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SOMMAIRE

LES NOTIONS DE CHAMP, SYSTEME ET PATTERN DANS L'ONTOLOGIE
SOCIALE

Ioan Biris

Tout en préférant comme unité d'analyse la relation, le rapport social et non pas "le fait", "la chose", dans sa célèbre distinction entre *Gemeinschaft* et *Gesellschaft*, Tönnies relève le fait qu'il faut comprendre "une communauté d'esprit" sous un double aspect (en tant que rapports communs avec le lieu et rapports communs avec la divinité), tous ces rapports ayant une nature mentale (Tönnies, 1944, pp. 15-16).

A travers le temps on a souvent critiqué sa théorie, mais elle est tout de même restée un point de référence. La distinction entre *Gemeinschaft* et *Gesellschaft* a occupé dans les manuels de sociologie à peu près la même place que le théorème de Pythagore occupe dans les manuels de géométrie élémentaire (Boudon, 1990, p. 300).

On a remarqué le fait que les idées de Tönnies sont tout particulièrement protéiques lorsqu'on emploie la notion de "communauté" non pas dans le sens de structure sociale mais dans celui de réseau de significations, de réseau culturel qui fonde les principales catégories du social (Badie, 1991, p. 112).

A présent c'est le sociologue P. Bourdieu qui utilise tout particulièrement l'idée de champ dans cette direction. D'une manière synthétique on pourrait structurer les principaux traits qui caractérisent la notion de champ dans la conception du sociologue français (Bourdieu, 1986) comme il suit: a) un champ socio-culturel ne représente pas seulement de fermeture, mais aussi de l'ouverture; b) dans un champ de forces ce sont les relations de "réciprocité" qui prédominent; c) un champ socio-culturel exprime un espace autonome qui peut comprendre aussi une série de sous-champs; d) le degré d'autonomie d'un champ est mesuré selon sa puissance d'imposer ses propres principes; e) le champ ne suppose pas seulement d'homogénéité, mais aussi de l'hétérogénéité.

Comprise de la sorte, la notion de champ entre en compétition avec d'autres notions consacrées dans les sciences sociales, mais tout aussi polymorphes: les notions de "système", de "contexte" et de "pattern". Dans la conception de Bourdieu, par exemple, la notion de "champ" doit remplacer - dans le domaine des sciences sociales - la notion structuraliste de "système", celle-ci étant trop pauvre pour exprimer la complexité de la vie sociale.

Pour pouvoir distinguer entre les notions mentionnées ci-dessus nous proposons avoir en vue la classification faite par Kant à l'égard de la nature des

connexions entre différents éléments (Kant, 1969, p. 189). Nous pouvons faire appel à cette classification car aussi bien la notion de champ que les autres notions (système, contexte, pattern) visent, en essence, les modalités de corrélation des éléments en ensembles, en entiers.

Dans la conception de Kant une liaison peut être: 1) une composition (c'est à dire une synthèse, surtout de l'homogène, synthèse où les éléments ne s'appartiennent pas nécessairement les uns aux autres, cette composition pouvant être à son tour "une agrégation extensive" ou bien "une coalition intensive"; 2) une connexion (cas où les parties composantes s'appartiennent nécessairement les unes aux autres, la connexion pouvant être une connexion "physique" ou bien "métaphysique").

La composition-agrégation constitue la forme la plus simple d'un ensemble. Dans ce cas-ci les éléments sont réunis d'une manière extérieure, tout comme dans une collection. La relation y est plutôt spatiale. Dans les sciences socio-humaines une telle situation est exprimée parfois par le syntagme d' "aire sociale" ou "aire culturelle".

La situation change lorsqu'on passe à la composition-coalition. Dans cette situation, les composantes coopèrent, leur relation ayant un "sens". Il y est question d'une relation fonctionnelle et non pas d'une relation organique. Une telle intégration est basée sur certaines "constantes" et sur le principe de l'identité réductive. D'habitude cette situation est exprimée par la notion de "pattern" (lorsque l'accent tombe sur les traits ou sur les éléments constants, typiques) ou par la notion de "contexte" (lorsqu'on met l'accent sur l'influence de l'ensemble sur les parties et sur la dimension de la compréhension au cadre de l'effort explicatif).

Le correspondant contemporain de ce que Kant nommait la "connexion physique" paraît être la notion de "système". Bien que cette notion ait connu un succès notable dans la philosophie et la science de ce siècle, de nombreux analystes croient que le concept de "système" est trop pauvre pour les sciences sociales. Nous n'y mentionons que la critique de Habermas qui met en évidence le fait que, dû à sa teinte anhistorique, généralisatrice et formelle, on ne peut pas se servir de la notion de "système" dans l'analyse du social (Habermas, 1983).

Enfin, nous croyons que la notion de "champ" a son équivalent dans ce que Kant nommait "la connexion métaphysique", c'est à dire ce type de connexion où les parties sont intégrées d'une manière organique, non pas seulement d'une manière fonctionnelle. Dans ce cas, l'entier est immanent aux parties et les parties sont immanentes à l'entier. Si la notion de "système" répond mieux aux besoins de généralisation, la notion de "champ" répond mieux aux exigences de particularisation. Ce n'est pas au hasard que l'idée de "champ social" et de "champ culturel" est employée surtout de la perspective des orientations ethnométhodologique et ethnocentriste dans les sciences sociales.

Dans la situation de "champ" on ne peut ni réduire les parties les unes aux autres, ni les séparer rigoureusement les unes des autres. Chaque "partie" est une concentration de champ et un agent d'interaction. Ça va sans dire que ces traits sont valables pour ce qui représente "le noyau" d'un champ (outre ce noyau, il existe aussi, de règle, une "zone fluide" où ce sont les alternatives qui prédominent).

Grâce à sa puissante cohésion intérieure, le noyau d'un champ (et nous y avons en vue tout particulièrement un champ symbolique, culturel) peut fonctionner comme un "réseau préexistant" (3). Mais entre le noyau et la zone fluide du champ ont lieu des processus de communication et d'influence. Certaines alternatives peuvent passer de la zone fluide dans le noyau, tout comme certains composants anciens du

noyau, tout en entrant en compétition avec d'autres nouveaux, peuvent passer du noyau dans la zone fluide. On appelle d'habitude le processus d'irradiation du champ à partir du noyau vers la zone fluide - un processus de "diffusion", tandis qu'inversement il s'agit d'un processus "d'absorption". Le noyau du champ fonctionne donc aussi bien comme "centre d'irradiation" que comme "attracteur archétypique" (Brill, 1993). A ces deux processus s'associent deux fonctions solidaires, c'est à dire au processus d'irradiation correspond la fonction générative du champ, tandis qu'au processus d'absorption c'est la fonction intégrative qui correspond.

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EPIC TRUTH AND THE TESTIMONY OF THE MUSES

Cristian GASPAR

Iliad's second book contains a famous catalogue of the Greek ships gathered at Troy (vss.494-760)¹. Nowadays, it is widely considered among the classical scholars that it represents one of the Mycenaean "survivals" in the poem². But to us *Boiotia*, as the passage is currently referred to, does not present any interest here other than the opportunity it gives to the poet to utter an invocation to the Muses exceeding by far, in length and, perhaps in importance, all other invocations to be found in the Homeric corpus. It includes some very significant phrases concerning the type of relationship established between the poet and the Muses, their function and, in a broader perspective, the relation existing between the truth and the epic narrative. We intend to analyze this metapoetical text whose correct interpretation may enable us to draw some general conclusions regarding the truth-criteria that makes its appearance generating significant alteration of the traditional social and spiritual patterns.

Before taking our research one step further we have thought it necessary to clearly state that Homer is an oral poet and should be treated as such. Both the poems that have come down to us under his name are deeply implanted with the marks of orality. That they had to wait until the third decade of this century to be uncovered and systematically studied, is in itself a remarkable fact. The place of Homeric poetry among the oral literary creations was established beyond any possible doubt by Milman Parry³ and his disciple and successor, Albert B. Lord⁴. Their works put an end to the endless debating that had been going on about the "Homeric Question" since the XVIIIth century⁵. As a result of our accepting to integrate Homer into an oral tradition, entirely different from the written tradition whose principles still serve as a fundament to traditional literary criticism, we have to assume entirely different standards in evaluating and analyzing the relation established between Homeric poetry and the truth. The text which we take as a starting point is itself a warning that the tradition, as we can perceive it from Homer's words, is not the same tradition upon which our modern European culture is based, it is a more ancient way of seeing things and its primary meanings had become partially unknown, or, at least, less familiar, even to the ancient Greeks. We are able to retrieve those meanings – only in a limited degree, naturally, – by attempting to reconfigure them with the help of the data we can obtain comparing different cultural environments which once shared the same archaic horizon.

Before beginning to list the Greek participants to the siege of Troy, Homer addresses these words to the Muses:

*“Εσπετε νυν μοι, Μουσσαι Ολυμπια δωματ’ εχουσαι –
υμεις γαρ θεαι εστε, παρεστε τε ιστε τε παντα,
ημεις δε κλεος οιον ακουομεν ουδε τι ιδμεν...”*⁶

The reason for invoking the Muses seems to be the fact that the *αοιδοι* do not know anything⁷ (*ουδε τι ιδμεν*), they can only hear a certain *κλεος* (*κλεος οιον ακουομεν*). In opposition with the earthly singers there are the Muses: Olympian goddesses, they are *present* (*παρεστε*) and know everything (*ιστε τε παντα*). A contrast is thus created between the poet-singer, whose ears can catch but a □□□□ about the facts he praises in his song, and the Muses who enjoy the special privilege of assisting "as witnesses" to the accomplishment of those facts and, consequently, of having a full, direct knowledge about them. This might lead us to conclude that the poet's part is only that of an impersonal and accurate transmitter who passes on the information provided by the divine beings who possess him during the performance. We would have to conclude also that the poet himself has no knowledge about the information he is transmitting⁸.

In fact, there are reasons to believe that the situation is not all like the one described above: the privileged position enjoyed by the *αοιδοι* in ancient times – and, most of all, by

Homer –, the prophetic quality assigned to their sayings, their widespread reputation as seers cannot be accounted for if we agree to reduce the poet to a mere versificator, an instrument for transmitting things he himself has no knowledge of whatsoever. On the other hand, we could not agree with Jean-Pierre Vernant's conclusion that: "the memory does not provide the capacity to evoke personal memories, to revive a range of events lost in the past. It gives the poet – in the same way it gives the seer, too – the privilege of seeing the permanent and never changing reality; it unites him with the spirit of the origins, revealed but to a small degree to the people and soon to be cast away again by the time, in its passing"⁹. This is, to our opinion, a rather extreme position and the poet himself will deny any "vision" of this kind.

The difficulty we have encountered is but an apparent one. It fades away as soon as we reestablish the true, primary meanings of the key words in the passage quoted above. In this case, the true, primary meaning is the etymological. Thus, in our view, *ουδε τι ιδμεν* does not imply any "lack of knowledge" for the poet; it simply states that the poet himself *has not seen* all the wondrous things he is singing about. "To know" is only a secondary, derived meaning of the verb *οιδα*, primarily, the verb derived from the root **Fιδ-* meant nothing else but "I saw", as a comparison with its Indo-European cognates will show: Skr. *veda*, Ochl. *Vede*, both of the same root, share the same primary meaning. The semantic evolution of "I saw" towards "I know" is natural and perfectly documented. However, we think that for our context it is not the later, derived meaning which is the best suited, but the primary, etymological one. We shall have to operate the same change in the case of *ιστε* (vs.485): the Muses *can see* all the facts mentioned by the poet in his song because they are *present* (*παρεστε*) when these are accomplished. A strong argument in favour of reestablishing the primary meanings of both verbal forms is the significant opposition of two pronominal forms *υμεις γαρ ... ημεις δε* (the use of the particles *μεν* and *δε* emphasizes this adversative opposition). In a similar way *παρεστε* and *παντα* are opposed to *ακουομεν* and *ουδεν*.

Our conjecture is based upon a precedent created by the famous French scholar Émile Benveniste. He applied the same procedure in a very similar context¹⁰, reestablishing the older meaning of the verb *ειδειν* "to see" in a ritual formula (appearing several times in *Iliad*) which invokes the gods as witnesses to an oath that is about to be uttered: *Ιστο νυν Ζευς πρωτα ... Γη τε και Ηελιος*¹¹. As Benveniste's conclusions present a great interest for our own research, we consider it necessary to reproduce them here *in extenso*: "Il faut rendre ici à *Ιστο* sa pleine force étymologique: non pas seulement «qu'il sache», mais proprement, «qu'il voie». La racine **wid-* survit dans cet emploi avec toute sa valeur. Il s'agit d'établir les dieux comme témoins du serment; le témoin, à date très ancienne, est témoin en tant qu'il sait, mais tout d'abord en tant qu'il a vu."¹² The linguistic proofs quoted by Benveniste to sustain his conjecture are quite convincing: besides Skr. *vettar* "witness", the exact correspondent of Greek *ιστωρ*, Goth. *weitwo s* and Old Irish *fiadu* (<*weidon), all meaning "witness", the French scholar also mentions a fragment of *Satapatha Brahmana* which dwells on the credibility of different kind of witnesses in case of a conflict: "now, if a dissension should arise between two people, one saying 'I have seen' and other 'I have heard' the credit should be given to the one who said 'I have seen'¹³. The conclusion is: "entre celui qui a vu et celui qui a entendu, c'est toujours à celui qui a vu qu'il faut ajouter foi. [...] Le témoignage de la vue est irrécusable; il est le seul"¹⁴.

If we apply the same principle to our text, which has, by now, regained its whole semantic value, of which so many translations deprive it¹⁵, we notice that the reason for invoking the Muses has become obvious: they are called upon to provide an undeniable testimony – precisely because they witnessed themselves what had happened, they saw everything – and, in this way, to sustain the poet's song which is based only upon things that have reached his ears, the *κλεος*,

We have then to proceed further in search for other passages in the poem that might confirm this interpretation and test its validity. In the eighth canto of the *Odyssey* an old *aioidos* is presented to us whom the muse "loved so much that she gave him – as the poet puts it – both a good and an evil" (*διδου αγαθον τε κακον τε*)¹⁶ meaning that "he lost his eye sight, but received the sweet song instead" (*οφθαλμων μεν αμερσε διδου δ' ηδειαν αιοιδην*)¹⁷. When asked to sing before Odysseus, at that time a guest of honour at the court of Alkinous, the king of the Phaeacians, the bard, "stirred by the Muse" (*Μουσ' αρ αιοιδον ανηκεν*)¹⁸, begins to weave his song, telling about "glorious deeds of heroes" (*κλεα ανδρων*)¹⁹, more exactly about the quarrel between Odysseus and Achilles. Thus, an opportunity is given to Odysseus to assist at the telling of a

story whose protagonists has been. As a consequence, he would undoubtedly be the most authorized judge of the song “the fame of which had already reached the widespread sky” (*οιμης της τοτ’ αρα κλειος ουρανον ευρυν ικανε*)²⁰. His reaction as a listener presents a great interest to us: his way of evaluating the song of Demodokos may enable us to identify the main criteria that were operational within the oral tradition when an epic narrative of this kind had to be judged. After having listened with strained attention the verses that were glorifying a deed in which he himself had played some part, Odysseus magnificently honours the bard. He sends the blind singer the “hero’s potion”, the most wanted piece of the roasted swine, to which only the most prestigious heroes were entitled. His gesture shows most eloquently that the singers enjoyed a considerable fame and appreciation (*τιμηης*) and were treated as venerable, objects of *αιδως*, a term whose complex moral and religious meanings are difficult to render in other language than Greek²¹. Odysseus’s remark about the way in which Demodokos had elaborated his song are even more flattering: he has sung “according to the custom” (*κατα κοσμον*) the Achaean tribulations “as if he had witnessed them himself” (*ωσ τε που η αυτος παρεων*) or “as if he had heard them from someone else” (*η αλλου ακουσας*)²². This is undoubtedly a praise, but is bound to arouse our curiosity, to puzzle us even: as Demodokos is blind, what would have been the use for him “to assist as a witness”? What does Odysseus really mean?

The answer is not hard to find: the hero is merely stating the two main criteria which play decisive part in evaluating an epic song within the oral tradition. The song is considered to be “true” (for this is the main concern of the author, and not the artistic quality) only if it proceeds – as we have already seen – from a direct testimony, this being the real reason for their invocation in the opening of each song. On the other hand, the truth may be embodied in the song when this *new* song is but another version, a mere reproduction, of an older one, *heard* and learned from another bard who was singing under the powerful spell of the divine inspiration or was reproducing, in his turn, a song that he himself *had heard* from others. And it had to be a song composed and articulated following the composition rules promoted and sanctioned by a century-old tradition.

Therefore, we think that the poet’s specific knowledge, far from being underestimated if compared to the direct knowledge of the Muses, is, on the contrary, presented as having a quite similar value, in spite of being mediated. It is even implied that the truth may be attained *either* one way *or* the other. One thing is sure, though: the song one *hears* from the others has to present the mark of the tradition, and this might be either (*η*) the testimony of the Muses invoked in the *proimion* or (*h*) the guaranteed quality of an uninterrupted tradition. But what exactly is this mark? Which are the distinctive features of tradition-sanctioned songs heard by the pupils from their masters and perpetuated through generations and generations of singers? What are the conditions to be met with so that a song may qualify as *κατα κοσμον* and *κατα μοιραν* “according to the custom, as prescribed”? These are the requests explicitly made by Odysseus when asking for a new song, the one that narrates one of his greatest achievements, the famous story of the Trojan Horse.

In order to find suitable answers to the questions asked above we may have to leave Homer for a while and look into the testimonies provided to a careful reader by other epic traditions belonging to the Indo-European peoples. There have been many attempts²³ – some of them quite successful – to reconstruct a common Indo-European epic heritage using the same comparative methods that had proved their efficiency in the field of linguistic studies. The result are very encouraging and suggest that, within certain limits, the data we may obtain from the study of Romanian, Serbian or Albanian epic tradition could be pertinent for interpreting the Homeric poems. As the comparative study of different epic traditions has already seen some illustrious precedents (Parry and Lord have brought upon a real “revolution” of the Homeric studies using this approach), we shall endeavour to take the same route.

A first confirmation of the date we have already obtained through our analysis of the Homeric lines is offered by the verses that end an Albanian epic song: “Je chante, mes amis, comme le reportent les vieux, / Puisque là-bas je n’ai jamais été. / Ainsi, dit-on, qu’il fut aux anciens temps”²⁴. In other words, the bard does not sing about what he has *seen*, but exactly as he has *heard* it *reported* since the days of old. Other poems are even more helpful: “C’est ainsi qu’on m’a dit / Que cela s’était passé aux temps jadis, / Car je n’ai point connu ces temps anciens”²⁵; “J’ai chanté une geste qui m’a été chantée / Car dans ces parages je n’ai jamais été”²⁶. It seems now that the proof of authenticity, of the truth contained in the poems, isn’t so much the direct testimony, not even that of the Muses, but the sole fact that the poem

is sung exactly as the current singer has heard it sung, the fact that it has been sung *in the same form* since the days of old.

The Romanian "lăutari", traditional keepers and interpreters of the heroic epic, operate with the same truth-criteria. The name of the song, *cântece bătrânești* "songs of old", is a testimony by itself: it clearly emphasizes that the songs have been kept *din bătrâni, din oameni buni*, "from the old, good people" and perpetuate a multiseccular tradition, whose only guarantee of truthfulness is this oral way of transmission. When asked where he had learned to sing the story of Toma Alimoș (a Romanian traditional epic hero), Alexandru Manea, a bard from Furești, answered: "I [know it] from the elders, from the ones who remember. [...] This is a very old song. Even my father's father has sung it"²⁷. Tudor Fieraru, a *lăutar* from Măldăreni, wishes to assure us that his epic songs are authentic: "[I tell it] as I have learned it then, a long time ago"²⁸. The same concern for the truth may be guessed from the words of another *lăutar*, living in Cocioc-Snagov: "This [song] is not heard, read in the books, it is heard from a certain Falcaș of Falcoș; he was a hundred and five when he told me this song, some thirty years ago"²⁹. The epic songs use to say about their heroes: "Și s-au dus, *nu se mai vede* / Numele nu li se pierde, / Că plățiți la lăutari / De-l spune la zile mari" ("And they have gone, *cannot be seen* anymore / But their name is never lost / For you pay the *lăutari* / Who tell it on days of importance")³⁰. Although a visual contact with these legendary figures is out of the question on account of their "having gone" and, therefore, direct testimony of their facts is not possible, the name still persists and it is *told* (i.e. *sung*) on important occasions with the sole purpose of *să se ducă pomina* ("for the fame to be spread"), as Romanian epic songs usually say. Once again, we come across the same positive connotation of saying and hearing: the glorious deeds, worthy of being incessantly repeated, whose *pomină* "fame" – the exact equivalent of Hom. *κλέος* – has spread all over the earth, are told again and again by the professional "singers of tales". They possess a highly-developed system of themes and formulas which they constantly shape and combine (as they have learned to from those of old) thus perpetuating and re-creating the tradition. There is a strong belief that this oral tradition is deathless, as another formula claims: "Și, neică, s-oa pomeni / Cât soare pe cer va fi, / Soarele merge ș-apune, / Cuvintele to' să spune" ("And it will be remembered / As long as the sun shines in the sky, / The sun travels and sets [each day] / But the words are always spoken")³¹. Florea Pucă, a well-known Romanian *lăutar*, whose words were recorded in 1959, said: "those will never be forgotten; the *young* ones, yes, they are easy to forge, but not the *old* ones: they are never forgotten because they come from the old, from the time when great heroic deeds were performed"³². He was referring to the recent epic songs (the ones called *young*) that appeared during the first decades of our century, clearly and most carefully distinguishing them from the archaic heroic songs (the *old* ones) which he particularly cherished and sang. The intrinsic value of this testimony becomes even greater if we consider the fact that it was recorded in 1959 when it was obvious to anyone (not the singer, however!) that the epic song, far from being eternal had entered in a phase of irreversible decline.

But the eternity of the oral tradition is constantly stated in most of the epic creations: they were meant to last – as the ones who produced and interpreted them liked to say – "as long as there is sun in the sky" i.e. for ever. It was the very survival of those songs, their uninterrupted transmission through the centuries that seemed to guarantee their eternity.

We should, therefore, consider this belief in its eternity as one of the specific characteristics of the heroic epic along with the other main feature: its truthfulness. One is the direct consequence of the other: the poems last for an eternity because they express the truth, which is eternal. Their transmission is guaranteed by an unbroken formal tradition that Lord has so brilliantly studied³³ and, to the same extent, by a continuous thematic tradition. Its contents, too were carefully analyzed by Lord, and he concluded: "it is of *necessary* nature of tradition that it seek and maintain stability, that it preserve itself. And this tenacity springs neither from perverseness, nor from an abstract principle of absolute art, but from a desperately compelling conviction that what the tradition is preserving is the very means of attaining life and happiness. The traditional oral epic singer is not an artist, he is a seer. The patterns of thought that he has inherited came into being to serve not art, but religion in its most basic sense. [...] Art appropriated the forms of oral narrative. But it is from the dynamic life principle in myth, the wonder-working tale, that art derived its force"³⁴.

We think there can hardly be any serious doubts about this: the epic songs contain *μυθολογία* paradigms, prestigious models that bring order and meaning into the existence of each individual. This is the main part played by the contents of the epic tradition. Their truthfulness

is validated by the testimony of the Muses for they were present *illo tempore* and they saw the accomplishment of those heroic deeds the songs tell us about. The contents of the tradition, its ground are thus authenticated by the direct testimony of the all-knowing Muses. It is not the poet who is taken back, freed of any temporal limitations, towards the fabulous world of the beginnings, as Vernant thought, but the immortal Muses, who were there, eye-witnesses of those archetypal gestures narrated by the songs.

If the contents are sanctioned by the testimony of the Muses, the authenticity of the form is guaranteed solely by the oral way of transmission, however paradoxical that may seem, the truth of the form springs from its unbroken transmission through the ages, from the way it is perpetuated: each disciple *hears* and *learns* the songs from an older master.³⁵ The form he inherits is constantly accompanied by the aura of prestige that comes from immemorial times, when the song was first sung. As long as the form is perceived as perfect and eternal – for it may suffer alterations only to a certain degree and vary within well defined limits – it becomes itself a guardian of hearing interface and sustain each other for the benefit of the truth expressed in the epic songs.

Because the poems contain such fundamental truths, they must be listened to and received in a certain way: the Romanian bards recite, as a prelude to their songs, a *prooimion* meant to state very clearly the need for a certain attitude to be adopted by the audience: “Am zâs verde de-arămeasă, / la s-asculta’ dumneavoastră / ‘ceastă poveste domnească, / Trebuie să isprăvească / La cinstiț’ ca dumneavoastră! / Cine, frate, ne-o asculta, / O mai alege ceva; / Cine nu ne-o asculta, / Om înșâra / Ce-om putea / Și ne-om scăpa de belea!” (“Listen all you squires here / To this princely story; / It must fulfill its end / For the honoured gents like you! / And of them shall grasp something, / But for those who will not listen / We shall improvise (litt. list) / Whatever we could / And we’ll get rid of this burden!”³⁶. Such an incipit is often accompanied by “C-așa e datina!” (“For this is our custom!”), a fair equivalent of the Homeric phrases *κατα κοσμον* and *κατα μοιραν*. The request for the listeners’ attention is not only a habitual *captatio benevolentiae*, as it may look, but the explicit statement of the necessary conditions for a correct and efficient hearing of a song which contains fundamental life-patterns. If the requested attitude is missing, the song and its performance have lost their point. The custom asks that the words invested with the power should not be left to sound in vain. Therefore, the song will turn into an improvisation for the nonce and the whole performance will lose its almost sacred character, the singing becoming a mere “burden” for the singer. Homer tells us about his bards that their songs were followed by a breathless audience in a perfect silence³⁷. The power of the word, when uttered in the way prescribed by the tradition, does not go to waste, it enchants and teaches, it slips into the souls of those who listen the fill to follow the life-patterns proposed by the songs.

We shall not end our research before taking a brief look at the difference between the kind of perenity claimed by the oral tradition and the permanence of the written tradition. It is self evident that as soon as writing became popular in Ancient Greece a new tradition was born and started to grow, the tradition of the written word. It will no longer need the testimony of the form because the new forms were exclusively visual and tended to remain virtually unchanged as soon as they were put down. The prestige of those who used to speak out the text of the epic poems in the same way they had heard it recited (or sung) by others before them will progressively diminish. The word, fixed as it is on a durable material, will become the only certitude. Although oral tradition has never fully died (neither in Greece, nor elsewhere) with the emerging reign of the written word, the virtually unlimited prestige it had enjoyed during the archaic period (and of which Homer could never be deprived!) kept fading away until it vanished almost completely. *Μυθος*, the “effective” word of the epic was to become an old woman’s tale, that particular tale against which Plato so vigorously protested. It is not our purpose here to follow all this evolutionary process, but we should like, however, to discuss two significant aspects: the gradual abandoning of the traditional form and the emergence of new significant truth-criteria. Both these phenomena are closely connected: their simultaneous appearance and parallel development, the capital part they played in the emergence of philosophy and history, both *in statu nascendi* in post-Homeric Greece, at a time when the traditional paradigm was being abandoned, are hardly due to a felicitous coincidence. The new “master of truth”, a truth that has become subject to arguing and speculation, in need of rational evidence so that it could be accepted by those who hear (or, more often, read) it, is entirely different from the Muse-inspired *aoidos*. He may be a historian or a philosopher, but his conduct is the same: while giving up the traditional versified form as a source of meaning and authority, he constantly emphasizes his need to see with his own

eyes, to inquire (*ιστορευω*), trying to become a *ιστωρ* (<*wid-tor* “the one who sees with his own eyes”, later “the one who knows”, but, significantly, not “the seer” in the traditional sense). In doing so, he is usurping the place of the Muses who, from now on, will be exiled on the top of remote Parnassus. No one, but a few frivolous poets in lack of inspiration, will ever invoke them again. The epic narrative about the glorious deeds performed by deathless heroes in the days of old will be replaced by scientific works that present to the public the results of individual inquiry (*ιστοριαι*) and personal opinions as answers to the important questions of humans existence. *Κλεος* will be pushed back to the outskirts of the vocabulary, becoming old and obsolete, just like *κυδος*, another key-word of the tradition. “The glory, the fame” they used to denote will no longer be perceived as related to the repeated hearing³⁸ of epic poems (*κλυειν*). From now on, the fame is known as *δοξα* “the opinion we form about something”. Science and knowledge are strictly associated with research, with the laborious activity of gathering, comparing, classifying and interpreting the data so that a new kind of truth, an absolutely relative truth, may emerge in the end.

The Homeric bards are not deprived of knowledge. It is not the knowledge they lack: what else would then be the *κλεος* that had reached their ears, the fame of glorious men of old whose heroic deeds were praised by so many other singers before them?³⁹ If they lack something, it is the absolute evidence for that truth, the unbreakable proof that can sustain and certify the facts portrayed in the song and offered as existential models to those who listen properly. This proof is beyond the reach of any human powers, and the only ones who can provide it are the Muses, as those who have really seen the things that happened once upon a time. Although they have not been present, the poets know, they had previously heard from their predecessors. They need only to be reminded (*μνησαιαθ'*)⁴⁰ so that they may not be lead astray from the truth. Their limited human powers⁴¹ may prove a burden and cause them to err. But their sacred duty does not allow for any mistakes: they have to know and “utter powerful words” (*μυθησονται*) about those who had come to Troy in search of glory and for a dignifying end to their short lives. They also have to remember the names (*ονομησησων*) of those heroes⁴² and pronounce them one by one, in the same way as the Romanian *lăutari* sing “on important occasions” the names and the fame of those who are gone. The poets need to feel the comforting presence of the Muses right beside them, so that the truth of the tradition may be kept unaltered. The only guides who can lead their paces onto the external paths of the truth are the Muses.

