed.), page 103 (in Romanian).

<sup>4</sup> Emil Cioran, *The Inconvenient to Have Been Born*, Bucharest, Ed.Humanitas, 1995.page 222 (in Romanian).

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Les problèmes fondamentaux de la phénoménologie*, Ed.Gallimard, 1985, page 276

<sup>6</sup> This is because we do not know yet were the axiological stress is placed: on the change or on static

<sup>7</sup> cf. Martin Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics?* in q.ed. (in Romanian).

<sup>8</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Time and Being*, Ed.Jurnalul Literar, 1995, page 27 (in Romanian).

<sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, *About the Ground's Essence*, q ed. , page 76

<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Time and Being*, q.ed., page 41

<sup>11</sup> Martin Heidegger, *About the Ground's Essence*, q. ed., page 111

<sup>12</sup> Vasile Tonoiu, *Archaic Ontologies Brought into Presence*, Bucharest, Ed.St. si Encicl., 1989, page 313 (in Romanian).

<sup>13</sup> Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, Bucharest, Ed.Humanitas, 1992, page 65 (in Romanian).

<sup>14</sup> *idem*

<sup>15</sup> Alexandre Koyre, *Galileo and Plato*, in Ilie Parvu, *the History of Science and its Conceptual Reconstruction*, Bucharest, Ed.Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1981, page 167 (in Romanian).

<sup>16</sup> Isaac Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, INC, 1952, page 8

<sup>17</sup> *idem*, page 9

<sup>18</sup> Alexandre Koyre, *op.cit.*, page 167

<sup>19</sup> *The History of Modern Philosophy from the Renaissance to Kant*, Ed.Tess-express, 1996, page 319, Nina Façon

<sup>20</sup> *idem*

<sup>21</sup> G.W.Leibniz, *Philosophical Works*, Vol.1. Bucharest, Ed.Stiintifica si Enciclop., 1972, page 555 (in Romanian).

<sup>22</sup> *idem*

<sup>23</sup> *ibidem*, page 556

<sup>24</sup> *idem*

<sup>25</sup> Leibniz, *quoted work*, page 590

<sup>26</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Philosophy as a rigorous science*, Bucharest, Ed.Paideia, 1994. Page 5 (in Romanian).

<sup>27</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps*, PUF, 1964, pg. 15

<sup>28</sup> *idem*, page 37-38

<sup>29</sup> Here is also the Augustinian time reevaluated (see *Confessions*), time that was studied by Husserl from the very beginning.

<sup>30</sup> Edmund Husserl, *quoted work*, page 6-7

<sup>31</sup> *Idem*, page 86

<sup>32</sup> *idem*, page 98

<sup>33</sup> *idem*, page 145 - 147

<sup>34</sup> Walter Biemel, *Heidegger*, Bucharest, Ed.Humanitas, 1996.page 69 (in Romanian).

<sup>35</sup> cf. *idem*

<sup>36</sup> *idem*, page 68

<sup>37</sup> *idem*, page 73

<sup>38</sup> *idem*, page 72

<sup>39</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, in q.ed., page 297

<sup>40</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, page 27

<sup>41</sup> *idem*

<sup>42</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, page 326 apud Walter Biemel, q.w., page 70

<sup>43</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Ed.Babel, 1995, page 124 (in Romanian).



## LA VIE SCIENTIFIQUE

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### DISCUSSIONS SCIENTIFIQUES

Daniel Laurier, dir.,  
*Essais sur le sens et la réalité*,  
Montréal-Paris, Bellarmin-Vrin, «Collection Analytique-2», 1991, 239 p.

Trois volumes d'articles entièrement consacrés à l'oeuvre de Michael Dummett existent à ce jour: le remarquable volume anglo-américain édité par Barry Taylor (1987), les actes du colloque sur Dummett tenu à Mussomeli (Sicile) en 1991, édités par Brian McGuinness et Gianluigi Oliveri (1994) et le volume de contributions en langue française édité par les soins de Daniel Laurier dont il est rendu compte ici. Dans l'ensemble des réflexions exégetiques et critiques consacrées à Dummett, nous avons donc là le premier et jusqu'à ce jour l'unique ouvrage collectif en langue française exclusivement tourné vers l'oeuvre d'un philosophe encore ignoré ou presque dans le monde francophone<sup>1</sup>. L'excellente présentation de Jacques Bouveresse (1980) a longtemps été

une heureuse exception. Depuis, Pascal Engel a pris le soin de présenter deux des grandes lignes directrices de la perspective antiréaliste, à savoir le révisionnisme logique (Engel 1989: chap. 6) et la critique du programme de Davidson (Engel 1994: chap. 4). Notons également que deux commentaires critiques du finitisme strict de Crispin Wright et de la logique intuitionniste de la pertinence défendue par Neil Tennant, positions héritières de l'antiréalisme dummettien, sont disponibles en français (Engel 1993 et Pataut 1991, respectivement)<sup>2</sup>. C'est donc avec un grand plaisir que l'on accueille la publication de cet ouvrage collectif consacré aux aspects centraux de la perspective antiréaliste.

Je consacrerai ce compte rendu aux six grandes questions qui ont

préoccupé les auteurs des contributions, Dummett compris<sup>3</sup>.

### **1. L'argument dummettien dans sa généralité et la notion d'assertabilité. Introduction de Daniel Laurier et contribution de Cesare Cozzo.**

C'est avec raison que Daniel Laurier remarque dans sa présentation générale que l'antiréalisme défendu par Dummett se distingue du réductionnisme sans pour autant abandonner franchement le vérificationnisme. Un réductionniste soutient que certains énoncés, par exemple sur les objets physiques ordinaires, ne sont vrais que si *d'autres*, par exemple sur les *sense data*, le sont également. Dummett (1982 : 74-75) remarque (à l'aide d'un autre exemple) que ce type d'hypothèse de dépendance n'implique, pour les énoncés problématiques de la classe «à réduire», ni le rejet du principe de bivalence, ni le rejet du principe de vériconditionnalité, ni même l'abandon de l'idée que la référence de leurs termes ne joue plus son rôle standard dans la détermination de leur valeur de vérité. Le problème est ailleurs, non pas dans l'entreprise de réduction, mais dans la supposition (réaliste) que des énoncés (quelle que soit leur classe) peuvent être à la fois vrais et indécidés. Si le verdict dummettien, en ce qui concerne les énoncés pour lesquels nous ne disposons d'aucune justification, n'est pas un verdict d'absence pure et simple de signification cognitive, il reste que, du point de vue antiréaliste, la fixation du sens est intrinsèquement liée à la disponibilité et à la saisie des justifications, comprises en un sens large qui va au delà de la vérification de chaque énoncé un par un, par la preuve directe ou l'expérience immédiate<sup>4</sup>.

Qu'il y ait une querelle du réalisme *en ce sens* pour différentes classes d'énoncés est une chose. Qu'il

faille envisager «la possibilité d'une forme unique d'anti-réalisme» qui convienne à tous les cas (Laurier, p. 14) en est une autre. «[L]hypothèse qu'une théorie de la signification pourrait être construite autour d'un concept central unique (celui de preuve ou de réfutation)» ne milite pas nécessairement en faveur de cette possibilité. L'unicité du concept central est une chose, la globalité éventuelle de la perspective antiréaliste en est une autre. Dummett n'a en tous les cas jamais argumenté en faveur d'un antiréalisme global, même si la notion générale de vérification peut légitimement apparaître comme une extension naturelle de la notion mathématique de preuve. Si la conception sémantique de la querelle du réalisme a les vertus heuristiques de l'unification, il reste que chaque domaine du discours a affaire à des justifications d'un type particulier, «défaisables» et partielles dans le cas empirique et dans celui du passé en particulier<sup>5</sup>, mais en principe toujours disponibles dans le cas mathématique. Le poids de la remarque de Laurier tient dans le fait qu'un réalisme strictement *local* semble difficilement envisageable. Si les énoncés d'un certain domaine pouvaient être vrais en absence de toute justification disponible alors même que des conclusions antiréalistes opposées auraient été établies *ailleurs*, la position antiréaliste apparaîtrait considérablement affaiblie.

La contribution de Cesare Cozzo examine les liens entre les notions de vérité, d'objectivité et d'assertion. Je doute que la position décrite par Cozzo (p. 47-49) reflète véritablement celle de Dummett, pour qui la notion d'assertion est *plus* fondamentale que celle de vérité. Que notre but en effectuant une assertion soit d'énoncer quelque chose de vrai est une chose, mais il est pour le moins douteux qu'un antiréaliste

puisse admettre sans plus de précision que l'usage assertorique du langage montre que l'objectivité de la non de vérité Consiste dans son indépendance par rapport à ce que *nous* décidons.

Quelques précisions et réserves me semblent ici nécessaires à propos de manière dont il faut concevoir le rapport entre les notions épistémiques et non épistémiques de vérité. Comment faut-il comprendre la remarque suivante (Cozzo, p. 51): «Le théorème de Gödel ne démontre pas que la vérité est non épistémique»? Il serait beaucoup plus direct de faire valoir que le premier théorème d'incomplétude montre qu'il existe une formule à la fois prouvée vraie et indécidable dans un système consistant et qu'il fournit par là-même un contre-exemple important à la revendication antiréaliste selon laquelle un oncé ne peut avoir les deux propriétés. Je dois avouer que je m'explique al le rôle que Cozzo (p. 52) attribue à la thèse dite de «garantie absente» selon laquelle il est possible que certains énoncés indécidés restent à jamais indécidés. Qui irait nier cela? Le réalisme est ailleurs, notamment dans la thèse modale selon laquelle il est possible que ces énoncés soient vrais. On ne voit donc pas comment la thèse de garantie absente pourrait servir à départager le réaliste de ses adversaires.

### **2. Davidson, la modestie et la robustesse. Contributions de Michel Seymour et de Daniel Laurier**

Michel Seymour et Daniel Laurier s'attaquent au problème difficile et crucial de savoir quel rôle la distinction entre les théories modestes et robustes [*full-blooded*] de la signification doit jouer dans le débat du réalisme. Une théorie robuste entreprend d'expliquer exhaustivement tous les concepts éprimés par les prédicats primitifs d'un langage. Une théorie modeste suppose

au contraire qu'ils sont déjà connus et maîtrisés par les usagers. La thèse de l'interprétation radicale de Davidson est modeste en ce qu'elle présuppose que le langage dans lequel on traduit un énoncé de la langue-objet est préalablement compris. Néanmoins, comme le fait très justement remarquer Seymour (p. 95), la robustesse de la théorie davidsonienne tient dans le fait que le sens des prédicats primitifs est fixé par leur contribution à la détermination de la valeur de vérité de tous les énoncés dans lesquels ils figurent. Elle hérite donc sa robustesse de son holisme. L'analyse de Laurier rejoint celle de Seymour sur ce point : le litige entre Davidson et Dummett concerne non pas tant la question du réalisme que celle du holisme. Il y a là, me semble-t-il, un véritable travail de clarification et un progrès indéniable dans notre compréhension des objections dummettiennes au programme de Davidson.

Laurier présente et critique brillamment le détail de ces objections et fait remarquer avec pertinence qu'il est injuste de la part de Dummett de critiquer le holisme de Davidson sous prétexte qu'il brouillerait les questions de fait et les questions d'interprétation (p. 128). Le rôle du principe de charité est précisément de donner un contenu à la notion d'erreur. Je suis d'accord avec Laurier sur ce point: on ne voit pas pourquoi Davidson ferait entrer les notions parentes d'erreur et de justification en contrebande dans sa théorie de l'interprétation radicale.

Seymour (p. 92) distingue à raison un autre sens de la modestie: une théorie modeste reste silencieuse sur ce qui relie le savoir sémantique des locuteurs à leur pratique linguistique. Elle fait l'économie des processus d'acquisition de la signification et reste donc (au mieux) incomplète du point de vue antiréaliste,

qui reconnaît que le sens doit être *fixé* par ces processus et par l'usage qui en découle. Mais il faut rappeler ici, à la décharge de Davidson, que la théorie de la vérité, qui respecte le principe frégeen de compositionnalité et n'admet qu'un nombre fini de règles sémantiques, est loin d'être neutre sur le chapitre de la pratique.

Il me semble qu'une question cruciale dans ce débat est de savoir si Davidson a raison de penser que l'interprétation n'affecte pas le sens des constantes logiques (Seymour, p. 98). Il y a là une difficulté pour l'anti-réaliste, qui tient au fait que la théorie de la signification a, chez Dummett, un double statut particulièrement difficile à concevoir. Comment peut-elle à la fois refléter ou décrire fidèlement l'usage déductif et indiquer le point sur lequel il doit être révisé<sup>6</sup>? Ce point reste à éclaircir et requiert des développements autonomes.

### 3. L'intuitionnisme et la négation. Contributions d'Alain Voizard et d'Yvon Gauthier

Le projet dummettien dans son ensemble consiste en une justification de la logique intuitionniste fondée sur l'idée que la signification est strictement déterminée par l'usage. Son principal mérite philosophique est d'éviter l'idéalisme et le solipsisme inhérents à la philosophie des mathématiques de Brouwer. Bien qu'intuitionniste et radicalement anti-frégeenne, la position défendue par Dummett s'enracine dans la lecture de Frege. Elle ne conserve de Brouwer, si j'ose dire, que la logique, en expulsant définitivement l'idéalisme<sup>7</sup>.

Alain Voizard (p. 63) voit dans le révisionnisme logique défendu par Dummett une position qui «exclut du discours pourvu de sens un très grand nombre de propositions». Ce serait pour le moins gênant si c'était le cas: un auteur qui défend une position à propos de ce qui *constitue* le sens ne

peut se permettre une erreur aussi grossière. La conclusion de Voizard ne tarde pas à se faire attendre: le révisionnisme logique est *a priori* suspect. L'erreur de Dummett serait de n'avoir pas vu que la notion sémantique antiréaliste de prouvabilité, centrale pour le cas mathématique, est *trop forte* pour être incorporée dans une sémantique des langues naturelles (p. 63, 66). Deux raisons sont invoquées pour que le cas empirique soit traité différemment du cas mathématique: notre incapacité, dans le cas empirique, à identifier des «faits probants» et le fait que notre compréhension des phrases des langues naturelles *dépend* de leur «vérifiabilité».

L'objection ayant trait au degré de force tombe à plat. Le fait qu'on ne puisse identifier de faits probants irréversibles pour la phrase «César participa à la bataille de Thapse» n'implique aucunement que l'introduction de considérations épistémologiques sur le terrain de la sémantique, regroupées sous l'exigence générale de manifestabilité, ne puisse s'appliquer au cas des énoncés empiriques. L'autre objection me semble tout simplement incompréhensible. Comment un antiréaliste pourrait-il nier que notre compréhension de la phrase précisée soit fonction de la *recherche* d'évidences pour ou contre ? Même si nous n'en trouvons aucune, nous aurons simplement manifesté notre compréhension de cette phrase par l'identification de ce qui *pourrait compter* comme une évidence «défaisable», soit pour, soit contre. Quand un antiréaliste rejette l'idée que «César participa à la bataille de Thapse, ou bien César ne participa pas à la bataille de Thapse» puisse être vraie en l'absence de confirmation ou d'infirmité de l'un ou de l'autre membre de la conjonction, il rejette simplement une instance particulière du

principe de bivalence. Mais il est erroné d'affirmer (p. 69) qu'il n'y a pas de sens à essayer de savoir si la disjonction est vraie ou fausse. Rien ne nous assure *a priori* qu'il n'y a pas d'évidences partielles ou indirectes en faveur de l'un ou de l'autre membre de la disjonction. J'avoue ne pas comprendre l'affirmation selon laquelle: «on ne dira pas de cette phrase qu'elle est insensée, on dira qu'elle est dénuée de sens» (p. 69). Elle a un sens puisque ses parties constituantes en ont un.

La contribution d'Yvon Gauthier est la plus technique de l'ouvrage. L'auteur privilégie un constructivisme plus poussé que celui implicitement contenu dans l'antiréalisme dummettien et rappelle à raison (p. 185) que le tour métalogue pris par les recherches des intuitionnistes contemporains comme Troelstra ou van Dalen est *a priori* assez éloigné des préoccupations fondationnelles de Dummett. Mais, dans l'affaire du révisionnisme, la question de l'interprétation des constantes logiques et par conséquent de la négation, reste bien évidemment centrale. L'auteur argumente en faveur d'une théorie de la négation locale dont le modèle est arithmétique, et qui n'a pas le caractère symétrique de la négation classique (p. 188-190). La discussion des difficultés de la logique de Heyting concernant la justification de l'implication  $p \rightarrow \neg\neg p$  et de la théorie brouwérienne des assertions négatives, pour être compacte, n'en n'est pas moins claire et tout à fait utile.

#### **4. Le molécularisme et le holisme. Contributions de Jocelyne Couture et de Pascal Engel**

Jocelyne Couture se propose de caractériser le molécularisme avec plus de précision que Dummett. Une sémantique moléculaire, rappelons-le, représente la signification des phrases *une par une, indépendamment* d'une description de la totalité du langage

auquel ces phrases appartiennent (Dummett 1978: 222, 304-305; 1991a : 89-90). Comment le molécularisme pourrait-il donc requérir que chaque énoncé «renvoie [ ? ], pour sa signification, à l'ensemble du langage dans lequel il est utilisé» (p. 162)? J'avoue tout simplement ne pas comprendre comment l'auteur peut en arriver à caractériser le molécularisme de cette manière.