NOTES:

¹ All references are made to *Homeri Opera*, recognouerunt breuique adnotatione critica instruxerunt David B. Monro et Thomas W. Allen, tomus I *Iliadis* libros continens, Oxoni, s.a..

² See G. S. Kirk, *Homer and the Epic*, Cambridge, 1965, pp. 73-4.

³ In this thesis, *L'Épithète traditionnelle dans Homère: Essai sur un problème de style homérique*, Paris, 1928. See also *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*, Oxford, 1971.

⁴ *The Singer of Tales*, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1964.

⁵ See E. R. Dodds, *Homer in Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, edited by Maurice Platnauer, Oxford, 1954, pp. 1-17.

⁶ *Il.*, II 484-6.

⁷ See, for instance, Paul Mazon's translation in *Homère, L'Iliade*, Paris, 1987, (coll. Budé), t.I, p. .

⁸ See Richard Rutherford, *Homer*, “Greece & Rome New Surveys in Classics”, no.26, Oxford, 1996, p.4.

⁹ *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Étude de psychologie historique*, nouvelle édition revue et augmentée, Paris, 1988. We have used the Romanian version, *Mit si gândire în Grecia antică. Studii de psihologie istorică*, traducere de Zoe Petre si Andrei Niculescu, cuvânt înainte de Zoe Petre, Bucuresti, 1995, p.459.

¹⁰ *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, vol. II, sommaires, tableau et index établis par Jean Lallot, [Paris], [1969], pp. 173-5.

¹¹ *Il.*, XIX 258 sqq.

¹² E. Beveniste, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹³ The Sanskrit text *apud* Benveniste, *ibidem*, p.173; the translation in ours.

¹⁴ E. Beveniste, *ibidem*, p. 173-4.

¹⁵ Among others, the Romanian version of the *Iliad* by Murnu; see Homer, *Iliada*, traducere de George Murnu, studiu introductiv, note și glosar de Liviu Franga, București, 1985, p.81.

¹⁶ *Od.*, VIII, 64; references are made to the Greek text published by W. B. Stanford, *ΟΜΗΡΟΥ ΟΔΥΣΣΕΙΑ. The Odyssey of Homer*, edited with general and grammatical introduction, commentary and indexes by ..., vol. I (books I-XII), 2nd edition, London, 1959.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, VIII 65.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, VIII 74.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, VIII 74.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, VIII 75.

²¹ *Aidos* implies, beside “shame” and “sense of honour”, “respect” and even “religious fear”.

²² *Od.*, VIII 89-91.

²³ Among them the most reputed is, perhaps, Rüdiger Schmitt's *Dichtung und Dichtersprache in indogermanischer Zeit*, Wiesbaden, 1967; see also T. V. Gamkrelidze, Vj. V. Ivanov, *Indoevropskij jazyk i indoevropejcy. Rekonstrukcija i istoriko-tipologičeskij analiz prajazyka i protokul'tury*, vol. II, Tbilisi, 1984, pp. 832-42.

²⁴ *Chansonnier épique albanais*, préparation et rédaction Qemal Haxhihasani, Kolë Luka, Alfred Uçi, Misha Trska, illustrations Sali Shijaku, version française Kolë Luka, avant-propos par Ismail Kadare, Tirana, 1983, p. 202.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 299.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 125.

²⁷ *O capodoperă a baladei românești: “Toma Alimos”*, editie critică și studiu introductiv de Iordan Datcu și Viorica Săvulescu, corpus de texte, convorbiri cu rapsozi populari [...], București, 1989, p. 262; the English version is curs for all the Romanian texts further quoted.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 262.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 263.

³⁰ Grigore G. Tocilescu, Christea N. Tapu, *Materialuri folcloristice*, vol. I, editie critică și studiu introductiv de Iordan Datcu, București, 1980, p. 163. The italics in the text are curs.

³¹ Al. I. Amzulescu, *Cântecul epic eroic*, antologie și corpus de texte poetice, București, 1981, p. 196.

³² Idem, *Cântecul nostru bătrânesc*, cuvânt înainte de Iordan Datcu, București, 1986, p. 4.

³³ We disagree with M. I. Finley who speaks of Homer's truthfulness in terms of historic accuracy. Cf. *The World of Odysseus*, New York, 1965; we have used the Romanian version *Lumea lui Odiseu*, traducere de Liliana și D. M. Pippidi, București, 1968 where, at p. 69, certain exaggerated views are to be found. See *contra* Sir John L. Myers, *Homer and His Critics*, edited by Dorothea Gray, London, s.a., p. 247; the author warns against the “extremists who treat Homer as a war-correspondent”.

³⁴ *The Singer of Tales*, pp. 220-1.

³⁵ It might be appropriate, in this context, to note that a part of the sacred tradition of the Indians thought to proceed directly from the divine revelation is called *śruti* from *śru-* “to hear”. Its exact correspondent in Greek is the root of *κλνειν* whence *κλεος* is derived. (See Pierre Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots*, Paris, 1968, vol. III, s.v., p. 540-1).

³⁶ *O capodoperă ...*, p. 209. (Italics ours).

³⁷ *Od.*, I 325 sqq. The poems sung by Phemios, the other Homeric *aoidos*, are defined by Penelope as *θελκτηρια* “enchantments, charms” (vs. 337), a term with powerful magic connotations used elsewhere in connection with Circe (X 291). For this magic power of the well-spoken word see M Detienne, *Stăpânitorii de adevăr în Grecia arhaică*, traducere de Alexandru Niculescu, București, 1996, pp. 57-73. and Andrei Cornea, *Scriere și oralitate în cultura antică*, București, 1988, p. 87.

³⁸ A similar semantic evolution has suffered *cudo*, a very frequent term in the South-Slavic epic songs. Although in the beginning it meant only “that which is heard” as its presence in a *figura etymologica* (e.g. *To se cudo na daleko culo* “that *cudo* was heard very far away”) together with the verb *cuti* “to hear” to which it is closely related (as Gr. *κνδος*, its exact correspondent, to *κν[F]εω* “to perceive, to notice, to hear”) demonstrates, it will come to signify, in the end, “wonder, wondrous thing”. The traditional *incipit* of the Serbian epic songs

is *Boje mili, cuda velikoga!* "Oh, dear Lord, what a great wonder!"; its main functions are similar to those of the Romanian *incipit* mentioned by us.

³⁹ We should then reconsider its meaning in the passage that we analyzed in the opening of this paper: *κλεος* is "the song about glorious deeds". The close connection between the epic poet and the warriors whose glory he records and transmits to the posterity is obvious in one of Plutarch's tales about the Spartans (*Apophthegmata Laconica*, 238 B, 16): before departing for battle one of the Spartan kings used to sacrifice to the Muses, so that the brave deeds about to be performed may not be deprived of skilled singers to record and spread them all over the earth. The Muses are called to the battlefield as eyewitnesses, their presence there being a strong guarantee that the brave conduct of each fighter will be correctly recorded.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, II 492.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, II 489-90. See, on this matter, R. Rutherford, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴² *Ibidem*, II 488.

VICO'S SIGNIFICANCE IN THE HISTORY OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT

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No one in the modern world can fail to grasp the significance of historical awareness for an understanding of human communities in the broadest sense. Attributes of mind which colour the way we regard ourselves as agents, particular styles of moral sensibility or political commitment, are seen essentially as products of traditions and practices that are handed down to us, for better or worse, historically. And it falls to the practising historian to disentangle the complex mythological threads which make up our historical inheritance.

All this may sound self-evident to us. But it was not always so. Our awareness of the historical traditions which have nurtured us is very much a product of what is often described as the "historical revolution" of the nineteenth century. It was the wealth of historical studies, some of them of a rather fanciful kind, which gave the impetus to the emergence of nation-states in nineteenth-century Europe. And historical knowledge of one kind or another has continued to furnish us with the clearest sense of our identity both as individuals and as peoples.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that this transformation of human consciousness, for that is what we are essentially dealing with, was exclusively the product of a proliferation of historical studies. Innovations in scholarship and epistemology were necessary prerequisites of this fundamental reappraisal of the significance of the past. Technical developments in scholarship, dating back to the philological work of the Renaissance humanists, are sufficiently familiar not to require further comment here. My concern, rather, is to focus on the contribution of a philosopher, Giambattista Vico (1688-1744), to the elaboration of an epistemology which set historical studies on a secure foundation.

Vico's early work would not have distinguished him as a man who would later be the principal architect of a shift in historical consciousness. For most of his adult life he worked as a lowly professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples. He had little sympathy for the intellectual fashions of his day, preferring the severe styles of scholarship associated with Roman law and classical literature to methods of study based upon the latest innovations in mathematics and the natural sciences. But though his intellectual predilections seemed to be quaintly outmoded to his contemporaries, he nevertheless succeeded in establishing a philosophical foundation

for methods and procedures appropriate to the historical and cultural sciences. His *Scienza nuova* (first published in 1725) has come to be seen as a landmark in the history of ideas, offering a new conception of the significance of the past based upon a crucial distinction between the natural and human sciences.

Vico's views were formed after painstaking criticism of prevalent theories of knowledge. In his early treatises, *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* (1709) and *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia* (1710), he took Descartes and his school to task for proposing a general approach to different fields of study which could not accommodate the sheer contingency of human affairs. Vico objected, in particular, to Descartes' claim that the model of mathematical proof should be treated as a paradigm for all knowledge. In Vico's view, the principles which made mathematical proofs indubitable likewise restricted the sphere of their legitimate application. He contended that the certainty which Descartes found in mathematics derived not from a clear and distinct idea (as Descartes had claimed in his *Discourse on Method*) but from the fact that mathematics was a science whose truth was dependent upon convention. Mathematics was only considered to be true because it consisted entirely of abstractions. In this scheme of things, the humanities in general (and history in particular) would be denied the status of certain knowledge because they each invoke qualitative criteria to appraise a mutable world of chance and change, fortune and fate. But the natural sciences had to rely on a similar approximation to truth in the pragmatic methods of experimentation. Descartes had thus been mistaken in seeking an exclusively mathematical foundation for the natural sciences. What he should have grasped, according to Vico, is that knowledge of a thing is a function of having made it (*verum ipsum factum*). Set in a theological context, we can say that God knows the world because he made it. Likewise mathematicians understand the properties of triangles because they define them. But it is beyond our powers to understand the natural world in this way. And Vico had yet to extend the model of agency and making to the sphere of institutions and practices.

At this stage of his career Vico had still to elaborate a clear conception of historical knowledge. But he had recognized the absurdity of disregarding the practical and qualitative judgements which give human life its distinctive character.

It was through studies of law (issued between 1720 and 1722) that Vico came to grasp the importance of setting judgements about the past in a proper frame of reference. Conceptions of law, he came to see, had been distorted because of the failure of historians and philosophers to recognize that law itself was but an aspect of a wider culture, intelligible in terms of assumptions which would change in the course of historical development. Without an adequate understanding of the way cultures changed, the original meaning or significance of legal and political ideas and practices would remain shrouded in mystery.

Underpinning this view of history and culture was a constructivist theory of knowledge which Vico worked out in detail in the *Scienza nuova*. He continued to accept that men could only properly be said to understand the things they had made. But just as they had made straight lines and triangles by defining them, so they had also made institutions, laws and practices by acting according to their various conceptions. Men had an insider's knowledge of history and culture that was always foreclosed in the natural world. And in understanding the complex network of

institutions and practices which other men had made in the past, they were also advancing their understanding of themselves as both the products and producers of historical traditions and practices.

The problem of reconstructing past modes of thought and practice was the centre-piece of the *Scienza nuova*. Vico combined two conceptions which in most discussions of philosophy of history are kept separate: a substantive conception of the past and an analysis of the sources of historical error. In his account of historical judgement, he generalized the insight of his legal studies: misconceptions were attributable to the casual imposition of present assumptions on the relics of distant ways of life. What was required, if anachronistic judgements were to be avoided, was an account of the way cultures assumed a specific guise in relation to different sets of circumstances. Vico argued that certain modes of social life (which he termed "poetic") were a necessary precondition for the emergence of attitudes of mind characteristic of developed civilizations. To judge the practices of primitive cultures in terms of the ethos of later (more refined) cultures would be the grossest anachronism. It would not only foreclose the possibility of an historical understanding of remote societies but would also prevent a developed society from penetrating its own past. And since men were the products of their societies, they would be denied the possibility of understanding themselves.

Vico described his achievement technically as a synthesis of philosophy and philology. Previously philosophy had concerned itself with abstract and universal truths which were held to be valid (or at least intelligible) without recourse to a consideration of the historical situation from which they had issued; while philology, concerned only with the proper designation of artefacts, had been pursued in disregard of the theoretical questions that might be raised in the activity of identification and classification. Vico's point was that neither philosophy nor philology could adequately fulfil the tasks they had traditionally been assigned unless they entered into some (ill-defined) reciprocal relation. What he had effectively produced was the first formal statement of an historicist position.

In Vico's account, then, history was cast as the central discipline in the humanities. Philosophical questions about the nature of man had become secondary to the determination of how and why practices had emerged and how they should be explained. And though few modern scholars would find Vico's detailed account of the transformation of cultures persuasive, his approach to the past had conferred fresh significance upon the various kinds of evidence. His conception of the unity of a culture enabled him to treat any artefact from a given period as evidence for the recovery of a particular cast of mind. Narrow etymological exercises, for example, could assume wider importance as epitomes of cultural history; and well documented episodes in a particular society's history could be used as points of reference for the interpretation of artefacts from other societies at a similar stage of development.

Vico's achievement was not restricted to the theory of history. Within the *Scienza nuova* he sought to illustrate the implications of his theories by means of substantive exercises in historical reconstruction. His accounts of Homer and Roman law attracted the attention of scholars in his own day who were but little interested in his more general speculations. And prior to the *Scienza nuova* he had completed two historical works of note. The first, *Principum neapolitanorum coniurationis anni MDCCI*

historia (1702), was a celebration of the suppression of a revolt of nobles at Naples in 1701; the second, *De rebus gestis Antonii Caraphaei* (1716), was a life of a particularly ruthless soldier employed by the Austrians to suppress disorders in Hungary. Both were commissioned works and reflect earlier conventions of historical scholarship (following classical models, using set speeches to emphasize particular issues, aiming rather to celebrate a point of view than to present a balanced account).

But it is as a philosopher of history that Vico chiefly warrants our attention. Whatever the shortcomings of his detailed scholarship, he had shown that people's understandings of themselves were directly related to their views of the past. He made possession of an historical sense a distinctive human attribute, long before nineteenth-century German historians and philosophers had sought to distinguish the *Geisteswissenschaften* from the *Naturwissenschaften*. His central claim, that understanding other cultures involves an empathetic identification with an agent's view of things, has implications which are still being debated in the humanities and social sciences. His *Scienza nuova* must surely rank as a seminal work in the emergence of historical consciousness.

LA DUPERIE DE SOI-MEME ET LA PHILOSOPHIE.
LA VISION DE DONALD DAVIDSON DE L'IRRATIONALITE.

Paul Kun

Cet essai a comme tâche de faire une présentation, une explication et, avec toute la modestie, une analyse critique de la conception du philosophe américain Donald Davidson sur l'irrationalité de certaines actions humaines, notamment la duperie de soi-même. L'objet de l'analyse sera, pour le principal, l'article de Davidson intitulé "Deception and Division", qui a été publié in Ernest Le Pore & Brian McLaughlin eds, *Actions and events, perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson*, Blackwell, Oxford. Avant d'entrer dans le sujet, je veux présenter sommairement le contenu de l'essai. Il peut être partagé dans plusieurs sections, qui comprennent:

1. Une première définition de la duperie de soi-même;
2. Formulation du principe (réquisit) de la totalité des données disponibles et du cas de la faiblesse de la garantie;
3. Argumentation en faveur de l'irrationalité "externe", au moins du point de vue philosophique;
4. L'analyse comparative duperie de soi-même – autres cas d'irrationalité: la faiblesse de la volonté, la pensée magique (wishful thinking), le mensonge;
5. Une définition "complète" de la duperie de soi-même et du caractère problématique de celle-ci;
6. Le rejet de solutions envisagées par David Pears et Kent Bach;
7. Présentation du modèle de l'esprit supposé par la description de Davidson de la duperie de soi-même.

1. Une première définition de la duperie de soi-même.

Premièrement, dit Davidson, la duperie de soi-même suppose 2 conditions:

- que quelqu'un croit à la fois une proposition et sa négation ;
- que l'une des croyances vienne à l'appui de l'autre.

Davidson parle toujours de "l'intérêt philosophique" de la duperie de soi-même. Nous pouvons comprendre, je crois, ce qu'il entend par cela, en analysant sa façon de traiter l'exemple.

Exemple:

- (1) D croit qu'il est chauve.
- (2) D croit qu'il n'est pas chauve.

(3) D croit (qu'il est chauve et qu'il n'est pas chauve).

(4) D ne croit pas qu'il est chauve.

Pour Davidson tout le problème est le rapport entre (1) et (2): une croyance comme celle rapportée par (1) est une condition causale d'une croyance qui la contredit, telle que (2). Son attitude envers les deux autres propositions est assez étrange: "Il est tentant....de supposer que (2) implique (4), mais si nous admettons cela, nous nous contredirons nous mêmes." Donc, Davidson renonce à (4) et puis, il renonce aussi à (3) en partant de l'idée qu'il est possible de croire chacun de ces énoncés sans croire la conjonction des deux. Pourquoi renonce-t-il à ces énoncés? L'analyse de ses raisons nous permettra de saisir une différence importante en ce qui concerne la sorte d'irrationalité qui intéresse Davidson. Nous pouvons voir qu'il rejette (4) parce qu'elle est en contradiction avec (1). Mais, on peut demander, pourquoi il ne rejette pas aussi (2), parce qu'elle contredit (1)? On peut voir qu'il ne s'agit pas du même type de contradiction. Pour, mieux voir la différence, nous faisons quelques simplifications:

(1) D Bel p.

(2) D Bel -p.

(3) D Bel (p&-p)

(4) D -Bel p.

Nous pouvons distinguer entre l'attitude propositionnelle ("Bel") et le contenu de l'attitude ("p", "-p"). Dans le cas de (1) et (2), nous avons la même attitude propositionnelle appliquée au deux contenus opposés (p, -p). Dans le cas de (1) et (4), nous avons affaire à une attitude propositionnelle et sa négation (Bel et -Bel). D'après Davidson, (1) et (4) sont dans un " rapport de contradiction plus évident, plus irrationnel que (1) et (2). (3) est, évidemment, auto-contradictoire, à cause de la conjonction "p& -p". Il s'agit d'une croyance inconsistante, ouvertement irrationnelle. Donc, les deux énoncés ont comme trait commun leur irrationalité criante, évidente. Davidson déclare qu'il n'est pas intéressé par cette sorte d'irrationalité. Nous pouvons voir ses raisons plus tard.

Les 2 énoncés étant éliminés, "notre tâche, dit Davidson, consiste à expliquer comment quelqu'un peut avoir des croyances comme (1) et (2) sans mettre (1) et (2) ensemble - c'est-à-dire sans introduire dans le raisonnement la proposition (3). Il s'agit, alors, de deux croyances rivales qui sont présentes à l'esprit en même temps, mais séparément. La première question est, donc, comment peut-on les maintenir séparées? Donc, Davidson pense que le noyau problématique de la duperie de soi-même est représenté par les deux conditions¹: a) la présence d'une croyance et de sa négation; b) le fait que l'une se base sur l'autre ou, comme on va voir plus loin, le fait que l'une est la cause de l'autre.²

Davidson semble être un peu imprécis sur l'attitude de l'agent envers les deux propositions: "...une personne *soit certaine* qu'une proposition est vraie et en même temps *certaine* que sa négation est vraie. Mais, plus loin, Davidson parle d'une inclination (ou probabilité subjective très élevée) de l'agent à croire la négation de la proposition initiale, même si la totalité des données dont il dispose va à l'encontre de cette attitude: "être certaine que" est plus fort que "être enclin à croire que". Davidson, lui-même marque la distinction: "est enclin à croire: l'agent croit que la proposition est fautive, mais n'est pas tout à fait certain de cela." Il semble que Davidson veut trouver une attitude cognitive qui soit suffisamment forte pour supposer l'existence d'une raison, mais, en même

temps, suffisamment faible pour permettre l'existence d'une croyance opposée, celle-ci aussi ayant une raison. Mon opinion est, donc, que ici, il ne s'agit pas de certitude ou d'inclination, mais de raison en faveur d'une croyance. Les deux croyances de la duperie de soi-même doivent être, toutes les deux, raisonnables, au moins au commencement.

2. Formulation du réquisit de la totalité des données (RTE) et de la faiblesse de la garantie (FG).

La ressemblance duperie de soi-même - la faiblesse de la volonté représente le point de départ de la démarche davidsonien et il est très importante non seulement pour le problème de la duperie de soi-même, mais aussi pour sa conception des cas d'irrationalité³.

Il revient à la définition de la faiblesse de la volonté: "agir intentionnellement (ou former l'intention d'agir) sur la base de moins que la totalité des raisons que l'on reconnaît comme étant pertinentes." Davidson souligne aussi le fait que l'akrasie suppose un contexte de conflit: "l'agent akratique a ce qu'il considère comme des raisons à la fois pour et contre une certaine ligne de conduite. Il juge, sur la base de toutes ses raisons, qu'une certaine ligne de conduite est meilleure, et pourtant opte pour une autre; il agit contrairement à son meilleur jugement"; arrivé à ce point, il fait une remarque un peu énigmatique: "En un sens, il est facile de dire pourquoi il a agi de cette façon, parce qu'il avait des raisons d'accomplir cette action. Mais cette explication écarte l'élément d'irrationalité présent; elle n'explique pourquoi l'agent agit contre son propre meilleur jugement". Ce passage nous permet de comprendre mieux, je crois, par quelle sorte d'irrationalité est intéressé Davidson dans les cas d'irrationalité. Il ne s'agit jamais d'une irrationalité *pure et simple*, mais d'une irrationalité qui suppose au moins la présence d'un élément rationnel. L'action, dans le cas de l'akrasie, la croyance, dans le cas de la duperie, doivent être explicables par des raisons, c'est-à-dire si nous faisons abstraction du meilleur jugement du sujet, son action ou sa croyance seraient parfaites raisonnables. Dans aucun cas, il ne s'agit pas d'une action ou d'une croyance qui, en elles-mêmes sont inconsistantes, irrationnelles. Nous verrons plus tard pourquoi Davidson adopte cette position.

La stratégie utilisée pour construire la duperie de soi-même est identique avec celle utilisée pour la faiblesse de la volonté:

il énonce un principe normatif (rationnel) pour l'action ou pour le choix entre deux croyances; le Principe de la Continence (PC) et, respectivement, le Réquisit de la totalité des données disponibles pour le raisonnement inductif (RTE): "Le Principe de Continence: principe normatif selon lequel on ne devrait pas intentionnellement accomplir une action quand on juge, sur la base de toutes les considérations qu'on considère comme étant disponibles, qu'une autre ligne de conduite également possible serait meilleure. Le PC implique une forme fondamentale de cohérence dans la pensée, l'évaluation et l'action." Hempel et Carnap appelle le principe normatif *requirement of total evidence*: le réquisit de la totalité des données disponibles pour le raisonnement inductif, qui nous dit que quand nous sommes en train de choisir au sein d'une ensemble d'hypothèses mutuellement exclusives, nous devons donner créance à l'hypothèse qui est le mieux étayée par toutes les données pertinentes disponibles";

b) il définit le cas d'irrationalité par rapport à ce principe: la faiblesse de la volonté par rapport au PC et la faiblesse de la garantie par rapport au RTE .

Toutes les analogies établies par Davidson peuvent nous conduire à la conclusion (trompeuse, d'après mon opinion) que la duperie de soi-même⁴ est une sorte d'action inconsistante, très proche de la faiblesse de la volonté. Mais Davidson lui-même marque certaines distinctions entre les deux: "La duperie de soi-même et la faiblesse de la volonté se renforcent souvent l'une l'autre, mais elles sont différentes." D'après lui, la différence principale réside dans leurs résultats: le résultat de la faiblesse de la volonté est une intention ou une action intentionnelle, une attitude évaluative produite à la suite d'une défaillance, pendant que le résultat de la duperie de soi-même est une attitude cognitive produite à la suite d'une défaillance. C'est-à-dire que, pendant que dans le cas de la faiblesse de la volonté la défaillance se produit *avant l'action*, dans le cas de la duperie de soi-même l'action a une contribution majeure à la production de la défaillance (voir aussi la définition finale de la DSM). Ici, on peut formuler un peu plus précisément le problème: Davidson nous laisse-t-il entendre qu'il s'agit, dans les deux cas, d'un échec de l'action rationnelle? Je crois que la réponse la plus probable à cette question est négative et par conséquent, la ressemblance entre les deux est superficielle. Il y a une phrase de Davidson qui est très importante, mais qui peut être interprétée dans les deux sens: "L'analogie cognitive de la faiblesse de la volonté est la faiblesse de la garantie". Je me propose de partir de cette assertion pour présenter la vision de Davidson sur la faiblesse de la garantie et sur la duperie de soi-même.

Si la faiblesse de la garantie est "l'analogie cognitive" de la faiblesse de la volonté, ceci peut signifier:

* soit que la faiblesse de la garantie est, sur le plan cognitif – c'est-à-dire sur le plan de la formation de la croyance - ce qu'est la faiblesse de la volonté sur le plan de l'action: si la dernière représente l'échec de l'action intentionnelle, la première représente l'échec de la formation de la croyance rationnelle,;

* soit que la faiblesse de la garantie est une sorte d'échec de l'action, similaire à l'échec de la faiblesse de la volonté, avec la seule différence que dans le cas de la faiblesse de la garantie seul le niveau cognitif de l'action est frappé par l'irrationalité. Mon opinion est que la première hypothèse est plus vraisemblable que la deuxième. Il y a plusieurs arguments en faveur de cette hypothèse:

1. le principe qui est transgressé dans le cas de la faiblesse de la garantie, RTE a une fonction différente par rapport au PC qui est transgressé dans le cas de la faiblesse de la volonté: pendant que PC est absolument nécessaire pour concevoir l'action, RTE a peu de rapport avec celle-ci, Mais on peut difficilement concevoir la formation de la croyance rationnelle sans ce principe. Pourquoi je parle de *formation* de la croyance et pourquoi pas "la croyance" tout court? La réponse est donnée par Davidson lui-même dans l'énoncé de RTE: le principe ne s'applique pas à deux croyances contradictoires, mais à deux hypothèses contradictoires et la croyance est le résultat de l'application du RTE;

2. l'action dont il s'agit dans le cas de la faiblesse de la garantie est liée à la transgression du RTE; Davidson cite deux cas: "*oublier*" les données qui sont favorables à l'hypothèse rejetée ou chercher seulement les données qui étayaient l'hypothèse admise. Il est vraiment un problème dans quelle mesure l'oubli, même intentionnel, peut valoir comme action. Mais, je crois, il n'est pas nécessaire de démontrer qu'il ne s'agit pas là d'une action, pour éliminer le

rapprochement de la faiblesse de la volonté. Ceci, parce que, comme Davidson le souligne lui même, ici l'action n'est qu'un moyen parmi d'autres, d'après moi, pour la réalisation du but de la faiblesse 'de la garantie, favoriser 1'hypothèse (la croyance) la plus faible, pendant que dans le cas de la faiblesse de la volonté le changement de croyances est le moyen pour la réalisation du son but qui est favoriser 1'action la moins préférable. Le fait que la formation de la croyance suppose certaines actions, ne signifie pas que, dans ce cas il s'agit d'une action comme dans le cas de la faiblesse de la volonté;

3. la difficulté la plus grande que rencontre ma lecture est représentée par le niveau évaluatif,

motivationnel qui joue un rôle pas du tout négligeable dans la duperie de soi-même. Dans ce cas, il s'agit d'une faiblesse de la garantie particulière, qui est intentionnelle, qui suppose, donc, un jugement évaluatif et ce jugement produit la transgression du RTE (voir 1'exemple de Carlos: il y a un jugement, tout bien considéré, qu'il est préférable pour lui de croire qu'il passera 1'examen plutôt qu'il ne le passera pas et ce jugement représente le motif de ses efforts de croire qu'il passera 1'examen). Mais, même si nous ne pouvons pas expliquer la présence de ce jugement évaluatif, on peut, au moins, noter une différence par rapport à la faiblesse de la volonté: dans le cas de celle-ci, le jugement est *affecté* par la faiblesse, pendant que dans le cas de la duperie de soi le jugement *affecte* le processus de la formation de la croyance. Le vrai problème, auquel malheureusement concerne le rôle joué par ce côté motivationnel dans la formation de la croyance. Si celle-ci se réduit à l'application du RTE aux deux hypothèses rivales, alors il ne joue aucun rôle et nous avons un processus strictement cognitif. Si elle suppose, d'habitude ce côté évaluatif, alors nous devons déterminer quel est son rôle. On peut supposer, même si Davidson n'offre aucune suggestion, que *seulement* dans le cas de la duperie de soi-même intervient cet élément motivationnel. Mais, dans ce cas, 1'écart par rapport au modèle de la formation de la croyance est trop grand et on se peut demander si, vraiment, la duperie de soi-même est plus proche de la faiblesse de la garantie que de la faiblesse de la volonté. Il y a la possibilité de la considérer comme étant à mi-chemin entre la faiblesse de la garantie et la faiblesse de la volonté, mais c'est assez difficile d'envisager qu'est-ce que signifie.

La faiblesse de la garantie est définie par les traits suivants:

1) quand une personne a des données à la fois pour confirmer et pour infirmer une hypothèse;

2) la personne juge que, relativement à toutes les données qui lui sont disponibles, 1'hypothèse

est plus probable que non probable;

3) pourtant il n'accepte pas 1'hypothèse (ou la force de sa croyance en la vérité de 1'hypothèse est

plus faible que la force de sa croyance en la vérité de la négation de 1'hypothèse).

En tenant compte de tout cela, nous pouvons construire le schème suivante sur la formation de la croyance et la faiblesse de la garantie :

H₁_D₁

RTE [(D₁ sup D₂)------(H₁)] -----C₁

H₂_D₂

nonRTE (FG)=[(nonD₁, D₂)------(H₂)] -----nonC₁

H_1, H_2 = hypothèses
 D_1, D_2 = données
 RTE = le réquisit de toutes les données
 FG = la faiblesse de la garantie
 C_1, C_2 = croyances
 "----" = implique
 "sup" = supérieur à

Fig.I

Comme exemple de faiblesse de la garantie il nous donne la situation suivante : croire que quelqu'un qui a la voix criante, qui s'appelle Hélène et qui porte une jupe, est un homme, pas une femme. Tous les données mènent vers la conclusion qu'il s'agit d'un homme, mais le sujet pense toujours qu'il s'agit d'une femme, en transgressant le RTE. Davidson nous demande de supposer que le sujet de l'exemple a envisagé la possibilité que le guide soit une femme, mais qu'il la rejette en dépit de toutes les données qui le poussaient à penser le contraire. Le cas est un peu contre-intuitif, parce que d'habitude, et même dans son exemple, le sujet devient conscient de sa stupidité, du manque de toute évidence de sa croyance. Pour rejeter la bonne croyance, il doit avoir des données à l'appui de la fausse croyance, mais dans l'exemple de Davidson il n'est pas question de cela.

3. L'importance du principe rationnel et le rejet de l'irrationalité interne.

Premièrement, nous avançons comme hypothèse le fait que PC et RTE sont des variantes du principe de rationalité. La raison principale de cette hypothèse est l'importance qui leur est attribuée par Davidson pour la caractérisation de l'irrationalité. Davidson soutient qu'on ne peut pas déterminer l'irrationalité de l'agent indépendamment des principes partagés par celui-ci, parce que, pour "dire que son comportement [de l'agent] est ou non irrationnel, on doit être capable de faire une distinction nette entre le fait de ne pas avoir certains critères de raisonnement et le fait de les avoir mais de ne pas réussir à les appliquer. Et il ajoute, en ce qui concerne le cas de la faiblesse de la garantie que "il n'y a pas d'échec du raisonnement inductif tant que les données disponibles ne sont pas reconnues comme étant effectivement des données pertinentes (p.141). Autrement dit, si on comprend une action irrationnelle comme étant une action qui transgresse un certain principe rationnel, pour faire ce jugement, nous devons déterminer effectivement si elle transgresse ou non le principe, qui doit être présent, c'est-à-dire reconnu comme tel par l'agent. La conclusion est, donc, qu'on ne peut pas discuter de l'irrationalité dans l'absence (non seulement pour l'interprète, mais aussi pour l'agent) du principe rationnel.

Question posée par Davidson: "quelqu'un doit-il accepter le réquisit de la totalité des données pour le raisonnement inductif avant que son incapacité à agir en conformité avec le réquisit ne révèle l'irrationalité de son comportement ?" (ibid.)

En examinant les données de la question, il trouve trois situations possibles, au moins théoriquement :
 quand l'agent n'a pas "des critères de raisonnement" ou ne reconnaît pas le principe ; dans ce cas, dit-il, le comportement de l'agent n'est pas irrationnel,

justement parce qu'on ne peut pas déterminer un comportement rationnel, ou le principe qui est transgressé ;

1. quand l'agent a "des critères de raisonnement" ou reconnaît le principe, mais il agit rarement ou il n'agit jamais conformément à ce principe ; cette situation est définie par Davidson comme "absurde", parce qu'elle suppose la conjonction inconsistante entre l'acceptation et le rejet du principe. Il parle dans ce cas d'irrationalité (ou incohérence) " interne"⁵ ; quand l'agent possède le principe sans en être conscient ou capable de l'articuler ou, encore, Quand "il perde une coutume ou une habitude" (p.141) ; dans ce cas, nous avons à faire avec une "incohérence externe", qui est applicable au cas traités par Davidson. En dépit d'une certaine imprécision de son affirmation, je crois qu'on peut déterminer cette situation comme exigeant deux conditions :
 - que l'agent peut, dans des conditions "normales", réaliser les exigences du principe ;
 - que les transgressions du principe soient assez rares et motivées.

L'aspect motivationnel est assez important pour Davidson et il souligne cette importance quand il donne des exemples des situations dans lesquelles le principe rationnel doit fonctionner: "il est plus probable que les gens se conforment au principe quand ils ont un peu plus le temps de réfléchir, quand la charge émotionnelle qui pèse sur leurs conclusions est moins forte, ou quand ils bénéficient d'une assistance socratique explicite." L'application du principe est une chose, la nécessité de respecter ce principe est une autre. Pendant que la dernière est une exigence *a priori*, la première dépend des conditions concrètes dans lesquelles vit et agit le sujet. La motivation est toujours liée aux conditions et le caractère impératif du principe ne peut pas devenir, en lui-même, une motivation.

Davidson pousse son analyse du rôle du principe rationnel plus loin en se demandant que se passe-t-il si quelqu'un n'accepte pas le réquisit et qui discute les critères d'après lesquels le principe est fixé. "Devons-nous dire que quelqu'un dont la pensée ne satisfait pas le réquisit de la totalité des données peut être irrationnel d'après les critères d'un certaine personne mais pas (dans le cas où il n'accepte pas le réquisit) d'après ses propres critères? Où devons-nous dire que l'incohérence interne est une condition nécessaire de l'irrationalité ? "Ici aussi on peut voir la dépendance de l'interprétation du comportement du sujet du rapport qu'il entretient avec le principe. La discussion dépasse le cadre étroit de la philosophie de l'action, parce qu'on discute le rapport entre une propriété logique (la cohérence) et le principe rationnel. Au fond, le principe se réduit à l'application de cette propriété logique, qui, elle aussi, est "une norme fondamentale".

Arrivé ici, Davidson énonce ce qui peut être considéré comme le principe de l'interprétabilité : "Les croyances d'une personne ne sont comprises par une autre que dans la mesure où cette première personne peut attribuer ses croyances aux divers attitudes de l'autre. Si

l'interprète ne peut pas reproduire dans ses grandes lignes son propre schéma d'attitude chez une

autre personne il ne peut pas identifier de manière sensée l'une quelconque des attitudes de cette personne." En partant de ce principe, nous pouvons déterminer le rôle joué par les principes rationnels : "Si les normes sont fondamentales, elles

ont un rôle constitutif dans l'identification des attitudes, ce qui veut dire que *la question de savoir si quelqu'un les "accepte" ne peut pas se poser*. Toutes les contradictions véritables reposent sur une déviation par rapport aux propres normes de la personne." L'affirmation tranchante de Davidson (que j'ai soulignée dans le texte) peut être éclaircie assez facilement si nous comprenons le fait que l'identification elle-même des attitudes propositionnelles (croyances, désirs , etc) est si dépendante de normes, que dans leur absence elle n'est pas possible. Sans les principes, il n'y a plus d'attitudes propositionnelles identifiables. Dans ce cas, on ne peut pas poser la question de l'interprétation des attitudes du sujet sans supposer les normes qui les constituent comme telles.

4. La duperie de soi-même et les autres cas d'irrationalité.

Pour mieux définir la duperie de soi-même, Davidson entreprend une étude comparatif de celle-ci et des autres formes d'irrationalité. Cette étude nous permet de nous représenter mieux le champ de l'irrationalité humaine.

La duperie de soi-même, nous avons vu, inclut la faiblesse de la garantie. Pourquoi ? Parce que la proposition relativement à laquelle une personne se dupe elle-même, dit Davidson, est une proposition qu'elle n'accepterait pas si elle ne commettait pas son erreur; elle a de meilleures raisons pour accepter la négation de la proposition. Mais la différence est plus importante que la ressemblance : "la personne qui se dupe elle-même doit avoir une raison pour sa faiblesse de la garantie, et elle doit avoir joué un rôle dans l'émergence de celle-ci. Par exemple, dans le cas du chauve, la raison pour sa faiblesse de la garantie est son désir de croire qu'il n'est pas chauve"⁶. La faiblesse de la garantie a toujours une cause, mais dans le cas de la duperie de soi-même, c'est l'agent lui-même qui induit la faiblesse de la garantie, c'est lui-même la cause de la faiblesse."(p.142).

L'analyse de la faiblesse de la garantie ou celle de la faiblesse de la volonté n'implique pas que l'abandon par l'agent de ses propres normes soit motivé; mais se duper soi-même implique un tel abandon. Nous avons , ici une différence de la duperie de soi non seulement par rapport à la faiblesse de la garantie, mais aussi par rapport à la faiblesse de la volonté: la duperie de soi suppose une motivation consciente très forte et nous verrons plus loin que cette motivation a des effets particulières sur la duperie de soi elle-même.

Le comparaison entre la pensée magique (wishful thinking) ou prendre ses désirs pour des réalités et la duperie de soi-même nous permet de remarquer d'autres traits significatives de la duperie. Davidson définit la pensée magique comme présentant les traits suivants :

- 1) celle-ci consiste à croire quelque chose parce que l'on désire que se soit vrai;
- 2) nous savons pourquoi nous avons telle croyance;
- 3) nous savons que nous ne l'aurions pas si nous ne désirions pas l'avoir.

Mais l'analyse de la pensée magique présente un intérêt qui dépasse la simple description des états irrationnels. Ici, Davidson introduit une idée qui, malheureusement n'est plus réitérée, ni développée : "une action intentionnelle

qui vise à rendre quelqu'un heureux n'est pas en elle-même irrationnelle."(ib.) L'assertion peut sembler trop générale, mais il y a d'autres, plus précises : "Elle (l'action) est irrationnelle si l'on continue à croire que les données qui infirment la croyance sont plus favorables que les données qui la confirment, car nous avons un cas de faiblesse de la garantie." L'irrationalité suppose, donc, une dimension temporelle, diachronique qui est essentielle. Et, plus loin : "Quand le fait de prendre ses désirs pour des réalités fonctionne bien,... il n'y a pas de raison de dire qu'à un moment donné le sujet doit être irrationnel. Pourquoi? Parce que si l'on a oublié les données qui nous ont, au départ, fait rejeter la croyance que nous entretenons présentement, ou si les données nouvelles dont nous disposons nous semblent suffisantes pour rejeter les données dont nous disposions avant, alors ce nouvel état d'esprit n'est pas irrationnel."(p.143). C'est-à-dire que, si par exemple, notre chauve cesse de penser qu'il est chauve, ou qu'il a des raisons de croire cela, alors il n'y a plus de désaccord entre sa croyance et son désir, il n'y a plus besoin d'une action de diriger son attention vers d'autres croyances ou raisons, il n'y a plus de duperie de soi-même, au moins comme phénomène irrationnel. Et, enfin, une déclaration assez tranchante: "la duperie de soi-même et la pensée magique peuvent parfois être des états de peu de gravité" et il donne comme exemple les enfants dont les parents et les professeurs surévaluent l'intelligence ou les épouses qui ignorent ou négligent le rouge à lèvres sur le col de la chemise de leurs maris: des cas de duperie de soi charitable aidée par des désirs pris pour des réalités (id.). Je crois que nous avons assez de données pour comprendre "états de peu de gravité" au sujet de la duperie de soi et de la pensée magique, comme synonyme de "états raisonnables". Cette possibilité est fondée par Davidson sur une distinction qu'il fait au niveau des raisons. Il distingue deux types des raisons:

1. la raison évaluative: qui donne "un motif pour agir de manière à promouvoir le fait d'avoir une croyance";
2. la raison cognitive qui consiste à "avoir certaines données qui confirment la vérité d'une proposition" (p.143).

Davidson souligne le fait que l'importance de l'élément motivationnel (le désir que p soit cas) peut engendrer un désir de croire que p, qui représente une raison évaluative pour toute action à la faveur de la croyance que p (soit vraie). La présence de l'intentionnalité au niveau du processus de la formation de la croyance n'est pas, en soi, un élément irrationnel, mais, plutôt nécessaire pour toute action. Il est assez improbable que, pour faire quelque chose, nous ayons des raisons suffisantes pour soutenir la croyance favorisée par cette action. L'élément motivationnel appui, d'une façon décisive, la raison cognitive; nous pouvons, bien sûr, douter sur toutes les raisons de nos croyances, mais cette doute ne peut pas représenter, aucunement, un motif pour l'action. Bien au contraire, le doute bloque la décision, empêche le passage à l'action. Les énoncés performatifs se fondent sur tels mécanismes: quand je fais un souhait à quelqu'un, par exemple de passer ses examens, j'exprime un désir que p soit le cas qui doit produire (au sujet auquel je fais le souhait) un désir de croire que p qui représente le motif nécessaire de son action de se présenter aux examens. Je fais le souhait justement parce que je sais que son rôle mental est de produire cette séquence causale. Toute cette discussion est, aussi, importante, nous verrons, pour pouvoir donner la réponse à la question: où intervient l'irrationalité

dans le cas de la duperie de soi ? En anticipant un peu, on peut dire que aucunement entre le désir de croire que non-p et la croyance que non-p.

Il y a plusieurs différences entre la duperie de soi-même et la pensée magique:

1. la duperie requiert l'intervention de l'agent, pendant que la pensée magique non;
2. quand on prend ses désirs pour des réalités, la croyance prend la direction que lui indique l'affect positif, jamais la direction de l'affect négatif: la croyance qui est causée est toujours bienvenue. Dans le cas de la duperie, la pensée nourrie peut être douloureuse (la jalousie, le pessimiste).

La duperie de soi-même requiert, donc, les suivantes:

1) que l'agent fasse quelque chose avec le dessein de changer ses propres vues (cette condition n'est pas exigée dans le cas de la pensée magique); c'est-à-dire l'agent veut changer une certaine croyance avec une autre. Encore une fois, Davidson est assez confus parce que "changer ses propres vues" signifie quelque chose différent que "former une croyance différente"; la première expression suppose que l'agent a déjà une croyance formée, mais qu'il désire de la changer, pendant que dans l'autre cas il s'agit de deux hypothèses, chacune ayant des données à son appui, le RTE conduisant vers l'une, pendant que le désir est orienté vers l'autre; s'il y a un changement, alors c'est un changement d'hypothèses, pas de croyances;

2) celui qui se dupe lui-même doit avoir l'intention de "duper", même si il peut avoir d'autres motifs. (dans le cas de la pensée magique, il suffit d'avoir le désir de croire pour croire). Se duper ressemble à mentir, de ce point de vue: il y a un comportement intentionnel qui vise à produire une croyance que l'agent ne partage pas; le menteur a l'intention de duper une autre personne, tandis que celui qui se dupe lui-même a l'intention de se duper lui-même.

La différence la plus importante entre se duper soi-même et mentir est la suivante: même si le menteur a l'intention de se faire croire, cette intention n'est pas essentielle au concept de mensonge; un menteur qui croit que celui qui l'écoute est pervers peut dire l'opposé de ce qu'il a l'intention que croie celui qui l'écoute. Un menteur peut même ne pas avoir l'intention de faire croire à sa victime que lui, le menteur, croit ce qu'il dit. Les intentions du menteur sont:

- 1) de se représenter comme croyant quelque chose qu'il ne croit pas;
- 2) il doit avoir l'intention de cacher son intention à celui qui l'écoute.

D'ici résulte que mentir implique une tromperie (*deceit*) d'un certain type, relative à la sincérité de la représentation de ce que l'on croit (p.144). Pour faire un peu plus claire l'idée de Davidson sur le mensonge, nous devons dire que mentir ne nécessite pas, contrairement à l'opinion de Platon, de dire intentionnellement le faux⁷, nous pouvons citer l'anecdote de S.Freud dans "Le mot d'esprit et ses rapports avec l'inconscient", où un juif, auquel un autre lui avait dit qu'il part pour Leipzig, dit : "Pourquoi cherche-tu à me mentir ?" L'autre répond: "Mais je ne te mens pas; c'est la pure vérité ." Justement pour cela, répond l'autre. Tu me dis la vérité pour me faire croire que tu me dis le faux et que tu ne pars pas pour Leipzig, mais pour Berlin. Donc tu me mens " Dans ce cas nous pouvons voir pourquoi le mensonge ne concerne pas la croyance (l'aspect épistémique) mais l'intention du sujet.

Cette forme de tromperie, supposée par le mensonge, ne peut pas être pratiquée sur soi-même, car elle exigerait que l'on fasse quelque chose avec l'intention que celui qui a l'intention ne reconnaisse pas cette intention elle-

même. C'est la différence la plus importante entre le mensonge et la duperie de soi. C'est-à-dire qu'on peut se duper soi-même, mais on ne peut pas se mentir soi-même, parce que la dernière demande une intention consciente de tromper, intention qui est mise en échec quand elle a comme objet le sujet lui-même. Mais, ajoute Davidson dans le cas de la duperie de soi la présence de l'attitude *de se*⁸ est plus facile à expliquer que dans le cas du mensonge .

5. Définition finale de la duperie de soi-même.

Arrivés à ce point, nous pouvons présenter un résumé sur la duperie:

Un agent A se duple lui-même relativement à une proposition p sous les conditions suivantes⁹:

1) A dispose de données sur la base desquelles il croit que p a plus de chances d'être vrai que sa négation;

2) la pensée que p, ou la pensée qu'il serait rationnel de croire que p, constitue un motif qui fait agir A de manière à ce qu'il cause en lui la croyance que la négation de p est vraie;

3) l'action en question peut être celle de détourner son attention des données qui confirment la vérité de p ou celle de rechercher activement des données qui infirment p:

3.1) une action dont le motif trouve sa source dans la croyance que p est vrai;

3.2) l'action soit accomplie avec l'intention de produire une croyance en la négation de p.

"Ce qui fait la duperie de soi-même problématique est le fait que l'état qui motive la duperie de soi (c'est-à-dire la croyance que p ou /et le désir de croire que non-p , ce n'est pas clair) et l'état qu'elle produit (c'est-à-dire la croyance que non-p) coexistent (p.145). Cette assertion est assez confuse, parce que au commencement et à la fin du texte Davidson parle plutôt de la séparation de les deux croyances que de leur coexistence comme étant problématique. La coexistence (exister-avec, "exister ensemble") exprime une idée à l'opposée de celle énoncée par "exister séparément". Je crois que Davidson veut dire autre chose, il veut souligner le fait que les deux croyances, en dépit de leur séparation, entretiennent une certaine relation causale, la première étant la cause et le fondement de la deuxième: "la croyance que p non seulement cause une croyance en la négation de p, mais aussi l'étaye." Le problème c'est si on peut concilier les deux exigences: d'un part de maintenir séparées les deux croyances, d'autre part d'étayer l'une sur l'autre. La difficulté envisagée ici est mieux mise en évidence dans l'exemple de Carlos: Il s'agit d'un exemple dans lequel la faiblesse de la garantie est induite par le sujet lui même qui prend ses désirs pour des réalités. Ici nous avons un cas de duperie de soi-même où la faiblesse de la garantie est provoquée par la pensée magique: "Carlos a de bonnes raisons de croire qu'il ratera son examen de permis de conduire. Il a déjà raté l'examen 2 fois et son moniteur lui a dit des choses décourageantes. Il connaît personnellement l'examineur, et il se fie à son propre charme. Il est conscient que toutes les données dont il dispose indiquent qu'il va échouer. Mais la pensée qu'il va rater à nouveau l'examen lui est pénible. Il a donc un motif arfaitement naturel pour croire qu'il ne ratera pas l'examen, c'est-à-dire qu'il a un motif pour

faire en sorte qu'il soit une personne qui croit qu'elle réussira (probablement) l'examen. Toutes choses égales (ou tout bien considéré), il vaut mieux éviter ce qui est pénible; croire qu'il ratera l'examen est pénible, par conséquent (tout bien considéré) il vaut mieux qu'il évite de croire qu'il ratera l'examen. Mais quels que soient les trucs qu'il emploie, les cas paradigmatiques de duperie de soi requièrent que Carlos demeure conscient que toutes ses données disponibles le conduisent à croire qu'il va échouer, car c'est la conscience de ce fait qui motive les efforts qu'il accomplit pour se débarrasser de la peur qu'il a d'échouer. Si Carlos réussisse à induire en lui la croyance qu'il réussira son examen, alors il est coupable de faiblesse de la garantie. C'est un état irrationnel, mais à quel endroit l'irrationalité s'est-elle introduite ?" (p.146)

Dans la présentation de ce cas, il semble que Davidson nous pose devant un élément qui, jusqu'ici est resté assez insignifiant: l'échec de toutes les tentatives de duperie de soi-même est la

condition même de la possibilité de la duperie; autrement dit, seulement dans la mesure dans laquelle le sujet (Carlos) ne réussit pas à se duper (c'est-à-dire à se convaincre qu'il va passer l'examen), qu'il trouve la motivation d'essayer de se duper: Carlos est motivé d'essayer de se convaincre qu'il va passer l'examen dans la mesure même dans laquelle il pense qu'il ne va pas passer l'examen. C'est une formulation paradoxale de la duperie de soi-même¹⁰ qui embrouille beaucoup les choses, parce qu'elle introduit une nouvelle exigence: la croyance que p appuie la croyance opposée dans la mesure dans laquelle reste elle-même présente à l'esprit. C'est pour cela que, plus loin, Davidson rejette la vision freudienne qui suppose que la pensée rejetée est exilée du domaine de la conscience. Même séparées, les deux doivent rester au même niveau mental.

Mais, l'aspect paradoxal est donnée par le fait que le but de la duperie de soi est justement d'éliminer la pensée rejetée; Davidson parle lui-même de l'oubli qui doit affecter cette croyance. Mais, comment peut-on oublier une chose, tout en le gardant en conscience ? Bien sûr que pour pouvoir oublier un souvenir, il faut, au moins, qu'il soit conscient, autrement à quoi bon oublier quelque chose dont tu ne te souviens pas ? Mais, peut-on dire qu'on peut oublier seulement dans la mesure dans laquelle nous gardons en conscience ce qu'on doit oublier ? Il ne s'agit pas, dans ce cas, d'une mise en échec de l'oubli lui-même, et donc, de la duperie de soi elle-même ? Alors, on peut définir la duperie de soi comme étant la tentative échouée d'oublier une pensée (ou une croyance, ou, encore, une hypothèse). Malheureusement, Davidson n'insiste pas sur ce point qui, à vrai dire, représente l'aspect le plus irrationnel de la duperie de soi et, en même temps, la limite de celle-ci. C'est-à-dire que, arrivée à ce point, la duperie de soi-même se retourne, d'une certaine façon, contre soi-même. Il y a des raisons de rapprocher cette façon de représenter la duperie de soi de la façon dont laquelle représente Freud le retour du refoulé.

Mais, je crois que cet aspect paradoxal de la duperie de soi a des liaisons aussi avec la façon dont envisage, généralement, Davidson l'irrationalité: si Carlos pense qu'il va passer son examen, alors il ne pense pas qu'il va échouer et il n'a pas besoin de se duper. Quelqu'un peut dire que, dans ce cas, Carlos a réussi à se duper, parce qu'il ne croit plus qu'il doit se convaincre qu'il va passer l'examen. Mais, si la duperie est définie par rapport aux croyances du sujet lui-même, alors il ne peut pas se duper que s'il échoue dans sa tentative de se duper. Revenant à l'exemple du chauve, celui-ci ne peut pas se duper que s'il

garde tout le temps à l'esprit la croyance qu'il est chauve. S'il réussit à se convaincre qu'il n'est pas chauve, alors nous n'avons plus de la duperie de soi, parce qu'il n'y a plus de cause (la croyance qu'il est chauve ou/et le désir de croire qu'il n'est pas chauve) de la duperie; il n'y a plus aussi de conflit entre la croyance d'un part et d'autre part le désir et l'intention; il n'y a plus de raison pour maintenir la faiblesse de la garantie: le sujet pense qu'il n'est pas chauve, désire de penser qu'il n'est pas chauve et, tout bien considéré, c'est mieux pour lui de penser qu'il n'est pas chauve plutôt qu'il est chauve et, par conséquent, il croit qu'il n'est pas chauve; enfin, s'il n'y a aucun motif de maintenir la faiblesse de la garantie, alors il peut rétablir le RTE et, donc, nous avons à faire avec un processus normal de formation de la croyance.

6. *Les solutions rejetées par Davidson.*

Solutions rejetées par Davidson:

1) la solution de David Pears selon laquelle celui qui se dupe lui-même doit "oublier" ou se cacher à lui-même la manière dont il est venu à croire ce qu'il croit. La solution de Pears est valable seulement pour peu de cas. Celui qui se dupe lui-même ne peut pas se permettre d'oublier le facteur qui a en premier lieu provoqué son comportement de duperie de soi: la prépondérance des données allant à l'encontre de la croyance induite.(p.146) 2) la solution de Kent Bach, qui pense que celui qui se dupe lui-même ne peut pas réellement croire que les données contraires pèsent d'un aussi grand poids. Comme Pears, Bach considère que se duper soi-même implique l'existence d'une suite de pensées dont le produit final entre trop fortement en conflit avec la motivation originale que le sujet avait de les faire coexister avec une conscience de ce produit final. Pour Davidson semble important de repérer une incohérence ou une contradiction dans la pensée de celui qui se dupe lui-même. Pears et Bach cherchent les conditions sous lesquelles on peut réussir à se duper soi-même.(p.147).

Mettre l'accent sur le premier élément rend l'irrationalité claire mais la rend psychologiquement difficile à expliquer; mettre l'accent sur le second élément rend plus facile l'explication du phénomène, mais nous empêche de voir où se trouve l'irrationalité. Il est difficile de trouver, dit Davidson un équilibre entre ces deux positions.

7. *Le*

Dans la dernière partie de son article, Davidson attaque deux questions décisives: à quel endroit de la séquence qui conduit à un état de duperie de soi y a-t-il une cause mentale qui n'est pas une raison de l'état mental qu'elle cause ? comment une personne peut-elle être incapable de réunir les deux croyances contradictoires ou incompatibles ? (ou, moi, comment peut-elle croire les deux croyances contradictoires sans, pour cela, croire leur conjonction ?). La réponse à la première, dit-il, dépend en partie de la réponse que l'on donne à l'autre question. Elle consiste, en principal, dans l'esquisse d'un certain modèle de l'esprit spécifique pour les cas d'irrationalité: "les gens peuvent quelquefois maintenir séparées des croyances proches par leurs contenus mais opposées l'une à l'autre. Dans cette mesure nous devons accepter l'idée qu'il peut y avoir des frontières entre les diverses parties de l'esprit. "(p.147)¹¹ Davidson postule qu'une de ces frontières peut passer quelque part entre deux croyances

manifestement conflictuelles. On ne découvre pas ces frontières par introspection; ce sont des outils conceptuels que nous posons pour décrire de manière cohérente les cas d'irrationalité véritable.

Le modèle davidsonien présente des ressemblances avec celui élaboré par la psychanalyse qui ont facilité une certaine confusion entre eux. En réalité, il y a des différences essentielles qui font que les objections justifiées apportées, entre autres par Wittgenstein, au modèle freudien, ne soient pas applicables au modèle de Davidson. Pascal Engel¹² résume de la façon suivante les différences:

1. les "causes motivationnelles" du comportement ne sont pas inconscientes;
2. le système "secondaire" n'est pas un centre d'action ou un moi autonome¹³,
3. la partition est *temporaire*, il ne s'agit pas des sous-systèmes stables de l'esprit.

Davidson pose le problème d'une transition, c'est-à-dire d'un processus dans l'obtention de la duperie de soi-même. Cette vision dynamique explique pourquoi il rejette l'idée d'une séparation nette et durable entre les deux "territoires". S'il y a un progrès, un changement, alors le rapport de "forces" entre les deux doit changer lui aussi. La réponse davidsonienne à la question de savoir où, dans la suite des transitions qui conduisent à l'état où le sujet est dupe de lui-même, il y a une transition irrationnelle.