Cela n'empêche nullement Couture de soulever un problème très important : en ce qui concerne l'usage déductif, comment garantir que les règles qui permettent d'inférer un énoncé et celles qui permettent de faire des inférences à partir du même énoncé soient «inverses» l'une de l'autre. Autrement dit, comment assurer qu'elles appartiennent à la même paire de règles? C'est là, ni plus ni moins, la question de l'harmonie des conclusions et des prémisses. Couture propose (p. 168-174) un argument convaincant et tort détaillé en faveur d'un critère d'extension conservative selon lequel, pour tout fragment d'un langage déterminé et étant donné une paire de règles d'introduction et d'élimination pour un connecteur C, (i) seules les formules qui ont C comme connecteur principal sont une conséquence d'une application de la règle d'introduction et (ii) toutes les formules qui sont une conséquence de l'application de la règle d'élimination sont identiques aux prémisses de la règle d'introduction.

Pascal Engel soulève un problème fondamental dans cette affaire cruciale de holisme en posant la question de savoir «à quelles sortes de contraintes doivent obéir respectivement une théorie réaliste et anti-réaliste du sens des constantes logiques» (p. 136). Comme le remarque Engel (p. 137, 151), la question n'est pas technique. Elle ne se limite pas au problème du sens que nous

confèrerions arbitrairement à des symboles d'un système formel de règles de déduction. Comme l'a montré par ailleurs Peacocke, c'est l'individuation des contenus de pensée en général qui est en cause et comme le montre ici très clairement Engel, la difficulté de la position antiréaliste et moléculaire tient en grande partie au fait que les *concepts* exprimés par les constantes logiques d'un langage doivent être jugés *séparables* des autres concepts.

J'irai plus loin que Engel, qui conclut de ce que Dummett refuse la séparabilité des constantes, que «[1] antiréalisme est compatible avec une certaine forme de holisme». L'antiréalisme a *besoin*, au minimum, du holisme de la confirmation. Les concessions embarrassées de Dummett aux objections de Wright, Loar et Tennant *in* Taylor (1987: 233, 237, 251, 270) sont assez claires : les conditions d'assertahilités d'un énoncé ne sont pas spécificables indépendamment de sa place dans le réseau des énoncés qui lui sont liés déductivement en amont et en aval. Ce qui est beaucoup moins clair, c'est qu'il faudrait expliquer, pour éviter en quelque sorte *trop* de holisme, que lorsque nous comprenons un fragment de langage, ce fragment *pourrait* être un langage complet, bien qu'il ne le soit pas en réalité. (*op. cit.*: 233, 251). C'est en quelque sorte *comme* s'il l'était. Quel statut donner à ce « comme si » ?

### **5. La signification et les actes. Contribution de Denis Fisette**

Denis Fisette se propose de répondre aux objections de Dummett (1981), similaires à celles de Tugendhat (1970), à la généralisation husserlienne de la notion de sens à la sphère de tous les actes; généralisation dont le résultat n'est autre que la notion de noème (Husserl [1913] 1950). On distinguera deux critiques. Selon la

première, en élargissant la sphère d'application de la notion de sens [*Bedeutung*] à l'ensemble de tous les actes, actes non expressifs inclus, Husserl est coupable de psychologisme. Selon la deuxième, si le noème d'un acte est l'objet tel qu'il apparaît à la conscience, le sens se réduit, semble-t-il, à une représentation privée. La question se pose alors de savoir si une telle notion peut passer l'épreuve de la critique frégéenne du psychologisme et des arguments de Wittgenstein contre la possibilité du langage privé. Comme Fisette le fait très pertinemment remarquer (p. 208), Dummett voit dans le passage à l'idée de noème une rechute dans le psychologisme alors qu'Husserl y voit son dépassement définitif. C'est l'analyse noématique qui, pour Husserl, distingue définitivement la phénoménologie de la psychologie empirique.

Il faut bien évidemment souligner que l'élargissement husserlien est justifié par le fait que « tous [!] les actes sont structurés intentionnellement » (p. 209). Une différence subsiste néanmoins et Fisette rappelle utilement (p. 212) que, du point de vue phénoménologique, la différence infranchissable entre les actes de perception et les actes signifiants est *eidétique*, une distinction qui ne recoupe pas nécessairement la reconnaissance par Dummett de l'hétérogénéité des actes de perception et de tous les autres actes.

L'objection frégéenne a trait spécifiquement au statut des *définitions* psychologisantes. Si nous définissons un concept en terme des opérations mentales nécessaires à son acquisition, la définition ainsi obtenue ne peut en aucun cas nous servir à *démontrer* les propositions dans lesquelles figure le terme qui renvoie au concept. L'objection husserlienne au psychologisme a trait spécifiquement, elle aussi, à la perte de l'objectivité et

l'analyse de Fisette (p. 207-210) fait parfaitement valoir que la généralisation husserlienne fait de tous les actes des actes objectivants. C'est de ce point particulier dont dépend finalement l'évaluation de la critique de Dummett.

Pour finir, contrairement à ce que semble suggérer Fisette, Dummett peut très bien accepter la définition de la justification proposée par Føllesdal (1981 : 156), selon qui justifier une croyance consiste «à la faire concorder [*fitting into*] avec un réseau plus large de croyances qui, prises comme un tout, *explique* ce que nous cherchons à comprendre». Ce genre de holisme n'est pas nécessairement en conflit avec l'exigence de manifestabilité exhaustive de la saisie du sens<sup>8</sup>.

#### **6. Ce qui s'est vraiment passé. «La réalité du passé» de Michael Dummett**

Un réaliste soutient que notre saisie de la signification d'une phrase au passé, disons «César a traversé le Rubicon», consiste en une connaissance de ses conditions de vérité, conditions qui, contrairement aux conditions d'assertabilité, sont éventuellement indépendantes des moyens que nous avons de déterminer si elles sont satisfaites ou non (p. 23). Un antiréaliste peut s'opposer à cette revendication de deux manières. Premièrement, il peut faire valoir que notre saisie de la phrase au présent «César traverse le Rubicon» est conforme au schéma réaliste, mais que, mise au passé, cette phrase n'est vraie qu'au cas où son assertion est justifiée à la lumière des évidences *présentes*. Deuxièmement, il peut faire valoir que notre saisie de «César a traversé le Rubicon», à n'importe quel moment du temps  $t_n$ , consiste soit dans une capacité à reconnaître ou à trouver une évidence en sa faveur au temps  $t_n$ , soit dans une capacité à reconnaître,

au temps  $t_n$ , qu'il y aura une évidence à un moment futur  $t_{n+1}$  ou que nous pourrions en trouver une. Dummett argumente en faveur de la deuxième position, dite de l'«antiréalisme global» (p. 34). La différence entre les deux tient au fait que, dans la deuxième, la saisie du sens consiste dans la possibilité de l'établissement ou de la disponibilité d'une méta-garantie, à savoir de la garantie que nous avons aujourd'hui qu'il y aura une évidence future disponible en faveur de la phrase au passé.

Cette position présente à mon avis deux difficultés. Premièrement, il n'est nullement assuré que nous puissions à coup sûr faire valoir la différence entre l'antiréalisme global et l'antiréalisme restreint au cas du passé *en termes de manifestabilité*. Manifesterons-nous nécessairement quelque chose différent en montrant que nous avons obtenu une évidence en faveur de «César a traversé le Rubicon» au temps  $t_n$ , et en montrant que nous avons obtenu une évidence, au moment  $t_n$ , qu'il y aura une évidence en faveur de la phrase à un moment ultérieur  $t_{n+1}$ ? Finalement, Dummett (p. 368) ne semble distinguer les deux contraintes suivantes: (C1) Il y a aujourd'hui une évidence qu'il y aura dans le futur une évidence en faveur de «César a traversé le Rubicon»; (C2) Il y aura une évidence en faveur de la vérité de «César a traversé le Rubicon» dans le futur, dont nous considérons *aujourd'hui* qu'elle garantit la vérité de l'énoncé «César a traversé le Rubicon» sera vrai dans le futur». Le problème est qu'on ne peut imposer (C2) sans céder à une forme ou un autre de réalisme à propos du futur.

On pourra regretter l'absence d'un index des noms et des notions, mais n'empêchera nullement le lecteur d'apprécier ces articles et le travail d'éditeur de Laurier à leur juste valeur.

On utilisera ce volume comme il se présente comme un outil de travail utile qui introduit à une pensée subtile, aux ramifications complexes. De plus, et c'est important, le volume contient une bibliographie bien sélectionnée et assez complète pour s'orienter armé sur un terrain difficile, passionnant et prometteur.