Il y a un passage assez énigmatique: "L'irrationalité de l'état auquel on parvient tient au fait qu'il contient des croyances contradictoires; la transition irrationnelle est donc la transition qui rend ceci possible, à savoir l'établissement de la frontière qui maintient les croyances contradictoires à distance l'une de l'autre". Ici, Davidson semble opérer un retournement dramatique de sa conception, parce que il ne pense plus qu'on part d'une croyance et sa négation, mais que les deux sont le point final de la transition. Au moins, cela nous laisse deviner la première partie du paragraphe. La deuxième partie, revient sur l'affirmation déjà faite et pose comme résultat de la transition "l'établissement de la frontière" qui isolent la croyance de sa négation. Cette deuxième partie semble être en accord avec le reste de la conception développée par Davidson dans cet article. Ce passage est en accord, notamment, avec sa remarque ultérieure: "Dans le cas où se duper soi-même consiste à induire en soi une faiblesse de la garantie ce qui doit être mis à l'écart du reste de l'esprit est le réquisit de la totalité des données. Souvenons-nous quel est le contenu de ce principe: quand nous sommes en train de choisir au sein d'un ensemble d'hypothèses mutuellement exclusives, nous devons donner créance à l'hypothèse qui est le mieux étayée par toutes les données pertinentes disponibles". Or, cela suppose que les données ne sont pas séparées en fonction de l'appui qu'elles apportent à l'une des deux hypothèses concurrentes. Cette séparation, cette frontière provoque l'isolement du réquisit: "Ce qui fait que ce principe est temporairement exilé ou isolé est, de toute évidence, le désir d'éviter d'accepter ce que ce réquisit nous enjoint de croire. Mais cela ne peut pas être une raison pour négliger ce réquisit. Il n'y a rien qui puisse être une bonne raison pour ne pas raisonner selon les meilleures critères de rationalité." Peut construire, en partant de toutes ces suggestions, le suivant modèle diachronique¹⁵:

1. nous avons deux pensées (avec le sens plus spécial "d'hypothèses") opposées, qui ont, chacune, des raisons à l'appui; par exemple,); c'est assez difficile de décider quelle est la plus forte si nous n'examinons pas toutes les

données que nous avons à l'appui de chaque pensée, c'est-à-dire si nous n'appliquons pas le RTE¹⁶;

2. pour éviter d'arriver à la croyance "je suis chauve" (en appliquant le RTE) à laquelle s'oppose notre désir de croire que "je ne suis pas chauve"¹⁷ [qui représente la cause (le motif) de l'intention de me duper moi-même], nous introduisons la faiblesse de la garantie, c'est-à-dire, nous empêchons l'application du RTE; la faiblesse est possible (comme dans le cas du Carlos), à cause du fait que les deux croyances ont été séparées par une frontière; dans le de notre exemple, je suis enclin à croire que "je ne suis pas chauve", même si, parfois, je reconnais que j'ai assez des données pour croire que "je suis chauve"¹⁸, mais je cherche immédiatement des données à l'appui de la croyance que "je ne suis pas chauve"¹⁹; c'est le cas d'irrationalité signifiante du point de vue philosophique, d'après Davidson;

3. enfin, quand la duperie de soi est mise en échec. Dans ce cas, soit j'arrive à croire (contre toute évidence) que je ne suis pas chauve (et alors, d'après Davidson, si je crois que je ne suis pas chauve, il n'y a plus d'irrationalité, voir plus haut, ou, d'après le bon sens, je suis devenu fou), soit je reconnais que je suis chauve et, par cela, je rétablis le processus normal de formation de la croyance. Nous ne devons pas oublier le fait essentiel pour la vision de Davidson, que le sujet est irrationnel par rapport aux normes et aux croyances que lui-même reconnaît. Qu'est qui ce passe dans ce cas ? Quand les raisons dans l'appui de la croyance rejetée s'accroissent et la différence de poids entre les raisons des deux croyances devient si évidente qu'elle élimine la possibilité de se tromper raisonnablement; alors elles demandent une révision (en accord avec le réquisit) de l'attitude envers les deux croyances en accord avec le rapport entre le poids de leurs raisons; dans ce moment, la duperie de soi-même cesse d'être raisonnable et elle devient ouvertement irraisonnée à cause du fait qu'on ne peut pas garder la situation de 2. qu'en séparant, en isolant les raisons qui soutiennent les deux croyances, pour empêcher toute application du réquisit). Mais la frontière n'est qu'une solution temporaire pour neutraliser ou, au moins diminuer "la force" de la croyance raisonnable: "Quand le motif de la duperie de soi prend sa source dans une croyance qui contredit directement la croyance induite, la croyance originale et motivante doit être placée en dehors des limites en même temps que le réquisit de la totalité des données. Mais le fait d'être hors des limites ne rend pas la pensée ainsi exilée sans force; bien au contraire, puisque la juridiction de la raison ne s'exerce pas au-delà de la frontière."(p.148).

En conclusion, nous pouvons, je crois, apprécier que l'irrationalité s'introduit au niveau de la formation de la croyance, entre la pensée initiale ("p") qui est favorisée par l'application du principe (RTE) et le désir, qui d'habitude offre à la pensée le poids nécessaire pour devenir une croyance²⁰, mais qui, dans le cas de la duperie de soi, en s'opposant à cette pensée, l'empêche d'accéder à ce statut, en l'écartant du champ de l'attention de l'agent, et par cela même, en empêchant l'application du principe, en provoquant, donc la faiblesse de la garantie²¹.

NOTES

1. La même opinion est partagée par Richard Foley, (cf. "Justified Inconsistent Belief", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 16,1979, p. 247) qui pense que l'inconsistance comprend plus que la conjonction contradictoire "p&-p".
2. Cette vision de la duperie de soi-même semble plus simplificatrice, pour des raisons "pédagogiques" je crois, que celle présentée dans "Incoherence and Irrationality", *Dialectica* (1985), no. 39, où l'aspect problématique concerne plutôt un ensemble des croyances inconsistantes et les principes de consistance partagés par l'agent. John Heil, qui développe dans "Divided Minds" le modèle davidsonien, parle, à son tour, d'un "complexe formé par le désir (qui cause l'intention de croire non-p), le principe et la croyance que non-p est irrationnelle" [c'est-à-dire qu'elle est rejetée par le principe] (op.cit., p.579-580).
3. Cette analogie est développée avec beaucoup d'ingéniosité par Robert Dunn ("Akratic Attitudes and Rationality", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 70,1992), en considérant la duperie de soi et la faiblesse de la volonté comme deux types d'akrasie ou d'incontinence, la duperie étant définie comme "croyance akratique ou une forme épistémique de l'akrasie" (p.34). A.R. Mele et J. Heil ont des visions similaires.
4. R. Dunn pense que la duperie de soi suppose un principe nommé par lui de continence pour la croyance, qui est défini comme suit: "l'agent doit croire ce qu'il juge meilleur de croire tout en prenant en considération toutes les raisons (liées à l'attitude)" (op.cit., p.29).
5. Au moins en apparence, il s'agit soit d'un échange de terminologie, soit d'un échange de conception par rapport à la conception de "Incoherence and Irrationality" où il parle d'inconsistance interne (inner inconsistency) comme étant possible "seulement parce qu'il y a des normes que tout agent doit les suivre"(p.352), il définit même deux types d'inconsistance interne, synchronique et diachronique. Mais de la façon dans laquelle il la définit ["seulement quand les croyances sont inconsistantes avec d'autres croyances d'après les principes soutenus par l'agent lui-même" (p.438)], nous pouvons tirer la conclusion que, dans ce texte il entend par "interne" "à l'intérieur du système des croyances".
6. Ici, nous devons préciser qu'il s'agit d'une raison pour la faiblesse de la garantie, pas d'une pour la croyance qu'il n'est pas chauve. Pour celle-ci, l'agent est seulement la cause.
7. Ce qui menait Platon à soutenir que seulement ce qui savent peuvent mentir, parce que pour pouvoir dire le faux intentionnellement, nous devons connaître le vrai.
8. C'est-à-dire d'une attitude propositionnelle qui se rapporte au sujet même de l'attitude, comme dans l'énoncé 'Je crois que je suis chauve', le deuxième "je" est celui qui distingue cette attitude d'autres, *de dicto*, ou *de re*. Il serait très utile, je crois, d'essayer de penser la duperie de soi-même et les autres cas d'irrationalité en partant de cette division des attitudes propositionnelles.
9. Cette différence, même si elle n'est pas très nette, peut justifier le rejet de la tentative de Mark Johnston d'interpréter la duperie de soi comme étant une type *de se* du mensonge et, notamment, d'attribuer à Davidson cette vision qui, d'après Johnston, justifie la partition de l'esprit: une partie de l'esprit trompe l'autre partie. Ce passage de Davidson est une raison suffisante, je crois, pour pouvoir rejeter cette lecture.
10. Plusieurs auteurs ont essayé de formuler le paradoxe supposé par la duperie de soi-même. Par exemple, Jennifer Church (dans "Reasonable

Irrationality", p.364') nous donne plusieurs variantes: "comment peux-je éviter effectivement de réfléchir sur une certaine croyance ou désir sans, au préalable, déterminer d'une façon réfléchie, quels sont la croyance ou le désir que je veux éviter ? Comment peux-je échouer intentionnellement de représenter quelque chose pour moi-même sans, toute de suite avoir représentée cette chose-ci pour moi-même dans la formation de l'intention ?" On peut remarquer que elle rapporte le paradoxe au caractère *de se* des attitudes envisagées.

11 . Le modèle est présenté d'une façon plus tranchante dans "Incoherence and Irrationality": quelqu'un, dit Davidson, peut croire *p* et, en même temps, croire non-*p*, mais il ne peut pas croire (*p* et non-*p*) à cause de la 'compartimentalisation de l'esprit qui l'empêche de poser les deux croyances ensemble.'(p.353). C'est-à-dire que cette partition de l'esprit est le moyen d'empêcher l'inconsistance de devenir "interne" dans le sens utilisé dans "Deception and Division". Il semble suggérer que l'agent choisi ici de transgresser temporairement le principe, tout en le gardant, justement pour éviter la renonciation ouverte à celui-ci: les deux énoncés contradictoires sont séparés justement pour empêcher leur conjonction qui introduit l'incohérence dans le coeur même du système des croyances. On affaibli un peu l'unité du système, justement pour le garder, pour ne pas le voir exploser.

12 . "Philosophie et psychologie", Gallimard, Paris,1996, p.251.

13 . Cette différence permet le rejet de l'étiquette "homunculaire" posée par M.Johnston au modèle davidsonien.

14 . Ce passage nous suggère une parallèle avec la vision de "Incoherence and Irrationality", dans le sens que le principe est, temporairement, "mis à côté", pour éviter son échec définitif.

15 . Un autre modèle diachronique est proposé par Dion Scott-Kakures (dans "Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality" , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. lvi,1996, pp.31-56) qui est composé par deux moments:

la présentation successive des pensées contradictoires;

leur présence synchronique.

Le premier élément est constitué par deux moments, *t* et *t+1*:

je crois:*p*

je crois : j'ai une raison suffisante pour croire que *p*

t+1: je crois: non-*p*

je crois: à *t* j'ai cru que *p*.

je crois: que à *t* j'ai eue une raison suffisante pour croire que *p*.

Cette façon de présenter la duperie de soi-même est, je crois assez différente de celle davidsonienne et nous mène dans une direction différente. Ce modèle peut être, je crois, applicable à la faiblesse de la garantie, mais pas à la duperie de soi-même, à cause de l'absence des autres attitudes propositionnelles du modèle (le désir, l'intention).

16 . Dans ce cas il s'agit plutôt des questions que des assertions catégoriques ; je me regarde dans le

miroir et je me demande "Est-ce que je suis chauve ? "

17. Qui est produit (causé) par un autre désir, celui de n'être pas chauve. Pour cela, la croyance "je suis chauve" ne peut pas être considérée comme étant la cause du désir de croire que "je ne suis pas chauve".

18 . Davidson reste assez imprécis sur cette situation, mais je crois que nous pouvons penser au fait que, parfois, dans tels cas de duperie de soi-même nous utilisons expressions comme : "D'habitude, quelqu'un qui est comme moi est dénommé 'chauve' , mais dans mon cas..." ou "Si je me tient aux apparences, alors je dois reconnaître que je suis chauve, mais...".

19 . Une raison supplémentaire dans ce cas particulier est l'ambiguïté du mot "chauve", autrement dit, le fait que les raisons semblent assez proches comme force: je remarque que les cheveux sur ma nuque sont de plus en plus rares; je pense (ou, comme disait Davidson au commencement, "je suis enclin à croire que) "Je suis chauve" parce que j'ai moins de cheveux qu'auparavant; mais, en même temps, je me dit "Je ne suis pas chauve" parce que, "chauve" signifie "sans cheveux"; les deux raisons semblent avoir (presque) le même poids.

20 . voir la discussion sur les types de raisons au sujet de la pensée magique et la duperie de soi-même.

21. Même si celle-ci est vue, par Davidson comme "un signe d'irrationalité", elle seule ne peut pas représenter l'irrationalité dans le cas de la duperie de soi-même, parce qu'elle seule ne peut pas justifier le côté motivationnel de l'irrationalité de la duperie de soi-même. Or, ce côté se rapporte justement au rôle du désir. La faiblesse de la garantie vise seulement le conflit entre les deux croyances, pendant que, comme souligne Davidson, dans le cas de la duperie de soi, nous avons un conflit entre un désir (et une intention) et une croyance. Ce dernier conflit cause et représente le motif du dernier: c'est parce qu'il désire de croire qu'il n'est pas chauve, qu'il arrive à croire qu'il n'est pas chauve.

LA RATIONALITE ET L'EPISTEMOLOGIE DE L'ERREUR

Paul Kun

Dans cet essai, je me propose d'aborder le problème de l'importance de l'erreur pour la qualification de l'action et du jugement humains. Il ne s'agit pas d'une question purement théorique, au contraire, elle a une importance capitale pour les recherches dans les sciences humaines, notamment pour celles développées par l'anthropologie culturelle et par la psychologie cognitive. Comment pouvons-nous justifier cette importance ? J'espère que je pourrai plus loin répondre à cette question.

Mais, pour commencer, il faut savoir qu'est-ce que l'erreur. Pour définir l'erreur, il faut réaliser trois exigences. Premièrement, l'erreur suppose, nécessairement, l'existence d'une différence par rapport à une action, croyance, jugement, etc. Cette condition est nécessaire, mais pas suffisante, parce qu'il y a beaucoup d'actions, de croyances, de jugements qui sont différents les uns par rapport aux autres, sans que, pour autant, l'un ou l'autre soit vus comme erronés.

Deuxièmement, cette différence doit être signifiante, c'est-à-dire qu'elle doit produire une véritable opposition entre les deux telle que si on fait (ou on pense ou on juge) l'un, on ne peut pas faire (etc) l'autre. Mais, même quand ces deux exigences sont remplies, nous ne pouvons pas qualifier l'un des deux comme d'erroné.

La troisième exigence est que l'autre alternative doit être vue comme étant *correcte, bonne, normale*. Cette dernière exigence suppose l'existence d'un ensemble de critères (normes) d'après lesquels sont jugées les actions, etc., comme correctes ou incorrectes. D'autre part, même si elle est la plus importante, elle seule n'est pas suffisante pour qualifier une action, etc. comme erronée, même si elle ne respecte pas les critères, parce qu'il est possible que l'autre action, etc. n'ait aucun rapport avec celle jugée correcte. Mais, cette dernière exigence est celle qui fait la liaison avec le problème de la rationalité. D'autre part, l'existence d'une certaine tension entre cette exigence et les autres expliquent pourquoi nous avons des théories différentes sur l'erreur et sur la rationalité.

Avant d'aborder ces problèmes, nous devons voir comment on peut définir les erreurs d'une façon plus empirique.

La notion d'erreur n'est pas univoque. Principalement, nous pouvons faire des erreurs dans l'action et dans les croyances. Faire une erreur pendant l'accomplissement d'une action et avoir une croyance erronée, ce n'est pas la même chose.

A ce sujet, on peut remarquer qu'il y a deux tendances dans la littérature philosophique sur l'erreur:

1. Celle qui considère l'erreur simplement d'un point de vue strictement négatif par rapport à l'action correcte ou aux croyances vraies. Cette tendance est très évidente parmi ceux qui embrassent une approche "charitable", c'est-à-dire qui supposent que toutes les actions ou les croyances des humains doivent respecter un principe nommé principe de rationalité ou de charité, qui consiste dans la supposition que les hommes sont rationnels, c'est-à-dire forment leurs croyances et agissent en accord avec certaines normes qui définissent la rationalité. Les plus importants représentants de cette orientation sont Daniel C. Dennett et Donald Davidson. La conséquence la plus importante de leur démarche, en ce qui concerne notre problème, est qu'ils associent la rationalité de l'agent à une incapacité de commettre des erreurs systématiques, persistentes et très répandues.

2. L'autre tendance est de penser l'erreur exclusivement en termes de fausses croyances. Cette tendance est privilégiée par le courant des "représentationalistes" – c'est-à-dire, par les adeptes de la Théorie Représentationnelle de l'Esprit – dont les plus importants sont Jerry Fodor et Fr. Dretske, qui soutiennent que la capacité empirique des hommes de commettre des erreurs prêche de la crédibilité à leur approche. Mais, l'explication fournie par cette tendance est assez difficile à accepter. La raison principale pour laquelle cette vision est mise en doute la difficulté d'expliquer comment on a des mauvaises représentations; d'après cette théorie, on pense que la représentation mentale d'une vache, par exemple, est causée par une vache. Alors, un cas typique de représentation erronée est, par exemple, le cas dans lequel un cheval cause la représentation mentale d'une vache plutôt que celle d'un cheval. Mais, d'après la même théorie, si un cheval peut causer une représentation, alors celle-ci ne peut pas être que la représentation d'un cheval, parce que la représentation d'une vache est causé seulement par une vache. On a suggéré que, peut-être la représentation en cause est du type "vache et cheval", mais dans ce cas il ne s'agit plus d'une représentation erronée d'un cheval. Donc, la tendance représentationaliste, même si elle accepte l'idée intuitive que les gens peuvent faire des erreurs systématiques, a des grandes difficultés à en prendre compte théoriquement.

C'est la raison principale pour laquelle mon intention est de m'occuper seulement de la première tendance et d'essayer d'aborder le problème de ce point de vue.

En revenant aux types d'erreur, nous pouvons dire que, même si elles sont différentes, il y a une liaison, qui est plus générale, la liaison entre action et croyance, qui peut être exprimée de la façon suivante: toute action part de certaines croyances et toute croyance a pour origine soit d'autres croyances, soit une action. Appliqué à notre problème, nous pouvons dire que:

- D'une part, les croyances sont essentielles pour la planification des actions. Les erreurs de planification et celles commises dans l'accomplissement des actions sont causées par des croyances erronées. Par exemple, si quelqu'un veut entrer dans une chambre et croit, faussement, que la porte est fermée à clé, il peut changer ses projets initiaux et adopter un plan d'action erroné, par exemple de tenter de briser la porte.

- D'autre part, aux moins certaines croyances sont formées pendant l'action, telle qu'une action erronée peut produire une croyance erronée; en revenant à l'exemple antérieur, ma croyance que la porte est fermée à clé peut être causé par la tentative de l'agent d'ouvrir la porte dans la mauvaise direction (par exemple, pour ouvrir la porte, nous devons la pousser, pendant que l'agent la tire). L'action inappropriée cause la croyance erronée que la porte est fermée à clé.

Mainenant, nous pouvons passer à l'examen des deux sortes d'erreur. Pour commencer, nous examinerons les erreurs dans les croyances: il y a deux sortes de croyances erronées:

- a. quand il s'agit d'erreurs épistémiquement fausses;
- b. quand la croyance a été mal formée ou quand elle est injustifiée.

Les deux sortes sont, du point de vue logique, indépendantes: une croyance peut être, en même temps, injustifiée et vraie, ou justifiée et fausse. Si nous revenons à l'exemple précédent, la croyance que la porte est ouverte est vraie, mais injustifiée, parce que l'agent ne réussit pas à l'ouvrir, pendant que la croyance que la porte est fermée est erronée mais justifiée par le fait que l'agent ne peut pas l'ouvrir.

Si l'utilisation de l'erreur dans des contextes épistémiques est structurellement proche de son utilisation dans le contexte de l'action, alors étant donnée la liaison entre action et croyance, nous pouvons trouver que la compréhension de l'erreur dans l'action peut nous aider à comprendre l'erreur dans la croyance. Cela est possible du fait que, nous avons vu, les sources de la croyance peuvent être soit d'autres croyances, soit l'action; la deuxième alternative nous permet de penser que les premières sont réductibles aux dernières à cause du fait que les croyances erronées ne peuvent être déduites que d'autres croyances (ou actions) erronées. Donc, nous pouvons réduire les contextes épistémiques – les croyances – au contexte de l'action et construire une explication pour les deux types d'erreur.

L'action et la croyance sont liées dans deux façons:

- i. L'activité de la formation et de la révision des croyances est une extension du processus par lequel nous planifions et remplissons les actions motrices. Former ou réviser une croyance est un type "plus haut" d'action; au sens où la croyance est une sorte de "conclusion" de nos actions motrices. Revenons à l'exemple de l'agent qui essaie d'ouvrir la porte en la tirant. Si, après plusieurs essais, il s'arrête, cela signifie que, à la suite de ses échecs, il a formé une croyance sur l'état de la porte (il croit qu'elle est fermée à clé);
- ii. Nos théories de la croyance sont formées en réfléchissant sur l'action, sur les types d'erreurs commis pendant l'action et sur leur découverte.

Si la croyance erronée est comprise en termes d'action erronée, alors les théories de la croyance erronée produites par le sens commun seront les plus proches de la vision standard de l'action erronée.

Je suggère que notre premier sens de l'erreur est dérivé de l'expérience de l'erreur dans l'accomplissement d'une action tel que l'erreur est identique avec l'échec dans l'accomplissement de l'action. Je reviendrai plus tard sur ce point.

Pour découvrir un comportement erronée, trois choses sont nécessaires:

1. un mécanisme de rétroaction qui compare ce qui est espéré avec ce qui se produit au but de l'action;
2. une divergence entre nos espoirs et nos réalisations;
3. un ou plusieurs critères pour identifier où nous avons commis l'erreur.

Contrairement à l'opinion de Donald Norman et de Natika Newton, qui pensent que les deux premiers critères sont suffisants pour découvrir un comportement erroné, je soutiens que ceux-là nous permettent seulement d'avoir une conscience assez vague que "quelque chose ne va pas", sans que nous puissions vraiment savoir à quel niveau (planification de l'action, accomplissement, formulation du but de l'action) se situe l'erreur. Dans ce cas, le comportement peut être correct par rapport à la planification et aux espoirs de l'action, mais l'erreur peut être localisée au niveau de la planification (c'est-à-dire le rapport entre comportement et but peut être erroné) ou au niveau de la formulation du but (c'est-à-dire que l'agent n'a pas identifié correctement le but de son action). Dans le cas de l'agent qui veut ouvrir la porte, son comportement (son action) est correct dans le sens qu'il ne peut pas ouvrir la porte en actionnant une manette, car il ne s'agit pas d'une porte qui s'ouvre à distance. En échange, soit le rapport entre comportement et but est mal conçu, car pour ouvrir la porte il doit la pousser, pas la tirer, soit le but n'a pas été correctement formulé: l'agent ne veut pas, en réalité, ouvrir la porte, mais la fermer. Donc, nous avons besoin du critère pour pouvoir déterminer si, vraiment, notre action est incorrecte.

Cela, parce que nous sommes dans l'impossibilité de classer les erreurs si nous n'avons pas de critères pour leur identification. En revenant à notre exemple, l'agent a voulu ouvrir la porte, mais il a échoué; même s'il est conscient de son échec, il ne sait pas si, vraiment, il a commis une erreur et de quelle erreur il s'agit dans ce cas. Il peut supposer soit que ses espoirs étaient faux (il espérait que la porte soit ouverte), soit qu'il devait actionner une manette, soit que son comportement était inapproprié (il doit tirer plus fort), soit, enfin, qu'il devait pousser la porte pour l'ouvrir. Toutes ces alternatives étaient possibles dans la même mesure. Il n'y avait aucun critère disponible pour déterminer laquelle était la vraie. Cela nous démontre la nécessité du critère pour déterminer une action comme correcte.

Toute cette discussion a eu comme but de préparer le terrain pour aborder le problème du rapport entre l'erreur et le principe de rationalité.

3. Le principe de rationalité et l'erreur.

Pour l'approche néo-rationaliste, la difficulté fondamentale liée au statut de l'erreur, concerne les rapports entre l'erreur et le principe de rationalité. Ce dernier joue un rôle fondamental dans la compréhension, l'explication et la prédiction du comportement humain. Les attributions intentionnelles de la psychologie du sens commun, d'après Dennett et Davidson, sont faites pour rationaliser le comportement et sont, pour cela, appropriées ou inappropriées par rapport à ce but. Mais bien que les considérations de la rationalité ne déterminent pas la façon dont nous décrivons les états intentionnelles, elles doivent limiter certainement le rôle joué par l'erreur dans ce processus. Si l'erreur est plus qu'un accident, alors le principe de rationalité peut être violé systématiquement, ce qui rend l'approche indéfendable. Une erreur systématique suppose une capacité *inhérente* d'errer à la nature humaine, qui élimine le troisième critère (normatif) qui nous donne la possibilité de distinguer l'action, etc., correcte de celle incorrecte, parce que les deux façons *différentes* d'agir ont la *même* justification. Le principe de rationalité est affecté dans son application et il doit être "complété" avec un principe d'irrationalité, pour pouvoir garder l'opérationnalité du modèle explicatif. Autrement dit, parce que l'erreur systématique suppose l'irrationalité, l'acceptation de la

possibilité d'erreur non accidentelle suppose une définition positive (critérielle) de l'irrationalité, ce qui contredit clairement le principe de rationalité.

McGeer nous permet de comprendre pourquoi Dennett pense que le problème de l'erreur est un pseudo-problème inventé par les représentationalistes: "Si nous supposons que l'attribution de croyances et de désirs est nécessaire pour expliquer le comportement d'un agent comme comportement de l'agent, le fossé introduit par les erreurs cognitives nous laissent dans le noir sur ce qu'on peut dire de l'agent dans telles circonstances. Parce que les concepts psychologiques ne peuvent pas être déployés, nous sommes privés d'un agent". Cela parce que l'action de l'agent se distingue du mouvement d'une partie du corps par le fait qu'elle est causée par des raisons. Or, l'agent est défini, à son tour, par la présence de l'action. Un simple mouvement corporel, explicable par des causes naturelles, n'est pas suffisant pour attribuer à quelqu'un la qualité d'agent. Donc, sans action, pas d'agent (op.cit.,p.298). Autrement dit, le problème de l'erreur de l'agent met en cause la capacité explicative et l'utilité même de la psychologie populaire (*folk psychology*).

Pour comprendre mieux l'importance de cette difficulté, nous prenons le cas de l'explication de l'action et des croyances dans l'anthropologie culturelle. Un anthropologue peut expliquer le comportement d'un représentant d'une culture totalement ou assez différente de la sienne, seulement s'il suppose qu'il s'agit d'un comportement rationnel. Si le comportement est (apprécié comme) irrationnel, alors il ne peut pas être expliqué en termes de raisons, croyances ou désirs. L'irrationalité est, pour cela, un sujet inabordable au moins pour les sciences humaines. Les croyances et le comportement des autres peut apparaître irrationnels, mais l'irrationalité doit disparaître si nous développons l'interprétation. Le problème le plus important est, donc, celui de réduire l'irrationalité apparente du comportement. Un comportement peut être qualifié d'irrationnel seulement quand l'anthropologue échoue dans toutes ses démarches explicatives. Mais, cet échec n'est pas, en soi-même, une explication du comportement irrationnel comme telle. Tout comportement qualifié d'irrationnel sort du domaine explicatif de l'anthropologie.

La base de l'explication anthropologique est représentée par trois thèses qui dérivent du principe de rationalité:

- La thèse du holisme des croyances.
- La thèse de la normativité.
- La thèse de la congruence.

La thèse du holisme des croyances nous dit que les croyances des agents ne sont pas des ensembles amorphes, mais des systèmes dans lesquels les croyances entretiennent des liaisons assez stables, avec une "coloration" logique, c'est-à-dire que les croyances qui forment le système doivent être non contradictoires. Cela implique que l'anthropologue ne peut pas attribuer à l'autochtone des croyances inconsistantes. Donc, l'anthropologue doit éliminer toutes les hypothèses interprétatives qui supposent des croyances contradictoires.

La thèse de la normativité suppose que toute action humaine doit respecter certaines normes, indépendamment du fait qu'elles soient manifestes sur le plan conscient ou soient inconscientes. Toute interprétation doit chercher les normes qui justifient une action comme étant rationnelle.

La thèse de la congruence introduit la limitation la plus importante, parce qu'elle suppose que les principes qui gouvernent la croyance et l'action des autochtones doivent être *les mêmes* que les principes de l'anthropologue. Comment explique-t-on cette thèse si exigeante ?

Pour expliquer le comportement de l'autre humain, représentant d'une culture étrangère, l'anthropologue doit l'interpréter: une condition nécessaire de l'interprétation est que l'interprète prenne les assertions faites par les autochtones comme des énoncés sincèrement assertés qui sont vrais. Autrement, il ne peut pas fixer la signification des mots et des propositions. Si, par exemple, l'autochtone dit "il va pleuvoir" et il montre le ciel, l'anthropologue peut comprendre ses dires s'il pense que le sujet sincère et que ses mots sont utilisés avec leur signification courante et que l'assertion est, au moins, tenue pour vraie, c'est-à-dire qu'il y a des raisons pour la considérer vraie. Dire qu'un énoncé est vrai c'est dire que quelqu'un doit le croire. Si l'énoncé n'est pas tenu pour vrai, alors l'anthropologue est privé des raisons qui, du côté de l'autochtone, donnent la possibilité de croire en sa vérité, et qui, du côté de l'anthropologue, donnent la possibilité d'attribuer les significations correctes aux dires du sujet.

En développant une interprétation du langage, l'anthropologue a besoin d'appeler aux principes et concepts qui guident la formation de la croyance chez les autochtones. Tous ces principes sont normatifs. La "raisonnabilité" dans ces cas doit être la raisonnabilité du point de vue de l'agent. Nous pouvons justifier l'attribution d'une croyance pour un agent sur les bases de sa raisonnabilité seulement si l'agent considère la croyance comme une raison d'agir, de parler ou de soutenir une autre croyance.

Martin Hollis exprime assez clairement cette thèse dans le passage suivant: "Si l'anthropologie est possible, les autochtones doivent partager nos conceptions de vérité, de cohérence et d'interdépendance rationnelle des croyances" (op.cit., p.269).

Il y a une autre ligne d'argumentation pour la thèse de la congruence, défendue par Michael Root, Graham McDonald et Philip Pettit, qui sont partis des idées de Davidson. Root soutient que la thèse de la congruence résulte de la thèse de la normativité et du fait que celle-ci est constitutive de l'interprétation. Les normes de rationalité sont constitutives dans le sens qu'elles constituent ce que peut être un agent rationnel et, pour cela, elles contraignent l'application du concept d'agent rationnel. Les autochtones doivent être soumis à des normes de rationalité pour que l'anthropologue ait la possibilité de les comprendre comme agents rationnels: "les normes qui guident un interprète dans sa description des actions d'un agent reflètent les normes qui guident l'agent dans l'accomplissement des actions". Les normes des autochtones doivent être, bien sûr, reconnues comme normes de rationalité.