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**Notes:**

<sup>1</sup> L'interview de Dummett par Roger Pol-Droit publié dans la rubrique «Débat» du journal *Le Monde* ne déroge décidément pas à la règle («Un entretien avec Michael Dummett», *Le Monde* du Mardi 11 octobre 1994, page 2). On est incapable, après la lecture d'une pleine page sur six colonnes, de déterminer *quelle* position philosophique Dummett peut bien vouloir défendre. Il y avait pourtant moyen de le lui faire dire en termes clairs, sans même aller sur le terrain aride de la philosophie des mathématiques auquel le lecteur du *Monde* ne s'intéresse pas nécessairement. Celui de l'éthique aurait fort bien convenu puisqu'il existe, là aussi, un débat du réalisme. Dummett, interrogé sur l'éventuel fondement philosophique de son engagement personnel dans la lutte contre le racisme, tend même la perche à plusieurs reprises (colonnes 4 et 5). Pol-Droit refuse de l'attraper. L'occasion aura donc été ratée. C'est dommage.

<sup>2</sup> Il faut, pour finir, citer deux traductions françaises : Dummett 1991a et Dummett 1991b. Je me permets également d'attirer l'attention sur un entretien avec Dummett qui peut fournir une introduction utile à l'anti-réalisme in Pataut (1993-1994).

<sup>3</sup> Il y a bien évident un certain arbitraire dans ce découpage. La question du hollisme, pour n'en citer qu'une, occupe

à plusieurs reprises le devant de la scène. Si elle constitue le point central des contributions de Jocelyne Couture et de Pascal Engel, les contributions de Michel Seymour et de Daniel Laurier n'y sont pas, à raison, insensibles (voir la sect. 2 ci-dessous). L'article de Dummett « La réalité du passé », traduit par Jean Laberge et Daniel Laurier, constitue la contribution de Dummett à ce volume. («The Reality of the Past» est réimp. in Dummett 1978 : 358-374.)

<sup>4</sup> Voir sur ce point, Pataut (1993-1994 : sect. 3, p. 79-86).

<sup>5</sup> Voir, ci-dessous, la section 6.

<sup>6</sup> Alain Voizard prend note de cette difficulté dans la conclusion de sa contribution (p. 76-77).

<sup>7</sup> L'introduction de Laurier (p. 15 et suivantes) éclaire très utilement ce point. Voir également Pataut (1993-1994 : 77-78).

<sup>8</sup> Voir les remarques de la section précédente.

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## LIVRES

Viorel Colțescu,  
*Immanuel Kant. O introducere în filosofia critică*,  
Editura de Vest, Timișoara, 1999, 168 p.

Certainly we are facing an important event in the Romanian philosophical exegesis. It has been said that Romanian philosophical literature is lacked of an open space for a real exchange of ideas and that the few Romanian philosophical magazines that exist deal with minor exegesis, mainly some translation reviews that, from a larger cultural point of view, play a minor function.

Mr. Colțescu's book opens a real see sight in Romanian philosophical exegesis. As main publisher houses in Romania continue to cover the lack in the field by publishing translations of European exegesis, it is noticeable that Mr. Professor Colțescu's book comes to offer a compatible rigorously structured instrument for the Romanian researchers of Kant's philosophy.

As the author says, we are interested in Kantian philosophy from three fundamental reasons: first, as a starting point for the German classical philosophy; second, due to its influence upon twentieth century philosophical thinking and, third, because of the importance of the criticism itself within the "Phenomenology of philosophical spirit"; critical philosophy is a "necessity

anyone who wants indeed to philosophize".

Combining the *historical* and *systematic* methods, the book aims to the role of a helping hand for those who endeavor to pass the labyrinth of Kantian philosophy.

After a presentation of Kant's biography and bibliography, chapter 2 brings elements about pre-critical period of Kant's thinking. We are pointed out that there is a unity between the pre-critical and critical periods, grounded on the continuous Kantian preoccupation for the *possibility of metaphysics*.

Third chapter is a contribution to the explanation of the great change that occurred in Kant's philosophical life just before the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770). In other words, we are led towards an answer to the problem of the "great enlightening", the criticism that overturned Kant's thinking.

After we are accustomed with main Kantian concerns, exegetical problems and methodological terms, the following chapters introduce the great three parts of Kant's system in the critical period: theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, and theory of finality.

Theoretical philosophy is presented according to the Kantian articulations themselves: the critical principle and its relation with dogmatism and skepticism, criticism and apriorism, analytical and synthetic judgments, the critical research of sensibility, space and time.

The Transcendental Analytic is presented within a large amount of pages that investigate mainly the transcendental deduction of categories, starting from the problem raised by the discussion between Dieter Heinrich (as he proposed the idea of double proof theory) and his opponents. Mr. Coltescu tries to propose a different interpretation, able to resist the objections brought to Heinrich's theory.

The presentation of Transcendental Dialectic (transcendental appearance, the ideas of reason and its dialectic arguments) brings an end to the main problems of the Kantian theoretical philosophy. The last section lets us see the light in the middle of the labyrinth; the author recalls the principal concern that challenged Kant's criticism and reader's confidence in it: the problem of metaphysics. Here we are told that, in spite of an apparently losing of sight, the problem of metaphysics is not forgotten by Kant but always postponed because of the need for the great prior critical investigation.

The fifth chapter investigates Kant's practical philosophy stressing on that critical approach has the same fundamental function, as it did in the theoretical philosophy.

Further on, Mr. Professor Coltescu promotes a personal point of view

concerning the so-much discussed Kantian rigorous ethic thought: thus, we find out that Kant does not exclude from the moral behaviour the acts performed *with* inclination (*mit Neigung*) but only the acts performed *from* inclination (*aus Neigung*).

In the final part of the book the author deals with the Kantian conception about the finality, the theory of the third Critique. Here the analysis is focused upon the faculty of judgment and its function of medium between reason and intellect, then on the principle of finality and the ways it manifests itself, as subjective finality and objective finality.

The end of the book is concerned with the meanings of the *revolution* Kant speaks about in the Preface to the second edition of the first Critique. We are also told about the actuality of the transcendental analysis.

The preoccupation of Mr. Coltescu for the problem of transcendental argumentation is also visible in the present issue of the *Annales Universitatis Occidentalis Timisiensis*, where he comes with an extremely actual and essential discussion of the problem.

We would like to mention the very last statement of the book. "Back to Kant – we are told – and then forward with Kant!".

**Claudiu Mesaroş,**  
West University of Timișoara

Vasile Frăteanu,  
*Essay on Subjectivity*,  
translated by Eva Zsizsmann and Eugen Gherghel, Cluj University Press, 1999.

*"The years have passed, my friend, and the book I promised – that pure, profound, virginal book which should have rendered in its transparence the shape of our authentic, real, 'abysmal' self – has not yet been written."*

This is the beginning of the book and it is at the same time a surprisingly pure and genuine description of a state of being. The book that has not yet been written must surely not taken as being this one *only*; it is *any* or *every* book, or story, in everyone's life. The author intends to draw attention upon this simple state of life: the moment of *not yet being done*, the feeling that something *is* happening, is becoming complete, but for a while we have no joy about. It is a state of mind that gives the feeling of sadness because the introspection or any questions that we could ask our selves are not possible. A state full of living determinations not yet named; a state of conflictual emotions that allows us say at the same time: *I know* and *I do not know* something about my self. This is the state of *pre-knowledge*. Thus, the interesting fact that this book on subjectivity brings is its starting point. I had the strange feeling of a book starting with the subsidiary idea that there is a state of self, of our inner life that is not expected to be *ex-plored*, but *im-plored*, a state we cannot name but only call, somehow.

There is an essential aporetic state of mind that author calls sadness; the aporias of subjectivity are in fact aporias of sadness. The idea of sadness as a determining point of every one's spiritual life throws a special shadow on the whole book.

Thus, the philosophical investigation of our self begins with stating that we must admit the aporetic determinations of any subjective manifestation. There are the *aporias of subjectivity* given by the whole set of relations human being establishes with surrounding world. They are *existence* and the *nothing*, *finite* and *infinite*, *time* and *eternity*, *reason* and *sensibility*, *purity* and *impurity*, *contemplation* and *action*.

Then there is a special aporetic state called the aporia of sadness. Beyond these aporias of subjectivity, sadness is a feeling perceived as a particular way of self-revelation of inner life and has a consubstantial aporia.

The philosophical introspection ends with *knowledge* and *creation* considered as final metaphysical stages of human being.

As we have no intention of discussing *in extenso* the content of the book given its complex and highly elaborated stream of ideas, we would like to end with a few subjective readers' notices.

A philosophical book on subjectivity is usually expected to deal with pleiads of cognitivist authors or psychologist literature. In contemporary literature there are even some "star" examples and experiments intended to sustain some whole modules of ideas. The special feature of this book is that there is no "case" or "patient" empirically investigated. There is only one responsible living being that speaks for the entire human specie: the author himself. Thus there is another interesting methodological idea that springs up: more relevant than highly diverse empirical "cases" there is a

special living case that can be a complete ground for a philosophical interrogation upon subjectivity: the very person who asks questions and tries to answer them; the author of the book himself. The philosophical book on subjectivity is a book on author's proper subjectivity. The subjective reality of life is not examined through discussing theories or analysing manifestations of some *alter ego*-s.