Mais, cette vision affronte des nombreuses difficultés dans le travail réel de l'anthropologue, la plus importante étant qu'une importante partie des assertions des autochtones doivent être jugées comme irrationnelles, parce qu'elles ne peuvent pas être interprétées comme sensées selon les principes et les normes de rationalité de l'interprète. Donc, l'anthropologue est confronté ici au problème esquissé plus haut: il est obligé d'éliminer tout ce qui suppose une erreur non accidentelle. C'est-à-dire tout ce qui ne peut pas être corrigé, ou au moins corrigé, par l'autochtone lui-même, même si l'anthropologue juge qu'une deuxième interprétation des dires de l'autochtone pourra les rationaliser.

L'autochtone peut avoir des croyances qui à ses yeux sont vraies, mais qui pour nous sont fausses. En regard de ces croyances, il peut être jugé comme irrationnel, parce qu'il refusera l'interprétation de l'anthropologue, parce qu'il ne peut pas renoncer à une croyance qu'il pense être vraie. Danc, la thèse de la congruence nous interdit une re-interprétation des croyances de l'autochtone dans son sens.

Mais, cela mène, tôt ou tard, à juger l'autochtone comme étant irrationnel. Cela signifie que, dans la mesure dans laquelle l'autochtone ne partage pas les mêmes principes et normes de rationalité que l'interprète, il peut être jugé comme irrationnel. Cette particularité a donné aux ennemis de la tendance rationaliste une raison pour l'accuser d'"impérialisme culturel". Nous pouvons voir assez clairement qu'on ne peut pas supposer que notre culture fonctionne comme une sorte de critère absolu de rationalité. Premièrement, parce que parmi nos croyances et nos valeurs il y en a beaucoup qui ne sont pas du tout rationnelles, mais qui peuvent sembler l'être. Deuxièmement, parce que le principe de rationalité peut être interprété de façon plus faible que celle supposé par la thèse de la congruence. C'est dans ce sens que Mark Risjord nous propose une solution.

Il propose une autre thèse pour remplacer celle de la congruence, la thèse de la cohérence: une croyance est justifiée si elle a des relations appropriées (non contradictoires) avec les autres croyances du système. Cette thèse permet le changement de l'interprétation quand la première interprétation échoue de donner une vue rationnelle du système de croyances de l'autochtone. Cela signifie que, après la première interprétation, le système de croyances de l'autochtone peut paraître incohérent, parce qu'il y a des croyances interprétées qui sont contradictoires avec les autres croyances (cette fois de l'anthropologue) qui composent l'interprétation. La thèse de la cohérence nous donne la possibilité d'opérer des modifications dans notre interprétation (c'est-à-dire de modifier nos croyances d'anthropologues) pour agrandir la cohérence du système.

La normativité qui résulte des croyances et des conceptions attribuées aux autochtones est leur normativité; pendant que les hypothèses grâce auxquelles leur sont attribuées ces conceptions sont gouvernées par de snormes qui engagent l'anthropologue.

D'après Mark Risjord, il y a trois critères permettant de qualifier une assertion comme irrationnelle:

- Les autochtones doivent, en apparence, prendre l'assertion à la lettre.
- Les données doivent indiquer qu'ils pensent que la phrase est vraie.
- L'interprétation de la phrase doit se baser sur la meilleure interprétation du langage faite par l'anthropologue.

Cette conception permet de concevoir l'erreur non au niveau du système des croyances de l'autochtone, mais au niveau de l'interprétation. Pour reprendre un exemple offert par Martin Hollis: "Certains membres de la population des Yoruba portent avec eux des boîtes qui sont traitées avec une attention particulière. Quand on leur demande pourquoi ils portent partout ces boîtes, ils répondent qu'elles sont leur tête ou leur âme et qu'ils les protègent ainsi contre la sorcellerie" (op.cit). La croyance en l'existence d'entités comme les sorcières et les âmes peut expliquer pourquoi les Yoruba disent de telles chose et agissent d'une façon si inhabituelle. Leurs croyances ne sont plus absurdes si les hypothèses agrandissent la

cohérence totale de l'interprétation, alors l'anthropologue peut changer son interprétation.

Donc, la thèse de la cohérence demande à l'anthropologue d'adopter le changement d'interprétation qui accroît le plus la cohérence explicative.

La vision de Risjord a l'avantage de proposer une différenciation entre l'irrationalité apprenante et l'irrationalité proprement dite. Celle-ci est basée sur une distinction au niveau de l'erreur. Une différence entre l'erreur d'une personne rationnelle et l'erreur d'une autre personne, irrationnelle, est la réaction à la correction. C'est un indice très important. Une personne rationnelle a la capacité de reconnaître une erreur et de la corriger. Donc, toute personne qui refuse de corriger une erreur est qualifiée d'irrationnelle. Pour être des cas d'apparente irrationalité déductive, les autochtones doivent persister dans la poursuite du modèle erroné malgré la critique de l'anthropologue. Nous avons, toutefois, affaire à une *apparente* irrationalité, justement parce que ce qui est, pour nous, une erreur, est, pour eux, une croyance vraie, donc elle est consistante avec les autres croyances de *leur* système.

Un exemple de raisonnement erroné qui est pris comme signe d'irrationalité a été offert par Evans-Pritchard, au sujet des croyances des Azande sur la sorcellerie. Celles-ci peuvent être exprimées par la triade suivante de croyances inconsistantes:

- I. Chaque lignée des descendants du même sexe est protégée par un aïeul qui a été sorcier reconnu.
- II. Si chaque lignée a un sorcier reconnu, alors tous les Azande sont des sorciers (les Azande pensent que la sorcellerie est transmissible).
- III. Les Azande ne sont pas tous des sorciers.

Evans-Pritchard dit que les Azande refusent de tirer la conclusion que leur croyances sont contradictoires et, en même temps, ils refusent de réviser leurs croyances.

David Cooper suggère une solution qui élimine l'apparence d'irrationalité. Il dit que le refus des Azande d'accepter l'inconsistance peut être expliqué par l'hypothèse qu'ils ont une logique trivalente. Ce type de logique non standard rejette le principe de bivalence, en soutenant qu'une proposition peut être vraie, fausse ou indéterminée. Une proposition a une valeur de vérité indéterminée si elle est, en principe, non testable par les Azande avec leurs critères. Si les Azande considèrent I comme indéterminée et III comme vraie, alors II doit être, elle aussi, indéterminée. Dans ce cas, I et II n'impliquent pas la conclusion que tous les Azande sont des sorciers, donc il n'y a aucune contradiction. L'interprétation de Cooper a l'avantage qu'elle accroît la cohérence de l'interprétation:

- Elle élimine la contradiction.
- Elle explique pourquoi les Azande n'ont besoin de rejeter aucun des éléments du raisonnement.

Une compréhension cohérente du changement interprétatif exige une sorte de double vision de l'irrationalité: certaines croyances autochtones seront rationnelles selon les standards autochtones, mais irrationnelles selon ceux de l'anthropologue. Au plus, la position cohérentiste est plus nuancée que celle de la congruence en cela que pendant que le cohérentiste soutient que les interprétations les plus cohérentes de tous les groupes humains *pourraient* s'avérer un jour avoir les mêmes normes de rationalité, la position du congruentiste affirme le caractère *a priori* et absolu du principe de rationalité.

Maintenant, je peux tirer la conclusion, très importante pour mon sujet, que le statut et la signification de l'erreur changent en fonction de la force qui est attribuée au principe de rationalité. Cette conclusion montre une autre aspect inéliminable de la nature normative de l'erreur.

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METAPHYSICS AS A HISTORICAL DISCIPLINE

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The development of Collingwood's treatment of religious faith seems to converge with the evolution of his other major perspectives, such as the metaphysical one, or his philosophy of history, as well as his ethics. In fact, all these appear to converge especially under practical pressures, aiming at answering as clearly as possible the questions entailed by these practical problems. In order to prove that, despite all Collingwood's turns and shifts, we still can talk about a structural unity (at least at the level of Collingwood's intentions) of his conception, I have tried to follow the image of 'absolute reality' as it appears - more or less explicit - in some of his writings. That means I had to focus my attention upon Collingwood's major metaphysical concerns. Thus, the object of his metaphysics, namely 'mind' as essential and unique reality, appears to me as having an implicit constant nucleus and that all Collingwood's apparent 'deviations' are only explorations of its various 'external' implications (which Collingwood didn't always succeed in dealing with in a unitary manner) which were mostly practical in character and thus joined the external pressures that moulded the 'extraction' of new (feed-back) consequences. Consequently, the whole 'moving picture' is simply a complex and diversified unfolding of 'mind' as ultimate reality. Against those who stress the radically new Collingwoodian thematic occurrences, I would argue that most of these 'events' were in fact announced in the seeds which could be found in Collingwood's earlier writings, given especially that in his view philosophy is rather a body of principles which runs through a man's life-work.¹

According to the Oxford philosopher, the 'mind' is created by man. This occurs in two processes, collectively as the race has evolved its culture, and individually as each person acquires his education within that culture. Every act of consciousness is a creative act of the mind, in which the mind exercises some degree of choice and has some goal in view.² This definition of mind presented in Collingwood's book *Speculum Mentis* (O.U.P., 1924) did not seem to be essentially altered in its meaning during the further stages of Collingwood's creation. Moreover, the mind is what it thinks; 'but this activity of reflection is no mere thinking; it is a *doing*, and it is the nature of what thought *does* that Collingwood [...] seeks to determine.'³ As regards the surrounding world process, it 'does not belong to some isolated world-in-itself but only to an experienced world, that is, to a world that is in some sense thought or interpreted. [Mind as (shared) subjectivity

is fundamentally a *world-making activity*. The key to an understanding [...] of consciousness, then, is to determine *how* the self makes or creates its world'.⁴ Thus, the world is in different ways and to various degrees, the activity of thought. The world and the self - as shared consciousness -, then, are both 'made' by 'knowing' them. And, accordingly, mind *makes* itself by *knowing* itself, and knowing is nothing else but *practical and theoretical achievement*.⁵ With respect to Collingwood's constant conception about history, Michael Hinz concludes that 'if consciousness [(mind)] is to contribute fully to self-knowledge and self-creation, it must do so in accordance with the methods of history'⁶ by which the processes of the self and the world can be ascertained⁷ and only by which I (as subject) 'can also explore a world consisting in things other from myself'(Collingwood, *The New Leviathan* (NL), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 128) and I can envisage 'the problem from which [a process of thought] started and reconstruct ... the steps by which its solution was attempted'(Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (IH), Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 312-13). And the historian's work of making the thoughts and action of the agent as self cohere is a matter a practical deliberation and choice. However, what the historian is trying to determine is the thought of the agent, and the thought of the agent can be determined only relative to the action which the historian is trying to explain. Accordingly, a self is practical activity. Freedom is the successful assertion of a self; it is attributable to a self that has overcome (to at least some degree) the obstacles which had temporarily hindered its effort after unity. A self frustrated and incapable of mastering its problem is, to the extent of its failure, not free. Freedom, therefore, consists in the self's transformation of its situation as constituting an increase in its unity. Thus, mind's activity is ultimately the endeavour to attain its unity through the activity of the individual selves as shared consciousness. I think this is in fact the internal side of the 'material' history.⁸ As a form of 'theoretical reason', history is an attempt to explain the activity of the not-self in terms of the 'practical reason' derived from the consciousness of 'duty'.⁹ In acting according to duty the agent gives his response to his situation starting from an understanding that the rational requirements of the situation are not accomplishable in merely utilitarian or regularian terms. Therefore, as Collingwood puts it, historical consciousness is in fact the 'consciousness of a necessity which cannot be stated analytically in terms of reasons and consequences' (Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (EPM), O.U.P., 1933, p. 156). This converges very well with Collingwood's famous assertion that when the historian 'knows what happened, he already knows why it happened (IH, 214).

Although historicity was always considered by Collingwood a fundamental characteristic of the mind, its life¹⁰, nevertheless history is not the synonym of metaphysics but its method, even if metaphysics, so far from being the science of being, is the true science of becoming. As Bruce Haddock observes, 'Collingwood had always seen his treatment of conceptual problems which arise in the conduct of historical research as a preliminary stage in a larger enterprise, the exploration of the historical dimension in experience as a whole. [Despite the fact that t]his project, involving as it did a reappraisal of the nature of mind and language, was somewhat swamped in *The Idea of History*, [y]et it is arguable that Collingwood's views on the character of history have been misinterpreted through neglect of his wider philosophical interest'.¹¹

Basically, the self-creative process of mind is a process of development which we become aware of insofar as we do metaphysics and that means insofar as we think historically. But to do metaphysics is not merely to think historically, because in metaphysics the reconstruction of the thought element comprising a certain situation is not similar to the historical reconstruction - which deals exclusively with past reflective thought - and because these thought elements (namely absolute presuppositions) are 'unconscious' (EM, 48n), in the sense of pre-conscious, pre-reflective¹² - that is, forms of 'propositional thinking' (NL, part 1) - and yet re-enactable¹³; implicit and yet explicable.¹⁴

Historical method is inferential (inductive); but the metaphysician doesn't proceed only inductively because he undertakes a non-historical re-enactment of the *strains* of an earlier phase of a certain development which were taken up and resolved within it and thus constituting a new phase. Whereas the historian tries to match the action to the situation, the metaphysician aims to establish the continuity between two phases (as systems of thought); whereas actions (which the histor¹⁵ian basically deals with) are characterised by the degrees of fulfilment of purposes, the developments - as 'substance' i.e. *doing* of mind as shared consciousness of the individuals¹⁶ - from a system of thought to another (which, in Collingwood's opinion, should become the genuine subject-matter of metaphysics) are characterised by the resolution of strains.

In solving its problems, the self-creative mind creates new problems which it solves differently and thus alters not only its world but itself as well (NL, 64). With respect to these responses from without (which act as feed-back pressures upon the self) Hinz offers a graphic example: 'The ancient Greek concepts of virtue and happiness were modified as a result of the changes in political life which followed upon the Alexandrian and Roman conquests.'¹⁷

However, what is special in the case of Collingwood is, on the one hand, the illuminating relevance of the evolution of his own doctrine for his interpretative principles, and the applicability of these principles to his own thought - as a series of acts of intellectual history - on the other. This would ultimately mean that in his oeuvre continuity prevails over discontinuity; among the most important elements of continuity, history represents the method of tracing the continuous process of mind's unfolding through human actions. As Mink pointed out, history as the 'concrete universal' and the overall notion of historical consciousness form the link between the early and later Collingwood.¹⁸ With respect to this matter one must bear in mind that Collingwood always considered that a philosophical enterprise is pointless unless it strives toward a system.

Obviously, up to a point, Collingwood is a faithful Hegelian, but there are essential aspects in respect to which he is in disagreement with Hegel, such as the latter's logicism i.e. his conversion of history into logic, or with his treatment of individuals as if they were universals.¹⁹ Of course, it could be argued that Collingwood's Hegelianism came to him not directly, but through the already critical accounts due to the Italian neo-Hegelians, especially Giovanni Gentile: but, even so, Collingwood's thought is not merely Hegelian, but Kantian as well; thus, in this respect, '[w]e might say that, as Gentile is the Hegelian 'Actual Idealist', so Collingwood is the Kantian (or 'critical' practitioner) of the 'method of immanence'.²⁰ At any event, for Collingwood, the unity of mind is a self-creative process having no necessary characteristics, and so is God in RP. In other words, he explains it as a

fundamentally practical process, not a logical one.²¹ And, indeed, Collingwood was consistent with his theory according to which every human act, including the most theoretical approaches is, to a significant extent, practical in terms of its motives and implications. Even the most 'theoretical' theories are meant to 'clarify misunderstandings which are a hindrance to the solution of practical problems.'²² As David Boucher indicates, '[w]hat Collingwood is suggesting is that we are thinking beings whose theories about the world in which we act make a difference to that world.'²³ In *An Autobiography*, Collingwood went so far along this idea as to accuse the 'realist' philosophers of unacceptable complicity with the evil factors which threatened man's life and freedom: 'I know now that the minute philosophers of my youth for all their profession of a purely scientific detachment from practical affairs, were the propagandists of a coming Fascism (A, 167). But I think we can easily detect the basic epistemological seeds of these principles even in Collingwood's early writings, such as the unpublished manuscript *Libellus de generatione* (1920), that contain critical remarks which address conceptions which claim that 'subject' and 'object' are things simultaneously standing apart as separate items in the world.²⁴ 'His aim in the first part of the essay is to demolish the 'Realists'' account of knowledge and judgement, and in the second to assert the superiority of a conception in which knowledge and judgement are resolved into process of becoming.'²⁵ Some other essays, such as 'Economics as a Philosophical Science', and 'Political Action' developed further in specific applicative manners the monist philosophical view pursued in *Libellus*, according to which there is no dualism between mind and its object such that while mind is wholly process its object can be conceived as a static whole outside it. The object is process too, and these are not two processes, but one. Much later, among the bitter remarks of *An Autobiography*, Collingwood wrote that all his life he was 'engaged unawares in a political struggle, fighting...in the dark [to preclude] 'the end of clear thinking and the triumph of irrationalism'; but after 1937 he decided to 'fight in the daylight'(A, 167). 'And for the philosopher fighting in the daylight... meant telling the truth. The candour of the post-1937 works is their most embarrassing quality.'²⁶ These writings include the unpublished manuscripts such as 'Function of Metaphysics in Civilization', in which the author dismissed the neglect of metaphysics (as science of absolute presuppositions) that, in his opinion, has caused both the situation which caused the First World War and the terrible misunderstanding of its causes: 'The result was quite natural. A war of unprecedented violence broke out: and when the belligerents tried to discover what they were fighting for, nobody knew. The analytic thinking which ought for a half a century or more to have been clarifying the issue had not been done, and such thinking cannot be done in a hurry.'²⁷ At the time when he was writing these things the Fascist and Nazi danger was overwhelming for Collingwood and definitely determined him to fight in the daylight:

[He] had no choice but to gore the increasingly sacred cow of Freudianism, to unmask the disingenuously humble programme of the positivists, and to attack the patronizing detachment of the minute philosophers by arguing that thought was more than feeling or tautology, that presuppositions could be asserted which discovered significance across the entire historical range of experience, and that philosophy must end in politics.²⁸

But, as David Boucher indicates, in Collingwood's view, 'the promotion and healthy existence of civilization were being undermined in various ways, not merely from without, by the threat of fascism, but also from within, by all tendencies associated with a utilitarian civilization.'²⁹

As many interpreters of Collingwood had already pointed out, most of his main and privileged themes could be traced in his earlier works. For example, in SM, the English philosopher argues that in philosophy (which is conceived as critical theology) the implicit interpretation of God as 'reality' (that is, as object of faith) is rendered explicit, whereas theology *qua* theology was understood as science of the presuppositions of religion. As regards his logic of questions and answers, it is known that it was already mentioned in 'Truth and Contradiction', as well as in SM (p. 78) whereas his doctrine of absolute presuppositions appears *in statu nascendi* in FR (Collingwood, *Faith and Reason*, O.U.P., 1928).

Obviously, the last thing one could say about Collingwood's general pursuit is that it is static: on the contrary, it has its dynamics, especially in terms of the development and implications of Collingwood's fundamental claims and perception of the practical life and pressures. But, though the fact that the basic relations between the presuppositional 'paradigms' and their implications (i.e. between faith and reason) evinced the disappearance, in the later writings, of the virtual identification stated with human sensitivity by Collingwood between the world of faith and the world of experience as it is lived, none the less the echoes of the earlier approaches are very vivid in the later writings (such as EM and A). Thus, Collingwood's theory of incapsulation of past thought into the present is brilliantly exemplified by his own later incapsulations of his earlier ideas. Even if Collingwood was nearly obsessively concentrated in his later years on problems of historical method, this does not necessarily mean that he tended, as MacKinnon thinks, to identify philosophical (i.e. metaphysical) insight with heightened historical self-consciousness³⁰ because, as I had already tried to point out, according to Collingwood, there is always an implicit preconscious element in any system of thought which cannot be traced inferentially, even if it occurs as a historical change and which, as the implicit core of any *Weltanschauung*, is the true object of metaphysics. That is why I think we can judge all Collingwoodian pairs of concepts, such as identity/difference, feeling/consciousness, faith/reason, mind/appanage (mind/objects of the senses), inside/outside, pre-reflective thought/reflective thought, implicit/explicit, not as signs of some metaphysical dualism but methodologically, as designating and exploring from various perspectives, the monist character of reality in its essential form, i.e. as mind. From this perspective, Collingwood found in Christianity as a system of thought the most adequate model of knowledge of the unity of reality as a whole:

With Christianity we find added to Greek thought the idea of a higher kind of knowledge, a knowledge in which we apprehend not the finite, but the infinite, not nature, but spirit, not the world, but God (Collingwood, 'Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself' (RFCI), in *Faith and Reason*, O.U.P., p. 5).

This knowledge Collingwood calls faith. For him, the model of self-knowledge offered by Christianity is that which emerged from its own fundamental

presuppositions; but, as a basic doctrine which aims at the knowledge - as lived experience which is mostly implicit - of the whole, it has its natural implications in terms of methods of inquiring into the diversity of experience. At the same time, we know that the questioning process is fundamental in Collingwood's view (we remember that Bacon, who was highly praised by Collingwood especially for his suggestion to put Nature into question³¹ has inspired Collingwood to elaborate, with respect to the human history, his own interrogative, i.e. historical, method under the form of the logic of questions and answers aiming at the re-enactment of the past thoughts under focus) but, as B.A. Haddock observes, '[t]o apply a logic of question and answer to [the history of man] would presuppose that one had already established what [he] could be trying to do. Collingwood's methodology, in fact, hinges on the assumption that thought is 'an eternal' object, unaffected by 'the fact of its happening in time' (IH, 218).³² At this point, I think, Haddock could be considered in agreement with Rubinoff, who wrote that, ultimately, Collingwood's historicism is a transcendental one because it shows that truth, while grounded in history, is not entirely historical in character. Rubinoff compares Collingwood's metaphysics with Husserl's phenomenology insofar as both Husserl and Collingwood were attempting to unveil the transcendental structures of the mind.³³

Given these elements, I think one does not have reasons to be puzzled by the 'return' of (Christian) religion in Collingwood's later writings, for, at least implicitly, it was never absent from his thought; however, as a response to the great threat represented by war and totalitarianism, the 'mystic' response of the Oxford philosopher did not come *ex nihilo*, as a desperate irrational overreaction, but, as Patrick puts it, 'as a kind of final responsive outrage' to the assaults of 'barbarism'³⁴, which, divested as it was of its mystical and emotional strength, will not be able to hinder utilitarianism from eroding civilization³⁵. Thus, the practical urges determined Collingwood to prescribe mysticism as an indispensable cure for civilization; for a 'dry' Christianity, without the passion of the love of God was both in peril to supply a *Lebensraum* for the 'barbarian' specialists in arousing the emotions and a substitute object of worship such as the power of scientific technology. As regards metaphysics as a historical science of absolute presuppositions, it is now preached insistently, as a clue for self-understanding and self-preservation of the civilized society, science, and culture; in my opinion, its *mysterious*³⁶ ultimate 'core' of undemonstrable beliefs converges with the object of Christian faith, and, paradoxically, must justify, basically from practical commandments, *the mystic love of God* as well, simply because, like Kant³⁷, Collingwood has more or less explicitly postulated the primacy of practical reason.

NOTES

¹ W.M. Johnston, *The Formative Years of R.G. Collingwood*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³ Michael Hinz, *Self-Creation and History*, University Press of America, Lanham, New York, London, 1994, p. 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁶ Ibid., p. 92.

⁷ Ibid., p. 26.

⁸ In Raymond Aron's sense, as designating a "certain reality", whereas the "formal history" designates the knowledge of that reality (cf. R. Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire*, Paris, Gallimard, 1981, p. 17). This distinction corresponds to Collingwood's own distinction between history *a parte objecti* and history *a parte subjecti*.

⁹ Hinz, p. 98.

¹⁰ J.P. Hogan, *Collingwood and Theological Hermeneutics*, University Press of America, Lanham, New York, London, 1989, p. 20.

¹¹ B.A. Haddock, "Vico, Collingwood and the Character of a Historical Philosophy", in David Boucher, James Connelly, Tariq Modood (eds.), *Philosophy, History and Civilization*, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1995, p. 139.

¹² Hinz, "Process and Progress", *Collingwood Studies*, Vol. I, Dinefwr Press, Llandbie, 1994, n12, p. 139

¹³ David Boucher, "Editor's Introduction" to the revised edition of NL, p. xxviii.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. xxx.

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¹⁶ The shared consciousness of individuals (whether or not pre-reflective or reflective thought) seems to me the only kind of *communion* which could be deduced from Collingwood's accounts. So far, at least, I only could understand that, in Collingwood, communion with God through Christ is jeopardised by failure because it only relates the selves with the man Christ. The re-enactment of Christ's thought is a metaphysical enterprise which could lead to his basic - but also consupponible - convictions, his preconscious processes of thought manifested in his ways of behaving. But this consists in operations of "propositional thinking" (which ultimately include presupposing) - like in case of all human selves - through which the self creates contexts of belief which are realised in institutions - such as the Church -, social frameworks and convention. These institutions and practices serve as "evidence" for the pre-reflective process of thought undertaken to solve a specific problem/situation, namely the problems of satisfying the urges of appetite (Hinz, *Self-Creation and History*, p. 146). Consequently, given the fact that the problems associated with these activities are not an embodiment of mere reflective and purposive thought, it follows that such processes can be known historically only to a limited extent. As L.O. Mink has pointed out, Collingwood emphasized that the historical Jesus would not be able to lead to the understanding of the basic content of Christianity: Jesus 'held definite beliefs about God and himself and the world; his interest was not historical, but theological' (L.O. Mink, *Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969, p. 78). That is why historical theology has to obtain access to that "living faith" and not confine itself to the mere repetition of dogmatic formulas. As Mink argued further, neither the bare *factum* of Jesus' earthly existence nor a Christ myth would be sufficient for such a understanding, because '[t]he life of Christ gives us, conspicuously, two other things. It gives us an example of how a human life may satisfy the highest possible standards; and it puts us in contact with the personality of the man who lived that life' (Ibid., p. 86). Now, as far as I am aware of Collingwood's general account on this issue, the only explicative enterprise which transcends history by encompassing it and making it one of its instruments is metaphysics. But it also seems to me that, inasmuch as he is conceived by Collingwood not as divine substance, but as *actus purus* who 'calls [the world] into existence out of nothing' (IH, 49) God (of the Christian religion) couldn't be attained metaphysically simply because he, as absolute self-mind-

consciousness, cannot be conceived either as pre-conscious thought (he couldn't have practical urges of appetite and thus problems to solve) or as separate pure and perfect reflective mind-in-act (or acting mind), because his thought should be re-thinkable by the true (i.e. scientific) historical method and envisaged as a frustrated and not omniscient self striving to find answers to his problems, which is also absurd. Therefore one can presume that Collingwood's own earlier philosophical account on God's truth led him to assume implicitly in his later writings that, apart from his presence experienced by the believer as a living unity with him, God doesn't necessarily have to exist but only to be asserted by a very absolute presupposition which, as all absolute presuppositions, does not have to be true, but to be supposed (Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics* (EM), Oxford, Clarendon, 1940, p. 28) in order to lead to the various historical, cultural, and scientific implications which thinkers seek to explore and explain. Since all that matters is the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition (EM, 32), one could be strongly tempted to think that Collingwood has exclusively equated God with "mind" both as its own transcendent/manent self-projection and as its practical/institutional answer to its own internal *strains*. For, at the discursive level, assertions such as "God exists" do not have for Collingwood the character of being true, though they may be right or wrong. Thus, he wrote, 'by "right", I do not mean "true". The "right" answer to a question is the answer which enables us to go ahead with the process of questioning and answering' (Collingwood, *An Autobiography* (A), O.U.P., 1939, p. 37). What seems now essential, then, is that the questions and the answers to them will suffice the mere supposing of their ultimate basis. And, following this pattern, I simply tried to suppose that, up to a point, Collingwood himself presupposed that God's existence didn't have to be true from a demonstrable point of view in order to influence men's common and scientific thinking and action - that is, irrespectively of the fact that this statement may have no external and indifferent referent at all - but "right", as a mere presupposition which, in respect to its consequences in human knowledge and behaviour, would work as if God was really existent. In other words, up to the early 40s, the English philosopher seemed to conceive an external relation with a distant and purely objective God as sufficient for human civilization. But the outbreak of the Second World War and the amplitude of this conflagration have determined him to reconsider this relation which proved itself once again chronically unable to defend the best achievements of the human race, and to plead for its internalization, through the strong antidote mysticism. However, I do not think the new prescriptions advanced *ad extremis* by Collingwood entered an irreconcilable conflict with his previous view on the relation between reason and belief, or faith, for even before "Fascism and Nazism" he saw 'beliefs, [as being] ... based on no reasons, [which does] not seem to [make them] ... wholly irrational, for they exhibit universality and necessity. Having faith, properly speaking, means to demonstrate in practical life beliefs or principles which one accepts without argument and which characterize one's activity as a whole' (Hinz, *Self-Creation and History*, p. 70).

¹⁷ *Self-Creation and History*, p. 153.

¹⁸ *Mind, History and Dialectic*, pp. 48-9.

¹⁹ From a Collingwood's unpublished manuscript, quoted by W.J. Van Der Dussen in *History as a Science: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, at p. 159.

²⁰ Harris, "Croce and Gentile in Collingwood's *New Leviathan*", in p. 119.

²¹ Hinz, *Self-Creation and History*, in David Boucher, James Conely, Tariq Modood (eds.), *Philosophy, History and Civilization*, p. 32n.