The virtue of such a construction is that philosophical problems are not dealt as pure logical or theoretical or historical ones but as concrete and

living questions of a living being. A philosophical problem is not taken as a *someone's* (let him be Kant or Davidson or anyone else) problem, but as *my own*. This classical claim of philosophy is indeed rarely embodied into philosophical texts.

As a genuine reader someone is inclined to think: "this is how philosophy should be".

**Claudiu Mesaroş**

West University of Timișoara

Vasile Frăteanu, *Ființa, Devenirea, Gândirea, Limbajul*,  
Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 1999

The recent book of professor Vasile Frateanu is built upon four fundamental categories of philosophical thought: being, becoming, thinking, and language. As the title reveals, the inquiry follows the relationist paradigm. The author is perfectly aware that these categories have been intensely discussed along the history of philosophy. Though there always was and still is a large amount of theories and discussions concerning these four concepts, this fact didn't contribute to a further elucidation of their ultimate meaning. In author's opinion, this lack of clarity is due to a corresponding lack of a steady will and of perseverance in discerning and clarifying. So that the first step in this inquiry is just making various distinctions between these concepts, beginning with thinking and language.

All along his research, professor Frateanu cautious analyses many philosophical systems, not neglecting

even some concealed from sight aspects, in order to illustrate his theory. Some philosophers does not regard "being" and "world" as the same, first being transcendent in respect to the world. Sometimes, the transcendent reality was considered to be the supreme being, namely God; other times, it was thought to be simply "is", a "pagan" is, conceived as a principle of individuation (e.g. for Heidegger). Other philosophers assign the absolute being far beyond the world and its determination (e.g. Plato and Plotinus). The distinction between being, thinking and language is then stressed within Christian thought. Even the masters of hermeneutics grant that an "ontological difference" may be ascribed to being, thinking and language; H.G. Gadamer and E. Levinas are therefore rightly mentioned for superseding the attempt to confine the whole reality to thinking and language. The upshot of this section, following from well chosen arguments is that every major

philosopher acknowledges the imperative existence of “something” outward, outside, and beyond thinking and language. We also find here a remarkable reminder of Locke’s warning: “even the individuals which do think and talk, doesn’t do this all time” (Locke’s statements were: “the soul thinks not always” and “it is not always conscious of it”). Giving this, the preliminary conclusion is that there must be other structures of existence besides thinking and language.

From this point arises another question: not for all thinkers the outward reality and the immutable being are the same, simply because even becoming may be the reality as well as being. Those who emend the previous theories are, of course, Heraclitus from Efes and later on, F. Nietzsche; David Bohm, H. Bergson, Michel Henry also had a similar view. The conclusion which professor Frateanu draws from this historical inquiry is that “the majority of outstanding thinkers introduces, more or less deliberate, a discrimination between something which is and something which is not identical with thinking and language” (p. 30). After this conclusion follows a reappraisal of the doctrines, a revolve on the problems grasped so far, this section ending with a discussion about a fundamental and maybe eternal question: the link between thinking and language.

The second chapter begins with a remark about the method employed so far; although in the previous section the differences between the four categories were analysed from various points of view, the principle of identity was left apart; or, the principle of differentiation

does not work alone, apart from the principle of identity. Nevertheless, the same disagreement between philosophers reappears; that is simply because some of them (Parmenides, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes) stresses the identity of being, thinking and language, and others (Nietzsche, David Bohm, Humboldt, Derrida) the same relation, only that regarding becoming, thinking and language. This section particularly hold attention for the reason that is sprinkled with many novelties and witted remarks about some philosophers and their doctrines, all of it arranged in a laborious argumentation. Moreover, this debate prepares the final result of the last part.

The third chapter shows what a relational philosophical perspective signifies, i.e. a relation between all four categories, which alone can overcome the complexities of the problem. Thus, the first type of identity is the relation itself, the mere relation, which gives birth to an identity-difference game, relation where being stands for order and stability. From this emerges a system of identities and relative differences. As concerning becoming, it would be wrong to reduce it to disorder and crisis; becoming has also a positive feature, being an element of differentiation and separateness between species and genera. Summing up, being and becoming are the main original causes of the Universe: being gives birth to a system of identities, and becoming generates a system of differences.

**Lucian Vesalon**

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Aristotel, Plotin, Sf. Augustin, Ioan Filopon, Alkindi, Avicena, Avencebrol, Algazel, Averroes, Albert cel Mare, Sf. Toma din Aquino, Siger din Brabant, Boetius din Dacia, Henri din Gand,

*Despre eternitatea lumii. Fragmente sau tratate. Împreună cu cele 219 teze ale lui Siger din Brabant și Boetius din Dacia și ale altora, condamnate în anul 1277 de episcopul Etienne Tempier al Parisului la sfatul doctorilor în Sfânta Scriptură.* Traducere din limba latină, tabel cronologic, note și postfață de Alexander Baumgarten, Editura IRI, București, 1999.

*(On the Eternity of the World. Fragments or treatises, with the 219 thesis of Siger of Brabant and Boetius from Dacia and others, condemned in 1277 by the Bishop of Paris Etienne Tempier under the advice of the doctors in the Holy Scripture).* Translation from Latin, chronological table, notes and afterword by Alexander Baumgarten. IRI Publisher House, București, 1999.

Mr Alexander Baumgarten is double specialised (philosophy and classical studies). His previous published translations (St. Anselm, *Proslogion*, *Monologion*, St. Thoma of Aquino, *Of the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists*) announced a few years ago an impressive training and a great future career. Here he comes again with a work of noblesse.

The book unifies the fundamental texts that cover a so-called problem in the history of philosophy; a "folder-book" or a binder containing the "files" of a case: the "case" of the Parisian University Crisis concerning the problem of the eternity of the world. From this first point of view, the importance of Alexander Baumgarten's work is more than huge.

Another reason for considering the book as having a maximum importance is the bibliographical crisis in Romania. It is well known that Romanian University life lacks many sources of documentation; there are – maybe – hundreds of fundamental texts that have not yet entered into Romanian libraries; also, many fundamental texts have not been translated into Romanian language. The efforts of any student to completely cover some

problems in philosophy are many times almost impossible to fulfil. The work of Mr. Baumgarten is once more admirable. From now on, an important historical theme of philosophy is covered by a complete textual source available for Romanian students and researchers.

Here is the complete list of the original and translated texts included: Aristotle (fragments from *Topics*, *Physics*, *On the Generation of Animals*, *Meteorologic*), Plotin (fragments from *Enneads*), St. Augustin (*Confessions*, *On the City of God*), John Philopon (*On the Creation of the World*), Alkindi (*Introductory Book to the Art of Logic Demonstration*), Avicenna (*Sufficientia*, *On the Heavens and World*, *Metaphysics*, *On Definitions and Problems*), Avencebrol (*The Spring of Life*), Averroes (*The Refutation of the Refutation Brought by Algazel Against Philosophy*), Albert the Great (*Summa Theologiae*), St. Thomas Aquinas (*On the Eternity of the World Against Those Who Protest*), Magister Siger from Brabant (*On the Eternity of the World*), Magister Boethius from Dacia (*On the Eternity of the World*), Magister Henry of Gand (*Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, *If the Creature Could Exist From Eternity*

– *If It Is Contrary to the Creature That It Could Exist From Eternity*, The 219 Thesis of Siger from Brabant and Boethius from Dacia and others, condemned in 1277 by the Bishop Etienne Tempier of Paris under the advice of the Doctors in the Holy Scripture.

As the translator himself lets us know, the translation of these texts is a complete novelty. There is only one similar book containing the texts of the problem, but not translated; it belongs to M. Gierens and has been published in 1933 at Gregorian University of Rome. Thus the book is not only a novelty in Romania but also even a European rarity.

The very dense and clear exposition in the *Afterword* written by Alexander Baumgarten (*Afterword. The sources of the controversy concerning the eternity of the world in the Parisian University Crisis of the years 1270-1277*, pp. 255-309) brings a supplemental light upon the problem. We can say that even the study dealing with the problem Medieval controversy on the eternity of the world is a complete novelty and, as far as we know, the single one in Romania. Mr. Baumgarten's book is for all reasons a total success and a precious scientific instrument.

**Claudiu Mesaroş**

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Ilona Bîrzescu, *Aventurile filosofiei contemporane*, Editura Delabistra, Caransebeş, 1998

The latest book of Mrs. Ilona Bîrzescu, *The Adventures of Contemporary Philosophy*, is an account of eight philosophical problems, belonging to eight or nine XXth's century thinkers: Sartre, Russell, Moore etc. Being classical in respect to the topics – every author discussed is a great public figure of western philosophy, - this book is original and inventive for the way it proceeds. It is generally admitted that philosophy means seriousness and gravity, but we find here that philosophy also means adventure and taking a risk. In author's view, the safest characterization of philosophy is that it consists in a perpetual adventure in searching the truth. Another important feature of this study is the way it describes the intellectual background of each philosopher, so that we can easily

discover the main streams of continental and analytical philosophy.

Within the first chapter, Giovanni Gentile, an Italian neoidealist usually left apart by almost every history of contemporary philosophy, proves that Hegel's idealism didn't used up all its consequences. Remarkable is the emphasizing of the paideutic role of philosophy, rarely noticed elsewhere. The second chapter turns to the French existentialist Gabriel Marcel. The religious marks of his thought are strongly emphasized, together with the rejection of any attempt to subordinate his tenet to some "-ism". Giving that existentialism was the prevailing philosophy in France after World War II, next chapter is dedicated to its outstanding spokesman, Jean Paul Sartre. We find here a vivid picture of Sartre's intellectual pilgrimage, from phenomenology to existentialism; his



literary productions aren't left apart neither. The main topics of his doctrine are examined step by step: "l'être en soi" – "l'être pour soi", freedom and free choice and historical action. So that three systems of speculative philosophy were described hitherto.

The linguistic turn, accomplished by analytical philosophy, both Anglo-Saxon and Austrian, follows next section. The problems of the new theoretical paradigm receives here a brief treatment only, because the real subject is the ethical doctrine of George Edward Moore. *Principia Ethica*, his most important work, is depicted in the light of its subsequent debates. The question of the link between "common sense" and philosophy is also mentioned.

Bertrand Russell, "one of the greatest defenders of rationalism and humanism of all times", claims our attention in the fifth chapter. After a short presentation of his extended work, three problems are further considered: philosophy or "the things we don't know", the perfect ideal language, and the ethics related to means.

The historical approach to analytical philosophy continues with a chapter entitled "The logical picture of the world", concerned with the "idol of experimental science", this being the new empiricism of the Vienna Circle. *The Scientific Conception of the World* – the program of the new empiricism is analysed in the light of the famous opposition between statements of experimental sciences and those of metaphysics, the final goal being the project of the single science that bridges the gap between natural sciences and cultural sciences. Then, the search for a perfect logical language is ascribed to Gottlob Frege, who renewed the theory of statements,

abandoning the well-known distinction between subject and predicate. He conceived instead a subject identical with the conceptual content of the statement. A defective natural language may have various causes, homonyms and confusion between direct and indirect speech being the most notable. The relation sign – meaning – signification, the conditions for a language free from errors, the problem of the framework are also important topics discussed here.

The penultimate chapter, "The Overpassing of Metaphysics", sets forth a tenet introduced in previous chapter, namely the new empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Its outstanding figure, Rudolf Carnap, had developed the techniques and perspectives of analysis of language and gave the classical formula for logical positivism. He intended to give up the old quarrel between realism and idealism, choosing a "neutral" perspective, that is to build the world in formal terms, replacing the objects by properties and relations, by images which follow the immediate datum. The first negative consequence which Carnap draws concerning metaphysics is the lack of sense and the sterility of philosophical statements. The only statements which have sense are analytical propositions (true from the beginning by form), which tell nothing about what is real, and the negations of analytical propositions. This laborious inquiry ends with a presentation of Nicolai Hartmann's critical ontology, whose work was often compared with a "gothic cathedral", although he didn't generate a school or an independent philosophical movement.

**Lucian Vesalon**  
West University of Timișoara

Emilia Guliciuc  
*Constantin Noica sau revolta intru spirit*  
EDP, 1999

Some may be disturbed by this title as well as by Emilia Guliciuc's one. As she told us from the very beginning, the traditional way of describing a philosopher sketches a very solitary, retired man. A wiser does never revolt-seem to say the common sense.

But Noica's revolt is a fight in the name of his ideas, in the name of philosophy. This is a great merit of this book as it underlines this very profound sense of a revolt. Noica belongs to a generation that made from the revolt its main point. They used to call themselves *the hooligans*, because all their ideas were meant to change the entire traditional Romanian world. Noica says that any revolt is a way of loving yourself, as you try to transform the rest of the world according to your ideas.

Emilia Guliciuc will follow the philosopher to find out the manner, the domains where this revolt took place. First of all there is "the great culture" field. Noica asks upon Romanian's place in the world history, upon the place of Romanian culture. He looks for some ways to improve this place, to make it immortal. This is the revolt against the traditional Romanian culture that ignored all this topic.

It was said that Noica has two faces, as Janus did. I don't think so. He shows us a lot of faces, but, I believe them to be just translations of one and the same idea. Noica seems to turn his back to this world and ends by trying to integrate himself in it. But he comes at the end with his idea, with the result of

his revolt. He realised to reformulate what he disliked and now he tries to convince us upon his interpretation. Therefore he provokes us / as Emilia Guliciuc says. He asks us to think together with him.

Another point is the comparison with the other "trairists" on the relation between soul and spirit. No reformulation of world may be attained out of ideas, so out of spirit. His project was to big to take soul in his cast. Here starts his scorn against "brother pig" that is a sign of the presence of body and soul in this world. But the pigdos not take part to a Weltanschauung!

Romania is seen as a culture that belongs more to virtual than to present, says he. I don't think that A. Marino is right considering it a false explanation. This means that we stop crediting Romania for its future. Any possibility is a sign of the presence of some ideas, of the concept. Any concept has its own time to fulfill. If Romania is not a possibility, but a reality, it means that it will never improve. I don't think so.

Therefore, this book is quite important for a culture that lacks such discussions and lives in a self/admiration. We have to re-discuss our state, and such books are very good mediators. They find exact the problems and their files. The rest to come!

**Laura Gheorghiu**  
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Ioan Mățu, Marciana Corici, Mironică Corici:  
*Foaia Diecezană, Caransebeș (1886-1918) - Aspects socio-culturels,*  
Edition Helicon, Timișoara, 1999

La parution de *Foaia Decezană*, organe de culture et publicite, a et precedee par une suite d'evenements historiques et sociaux dont nous citons l'introduction dans **L'Empire des Habsbourg** du dualisme (1867), qui devient une puissante menace contre l'existence des nationalites soumises a la monarchie dualiste puis la proclamation de l'independance d'etat (1877) par les roumanins de l'exterieur de l'arc carpatique et aussi l'unifications de l'activite politique de Transylvanie pour la creation du **Parti National Roumain** (1886).

Dans ce contexte, la culture reste la plus efficace arme dans le combat pour la realisation de l'unite nationale en se constituant un important moyen de contac entre Roumains. Conformement a son statut, L'Eglise detient un role considerable dans la promotion de la culture e de l'enseignement en dirigeant ses efforts vers les problemes d'ordre national et social et ensuite vers ceux de nature theologique .

La premiere publication dans l'eparchie de Caransebeș parait le 2 juillet 1869 et s'appelle *Circulara Eparhiei Caransebeșului*. En jouvier 1886 naît *Foaia Diecezană*, publication dans le contenu de laquelle figureront des problemes historiques, de langue et litterature roumaine, des etudes scientifiques, diverses nouvelles et informations, des aspects de la vie ecclesiastique ainsi que des notes sur les seances de l'**Academie Roumaine**, des problemes de nature economique etc. Un espace important

est reserve aux personnalite marquantes de la vie publique au diocese . Ioan Popasu, Nicolae Popea, M. Cristea, Vicențiu Babeș et aux chroniques relatives a l'activite de la societe ASTRA.

La parution de *Foaia Diecezană* ne sera pas interrompue pendant la guerre: elle fournira des informations recues du champ de bataille et plus des articles sur la Grande Union du 1 decembre 1918. Meme aux depens de l'espace destine aux informations a contenu religieux, *Foaia Diecezană* a ete en premier lieu un puissant organe de presse au caractere national et culturel - scolaire.

Dans le cadre de la rubrique destinee aux nouvelles on publie aussi des articles sur l'activite des societes actives sur le territoire de l'eparchie (**La Societe Roumaine de Chant et Musique, Le Fond Theatral Roumain, La Societe de Lecture**). Elles ont deploye des activites artistique ont soutenu l'armee, ont fonde l'**Hopital Militaire**, ont organise divers spectacles et fetes d'**ASTRA**, ayant une contribution substantielle au developpement de la culture roumaine ainsi qu'a la consolidation a sentiment patriotique. En meme temps *Foaia Diecezană* publie des article sur les evenements sociaux et politiques, economiques et culturels, offre aussi des informations sur l'activite des autres organisations culturel politiques de Transylvanie.