²² R.G. Collingwood, "Political Action", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXXIX (1928-29), p. 158.

²³ David Boucher, "Overlap and Autonomy: The Different Worlds of Collingwood and Oakeshott", *Storia, antropologia e scienze del linguaggio / Anno IV - fascicolo 2-3 - 1989*, p. 87.

²⁴ James Conelly, "Art Thou the Man: Croce, Gentile or de Ruggiero?", *Philosophy, History and Civilization*, p. 109.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁶ J. Patrick, "Fighting in the Daylight: the Penultimate Collingwood 1937-1941", *Collingwood Studies*, Vol.II, 1995, p. 83.

²⁷ "Function of Metaphysics in Civilization", unpublished manuscript, MSS Folder 19 1937-38, p 30.

²⁸ Patrick, "Fighting in the Daylight...", p. 83.

²⁹ Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 237.

³⁰ D.M. MacKinnon, "Faith and Reason in the Philosophy of Religion", *Philosophy, History and Civilization*, p. 85.

³¹ IH, Ch. "Historical imagination".

³² Haddock, "Vico, Collingwood and the Character of Historical Philosophy", p. 137.

³³ Rubinoff, *The Reform of Metaphysics*, Toronto University Press, 1970, p. 25.

³⁴ not because he preferred the topic, but because the themes of the plan of action of the fighting philosopher -... the interest in politics as the fulfilment of action - turned upon his ability to produce, to bring into the light, the presupposition which made thought, and hence action, possible', Patrick, "Fighting in the Daylight...", p. 84

³⁵ Cf. Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R.G. Collingwood*, p. 241.

³⁶ Hogan, in *Collingwood and Theological Hermeneutics*, at p. 87, stresses upon the mystery that surrounds the origin, preservation and change of absolute presuppositions, which, in my opinion, suggest 'practical faith, which means [simply] "accepting the universe", or, what is the same thing, knowing that we are free.' (FR, in *Faith and Reason*, ed. Rubinoff, p. 140) their meta-rational nature.

³⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Rom. transl. *Critica ratiunii pure*, by N. Bagdasar, Bucharest, Edit. Stiintifica, 1972, p. 210 ff.

THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN COLLINGWOOD'S
UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT 'LECTURES ON THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD'¹

Florin Lobonț

Even stronger than in the previous writings, in his unpublished 'Lectures on the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God' written in 1919, the length and the content and the scrupulosity of the analysis undertaken indicates that for Collingwood the problem of *belief* represented a deep and serious concern. According to the ideas of this text, which were firmly held in this form at least until 1923, the specific problems - including the problem of belief and faith - and discussions of theology were taken over by philosophy in virtue of a historical process of the mind (LOP, 7) whose necessary character was basically constantly claimed by the Oxford philosopher. This means that philosophy must renounce the judging of truth-claims regarding the general nature of reality, and aim to uncover the actual beliefs about reality held by men. This idea Collingwood will reiterate in EM (*An Essay on Metaphysics*, Oxford, 1940) when he wrote that the ontological proof does not have any ontological implications: '[W]hat [Anselm] proves is not that because our idea of God is an idea of *id quo maius cogitari nequit*, therefore God exists, but that because our idea of God is an idea of *id quo maius cogitari nequit*, we stand committed to belief in God's existence' (EM, 190). Thus, in Collingwood's opinion, Anselm did not necessarily mean that God exists independently of the believer's mind, but rather that for the Christian orthodox believer, God is conceived as existing not only as an idea pertaining to his mind, but also independently of it. According to the Oxford philosopher, the examination of the ontological proof must help us to clarify the nature of the most basic beliefs held by men. And that is why, he wrote,

[the analysis of] the ontological proof is of immediate and overwhelming importance...[and] the neglect of it is the cause of all that is most unsound and unphilosophical - as well as irreligious - in the modern theories of religion (LOP, 1).

The first aspect of the Anselmian discussion - whose interpretation represents the nucleus of LOP - the English philosopher stresses is the fact that the notion of God includes the notion of *existence*:

The ontological proof consists in the demonstration that the notion of God as we conceive it includes existence; that is to say that a belief in the real, as opposed to the merely imaginary, existence of God is a necessary and inseparable part of religion (LOP, 6).

However, the emblematic formula or motto of Anselm's argument, namely *credo ut intelligam* is not an Anselmian innovation, but is borrowed from Augustine;² indeed, as my own research fully confirmed, this important idea is brilliantly expressed in Augustine's *On Free Will*; moreover, its argument proceeds from the same Biblical verse as Anselm's, who had arguably been decisively influenced by the entire demonstration, including its premise:

Augustine—...[Y]ou are certain that God exists. *Evodius*— I firmly believe it, but I do not know it. *Aug.*— We read in Scripture: 'The fool hath said in his heart: there is no God' (Ps. 52:18). If such a fool were to say to you there is no God, and would not believe as you do, but wanted to know whether what you believe is true, would you simply go away and leave him, or would you think it your duty somehow to try to persuade him that what you believe is true, especially if he were really eager to know and not merely to argue obstinately? *Ev.* — Your last proviso tells me...I ought to reply to him...[For] we want to know and to understand what we believe. *Aug.* — We cannot deny that believing and knowing are different things, and that in matters of great importance, pertaining to divinity, we must first believe before we seek to know. Otherwise the words of the prophet would be vain, where he says: 'Except ye believe ye shall not understand (Isa. 7:9. LXX)...[N]o one is fit to find God, who does not first believe what he will afterwards learn to know.'³

For the Oxford philosopher, the principal function of Anselm's argument is one of clarification rather than one of justification - and therefore faith and reason cannot be separated one from the other; for, according to Collingwood, only during the scrupulous and accurate critique (in the Kantian sense) of the former, which it logically presupposes, reason gains its proper aim and content. Consequently, more categorically than his predecessor Augustine, Anselm does not address the faithless people, but those who already share the religious experiences upon which he focused his analysis. In trying to emphasize this aspect, Collingwood quotes from the written dispute between Anselm and Gaunilo and notices the accurate remark of the latter that in fact the Anselmian argument did not refute the fool⁴ (who says - in his heart - that there is no God;⁵). And, the English philosopher wrote, Anselm's reply was that he does not talk to the fools, but to Christians (LOP, 6); moreover, Collingwood will re-assert this interpretation in EM, proving that he will practically hold this conviction, in specific forms, until his last creative period.⁶ Given that the characteristic which makes the Christian able to grasp the truth preached by Anselm is his faith, which is primarily expressed in verses that are uttered during prayers, such as 'Except ye believe ye shall not understand' (Isa. 7:9. LXX), Collingwood will implicitly remain faithful to his earlier conviction that prayer and faith are coincidental (Collingwood, 'The Devil (D)', Oxford, 1916, 223). At the same time, the Oxford philosopher has noticed that Anselm himself develops his argument under the form of a prayer which is, if we are to use Collingwood's own terms, a part of Anselm's own religious experience. And,

according to Collingwood, all that the latter does is to 'articulat[e]...the noetic side of a religious experience whose essential trustworthiness is unquestioned;...[for] Anselm is analysing and discussing the religious experience, not trying to formulate a logical proof which shall take the place of religion in supplying a certainty of God (LOP, 52).⁷

What seems to me significant here is the implicit tendency manifested by Collingwood to reject the exclusively intellectualist perspective on religion: at this point the English philosopher seems to suggest that the orthodox believer in God conceives his faith as solidly grounded, even if he does not know of any logical argument (deductive or inductive), or, as Alvin Plantinga would say, 'even if he does not believe there is any such argument, and even if in fact no such argument exists. Like Calvin, Kuyper, Bavinck,...or Barth', Collingwood appears to hold that 'belief in God is *properly basic* - that is, such that it is rational to accept it without accepting it on the basis of any other propositions or beliefs at all; and, even though, in fact, the Christian ought not to accept belief in God on the basis of any argument, the believer remains rational [- even if his rationality is limited; for, unlike philosophy, religious consciousness does not dogmatically question its assertions -], entirely within his epistemic rights, in *starting with* belief in God, in accepting it as basic, and in taking it as premise for argument to other conclusions.'⁸ In conspicuous concordance with the Reformed thinkers mentioned above, Collingwood appears to claim, in his analysis of the ontological argument, that a rational noetic structure can include belief in God as basic. His account of the Anselmian analysis of religious experience converges with the assertion of the Dutch theologian Herman Bavinck:

Scripture does not reason in the abstract. It does not make God the conclusion of a syllogism, leaving it to us whether we think the argument holds or not...Both theologically and religiously it proceeds from God as the starting point...[W]e accept [God's existence] without any constraint or coercion. The so-called proofs are by no means the final grounds of our most certain conviction that God exists. This certainty is established only by faith; that is, by the spontaneous testimony which forces itself upon us from every side.⁹

In his unorthodox analysis of the Anselmian argument, the Oxford philosopher ascribes to the author of *Proslogion* an infirm symbiosis of hard Christian dogmatism and Platonic realism which, in his opinion, are in fact hardly compatible. It is also worth bearing in mind that Collingwood performs this investigation *indirectly*, via his account of Thomas Aquinas' critique of Anselm's proof; and I assume that this option made by the English philosopher implicitly entails his divergences with Aquinas given that, according to the latter, to prove or demonstrate that God exists is to exhibit a deductive argument whose conclusion is that God exists, whose premises are drawn from the deliverances of reason, and each of whose steps is by way of an argument whose corresponding conditional is among the deliverances of reason. Aquinas' first three ways of proving the existence of God would be attempts to demonstrate the existence of God just in this sense. Thus, in his own words,

The existence of God can be proved in five ways. The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. [But] is...impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, *i.e.*, that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another...But this cannot go on to infinity... Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (...) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes is not possible to go to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause...Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause...Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity...We find in nature things...[that] are found to be generated...and, consequently, they are possible to be and not to be...Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence...because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing...[And], if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist...Therefore...there must exist...some being having in itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.¹⁰

I have made this long quotation in order to sustain my assertion that these first three ways of demonstration made by Aquinas are the exemplary arguments of this genre whose implications are unacceptable for Collingwood; for, in this context, a demonstration that God does not exist seems to be structurally isomorphic, and thus it would have as conclusion the proposition that there is no such person as God. I think that this results from the fact that to be in the standpoint suggested by Aquinas it suffices to hold that belief in God is rationally permissible - that is, as Karl Barth would say, '*only if it is more likely than not with respect to the deliverances of reason*' - 'for a person who has a good reasonable argument for it.' But one who holds this belief is in fact in the standpoint of unbelief; for he is ultimately 'commit[ted]...to the deliverances of reason rather than to God.'¹¹

Now, it is obvious that, whereas Anselm has conceived his proof as a logical argument, for Collingwood the whole demonstration becomes truly valuable only when it leaves aside its alleged logicity - viz. in the answer to Gaunilo - and addresses only those who share this basic devotional experience. In fact, as I have already pointed out, the Oxford philosopher has unorthodoxly transformed Anselm into an analyst of religious experience. Evidently, this was much beyond the intention of the latter, who was a Platonic realist, whereas Collingwood's reading of his argument is strongly anti-'realist'; according to the English philosopher, the subject-matter of Anselm's proof is not God's existence in itself, but the nature of the religious mind's experience of God's reality. At this point, he is consistent with an idea expressed in 'The Devil': 'Belief in God is not a result or an inferential

conclusion drawn from previously determined facts (the finding [based on the information provided by the senses, like in Thomas Aquinas] that the world is ordered...). God's existence is an immediate result of a direct experience of His presence, namely the experience of communion with Him' (D, 232). As Felser suggestively comments,

In...[his accounts on the nature of God he] attribut[ed] to Anselm, Collingwood is not saying that God is not fictitious - though at times this is what he appears to be asserting. What he is saying is what he subsequently says in *Speculum Mentis*: that the religious consciousness *does not* and *cannot* recognize God as the product of its own imagination without ceasing to be what it essentially is...For the religious mind, God is a fact - a religious fact, but a fact nonetheless (p. 333).

In fact, Collingwood himself will constantly prove that his idea that faith cannot be inferred from reason, but rather that reason draws its substance from faith, is one of his grounding metaphysical *leitmotifs*; for example, in *Faith and Reason*, he will write:

Faith cannot be the product of reason...you cannot produce faith by arguing. Faith is presupposed in the argument itself. People do not, and never can, come to believe in God, or in anything else as a result of ratiocination. The function of ratiocination is not this, but the development or reasoned statement of what faith finds within itself (Collingwood, *Faith and Reason* (FR), O.U.P., 1928, 118).

Collingwood's interpretation of the Anselmian argument reminds the reader of his interpretation of St. Paul made in LPSP (Lectures on the Philosophy of St. Paul, unpubl. Manuscript, 1916); according to these lectures, all that Paul truly does is to unveil and analyze, indirectly, certain general truths about human nature and the perennial problem of actualizing the potential unity of the mind. The Oxford philosopher praised Anselm especially for his refusal to discuss God's existence in separation from the experience of his worshipper. In my opinion, the God of both St. Paul and Anselm is seen by Collingwood as a person of whom communal knowledge is *sui generis* in character. When abstracted from the individual's practical religious life, that is, from the experience of prayer, worship, and the like, mind's awareness of God cannot be understood. A few years later, in *Outlines of the Philosophy of Art*, the importance of the specific form of practice relative to every type of experience is conspicuously maintained: 'Practice is the mind [engaged in] bringing about a change in itself and in its world' (*Outlines on the Philosophy of Art* (OPA), O.U.P., 1925, p. 50).

One of the most important ideas of LOP is that the practice of worship and prayer do not only express and presuppose belief, but belief of a certain sort; in my opinion, this is the standpoint subsequently generalized by Collingwood under the form of a universal way of obtaining acquaintance with all indemonstrable basic truths upon which human knowledge and practice rests. (This tacit extension evokes in me, to some extent, Wittgenstein's theory of the family resemblances, in which the various 'wool wires' seem somehow to take, in Collingwood, the forms of artistic, religious, scientific, and philosophic, knowledge and practice, whose 'common features' implicitly seem not to literally represent shared 'ingredients'¹²).

Of course, this generalization has not yet been unleashed in LOP; at that time, the Oxford philosopher was trying to work out this principle only with application to religion. Unlike religion, philosophy was conceived as not regarding its premises as indemonstrable: as the English philosopher puts it, 'it does not accept its starting-point as containing unquestionable truth, but begins precisely by questioning and overthrowing it' (LOP, 9). Yet, the relevance of religion for philosophy is already suggesting the possibility of a future conceptual unification of the two, and of a symmetrical, or mutual, dependence and circumscribing; so far, only philosophy is presented as implicitly contained within the essential aspect of religion, namely faith (expressible in worship and prayer). Thus, for Collingwood, the ontological proof expressed in the form of a prayer by Anselm contains the general philosophical problem of the necessity or non-necessity for knowledge to presuppose the existence of an object:

Does knowledge in general assume or presuppose the existence of an object, or is our ordinary common-sense realism satisfied by the theory that the external object is a mere figment of the imagination?...[T]he Psalmist's Fool is the person who says that all experience is illusory, that nothing is as we think of it, that truth is unattainable...[This is the standpoint of] universal scepticism [which] must be carefully distinguished from that maintained by the solipsist or subjective idealist, who maintains that nothing exists except my own consciousness...Anselm is directing his proof...against the solipsist..., who thinks that everything except my own states of consciousness [represent]...a mere unprovable hypothesis where he declines...to argue against the sceptic, and contents himself with calling the sceptic a fool; that is, admitting his position as unassailable (LOP, 7-8).

The asymmetry I mentioned comes into light when the Oxford philosopher translates this philosophical meaning of the Anselmian proof into theological language. Thus, according to Collingwood, this translation

indicates that the ontological proof is no argument against atheism or any purely destructive attack on religion from the outside: *but it is of great value against the tendency to disintegrate religion from within by reducing God to a myth* (LOP, 11, italics mine).

The value of the ontological proof consists in the fact that in affirming the belief in the existence of God as an absolutely integral element of the theistic consciousness it affirms the unity of the religious mind.¹³ Thus, as regards the true worshipper, the ontological proof provides him with an explicit description of his communion with an external absolute being, whose unquestionability confers on the account a dogmatic character. But this 'mysterious' nucleus of the religious frame of mind represents for Collingwood a gulf between religion and philosophy; for, unlike philosophical premises, religious beliefs do not have truth-value: yet, even if unquestionable, they are not assumed by Collingwood as necessarily false. This seems to me an important change in comparison with 'Ruskin's Philosophy' (1919), according to which the basic assumptions of religion have truth-values accessible to critical scrutiny and need to be validated by it. However, the English philosopher will not return to this early standpoint, but will develop the other one,

exploring - during the next two decades - its implications; thus, in EM, he will write that the distinction between true and false does not apply to ultimate beliefs (or absolute presuppositions) (EM, 32-3). Therefore, in uncovering these hidden beliefs one has to abandon any further attempt at critical evaluation.

As regards the main achievement of the LOP itself, it consists in the solution offered to the problem of the tension between religion and philosophy: it is philosophy of religion, that represents basically an expression of the religious frame of mind; as regards its philosophical (that is, critical) side, it is reduced to a minimum, technical, analysis. Hence

[T]he philosophy of religion [exhibited by Anselm] is - or ought to be no mere reflection upon religion from the point of view of logic, but a logic impregnated and informed at every moment by the religious consciousness; that is to say, that no one can exhibit a genius for the philosophy of religion unless he exhibits at the same time a genius for religion itself. The relation between philosophy of religion and the religion upon which it reflects is *not* the relation between rational subject and externally-apprehended object: it is a relation in which the subject and object are identified, so that philosophy becomes no mere discussion about religion but *the rational expression of religion itself* (LOP, 44, italics mine).

I interpret this solution as a crucial step towards the future developments made in *Faith and Reason*, 'Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself', and, much later, in *An Essay on Metaphysics*. In the LOP the dogmatism of religion is mitigated through the logical (deductive¹⁴) inferentiality of criticism. In its turn, philosophical criticism is limited by religion, for the philosopher of religion will not be concerned with the rational justification of basic religious beliefs, but with 'explicating the meaning which those beliefs have for him, as one who minimally presupposes the validity of the general claim of religious experience to provide knowledge.'¹⁵ Given that religion is conceived as implicitly philosophical both in its content and in its form, I think that the establishment of this univocal relation could be viewed as the opening to a future reciprocity, that is, that philosophy will be conceived as implicitly and partly unconsciously 'religious' in its form (as re-enactable pre-reflective, or propositional, thought) and content.

On the other hand, Collingwood does not lose the sight of the practical, or experiential, aspect of religion, whose crucial role in understanding he claims are clarified by the author of *Proslogion*. Now, if we focus these accounts on Collingwood's general concern with the establishment of the unity of the mind - within which mind is identical with its acts -, we ought to interpret the new philosophy of religion both as a means towards self-knowledge, and a radical expression of religion. But, unlike other similarly aimed approaches, this form of rationality is also a systematic reflective inquiry. This does not mean that the method suggested by Anselm is not limited, says the Oxford philosopher; its main inconsistency consists in the conflict between Anselm's actual object of reflection, namely his own thought, and the claimed conclusion of his inference, that is, the existence of an absolute being situated beyond his thought. The conclusion is, according to Collingwood, false; it falls, due to Anselm's Platonist commitment, into the fallacy of a realism which the premise had impeccably removed. What Anselm has failed to understand was the fact that the externality of the Platonic absolute is

that of an absolute transcendent whereas the Christian God is not only conceived as the transcendent cause of all things, but also as the immanent spirit in them (LOP, 24). Nonetheless, what the author of *Proslogion* has achieved was the successful employing of the Platonic doctrine 'in order to express through it a profound truth concerning the nature of religious experience - the truth that God is not a hypothesis...[and that he] as an object of *a priori* knowledge is pre-eminently not an imagination of our minds, but a reality' (LOP, 28, 31).

At this point I think a critical reference to Descartes' view on the ontological argument is both useful for a better understanding of Collingwood's denial - *via* his implicit rejection of the validity of the Cartesian type of argument started from *Dubito* - of the possibility of demonstrating basic beliefs and of Collingwood's own view on the matter. My choice of this particular theme was firstly determined by an assertion in defence of Thomas Aquinas' critique of Anselm's proof made by the Oxford philosopher and signaled by Felser:

[Anselm's] faithful statement...[is] that [b]y God we understand *id quo maius cogitari nequit*. But that which is both *in intellectu* and *in re* is greater than that which is *in intellectu* alone: therefore the very meaning of the term God makes the existence of God self-evident. [To this argument] Aquinas [replies] that God's existence is not really but only apparently self-evident...it only appears to be [so] because we are accustomed to the idea of God from childhood and cannot rid ourselves of it' (LOP, 50).

And, as Felser suggests, at this point the Anselmian argument will be ultimately reiterated by Descartes:

[O]ne can be so indoctrinated that one mistakes an idea for a fact. That 'God' means 'that than which no greater can be conceived', i.e., the absolutely perfect being is, according to Descartes, clear and distinct - but only to someone like Descartes. If he had not spent eight years with the Jesuits at *La Flèche*, he would not have mistakenly identified the tenet of a particular theological tradition as a piece of the timeless furniture of the human mind.¹⁶

NOTES:

¹ Abr. LOP (1919), Bodleian Library, Modern Manuscripts, MSS. 12.

² From the numerous influent commentators who had analysed the influence exercised by Augustine upon Anselm, I have chosen Nicholas Wolterstorff: 'Anselm's motto was that of Augustine: *credo ut intelligam*. In the opening pages of his *Proslogion* he makes clear what that means for him. [Like in case of Augustine, h]is goal in the book was to come to know, or understand, what already he believed. 'I have written the following treatise,' he says, 'in the person of one who strives to lift his mind to the contemplation of God, and seeks to understand what he believes.' (Preface) 'For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand.' ' (N. Wolterstorff, 'Can Belief in God Be Rational?', in A. Plantinga, N. Wolterstorff (eds.), *Faith and Reason*, Notre Dame & London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1991, p. 141.

³ *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, trans. John H.S. Burleigh, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953, Library of Christian Classics, Vol. VI, pp. 137-8.

⁴ In the Latin text: *insipiens*, that is, the unwise.

⁵ Anselm quotes repeatedly this provocative assertion in *Proslogion*, starting from 227c. (I used the Romanian translation of Sancti Anselmi, *Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei Existentia*, trans. A. Baumgarten, Cluj, Biblioteca Apostrof, 1996).

⁶ Thus, in this book he wrote: 'Whatever may have been in Anselm's mind when he wrote the *Proslogion*, his exchange of correspondence with Gaunilo shows beyond a doubt that on reflection he regarded the fool who 'hath said in his heart, There is no God' as a fool not because he was blind to the actual existence of *un nommé Dieu*, but because he did not know that the presupposition 'God exists' was a presupposition he himself made' (EM, 189).

⁷ Felser, 325.

⁸ Alvin Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God', in A. Plantinga, N. Wolterstorff (eds.), *Faith and Reason*, pp. 71-2.

⁹ Herman Bavinck, *The Doctrine of God*, tr. William Hendricksen, Grand Rapids, Erdmans, 1951, pp. 78-9.

¹⁰ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Vol. I, Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Benziger Brothers, pp. 25-6.

¹¹ Cf. Plantinga, pp. 70-71.

¹² Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Caietul albastru* (The Blue Book), Bucharest, Humanitas, 1994.

¹³ Cf. J.M. Felser, 'R.G. Collingwood's Early Philosophy of Religion and its Development', Ph.D. Dissertation, Chicago University, Illinois, June, 1992, p. 345.

¹⁴ It is well-known that in *The Idea of History* (IH, O.U.P., 1946) the deductive method is repudiated in favor of the inductive inference inspired by Bacon; yet, in my opinion this can be understood as a *complementary aspect* applicable to the domains of reality which are accessible to science whereas with respect to the 'matters of great importance, pertaining to divinity', as Augustine would say, (that is, in the domain explored by unconscious thought, as Collingwood would say) deduction remains the only applicable type of inference.

¹⁵ Felser, p. 349.

¹⁶ Felser, 327.

"LA DIMENSION ROUMAIN DE L'EXISTENCE"
- UN MODELE ONTOLOGIQUE OUVERT -

Dumitru Marcus

La génération de Mircea Vulcanescu s'est assumée le destin culturel du peuple roumain dans un processus général synchronique avec la pensée européenne. Les plus importants noms de cette génération comme M. Eliade, E. Cioran, C. Noica, P. Comarnescu et beaucoup des autres ont assimilé les valeurs de la littérature et de la philosophie européennes et en même temps, ont-ils pris possession la culture du monde. M. Eliade a étudié la pensée et la spiritualité indiennes, P. Comarnescu la culture américaine, les autres "Criterion"-istes ont fait des études dans les plus importants centres culturels de l'Europe. Pouvons-nous dire que le rapport avec les valeurs de la pensée européenne et du monde ont été un échappatoire sur lequel il faudra construire une nouvelle spiritualité mais sur un fondement spécifique, celui de l'existence roumaine. (Évidemment, l'existence dans un sens plus large).

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* *

En général, l'œuvre philosophique de M. Vulcanescu a essayé répondre aux questions suivantes: Comment nous pouvons nous définir comme spiritualité et comme culture ? Quelle est notre modalité d'être ? Pouvons-nous dire d'une vision roumaine sur l'ordre du monde ?

Dans son projet philosophique il répond aux questions par une esquisse d'ontologie construite d'une manière phénoménologique.

La "Dimension roumaine de l'existence" a essayé entourer la richesse de l'univers roumain sur l'aspect de son identité.

Tout d'abord nous sommes mis devant une situation paradoxale: "la dimension" est une catégorie quantitative; "l'existence" est une qualité des choses. La réponse de Vulcanescu est: la dimension de l'existence dans une forme intuitive a un sens précis, celui d'un critère de jugement "une norme pour les autres existences".

Comme "existence", l'homme roumain se trouve au carrefour de la métaphysique avec l'histoire et il appartient aux ascendances unies par l'unité du destin durable en temps. Cette réalité vivante, une réalité avec des traditions plus riches et des valeurs morales bien établies sont toujours actuelles et actualisées pour chaque génération.

D'une perspective phénoménologique "les vivantes" (Erlebnis) se sont ordonnées dans un flux de la conscience et elles représentent beaucoup de

déterminations de l'Être. Chaque "vivante" a associé une unité temporelle. "Les vivantes" sont déployées en temps, elles se succèdent l'une après l'autre, elles sont donc histoire.

Le long de l'histoire, le peuple roumain présente quelques traces d'identité. Par la méthode phénoménologique (la réduction eidétique et puis celle phénoménologique) Vulcanescu met en évidence les caractéristiques de l'homme roumain. Le concept "ispita" = la tentation et, également, la provocation, signifie la possibilité de l'Être et les impulsions vers quelques choses, les impulsions orientées.

Donc, l'homme roumain est une succession des possibilités de l'Être, orientées vers les faits et vers les valeurs. Par exemple, il y a dans la structure de la spiritualité roumaine les tentations/provocations autochtone, romanes, byzantines, slaves, françaises, allemandes, polonaises, gitanes. En somme, elles représentent d'une part l'histoire, où nous retrouvons les traces de la création culturelle, et d'autre, la modalité d'existence comme existence.

M. Vulcanescu imagine, tout d'abord, un dialogue où il met en évidence les difficultés d'une telle construction. Pouvons-nous considérer l'existence du point de vue national se demande-t-il ? La réponse affirmative est soutenue avec les arguments philosophiques: l'existence est une caractéristique générale des choses: celui qui pense, comprend l'existence d'une perspective propre, par la grille de sa structure. Les exemples sont les grands penseurs comme Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger.

L'intérêt d'un tel recherche est de montrer la perspective d'identité comme un moyen de liaison avec les autres identités culturelles, comme une ontologie générale.

C'est possible à construire une ontologie avec une méthode extérieure comme une succession hiérarchique des tentations/provocations ou avec une méthode intuitive qui suit les faits en manière comment sont-elles exprimées par la langue. "La langue c'est la maison de l'Être" (Heidegger). En cherchant la langue, nous relevons les déterminations de l'Être. Pour les roumains les mots - concepts indiquent une solidarité universelle; l'existence terrestre est prolongée en Cosmos: l'être en monde (im Welt - Heidegger) signifie en même temps, que le monde est constitué par l'effort de la conscience. Pour la conscience, le monde est un livre de signes: comme en phénoménologie, la conscience est conscience de quelques choses.

Les notions corrélatives " présence - absence"; "ici - là" nous indiquent les qualités de l'Être, un Être plein; entre "l'existence ici" et "là" n'existe seulement une "douane" imaginaire, les rituels de passage qui existent encore dans les formes de la culture folklorique nous indiquent une telle vision sur l'existence.

Cette modalité de représenter l'existence impose des attitudes fondamentales dans l'ordre moral, toutes en ayant des caractéristiques négatives: 1) n'existe pas le néant; 2) n'existe pas l'impossibilité absolue; 3) n'existe pas l'alternative; 4) n'existe, aussi, l'impératif.

S'impose ici une interrogation: comment est alors possible les aspects normatifs des valeurs ? La réponse est, peut-être, qu'existe en tous les faits, en toutes les actions humaines un chargement rituel, un indéfini, une structure "générationnelle" qui découle d'une conscience de la communauté avec la nature et le Cosmos.

Le fil des négations conduit à deux conclusions: a) Pour les roumains il y a une facilité devant la vie, un manque du sentiment grave de l'existence, l'absence du sentiment tragique, et b) l'absence de peur devant la mort, devant les limites de l'existence.

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L'importance de la pensée de M. Vulcanescu est, nous croyons, significative sur les penseurs comme C. Noica en ce qui concerne l'analyse de la langue et d'élaborer un modèle ontologique comme "L'être et le développement"; sur M. Eliade en ce qui concerne l'herméneutique et sur E. Cioran comme vision générale sur l'existence.