La celebration du demi-centenaire d'**ASTRA**, la plus importante organisation culturelle de Transylvanie,

a été consignée dans les pages de *Foaia Diecezană* sous le titre "Un jubilé". Un autre sujet aborde est le statut de l'enseignant, serviteur de la culture. On traite aussi des problèmes concernant l'histoire de certaines écoles, les examens, les expériences pédagogiques, autrement dit des problèmes spécifiques de l'enseignement. De cette manière la publication réalisera un image d'ensemble de l'enseignement roumain de l'époque. En tant qu'aide pour la réussite de l'enseignement, de l'éducation, on consignait des conseils et des exhortations psychopédagogiques à la connaissance individuelle de l'élève, à la connaissance des facteurs du processus instructif éducatif.

*Foaia Diecezană* offre en même temps à ses lecteurs des informations sur les matières étudiées par les élèves à l'époque (religion, géographie, sciences naturelles etc.). On accentue ainsi le caractère religieux-moral de l'enseignement. En ce qui concerne les articles de morale chrétienne publiés dans *Foaia Diecezană*, ils se sont constitués sources d'informations et nouvelles expériences, gravitant autour de sujets tels que la foi, l'amour, les vertus etc. On évoque donc l'importance de l'étude de la religion en parlant aussi du **Symbole de foi**, dans lequel est concentré le mystère de l'existence, le mystère de **La Sainte Trinité**, **Le Jugement Dernier**. Les articles de *Foaia Diecezană* mettent un accent particulier sur les vertus cardinales (la foi, l'espérance et l'amour), sur l'interprétation du *Decalogue*, en débattant aussi des thèmes contraires aux

commandements (la calomnie, la médisance, le concubinage). On met aussi en évidence le rôle de la famille dans la société, en faisant l'éloge de l'honnêteté et de la générosité. Les grandes fêtes chrétiennes (**La Naissance**, **La Résurrection** et **L'Ascension du Sauveur**) sont mentionnées aussi dans les pages de *Foaia Diecezană*. Une place importante dans les pages de la publication est occupée par les biographies de quelques-uns des plus insignes évêques du diocèse de Caransebeș: Ioan Popasu (1808 - 1889) restaurateur de l'évêché et fondateur de **Tipografia Diecezană** (1885), **Librăria Diecezană** et *Foaia Diecezană* (1886), Nicolae Popea (1826 - 1908) et Miron Cristea (1868 - 1939), évêque de Caransebeș à partir du 21 novembre 1909, métropolitain primat de Roumanie depuis décembre 1919, premier patriarche de **L'Église Orthodoxe Roumaine** et aussi premier ministre entre 1838 et 1939.

En synthétisant le contenu du livre, on peut dire qu'il est un essai réussi des trois auteurs de mettre en évidence la place et la mission de *Foaia Diecezană* dans le paysage journalistique de Banat d'avant 1918. Par la thématique variée abordée dans les pages de la publication concernant divers aspects de la vie sociale, politique, économique, culturelle, *Foaia Diecezană* a été un miroir fidèle de la vie religieuse culturelle, mais aussi le plus représentatif organe de presse du diocèse de Caransebeș pendant la période mentionnée.

Claudiu Munteanu

Emilia Guliciuc,  
*Aporiile gândirii nicasiene*  
(*The Apories of Noica's thought*)  
EDP, 1999.

Constantin Noica is very little studied in spite of the great effort of Humanitas Publishing House to offer us as much as possible from the philosopher's work. It seems that his ideas are too much different from our speed today; they require too much patience and too much desire to understand. We are in a great hurry to recover the latest fifty years, so we delay our serious analysis for better times.

Therefore, Emilia Guliciuc's book is well/come to wake us up. This is where she discusses Noica's greatest topics, concerning ontology, the philosophy of culture, history and language. In fact, here are the main marks of any philosophical system. For the beginning, she presents the three logical terms that helped Noica to build his entire vision: the individual, the determinations and the general. While many researches use to consider that everything that Noica did or wrote confess a scorn for the individual, this book is here to prove the opposite. It's one of the main gains of it. The author picks up Noica's arguments. The most important is the preoccupation for the names. No individual can be identified through a single name, nor grace a word with no importance. On the contrary, says he. Any name will stay for the determinations, for the real description of that individual's possibilities. Therefore, the language as well as the name of a people becomes ontological categories expected to sustain any of Noica's efforts. But all these efforts take place in a world that has forgotten the name's significance as well as its real sense in this history.

Here is the starting point for Noica to compare the Romanian culture to that of Occident, using the importance of folklore. In the same time, our author remarks Noica's argument for a philosophical manner of reading the reality in order to generate a great, immortal culture. Culture is the general where everyone has to mark his presence, so he individual has to become a necessary shade of it. As a consequence, a culture might become a preoccupation worthy for the elite not for the whole people, that is to ignore a lot of individuals. Noica's reply would be – and Emilia Guliciuc did remark it – that no individual has to be absent. Each one has to gain this understanding level and to take part to the general. Any history that lacks a nation is an incomplete one, since that individual did not manage to find its name.

Above all, this book is an excellent proof of pedagogical abilities to explain some complicate relations in a very accessible language. Philosophers use to translate everything in less known terms and so, many virtual readers became unable to come close to philosophy. Therefore, this book is, again, a remarkable work. It brings Noica in our proximity and helps him to influence our vision. In fact, is the best service one may do to a philosopher!

**Laura Gheorghiu**  
West University of Timișoara

## MANIFESTATIONS SCIENTIFIQUES

### SYMPOSION NATIONAL DE PHILOSOPHIE "LOGIQUE ET CONNAISSANCE" Timișoara, 27-28 mai 1999

Cet symposium a été organisé par l'Université de l'Ouest de Timișoara, la Chaire de Philosophie, en collaboration avec l'Académie Roumaine – la Filiale Timișoara.

Le but de cette manifestation scientifique a été de relever l'actualité et la complexité des thèmes et des idées dans les domaines: logique, épistémologie, philosophie du langage, esthétique, connaissance scientifique.

Ils ont participé avec des communications les membres de la chaire de Philosophie: le prof. Dr. Constantin Grecu (*De la logica științei la retorica științei*), le prof. Dr. Ioan Biriș (*Valențele cognitive ale claselor mereologice*), le prof. Dr. Cornel Haranguș (*Noțiunea de haos și ontologia filosofică*), le prof. Dr. Viorel Colțescu (*Presupoziții ale deducției*

*transcendentale kantienne*), le conf. Dr. Ilona Bîrzescu (*Hermeneutica și logica dublului sens*), le lect. Dr. Iancu Lucica (*Un concept aristotelic de presupuziție*), le lect. Dr. Ionel Narița (*Problema autorității epistemice*), le lect. Dr. Aurelia Mariș (*Problema umanismului la Gianni Vattimo*), le lect. Alexandru Petrescu (*M.Heidegger și deducția transcendentă a categoriilor*), l'assist. Florentina Muțiu (*Raționalitatea în cunoașterea științifică*), l'assist. Claudiu Mesaroș (*Latura sceptică a metafizicii aristotelice*).

Aussi, parmi les participants on peut mentionner: Florea Lucaci (Arad), Călin Petcana (Timișoara), Laura Gheorghiu (Timișoara) et le lect. Silvia Lucica (Timișoara).

Florentina Muțiu

### THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE Suceava, "Ștefan cel Mare" University, 15-16 october 1999

The title of this year colloquium was "Limbe și comunicare" (*Languages and communication*) and was covered by four disciplinary sections: *Modele interculturale* (Intercultural Models), *Norma lingvistică între tradiție și modernitate* (Linguistic

*Rule Between Tradition and Modernity*), *Semiotica discursului* (Semiotics of the Discourse), *Poetica discursului* (Poetics of the Discourse). We note the very inspired motto that was chosen by the organizers: *Tout est signe, mais le signe est-il tout?*

The colloquium was opened by a festive award of the title *Doctor Honoris Causa* to Mr. Professor Eugen Coșeriu from Tübingen, Germany, Mss. Anne-Marie Houdebine-Gravaud from Paris, France and Mr. Constantin Ciopraga from Iași, Romania, who kept some very interesting and fully audienced conferences the days after.

Other participants came from: University of Angers (France), University of Bălți (Moldova Republic), Academy of Sciences Chișinău, State University of Chișinău, Linguistics Institute from Chișinău, "Ion Creangă" University of Chișinău, Debrecen University (Hungary), University Lyon 2 (France), University of Montpellier (France), University Paris V.

Romanian invited participants came from Institutes and Universities all over the country: Bacău University, București University, Linguistics Institute from București, "Spiru Haret" University from București, Academy of Economic Sciences from București, "Babeș-Bolyai" University of Cluj, Romanian Academy Cluj-Napoca, Constanța University, Craiova University, Galați University, Iași University, Philology Institute from Iași, Iași Institute of European Studies, Iași University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Oradea University, Suceava University, West University of Timișoara, Timișoara "Politehnica" University.

The academic participants from West University of Timișoara were Gheorghe CLITAN (he presented the paper "Mecanisme de instituire a presupuzițiilor în discurs"), Laura GHEORGHIU ("Limbaajul ca instrument de generare a masei de manevră. Studiu de caz: Orwell), Elena GHIȚĂ ("Senses symbolistiques réversibles"), Claudiu MESAROȘ ("Semiotica discursului la Aristotel"), Alexandru PETRESCU ("Martin Heidegger și originalitatea limbajului poetic").

On October 16<sup>th</sup> there was also a workshop having as subject *Multiculturalitatea – risc sau șansă în dezvoltarea grupurilor? (Multiculturality – risk or chance in the development of the groups?)*.

We can appreciate the colloquium as a high standard scientific event; participants shown themselves very pleased by the level of discussions and debates were greatly fruitful. One single observation could be made, namely that all the papers were included in the four special linguistic sections; the contributions coming from the philosophic disciplines (Philosophy of language, Rhetoric) should have had a section of their own in order to assure a higher level of philosophical debates.

Claudiu Mesaroș

### "THE END OF THE STATE? REGIONALISM & GLOBALISATION"

Civic Education Project 8<sup>th</sup> National Student Conference, Cluj-Napoca 2-5 March 2000

The CEP 8<sup>th</sup> National Student Conference Romania meant for most of its participants an inspiring atmosphere, the ideal background within they could

thoroughly express themselves in an intellectual sense. The CEP staff and the other organisers deserve our congratulations for the way they have

succeeded to ensure the optimum conditions for such an event. Thanks have to be expressed not only for the great intellectual atmosphere but also for the appropriate accommodations.

Its interdisciplinarity and cosmopolitan spirit induced the special allure of this event. We had the opportunity to ascertain opinions expressed by students in economics, legal studies, political science, sociology, and philosophy and to debate the main topics from different theoretical standpoints. Romanian and foreign CEP instructors accustomed to the theme and to the papers proposed in each panel moderated our debates. The idea to render the papers and their presentations in English was welcomed by the participants. The elevated performance of the most of the discussants and students contributed to the high level of this serious academic event.

This national conference gathered students from all the great Romanian Universities: Bucharest University, UBB Cluj, Cuza University Iași, and West University of Timisoara. The participants, in an inclusive enumeration, were: Laura Necolai, Mihai and Iluț Copaciu, Coralia Rusu, Bunea Rareș, Crețu Valentin, Maria Șerban, Oana Bunău, Camelia Dusa, Radu Moldovan, Costina-Corina Barbu, Constantin Cojocariu, Vlad Andriescu, Alex-Leonard Ioniță, Andrei Mihoc, Roxana Ciurcanu, Alina Dana Țaralungă, Crețu Andrei, Lavinia-Cristina Samoilă, Bogdan Maniu, Iuliana Topăleanu, Simona Rentă and Paul Marian, Andreea Pârcălabu, Dragoș Bârlea, Ciprian Nițu, Irina Tănăsescu, Smaranda Ignat, Maria Augusta Szasz, Magdalena Misleanu, Noemi Brodocs, Cristina Wlassopol, Doina Cajvăneanu, Ion-Traian Ștefan, Valeriu Lingurar, Liana Radu, Mirela Arsene and Iuliana Mihalcea, Mihaela

Scarlat, Anca-Laura Mocan, Melinda Torok, Alin Dosoștei, Ludmila Martanovschi, Gabriel Leanca, Constantin Orzescu, Daniela Dăscălița, Georgeta Miclăuș, Ștefania Toma, Moni Alina Nechită, Valentin Nicolescu, Mihaela-Simona Pricop, and Dan Cristian Diaconu. Our University was represented by Andreea Pârcălabu (Faculty of Sociology), Costel Orzescu (MA Student in Sociology), Ciprian Nițu (Faculty of Sociology), Andrei Mihoc (Faculty of Economic Studies), Ion-Traian Ștefan (Faculty of Philosophy), and Valeriu Lingurar (Faculty of Philosophy) trained for this event by the CEP instructors Corneliu Berari and Petru Vîrgă.

The CEP conference lasted 4 days and its schedule included, besides the presentations and the discussions proposed by the 12 panels, the Opening Ceremony conducted by Dr. Liliana Popescu (CEP Country Director), the Welcome Reception hosted by Restaurant Casa Universitarilor, the Closing Ceremony and disco.

The conference suggested an extensive range of themes related to the general topic **“The End of the State? Regionalism and Globalisation”**.

Panel 1: **Dynamics of Globalisation and Regional Development** (discussant: Horațiu Rus, Faculty of Economics, UBB Cluj);

Panel 2: **Sectoral Vehicles of Globalisation** (discussant: Alexandra Horobeț, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest);

Panel 3: **Regionalism: Romania and its Neighbours** (discussant: Stephen Blackwell, Faculty of European Studies, UBB Cluj);

Panel 4: **Euro-Atlantic Integration** (discussant: Olivia Rusu Todorean, Faculty of Political Science, UBB Cluj);



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Panel 5: **NATO, Security, and Eastern Europe** (discussant: Radu Carp, Faculty of Political and Administrative Sciences, Bucharest University);

Panel 6: **The State and Economic Consequences of Globalisation** (discussant: Dana Popa, Faculty of European Studies, UBB Cluj);

Panel 7: **Conceptions of Nation and Nation-State** (discussant: Petru Vîrgă, Faculty of Sociology and Psychology, West University of Timisoara);

Panel 8: **Women** (discussant: Liliana Popescu, CEP Country Director, National School of Political Studies and Economic Administration, Bucharest);

Panel 9: **Civil Society, Regionalism and Local Identities** (discussant: Yasmin Lodi, Faculty of Political and Administrative Sciences, Bucharest University);

Panel 10: **Ideology, Science and Education** (discussant: Eniko Magyari Vincze, Faculty of European Studies, UBB Cluj);

Panel 11: **Identities and Minorities** (discussant: Viorel Anastasoae, Faculty of European Studies, UBB Cluj);

Panel 12: **Mass-media** (discussant: Corneliu Berari, West University of Timisoara).

The CEP National Conference was a successful event; an extensive number of participants have indicated that it was one of the most important experiences of their academic careers so far. The organisers and the students managed to find the proper balance between academic seriousness and entertainment.

Valeriu Lingurar  
Ion-Traian Ștefan

## SESSION NATIONALE DES COMMUNICATIONS SCIENTIFIQUES

“Dimensiuni teoretico-praxiologice în științele socio-umane”

(“Dimensions théoretico-praxiologiques dans les sciences socio-humaines”)

Timișoara, 10 décembre 1999.

Cette session nationale est organisée chaque année par l'Université de l'Ouest de Timișoara, L'Association des étudiants dans les sciences Socio-humaines. La manifestation a été déroulée en sept sections: I. Sociologie; II. Psychologie; III. Assistance Sociale; IV. Sciences de l'Education; V. Sciences politiques; VI. Etudes européennes; VII. Philosophie.

Cette session est très importante pour les professeurs et les étudiants dans les sciences sociales parce que faut que la complexité des problèmes et des recherches dans ces domaines doit

être discuté dans une manifestation commune.

La section de Philosophie a été honoré par neuf communications: Gheorghe CLITAN, lect. univ. drd., *“Tradiții și perspective actuale în abordarea pragmatică a limbajului”* (*“Traditions et perspectives actuelles dans la recherche pragmatique du langage”*), Paul KUN, lect. univ. dr., *“Realitatea virtuală – o abordare filosofică”* (*“La réalité virtuelle – une approche philosophique”*), Alexandru PETRESCU, lect. univ. drd., *“Natura schemelor transcendente la Kant”* (*“La nature des schémas*

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*transcendentalles chez Kant*”), Lucian VESALON, prep. drd., “*Dilema textului filosofic*” (“*La dilemme du texte philosophique*”), Claudiu MESAROȘ, prep. drd., “*Cercetarea empirică la presocratici*” (“*La recherche empirique chez présocratiques*”), Lorena ARMULESCU, étudiante, “*Postmodernismul ca relativism axiologic*” (“*Le postmodernisme comme relativisme axiologique*”), Adrian BRICIU, étudiant, “*Principiile cunoașterii în filosofia lui G.W. Leibniz*” (“*Les principes de la connaissance*

*dans la philosophie de G. W. Leibniz*”), Simona VUCU, étudiante, “*Anaxagora – Leibniz: o paralelă posibilă*” (“*Anaxagora – Leibniz: une parallèle possible*”), Dan Cristian ZEMAN, étudiant, “*Mario Bunge. O încercare de reabilitare a ontologiei din perspectiva teoriilor epistemologice contemporane*” (“*Mario Bunge: Essay de réhabilitation de l’ontologie dans la perspective des ontologies contemporaines*”).

Claudiu Mesaroș