Le philosophe était considéré "en légitime abîme" toute sa génération. Actuellement, il provoque pour les recherches approfondies, d'une perspective phénoménologique sur l'existence dans sa plénitude. C'est une provocation pour les efforts actuels de reconstruire l'ontologie.

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NECESSITY OF CONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE IN APODEICTIC KNOWLEDGE
- A Discussion on Conventionality of Language in Aristotle -

Claudiu Mesaros

In the second book of *De interpretatione* Aristotle asserts about the *onoma* that it has a meaning "by convention", as "nothing is naturally a name" but it becomes like that only as a symbol (*De int.*, 2, 16a; also 4, 16b.). This is a very important assertion according to which we may assume that, in some way whatsoever, names (and hence, words) are not naturally given as they seem to be for Plato or, at least, for his character Cratylus. It may be for the first time in the history of thought that symbols, whatever their function might be, are regarded as constructs or human-made. There are two main ideas (or precisely: emphases) relating to this assumption: first, the idea of the language as artefact and second, maybe more important in a specific Aristotelian framework, the idea of language as being a proper human feature. For unarticulated sounds, as beasts can produce, have a reference (*delousi*), indicate something but "no one of them is a name", read a symbol. The simple naturally given faculty of producing sounds, although having the quality of indicating something, is not rational. Speaking (*logos*) has a meaning not by nature but by convention (*De int.*, 4, 17a).

Our attempt will consist in some commentaries upon the language as artificially given in Aristotle. We must ask from the very beginning some prior questions as starting point. What is "by nature" for Aristotle? And, basically, what is "by convention"? Is it that human being, any individual one, is peculiarly able or entitled to choose and insinuate a relation between any word and any meaning he wants? This would be nothing but sophistic. How are we to understand Aristotle's claim? And, in addition, is there a relation of opposition between "by nature" and "by convention"? Which implies: is there an opposition between human and natural efforts?

First we cannot but notice the distinction between what is by nature and what is by convention. Speaking is not a part of that category of phenomena that evolve (generate) by themselves, by *genesis*; it is, we have seen, a product that implies a distinct formation, by synthesis (*kata syntheken*). Not only name but also verb and statement (*logos apophantikos*) are so. Aristotle does not raise the question, as Plato does, concerning the origin of phonetic structure of words but he is not quite clear in indicating some other way. Assuming the distinction just mentioned we might proceed endeavour of throwing a light upon it.

Language as artefact. For language being a "meaningful sound" it requires a process, an evolution from a prior natural state to a posterior human-made one. Nothing can be a sign by nature, will ascribe Heidegger later on, but after a preliminary investment (*Zeichenstiftung*)¹ Language is the result of a human operation upon some natural faculty of producing sounds, as operation through which a correspondence law between sign and something else is intellectually established² Is there an opposition between such a rational law and that, which is given "by nature"? The problem has been raised by the Neo-platonic scholarship and even "solved" in a specifically Cratylan manner that ought not to not be ignored as such. Ammonius, for example, offers many important suggestions.

By just taking a look at the Aristotelian term *kata syntheke* we can observe that the synthesis or convention implied is not a spontaneous or random one. It is a human action based on *just* and *necessary* rules that must be able, as rules, to grant the subsequent "engineering". Human being produces artificial "constructs" whose *temeloi* (rules and laws of building) is a fixed one (rationally given). There is no such a sharp opposition between nature and convention as one could assume, the latter one being actually a transformation of the nature itself according to its own rules of becoming.

Language is not wholly natural, but a result of some human natural potency actualisation. Man has the potency (*dynamis*) of producing sounds. Meaningful speaking must be something that human has obtained by a rational processing of this potency in which a potential sign (voice) has been transformed into symbol. We have here a transfer from natural to quasi-natural that could be corroborated with the Aristotelian division of human knowledge: theoretical sciences, practical sciences and poetical ones³ in order to see that reality shows itself under, finally, two ontological modes of being from the genetic point of view: the natural objective level and the human-made level. In fact these are the two genetical Aristotelian types of reality: things that have come into existence by art and things that have come into existence by nature. (Chance and fortune are nothing more than privations of these)⁴. Consequently we can speak of two types of genetical reality: by nature and by art (*poiesis*; nothing here about "*syntheke*"). The theoretical sciences do not concern with a separate part or level of reality; they are concerned with the rules or laws of reality, the form in it. The theoretical sciences operate an "horizontal", to say so, partition of being as "special sciences"⁵. Genetically speaking, there are the two mentioned "vertical levels of reality (we do not say "being" for the moment): natural and artifactual.

If the meaningful specific human language is not "by nature" then it must be an artefact. But (here necessarily appears another landmark-question): what is the theoretical status of the artefacts in Aristotle? Are they "beings" or simple "copies" of some secondary value? Are they (the question entails a second one) entirely human demiurgically made or are they somehow still parts of the nature? (The meaning of this second question tends to the problem of man having the power to "add", ontologically speaking, something to the Universe).

The theoretical status of artefacts. There is a suggestion of W. K. C. Guthrie that the teleonomy of Aristotle can solve the question. First, we notice, "art and nature are similar in that both exhibit a progress towards order and

perfection⁶. The final cause of the nature manifests, that is to say, even in human activity. Every object, every natural product contains in it a principle of motion and change; on the other side, human-made products do not contain within themselves a faculty (*dynamis*) of change. While the cause of a natural event or product is internal, the cause of an art object is external to it (*Met.*, 1070a). In the case of art, the final cause is to be found in the *mind of artist*⁷. As artefacts, objects are sustrained from the natural becoming. Though, they are not in opposition with nature. We could say that the matter in them (marble or bronze in sculpture, wood or iron in tools) has its own participation to becoming for, i.e., the essence of wood is not to procure the form of a spoon because if we bury a piece of wood, if germinating, we are not expected to obtain a new spoon but a new tree. A human-made object has a human-given form, though perishing and unnatural, its form being not given by its own *dynamis* but by something else: the human mind. Natural generation is *genesis* and artificial one is *poiesis*. Their principles of being are to be found in different places⁸.

Though, the Aristotelian teleonomy is not hurt in this point: the final cause of the artefacts, being present in artist's mind, is not something arbitrary. Aristotle distinguishes between nature and mind (*nous, dianoia*) only for methodological and epistemological reasons. They are, actually, similar⁹ in that they act and evolve reasonably¹⁰. The human intellect is able (this being its *entelecheia*, as is well known) to possess the forms of natural objects by knowledge. In *techne* there is a such constituted mental form that governs the creation. Knowing the Universal, human intellect knows the principle (*arche*), from which results a unique persistent General in human soul. The General gives a principle of *art* (when applying to the objects as such - *becoming* entities) or of *science* (when applying to the Being - *to on*)¹¹. The conclusion is that art might a mimetical process besides *natural becoming* not besides Being.

The artist makes a natural object to become (*gignomai*) spontaneously, following natural rules, by simply rejecting some natural intermediary *states* or *phases* of that object. Human mind has the ability to interfere with, to modify nature without contradicting its axioms. For the principle of art is of the science too (*arche technes kai epistemēs*, as Aristotle himself expresses in *An. Post.*). The Aristotelian *logos* is thus the principle of every production; human activity is underwent by natural teleology. Outside the laws of nature nothing can exist¹².

The "conventional" language. The truth and error of *logos apophantikos* are based on synthesis and division, operations made by human intellect in order to obtain a correspondence between names and verbs¹³ (the "matter" of judgements) and, respectively, surrounding gnoseologically approached reality. We say "gnoseologically approached reality" because we must take account of the fact that there is no "objective" reality relating to speech but a kind of "inner" reality: a soul image (*phantasma*) of reality that must be understood as "similitude" (*homoiomata*). These *homoiomata* are universal (not subjective in the sense of individual)¹⁴. Not only these *homoiomata* but also *words* are persistent and have the quality of being non-relative; thus, verb is a durable sign for those, which are told about something else (*De int.*, 3, 16b). If there is such a stable relation between objects, "images" (*homoiomata*) and words we must naturally ask what

kind of a “conventionality” they show, being clear that it could not be some simple habit or game.

As we see again in *De int.*, 1,16a, not all the people have the same writing or the same sounds of speech but, at the same time, we know that words symbolise the same *phantasmata* through a “persistent” relation. The Neoplatonic Ammonius, proving a proper understanding of this problem, gives a brilliant analogy: just as the different understanding of the same man are multiple, he says, the matter of which they might be made being different (copper for example or wood or stone), in the same way nothing can hinder the same nature to be named by different syllables¹⁵.

It is not of great importance (it would be quite a trap) to remain at phonetical aspect (maybe origin) of words, even to the syntactic appearances. Syntax is, we can notice, *arbitrarily generated* on extra-intellectual basis, by mere custom of use.¹⁶ Aristotle himself manifests a strange “liberal” attitude towards phonetical and syntactical abnormalities of language, being aware of their utility in poetry and rhetoric (concerning their persuading function, not connected with cognitive function) but he never takes any account of their eventual importance in the metaphysics or in the theory of judgements¹⁷. Judgement and knowledge do never depend on language itself; on the contrary, language must be on every occasion corrected if necessary, according to knowledge (universal notions).¹⁸

The most interesting is the relation between words and representations and, respectively, between sentences and judgements. Aristotle does not apply the attribute of conventionality to only names and verbs but also to *logos apophantikos*. Speech in general is meaningful “by convention” (*kata syntheken*), but we are also told that the meaning of the languages a synthesis between meaning of the name and verb.¹⁹ What kind of a conventionality is there laying on the unity or separation in the *logos apophantikos*? Arbitrariness cannot be considered because this would mean that truth and false are so; such a sophistic thesis would be incompatible with Aristotle. When saying that verb is a lasting sign of those that are told of something else Aristotle does hint neither a particular verb nor the verb as phonetic or syntactic entity but a semantic structure. The *notion* given by the definition of the verb is that lasting thing; the *function* as such, we will say, not its value or instantiation. As for the *name (onoma)*, lasting must be its function of bringing about an essence. This is why the conventionality of language concerns not at all the vocabulary of signs but the *rules of signification and rules of interpretation*. Though, these could not be some formal rules because with Aristotle we are talking about a complex ontology of logos, the logos of being; *formalism is not a proper companion to any classical ontology*.

The opposition between “nature” and “convention” is an appearance here. As we have seen in dealing with artefacts, man cannot postulate any contradiction in nature. If there is any process then it is natural and man can only know it without fundamentally disturbing nature’s rational teleology. Man cannot be, as Protagoras would have concluded, the transformer or even, however we understand this, the measure of all things²⁰. The opposition nature-convention is originated in the sophists’ exaggerations that generated earlier in Plato some preoccupations for introducing some coherence or continuity between the two terms. Sophists insinuated the gap between nature and *nomos* and Plato dealt with it a lot²¹. Aristotle seems to avoid the old terminology in order to, we would say, “trick” the dilemma. In Plato *nomos* was understood as *techne*, ideal mental project.²² In

Aristotle *nomos* is only an extension of common sense inferior to arts.²³ Aristotelian *techne* is a superior one. Rational as it is, it cannot be as widely placed against nature as it could appear. For nature, says Aristotle, is worth to be preferred as such²⁴; the wise men talk according to *nature and truth*²⁵. Moreover, we have all the reasons to trust nature: nature itself (*aute he physis*) brings about the right foot in poetry²⁶. Aristotle prefers *kata physin* to *kata nomon* because it is more closed to the truth. We find, as it seems, a triad: nature (*physis*) - custom (*nomos*) - convention (*syntheken*). Custom is proper to the many, says Aristotle²⁷, and if we really want to bring arbitrariness into discussion we should right here look for it. But language is not like that and we must account for the remaining two terms. What kind of relation is there between the *kata physin* and *kata syntheken*?

Recalling the whole set of previous considerations, we could be able to establish two pairs of meanings for each term. We have already seen that nature has its own processuality according to its proper laws and teleonomy. "By nature" would be, then, nature's own opera; this is the case when nature itself creates or acts upon things. We have also seen that "by nature" acts and speaks a "wise man" because this way is more appropriated to the truth and is worth to be preferred as such. The two acceptations of *kata physin* will be then a) natural action and b) *according to* the natural rules of action²⁸.

On the other side there is *kata syntheken* having, we would see, two acceptations. First of them is the most familiar to a modern reader who spontaneously associates this term with something parallel, independent of nature. The second is a logical subsequently one according to which we understand *kata syntheken* as dependant of nature. In the prior acceptation we must account the possible tendencies: a) the independent convention being rational (as opposed to some irrational character of nature); b) the independent convention being rational (but independent to the no less rational processuality of nature); c) the independent convention being non-rational (but independent to the non-rational character nature itself); and d) the independent convention being non-rational (and opposed to the rationality of nature). We would not minutely discuss *in extenso* this schema for the simple reason that we have seen (it is a commonplace in fact) that, first of all, nature in Aristotle is not an irrational processuality. It is perfectly causal (the four Aristotelian causes being, first of all, natural), it has aims and is intellectually cognoscible. There are two remaining hypothesis, b) and d)²⁹. Let us begin with the second one because there is a question raised from the previous ascertainments. How could be the convention "non-rational", for we have seen that Aristotle leaves irrationality down in the field of the prejudgements of the crowds? If custom (*nomos*) is proper to the many and at the same time wise man does not act according to it then follows a single reasonable conclusion: convention is not opposed to the rationality but quite rational. Thus we reach the result of our investigation: convention is a rational independent act of human being. The question remains if the conventional (human) rationality can be thought of as opposed to the rationality of nature itself. But with this question we simply return to the problem of *techne* and artefacts. The answer would accordingly be: no³⁰.

We notice that there is no opposition between natural rationality and conventional (human) one. Names must be in accordance with nature, to the rational principle that is the essence of things. We must think of the *logos*, the "construction power" of active intellect because all that is established by language belongs to the thinking itself (*esti de kata ten dianoian tauta hosa hypo tou logou*

dei paraskeuasthenai)³¹. So the language is intellectually gifted with a “power” to refer to (*he ton onomaton dynamis*), and the ones who are not aware of this power fall into mistake and commit *paralogismos*³². This “power” is a *dynamis*. Language is rationally instituted as a power or potency similar to any natural thing; for all the things that are by nature are first of all known, integrated in a rational structure. What is *by nature*, says Aristotle, is this: it is the thing being used by the cautious man, as he is cautious and by the proper science of that thing³³. The natural things are nothing else but the objects of cautiousness (*phronesis*, practical wisdom), an intellectual virtue of acting by rational choice (*proairesis*)³⁴, and also the objects of science³⁵.

The meaningful language is an artefact as a result of rational setting up. The argument is purely metaphysical because we cannot identify some particular determinations of such an act. Linguistic convention is, too, concerning the rational meaning of terms, metaphysically understood. There is an analogous situation between artistic creation and institution of language, the level being different. If in the field of substances there are natural objects that contain the principles of artificial objects (see *De. An.*, 412a 10-15), there is a similar natural disposition of producing sounds (common to the human and beasts) that can be forged into a meaningful speech by human intellect through a rational decisional act: *thesein*. “Convention” is a legitimate instituting based on rational activity. Thus the Aristotelian language is the kind of language which, as much as conventional, has a necessary meaning³⁶. We cannot ever take a word as such, without its rational significance, as sophists used to. Aristotelian convention must be taken as a subsequent result of his efforts towards legitimating the unicity of meaning, the non-contradiction of essence into the words: that is, the possibility of an ontological discourse³⁷ being given that words do not by themselves postulate entities but entities must be successfully expressed (and defined) in words. Conventionality appeared to this aim a necessity if there is any possible apodeictic knowledge, as Aristotelian system of science requires in stating the necessity of judgements³⁸.

NOTES:

¹ M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, #17.

² In *De int.*, Aristotle establishes a relation between *sounds (ta en te phone)* and states of the soul (*pathemata tes psyches*) - *De int.*, 1, 16a. That is to say, the spoken word is a symbol for processes in the soul. The relation is a direct one and reminds us that we must appeal, for a better understanding of the theory of language in Aristotle, the theory of the soul. In *De an.*, 430b 25 Aristotle himself refers to a relation (or, more precisely, to a difference) between intellect and speaking: the indivisible things are thought by an indivisible act of the soul which is neither true nor false, in difference from enunciation (*phasis*) which can be true or false. There is an important gap between modern positions and the Aristotelian one. For Aristotle there is a direct relation between sign and thought (*semiosis*), distinct from the

relation between thought and objects (*knowledge*). The sign-object relation is not directly constituted but mediated by the prior ones.

³ See *Met.*, 982 b; 1025b.

⁴ *Met.*, 1070a.

⁵ *Met.*, 1003a.

⁶ W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, paperback 1990, vol. VI, p. 113.

⁷ *Met.*, 1032a. See also *Phys.*, 199a, *N. E.*, 1140a.

⁸ See the very elaborated study of Mihail Nasta, "Natura si artefactele", in *Studii aristotelice*, Universitatea din Bucuresti, 1981, p. 99.

⁹ See *Met.*, 1065a 27, *De An.*, 415b 16, *Phys.*, 198a 12, 196b 22, *G. A.*, 735a 3-5.

¹⁰ In *E. N.* (1140a 9-10) Aristotle defines *techne* as a state of preparedness to make something by true reasoning (*meta logou alethous*)

¹¹ See *An. Post.*, 100a.

¹² See for interesting remarks Joseph Moreau, *L'ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1939, p. 133.

¹³ The *logos apophantikos* is a synthesis, generally speaking - for we have seen in *De int.*, 1.16a that there is a *synthesis* (bounding) and a *diairesis* (separation) that purports truth or falsehood - between names (*onomata*) and verbs (*rhemata*). Names and verbs give the meaning of the *logos apophantikos* as a whole; taken as separate they lose this meaning (*De int.*, 4.16b).

¹⁴ See *De int.*, 1.16a, where Aristotle asserts that states of soul for which sounds are symbols are the same for all men.

¹⁵ Ammonius, *Commentaries on De interpretatione*, 31v.

¹⁶ See for example *Poet.*, 1457b-1458a.

¹⁷ There are in Aristotle multiple remarks that misusing common language results in errors of knowledge (*Top.*, 109a) or rhetoric discourse (*Rhet.*, 1404 26-37) or sophistical arguments (*Soph. El.*, 165b). But Aristotle never says anything about the logical priority of language upon thought and knowledge. Language is not an independent part of human acts, it is instrumental as such.

¹⁸ There are two Aristotelian terms for language each of them being used in different cases. The central term is *logos*, meaning speech and noetic act at the same time. The second one is *lexis*, mainly used in *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, which means speaking as independent from knowledge, having a pure instrumental and persuasive function. The syntactical parts of the speaking are named in *Poetics* "*mere tes lexeos*" and *Rhetoric* at its turn deals with the art of accompanying arguments by a proper presentation (*Rhet.*, 1403b 14-18), that is, *style*. On the other side, *logos* is the language of the true knowledge, necessarily meaningful. While the unity of *logos* is acquired by synthesis, the unity of *lexis* stands in *syndesmos* (composition), a merely pure syntactical operation (*Rhet.*, 1409a 25-26).

¹⁹ *De Int.*, 4, 16b.

²⁰ "Le livre *Gamma*, celui qui traite comme on sait de la science de l'être en tant qu'être et de son premier principe, procede a partir de son quatrieme

chapitre, et il y en a huit, a une serie de refutations, tant pour etablir le principe que pour interdire le discours de Protagoras" - Barbara Cassin, "Parle, si tu es un homme", in: Barbara Cassin et Michel Nancy, *La decision du sens*, Paris, J. Vrin, 1989, p9.

²¹ See M. Nasta, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

²² *Idem*, pp. 137-138, n.5.

²³ *Rhet.*, 1369a 35-b.

²⁴ *Top.*, 119a.

²⁵ *S.E.*, 173a.

²⁶ *Poet.*, 1449a 23-26.

²⁷ *S.E.*, 173a.

²⁸ The idea of this interpretation is contained in Ammonius' already mentioned opera (see 26r-34v). The Neoplatonist interpreter gives an interesting solution to the problem, though in Platonic terms: for him, "by nature" means a "natural name" according to the natural essence of things, so as the natural name of a well leading-minded man to be *Archidamos*. He even uses the term *nomothet* in order to elucidate the rationality of conventional names: the *nomothet* is the knower of the nature of things.

²⁹ These four tendencies of the first acceptance of *kata syntheken* (as independent of nature) will resume finally to only two. There is another logical acceptance of *kata syntheken*: dependent of nature, purporting four similar tendencies (read the *a* - *d*) points replacing "independent" with "dependent"). This second acceptance is nothing else but a weaker sense of *kata syntheken*, which will appear in fact as the solution to the problem itself in discussion.

³⁰ We see that there is no reason to discuss separately of the second presupposed acceptance of *kata syntheken* (as dependent of nature). See previous note.

³¹ *Poet.*, 1456a.

³² *S. E.*, 165a.

³³ *Top.*, 154a.

³⁴ *E. N.*, 1139a 31.

³⁵ The discussion if there is a real opposition between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom remains opened. Though some authors (e.g. W.K.C.Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p.347) preserve that *phronesis* is not *nous* but different to noetic activity, being prescriptive concerning means to the aim and reduced to the intuition of particulars, we cannot ignore the fact that practical syllogism, choice and deliberation, all rational proceedings, are closely connected with *phronesis* (see *E.N.* 3 ch. 2, *M.A.* 700b 23, *E.N.* 113a 11, 39b).

³⁶ Barbara Cassin, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³⁷ Pierre Aubenque in his classical *Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote* (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1968) has a consistent chapter on this subject where we can find all the necessary details.

³⁸ Proper considerations on "Aristotelian model of science" in Willem de Jong's article: "How is Metaphysics as a Science Possible?" in *Review of Metaphysics*, 49 (dec. 1995): 240-244.

DIE KONZEPTION VON TUDOR VIANU ÜBER DAS RATIONALE UND DAS
IRRATIONALE IN DER KÜNSTLERISCHEN KREATION

Florentina Roșu

Tudor Vianu hat einen besonderen Verdienst in der Geschichte der rumänischen Ästhetik, weil er zur Erforschung des komplexen Prozesses der künstlerischen Kreation beigetragen hat.

"Die Ergründung der spezifischen Natur der künstlerischen Kreation und ihrer Züge, ist einer der interessantesten Verdienste des rumänischen Ästheten in dem Kontext einer Periode, in welcher in der rumänischen Ästhetik ähnliche Anliegen fehlten, oder von verschiedenen idealistischen Strömungen beeinflusst worden sind."¹

Die künstlerische Kreation, als spezifische menschliche Aktivität, befindet sich innerhalb eines axiologischen Rahmens, der ihn individualisiert. Die künstlerische Kreation liegt unter dem Kennzeichen der Verwertung von dem Künstler der existentiellen, kognitiven, gefühlsmäßigen, sensorischen Daten. Diese veranlassen ihn sich zu entscheiden und getreu dieser Option zu schaffen. Aber unter dem Kennzeichen des neuen Wertes, welchen er produziert - der enthaltene Wert in dem Kunstwerk - und verleiht ihm die eigenen, originellen Attribute.

Von dieser Aussage ausgehend, eröffnet sich die Perspektive einer Diskursion über die Möglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnis des künstlerischen Prozesses.

Tudor Vianus Aussagen sind relevant für die Hervorhebung der Komplexität des künstlerischen Prozesses. Diese Komplexität kann nicht auf eine theoretische Schematisierung reduziert werden.

Die Idee des "einheitlichen Wertes des ästhetischen Schaffens" unterstützend, behauptet Tudor Vianu, daß die Normen, die individuellen Regeln des Ablaufs des künstlerischen Prozesses schwer zu erfassen sind, "der Künstler hat keine Möglichkeit auf intellektuellen Wegen die Regeln, welche sein Schaffen geleitet haben, zu formulieren"² Aber das heißt nicht, daß der Prozeß des künstlerischen Schaffens nicht ergründet werden kann.

In diesem Sinne sind Tudor Vianus Bemühungen von größter Bedeutung. Er präsentiert und erklärt die Etappen des Kurationsprozesses, wobei sich rationale und irrationale Elemente verbinden.

In der Analyse des Kurationsprozesses hebt der rumänische Ästhet die Existenz von eigenen Unterschieden hervor, die sich auf die Entfaltung des

Kreationsprozesses beziehen. Diese Unterschiede werden von dem Gewicht der verschiedenen rationalen und irrationalen Elementen beeinflusst, von der Überlegenheit des einen oder des anderen Elementes, im Rahmen der Etappen des Prozesses des künstlerischen Kreation die Vorbereitung, die Inspiration, die Erfindung und die Ausführung.

Zur Erforschung des Prozesses des künstlerischen Schaffens ist eine Festlegung der Bedeutungen und die Hervorhebung der Eigenheiten der beiden Aspekte notwendig, die sich auf die beiden Elemente bezieht, die in der Analyse von Tudor Vianu einbezogen werden: das Rationale und das Irrationale.

a) Das Rationale

Rational heißt in Tudor Vianus Auffassung all das, das unter dem Zeichen der Vernunft steht und mit Hilfe der logischen Prinzipien und der Formen des logischen Denkens erklärt werden kann.

Man geht von der Idee aus, daß "ein Hintergrund einer tiefen Rationalität in jedem Schaffen der Schönheit und der Kunst"³ existiert.

Der rumänische Ästhet unterstreicht, daß die künstlerische Kreation vor allem dem Zeichen der Vernunft unterliegt.

Im Prozeß des künstlerischen Schaffens sind einige Aspekte der Rationalität zu unterscheiden.

"Einer dieser Aspekte ist die mentale Verfassung des Künstlers, seine Fähigkeit zwischen verschiedenen Alternativen zu wählen, Ideen und Materialien zu selektieren. Diese sind in enger Verbindung mit der eigenen Lebenserfahrung und der Kunstauffassung des Künstlers".⁴

Dieser Aspekt spielt eine wichtige Rolle in der Vorbereitungsphase des künstlerischen Schaffens.

Tudor Vianu ist ein Gegner der irrationalistischen Orientierung, die, die Einmischung des rationalen Elements in der künstlerischen Kreation verneint. Tudor Vianu behauptet, daß dieses Element notwendig ist und den ordnenden Faktor im Prozeß des künstlerischen Schaffens darstellt.

Diese Rationalität überwiegt im Schaffensprozeß und erhält einen genaueren Sinn innerhalb der Etappe der Erfindung die, nach Meinung von Tudor Vianu den Keim des Kunstwerkes darstellt, der von der Inspiration geboten wird.

Tudor Vianu verwertet die Idee von Volkelt nach welcher die rationalen Prozesse im künstlerischen Schaffen der Kategorie der Kausalität und der Finalität angehören. Tudor Vianu hat die Bedeutung des Existenz der Luzidität und der Wachsamkeit des Künstlers im Prozeß des künstlerischen Schaffens unterstrichen.

Wenn ein Künstler sich einen Inhalt vorstellt, finden Assoziationen statt, im Zusammenhang mit der Kategorie der Kausalität. In der Erfindungsphase hat die Existenz der Gründe eine wichtige Rolle, welche die Einstellung des Künstlers und die Konzeptionsweise, sowie die Verwirklichung des Kunstwerkes beeinflussen.

Wenn der Künstler das Werk für einen bestimmten Zweck entwirft, dann bedient er sich der rationalen Kategorie der Finalität.

Die Rationalität des Prozesses des künstlerischen Schaffens wird von diesen Kategorien aufrechterhalten.

Dieser Aspekt wird ersichtlich bei dem Übergang zur Ausführungsphase des künstlerischen Schaffens. Hier kommt die Absicht des Künstlers hervor, eine Botschaft zu vermitteln, mit einem Publikum zu kommunizieren.

Der Künstler offenbart seine Ausdruckskraft, er organisiert seine inneren Visionen in einer Form der Kommunikation.

Um kommunizierbar zu sein, muß ein Kunstwerk eine Einheit bilden, die mit Hilfe logischer Elemente verwirklicht werden kann: aufeinanderfolgende Beweisführung, Präzision, logische Strenge, Erfindung vom Detail zum Ganzen und vom Ganzen zum Detail, logische Verkettungen von Präzedenz und Konsequenz.

Nun erscheint die Notwendigkeit des Künstlers, die Elemente des künstlerischen Kurationsprozesses im Verhältnis zu setzen, sein Werk zu motivieren die inkohärenten Aspekte zu beseitigen und auszuschließen, nur jene Aspekte beizubehalten, die dem Kunstwerk Einheitlichkeit verleihen - Endprodukt des Kurationsprozesses.

Das Rationale zeigt sich als eine Relationalität, das bedeutet, daß jede künstlerische Struktur ein System von Relationen darstellt, zwischen den verschiedenen Elementen eines Kunstwerkes und hebt ihr rationales Schema hervor. Aber das ist nicht hinreichend, um das Werk insgesamt zu erklären. Eine Hervorhebung der Nuancen ist nötig, außerdem der Valenzen, die nur das Irrationale tun kann. Die wesentliche Rolle hat die Vernunft, ihre Existenz besitzt die Eigenschaft die Irrationalität der Spontaneität zu "verbessern"⁵.

Th. W. Adorno unterstreicht in *Ästhetische Theorie*, daß im Kunstwerk die Rationalität ein grundlegendes Element der Einheitlichkeit und Organisation ist.

"Die ästhetische Rationalität ist eine Rationalität, die sich selbst ausdrückt, die kommunikativer Art bestimmt."⁶

Die künstlerische Kuration muß die Bedingung der Wahrhaftigkeit erfüllen, um als rational innerhalb eines Kommunikationsprozesses angesehen zu werden.

"Die Wahrhaftigkeit stellt das bedingungslos Echte, das wahre Gründungsmoment der Einheitlichkeit des Kunstwerkes (...) und ihr spezifisches Erfordernis"⁷.

b) Das Irrationale

Die Aussage von Tudor Vianu, daß "die irrationale und die rationale Kuration, oder, genauer gesagt, die überwiegend irrationale und überwiegend rationale Kurationen sind die beiden Typen, die man durch Erforschung und Analyse des künstlerischen Schaffensprozesses feststellen kann"⁸, erlaubt die Bestimmung der Bedeutung und der spezifischen Aspekte des zweiten Begriffes.

Die Bedeutung der Irrationalität bei Tudor Vianu ist verbunden mit der Individualität des Kunstwerkes, also mit der Tatsache, daß durch seine Natur, das Werk nicht gänzlich einigen allgemeinen Faktoren untergeordnet werden kann. Wenn dies möglich ist, dann bleiben einige Aspekte unerklärbar und man kann sie nicht in Schemata einordnen.

Bei Tudor Vianu geht es um die Unmöglichkeit einige der Faktoren des künstlerischen Schaffens logisch und wissenschaftlich zu erklären.

Von außerordentlicher Bedeutung ist Tudor Vianus Erläuterung der Idee, daß "durch ihre einzigartige Natur, ist es schwierig das Kunstwerk der rationalen Analyse zu unterwerfen".⁹ Aber die Existenz des Irrationalen muß die Initiativen der Vernunft nicht abschrecken.

So wie es aus dem Verliegen der Analyse hervorgeht, verleiht Tudor Vianu dem Irrationalen einen Sinn, er beschränkt sich nicht nur auf das Verstehen des Irrationalen als psychologische-gefühlsmäßige, oder imaginative Bedeutungen, die

sich auf Schein und auf Tatsachen beziehen und die sich von der eigenen Realität abwenden.

In der Auffassung von Tudor Vianu sind all diese Aussagen und Nuancierungen notwendig, um zu verstehen, daß die rationalen und irrationalen Elemente in der künstlerischen Kreation koexistieren.

Nur Dank ihrer Interaktion und ihrem unterschiedlichen Überwiegen, kann ein Kunstwerk entstehen.

Das Irrationale wird verstanden als eine Notwendigkeit innerhalb des künstlerischen Kurationsprozesses. Das Irrationale erscheint vor allem in der zweiten Phase dieses Prozesses, die der Inspiration, die als eine Stimmung erscheint in welcher der Künstler intuitiv den Weg findet, den er einschlagen muß, um sein Werk zu vervollständigen.

"Aber die Weiterentwicklung der Anfangsidee zeigt wie das Kunstwerk die ganze Vision der Inspiration verändert."¹⁰

Das Problem ist die Festlegung der Hierarchie und das Gewicht der irrationalen Faktoren im Prozeß der künstlerischen Kreation und nicht deren Verneinung.

Tudor Vianus Versuch die Etappen der künstlerischen Kreation zu analysieren enthält einige Ungereimtheiten die selbst dem rumänischen Ästheten aufgefallen sind. Manchmal existieren diese Etappen gemeinsam, in anderen Fällen verschiebt sich deren Entfaltung, oder eine der Etappen fällt gänzlich aus. Die Analyse scheint einfach zu sein, aber nur auf dem ersten Blick. Aber die von Tudor Vianu vorgenommene Einteilung ist notwendig für das klare Verstehen des Ablaufes des Kurationsprozesses und der rationalen und irrationalen Elemente dieses Prozesses.

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CARDINAL NUMBERS

Ionel Narița

The aim of this issue is the demonstration that the cardinal numbers can be defined inside of Logic of Predicates and the formulas which express their properties are logical laws. I believe that the *logicism* program can and must be revived with the condition that its presuppositions be shaded. The main dogma of logicism is the mathematics can be founded only on Logical Principles. Because of this desideratum the mathematical formulas are logical laws or are reducible to the logical laws.

The cardinal numbers are useful for answer to the questions of following kind: "How many presidents had Romania after 1989?". If we answer: "Romania had *two* presidents", we mention the cardinal number "two".

The cardinal numbers must be distinguished of both "ordinal numbers", which appear in contexts like "the *second* president", and "natural numbers". The attempt to reduce or explain the natural numbers by the cardinal ones is an error because the properties of cardinals are different to the properties of natural numbers. For example, two cardinal numbers can't be multiplied or divided. It is possible only to multiply (to divide) a cardinal with a natural number, but not with an other cardinal.

In the judgment of the attempts to define cardinal numbers we must take in consideration all these aspects. For example, the usual definition of cardinal numbers inside of the sets theory is incorrect. First, the term "set" is not well defined, it remains an obscure term. Secondly, if we understand the cardinal number that "the set of all sets equivalent with a certain set" are present a lot of difficulties.

First, nobody can give an example of such set. Secondly, if the sets are problematic concepts then it is hard to admit that exists "set of sets". Finally, the theory of sets don't explain why only certain "set of sets" are numbers, but the others aren't.

The formal argument that a such definition has success to reduce the operations with cardinal numbers to the operations with sets can't satisfy us; a such reduction isn't necessary. It is possible to build a definition of cardinal numbers without enigmatically sets.

At these objections it adds the paradoxes of set theory. One of most famous paradox affirms that "the greatest cardinal isn't the greatest". In set theory is accepted if there are two sets, then there is their reunion too. If there is a set, then

there is the set of his parts and, the cardinal of the set of parts of certain set A is greater than the cardinal of A .

Because the reunion is associative it results that there is *the total set* (T) which is the reunion of all existing sets. Normally, the cardinal of T is the greatest one. But, if the total set exists, than there is the set of parts of T which has a bigger cardinal than T .

The attempt to find an autonomous foundation for mathematics in a obscure concept like "set" lead us to new misunderstandings and confusions. Logical principles are the only way on which the mathematics can be justified.

In the formulas of the Predicate Logic, there are two kinds of variables: individual and predicative. We obtain propositions from a formula Fx in two ways: by the interpretation of the variables on domains of constants or, by their quantification.

In the first case, the individual variables are interpretable on a domain of individual constants, $U = \{a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m\}$, where "0, 1, 2, ..., m" are indexes. In dependence on U it is defined the field of predicative constants (or *predicates*): $\Phi = \{f_0, f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n\}$. For example, if $U = \{a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3\}$, then, the predicates of Φ are:

a_0	a_1	a_2	a_3	
0	0	0	0	f_0
0	0	0	1	f_1
0	0	1	0	f_2
0	0	1	1	f_3
0	1	0	0	f_4
0	1	0	1	f_5
0	1	1	0	f_6
0	1	1	1	f_7
1	0	0	0	f_8
1	0	0	1	f_9
1	0	1	0	f_{10}
1	0	1	1	f_{11}
1	1	0	0	f_{12}
1	1	0	1	f_{13}
1	1	1	0	f_{14}
1	1	1	1	f_{15}

In this table, the sign "1" means that the constant "a" *satisfy* the predicate f . We'll say about those individual constants which satisfy a predicate, f , that they constitute the *extension* of f (f').

If in Fx , the variable F is substituted by predicative constant f_j , and the variable x is substituted by individual constant a_i , then we obtain the proposition " $f_j a_i$ " which is true when a_i belong to extension of f_j .

Inside of field Φ there are definable the next operations named *compositions*:

a. *conjunctive composition* ($F=G.H$), by which the predicate which has an equal extension with intersection of factors is obtained. For example, $f_2=f_3.f_6$.

b. *sumative composition* ($F=G \wedge H$). The extension of F is the reunion between G " and H ". For example, $f_3=f_1 \wedge f_2$.

c. *exclusive composition*, ($F=G/H$), has place when $F'' = \neg G'' \cap \neg H''$; an case is next: $f_{10} = f_4 / f_5$.

d. *disjunctive composition* ($F=G \oplus H$). In that case, the extension of resulted predicate contains the elements which belong to the extension of factors but don't to their intersection: $f_1 = f_{10} \oplus f_{11}$. If the extensions of factors are disjunctive, then we'll say that the disjunctive composition is the "logical sum" of factors ($F=G+H$). The extension of logical sum is the reunion of factor extensions.

The second way to obtain propositions from a formula is the quantification of its variables. The predicate language admits two types of quantification:

a. *existential quantification*:

$$(\exists x)Fx =_{df} Fa_0 \vee Fa_1 \vee \dots \vee Fa_m \text{ and}$$

b. *universal quantification*:

$$(x)Fx =_{df} Fa_0 \& Fa_1 \& \dots \& Fa_m.$$

In order that the conjunction and disjunction are the only associative and commutative logical connectors, the only these two fundamental quantifiers can be independently defined. The others quantifiers must be defined starting from them.

If we analyze the fundamental quantifiers, then we find that the existential quantified propositions refer to a part of domain U , while the universal propositions refer to whole domain. From here it results that we must distinguish between two kinds of quantifiers: *determinate* as the universal quantifier, and *indeterminate*, as the existential one.

We propose us to establish the determinate quantifiers. An existential quantified proposition $(\exists x)Fx$ affirm that it exists the individual constants which satisfy the predicate F , but, about the others constants different from x , which we note with symbol x^1 , it says nothing. ($x^1 =_{not}$ an individual constant, different from x).

For to obtain a determinate quantifier, it must be said something about x and about x^1 , as the following example: "It exists x so that Fx , and the others x aren't F ".

In that way we'll obtain the following successive and determinate quantifiers:

"It exists x^0 so that Fx , and the others x aren't F "

"It exists x^0 so that Fx , and from the others, it exists x^1 so that Fx^1 and the others x^2 are $\neg F$ "

"It exists x^0 so that Fx^0 , and from the others, it exists x^1 so that Fx^1 , and from the others it exists x^2 so that Fx^2 and the others x^3 are $\neg F$ " and so on.

By formalization in Logic of Predicates, we obtain the following formulas:

a. $(\exists x^0)Fx^0 \& (x^1)Fx^1$

b. $(\exists x^0)Fx^0 \& (\exists x^1)Fx^1 \& (x^2)\neg Fx^2$

c. $(\exists x^0)Fx^0 \& (\exists x^1)Fx^1 \& (\exists x^2)Fx^2 \& (x^3)Fx^3$

...

After the interpretation of quantifiers we arrive to following expressions:

- a. $(Fa_1 \& \neg Fa_2 \& \dots \& \neg Fa_m) \vee (Fa_2 \& \neg Fa_1 \& \dots \& \neg Fa_m) \vee \dots \vee (Fa_m \& \neg Fa_1 \& \dots \neg Fa_{m-1})$
 b. $(Fa_1 \& Fa_2 \& \dots \& \neg Fa_m) \vee (Fa_1 \& Fa_3 \& \dots \& \neg Fa_m) \vee \dots \vee (Fa_1 \& Fa_j \& \dots \& \neg Fa_m)$

We agree to note the determinate quantifiers like this:

- (a) $\equiv (1x)Fx$, namely, "For one x , Fx "
 (b) $\equiv (2x)Fx$, namely, "For two x , Fx "
 (c) $\equiv (3x)Fx$, namely, "For three x , Fx "
 ...
 (m) $\equiv (mx)Fx$, namely, "For m x , Fx ".

For the list be complete, we must add an another determinate quantifier:

$$(0x)Fx \equiv \neg(\exists x)Fx \equiv (x)\neg F(x)$$

The determinate quantifiers: 0, 1, 2, ..., as they was defined are the *cardinal numbers*. We observe that in this list the universal quantifier is absent. It is substituted, in dependence with the domain U by greatest cardinal definable on U . For example, in the case of a domain with two elements, the universal quantifier is the same with the cardinal number "two": $(x)Fx \equiv (2x)Fx$. In the same way we establish that "the greatest cardinal number" don't exists in the Cantor's sense because it is relative to certain domain, so that, the famous paradox disappears if the cardinal numbers are interpreted as determinate quantifiers. Besides, in this interpretation we don't need of problematic entities like "sets" and we remain inside of Logic of Predicate.

The determinate quantifiers separate the predicates of field Φ in classes:

- 0 - f_0
 1 - f_1, f_4, f_2, f_8
 2 - $f_3, f_5, f_6, f_9, f_{10}, f_{12}$
 3 - $f_7, f_{11}, f_{13}, f_{14}$
 4 - f_{15}

The formula $(kx)Fx$ is true for the predicates which belong to class correspondent to number k . For example, $(3x)Fx$ is true in following situations: $(3x)f_7x$, $(3x)f_{11}x$ etc. and is false for $(3x)f_3x$ etc. We'll say that the predicates have a *cardinal*. We so establish that the cardinal numbers are "predicates of predicates" or "predicates of order two", how wrote many others authors. In fact, any quantifier may be interpret in this fashion.

If we start of cardinal numbers, then we can imagine others numerical quantifiers, indeterminate, as "at the most 3", "at least 2", "between 8 and 12" etc. With help of cardinal numbers we can build the numerical quantified propositions, as " kS are P ", where k is cardinal.

The formulas which express the properties of cardinal numbers are logical laws. For example, there are demonstrable the following formulas:

- a. $(F)(G)((0x)Fx \& (kx)Gx) \supset (kx)(F+G)x$

$$b. (F)(G)((1x)Fx \& (1x)Gx) \supset (2x)(F+G)x$$

$$c. (F)(G)((2x)Fx \& (1x)Gx) \supset (3x)(F+G)x$$

Where F'' and G'' are disjunctive each other, and F+G are their logical sum. The demonstration of first formula is:

$$\begin{array}{l} (0x)Fx \equiv \neg Fx^0 \& \neg Fx^1 \& \neg Fx^2 \& \dots \& \neg Fx^m \\ (kx)Gx \equiv Gx^0 \& \dots \& Gx^{k-1} \& \neg Gx^k \& \dots \& \neg Gx^m \text{ (df.)} \\ \hline (F+G)x^0 \& \dots \& (F+G)x^{k-1} \& \neg (F+G)x^k \& \dots \neg (F+G)x^m \text{ (df.)} \\ \hline (kx)(F+G)x \end{array}$$

The third formula may be demonstrate in following way:

$$\begin{array}{l} (2x)Fx \equiv Fx^0 \& Fx^1 \& \neg Fx^2 \& \dots \& \neg Fx^m \\ (1x)Gx \equiv \neg Gx^0 \& \neg Gx^1 \& Gx^2 \& \dots \& \neg Gx^m \\ \hline (F+G)x^0 \& (F+G)x^1 \& (F+G)x^2 \& \dots \& \neg (F+G)x^m \equiv (3x)(F+G)x \end{array}$$

If we introduce the definition of the cardinal numbers sum:

$$(kx)Fx \& (k_1x)Gx =_{df} ((k+k_1)x)(F+G)x,$$

where F'' and G'' are disjunctive, so that: 1+1=2, 2+1=3 etc. are abbreviations for precedent logical laws, and the respective formulas are *valid*. It is demonstrable also the next formulas for associativity and commutativity of cardinal's sum:

$$a. (k_1+k_2)+k_3 = k_1+(k_2+k_3)$$

$$b. k_1+k_2 = k_2+k_1$$

For example, the associativity may be demonstrated in this way:

$$\begin{array}{ll} a. k_1F_1 \& k_2F_2 \& k_3F_3, \text{ where } (F_i)'' \text{ are disjunctive.} & \text{(presup.)} \\ b. (k_1+k_2)(F_1+F_2) \& k_3F_3 & \text{(a, df.)} \\ c. ((k_1+k_2)+k_3)(F_1+F_2+F_3) & \text{(b, df.)} \\ d. k_1F_1 \& (k_2+k_3)(F_2+F_3) & \text{(a, df.)} \\ e. (k_1+(k_2+k_3))(F_1+F_2+F_3) & \text{(d, df.)} \\ f. (k_1+k_2)+k_3 = k_1+(k_2+k_3) & \text{(a, c, e)} \end{array}$$

Other operations, like disjunctive or conjunctive compositions of the predicate don't lead to the determinate quantifiers; these cases can't be resolved inside of cardinal numbers class. For example, if $(3x)Fx \& (5x)Gx$, then it results "at the most 3x are F.G".

A formula as "1=1+2", which, if it is integral wrote then it becomes $(F)(G)((1x)Fx \& (1x)Gx \& (x)\neg(F+G)x) \supset (2x)(F+G)x$, is useful to justify the numerical propositions.

For example, the proposition $(\exists x)fx$ take place because f is logical sum between two predicates with cardinal "1".

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INDUCTION AND DEMARCATION

*Induction turns out to play no integral
part in epistemology or in the method
of science and the growth of knowledge.*
- Karl Popper

Mark A. Notturmo

Karl Popper regarded the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation as the two fundamental problems of epistemology. He claimed that he had solved both of these problems, and that his solutions to them were related to each other. But few philosophers, as Popper himself acknowledged, think that he has solved the problem of induction. And even those who think that he has solved the problem of demarcation often misconstrue what his solution was.

In my view, Popper did indeed solve both of these problems. But I also think that he presented these problems, and their solutions, in ways that can be easily misunderstood. He presented the problem of induction, for example, as a problem regarding the justification of scientific theories - while at the same time denying that deductive inferences justify their conclusions. And he talked about conjectures and refutations and about the falsifiability of scientific theories - while at the same time denying that conclusive falsifications are ever possible. In this way, he helped to obscure not only the problems of induction and demarcation, but also his own important and revolutionary solutions to them. The problem is that the ways in which Popper formulated his views on induction and demarcation sometimes suggest that we can justify our knowledge, and, indeed, that we must do so in order for it to be regarded as rational - despite his explicit claims to the contrary. This has not only confused philosophers as to how his views on induction and demarcation constitute solutions to these problems, it has also obscured the real nature of the problems themselves, and the ways in which Popper's solutions to them are related to each other.

The purpose of this paper is to explain these problems, and Popper's solutions to them, in a way that avoids these confusions.

I

In order to understand Popper's solutions to the problems of induction and demarcation, it is necessary to understand his problem situation. It is necessary, in

other words, to understand why Popper regarded induction and demarcation as the two fundamental problems of epistemology.

This, I suggest, can best be understood as a result of the collapse of foundationalism, which can, in turn, be best understood as a problem regarding the rational authority for our beliefs.

Traditional 'bedrock' foundationalism said that knowledge must be justified in order to be rational, and it attempted to justify our knowledge by deriving it from an indubitable and infallible source. Descartes, it is well known, declared that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceived is true. But by the eighteenth century, many philosophers had grown sceptical of attempts to ground our knowledge upon *a priori* intuition. These philosophers regarded sense experience as the only criterion of truth, and they demanded that we eliminate beliefs that could not be grounded upon sense experience alone. But then Hume pointed out that the attempt to ground scientific knowledge upon sense experience leads to irrationalism. Since there is no 'middle term' that allows us validly infer future events from past experiences, inductive inferences can be justified only psychologically, through custom and habit. Hume thought that our knowledge was, in fact, justified inductively in this way, and he said that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. But Kant rejected Hume's irrationalism, and, thinking that Hume was right to think that empiricism entailed it, proclaimed that there must be *a priori* knowledge after all. Kant pointed to Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Mechanics as examples of what he called *a priori* synthetic knowledge. And he tried to explain how *a priori* synthetic knowledge was possible by saying that the mind imposes its laws upon nature in order to understand it, and that all rational beings impose the same laws. This, more or less, was the situation in epistemology before Einstein.

Kant's attempt to salvage the rationality of science collapsed when Einstein imposed a non-Euclidean geometry and a non-Newtonian physics upon nature. Einstein described a natural world that rational beings before him had never conceived. And his descriptions were then corroborated by the results of the experiments that he conceived in order to test them.

The success of Einstein's theory shattered all hopes of explaining the rationality of science in terms of *a priori* foundations. If Kant could be wrong about the certainty of Newtonian Mechanics and Euclidean Geometry, then how can anyone ever claim to be certain again? But it did not quite shatter the hopes of foundationalists. Instead, most foundationalists, reverting to Hume, tried to explain the rationality of science as a product of its justification by sense experience.

It was in this context that induction and demarcation emerged for Popper as the two fundamental problems of epistemology.

Popper recognized that the attempt to explain the rationality of science as a product of its justification had failed. We cannot rationally ground science upon *a priori* cognition because *a priori* cognition is unreliable, and we cannot rationally ground science upon sense experience because inductive inference is invalid. If we want to avoid Hume's conclusion that science is based upon custom and habit, then we have to explain how scientific knowledge can be rational *given* the fact that it cannot be justified.

This, in a nutshell, was Popper's problem. In order to solve it, Popper had to first offer an alternative to the view that science is distinguished from non-science by its inductive method, and then an alternative to the view that the

rationality of a belief depends upon its justification. He had, in other words, to offer an alternative to the view that science is science, and rational, because it justifies its theories through experience.

Popper's alternative is easily misunderstood, in part, because it offers a real alternative. In order to understand it, we must think of knowledge and of rationality in a way that does not presuppose that our knowledge must be justified in order to be rational.

But Popper's alternative is also misunderstood due to the way in which Popper himself presented it.

II

In *Objective Knowledge*, Popper credits his solution to the problem of induction to his reformulation of the problem. 'The traditional philosophical problem of induction' was:

Tr What is the justification for the belief that the future will be (largely) like the past? Or, perhaps, What is the justification for inductive inferences?¹

But formulations like this are 'wrongly put'. They beg the question by presuming that inductive inferences, or the belief that the future will be (largely) like the past, are in fact justified.² The problem thus becomes one of providing a justification that is already presumed to exist.

Popper reformulated the logical problem of induction as:

L₁ Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true be justified by 'empirical reasons'; that is, by assuming the truth of certain test statements or observation statements (which, it may be said, are 'based on experience')?³

This is clearly an improvement. Instead of presupposing that inductive inferences are justified, it allows us to say that they are not.

But *L₁* still construes the problem of induction as a problem of justification. And this not only obscures the real problem with inductive inferences, it also obscures the relationship between Popper's solution to the problem of induction and his falsifiability criterion of demarcation.

In what follows, I will first try to clarify the real problem with inductive inferences, and I will then try to show how Popper's solution to the problem of demarcation is related to it.

III

Philosophers typically present the problem of induction as a problem of justification: as the problem, namely, of whether the premises of an inductive argument justify its conclusion - or, at least, our *belief* in its conclusion. But the conclusion of an argument and our belief in it are two different things. Later I will suggest that the failure to distinguish these two different things is responsible for the widespread belief that inductive arguments justify their conclusions. But this is not the focus of

my discussion. For I do not believe that the real problem with inductive arguments has anything to do with justification at all. And this is what I here want to explain.

I can begin by saying that if the problem of induction were a problem about justification, then there should also be a problem of *deduction*. For it is well known that valid deductive arguments may easily have false premises and false conclusions. So it is clear, if justifying the conclusion means showing it to be true,⁴ that deductive arguments never justify their conclusions.

Popper knows this, but tends to obscure it. For after answering L_1 in the negative, he 'generalizes' the question as:

L_2 Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true or that it is false be justified by 'empirical reasons'; that is, can the assumption of the truth of test statements justify either the claim that a universal theory is true or the claim that it is false?⁵

Here, part of the problem is that L_3 mixes inductive and deductive forms. Popper knew full well that the *modus tollens*, the argument form through which he would 'justify' the claim that a universal theory is false, is deductively valid. Nevertheless, he characterized it as 'the only strictly deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in the 'inductive direction' ; that is, from singular to universal statements'.⁶

I do not know what Popper meant by 'as it were'. But his claim that the *modus tollens* proceeds from singular to universal statements is simply false. It is possible, as Popper says, to use *modus tollens* 'to argue from the truth of singular statements to the falsity of universal statements'. But when we do so, we argue from the negation of a conditional's consequent to the *negation* of its universal antecedent. And the *negation* of a universal statement is an existential statement, and *vice versa*. So the *modus tollens* proceeds from universal to singular statements after all.⁷

But the real problem is that the *assumption* of the truth of a statement cannot justify anything. If you have to assume the truth of your premises in order to justify your conclusion, then you might as well assume the conclusion itself.

Neither inductive nor deductive arguments can show that their conclusions are true. If this is what it means to justify a conclusion, then neither inductive nor deductive arguments justify their conclusions. Here, someone might regard inductive arguments as worse in this respect. For valid deductive arguments *would* justify their conclusions, if we could be certain that their premises were true. Inductive arguments, on the other hand, are not even valid. Their conclusions may be false even if their premises are true.

There is nothing in this that I want to deny. But putting it like this obscures the problem. If the premises of a deductively valid argument are true, then its conclusion must also be true. But this doesn't mean that the premises of deductive arguments are true. It simply means that deductive arguments entail their conclusions. And this fact may be equally expressed by saying that if the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is false, then one or more of its premises must be false as well.

Deductive arguments entail their conclusions and inductive arguments do not. And entailment, I agree, is crucial. But entailment is not enough for justification. It pertains, instead, to validity, or formal implication, which is an entirely different thing. A valid deductive argument entails its conclusion. But it

cannot justify its conclusion unless we are certain that its premises are true. Popper, however, thinks that we are fallible. And this, I presume, is what leads him to ask whether the *assumption* of the truth of a test statement can justify the claim that a universal theory is false.

In my view, the problem with inductive arguments pertains not to their utility for justification, but to their utility for criticism. Were I to follow Popper's example and reformulate the logical problem of induction, I would do so as follows:

L_3 Can our belief that the conclusion of an inductive argument is false ever force us to question the truth of its premises?⁸

The answer to L_3 is 'No'. Inductive arguments are one and all invalid. The falsity of their conclusions is entirely consistent with the truth of their premises. And this means that inductive arguments, unlike their deductive counterparts, could not justify their conclusions *even* if we were certain that their premises were true.

But this also obscures the problem. For it tends to suggest that deductive arguments can in some way justify their conclusions after all. And it tends to camouflage the fact that the invalidity of an inductive argument makes it entirely useless for criticism.

This, I suggest, is the real problem with induction inferences, and the real relationship between the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation.

Deductive arguments force us to choose between the truth of their conclusions and the falsity of (one or more) of their premises. Inductive arguments do not. This, in and of itself, does not show that anything is true or false. But if an argument is deductively valid, then we simply cannot, without contradicting ourselves, deny its conclusion unless we also deny (one or more of) its premises. In this way, deductive arguments enable us to exercise critical control over our scientific debates.

Far from enabling us to exercise critical control, inductive arguments deprive us of it. Since their premises do not entail their conclusion, the falsity of their conclusions gives us no reason to even question, let alone deny, the truth of their premises.

Consider the situation. We assume the premises that we do because they seem to be obviously true. But their truth may suddenly seem doubtful if they are shown to entail statements that seem more obviously false. If a statement is a deductive consequence of premises, then it cannot be false without (one or more of) those premises being false. But this is not true of inductive arguments. And this is why they are useless for criticism.

The premises of an inductive argument seem obviously true - otherwise they wouldn't be assumed as premises. And the conclusion of an inductive argument is not entailed by them - otherwise it wouldn't be inductive. The argument itself says that its conclusion is true because its premises are true - or, at the very least, that you should believe that its conclusion is true because you believe that its premises are true. But the conclusion of an inductive argument does not *follow* from its premises.

So there is no reason at all for our confidence in the truth of those premises to change if we should think that the conclusion that is 'derived' from them is false.

It is not just that the falsity of the conclusion of an inductive argument does not force us to *deny* (one or more of) its premises. It is that the falsity of the conclusion gives us no reason to even *question* the truth of its premises. We believed the premises to be true before the 'conclusion' that we think is false was 'derived' from them. And there is nothing in the logical relationship between that conclusion and those premises to prevent the premises from being true and the conclusion false. So why should we now question whether the premises are true?

If this is true, then the problem with inductive arguments is not that they never justify their conclusions. It is that they never give us reason to question their premises. Since their conclusions do not follow from their premises, they never place us in a position in which we have to choose between accepting their conclusions and denying their premises. Here I want to emphasize that neither L_3 nor its answer have anything to do with justification. We are not, as in L_1 and L_2 , asking whether we can justify something on the strength of an assumption. And we are not, as in Popper's answer to L_2 , claiming that we can.

IV

Popper's solution to his reformulated logical problem of induction, L_1 , was the same as Hume's: no number of true test statements would justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true.⁹ But his answer to its 'generalization', L_2 , was 'Yes, the assumption of the truth of test statements sometimes allows us to justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false.'¹⁰

I have already cited two ways in which this obscures the problem. *Modus Tollens* is a deductive argument form that proceeds in the deductive direction. And if we need to assume premises in order to justify conclusions, then we might as well assume the conclusions themselves. There is, however, a third way in which L_2 , and Popper's answer to it, obscures the problem. To say that we can justify the claim that an explanatory universal theory is false is to say that we can falsify or refute our theories. Popper has always denied that conclusive falsification is possible.¹¹ But by likening criticism to refutation, he nonetheless suggests that conclusive falsification is possible, and that the difference between inductive and deductive arguments is that deductive arguments can, but inductive arguments cannot, justify their conclusions.

If I am right, then the problem of induction, as I have formulated it in L_3 , pertains entirely to the *criticism* of our assumptions. But in order to explain this properly, I need to explain how criticism differs from refutation.

Most people regard refutation as proof that a theory is false. In this sense, 'refutation' is synonymous with 'falsification'. It is what we would do were it possible to justify the claim that an explanatory theory is false. Popper has characterized the method of science both as conjecture and refutation, and as the criticism of our tentative solutions to problems. In so doing, he has identified refutation with criticism, and has described the scientific attitude as the critical attitude. But he has always qualified this by denying that anything like conclusive refutations or disproofs are possible. And it is this, I think, that has always confused people.

If justification is impossible, then criticism is not the refutation of theories. It is the setting of problems for them. We set problems for a theory by showing that it contradicts other statements that we believe to be true. Since contradictory

statements cannot both be true, we can force ourselves, in this way, to choose between our theories and our other beliefs. If our criticism is effective, then we may, at the minimum, have to refine our theory in some way so as to remove the contradiction. But the criticism itself never proves that our theories are false. And if this is what is meant by 'refutation', then it never refutes them. The problems that we set may sometimes seem overwhelming, and they may even lead us to think that our theories have been shown to be false. But if they do, then we should remember that we are fallible human beings, and that our fallibility means that what seems overwhelming at one moment may seem easy to deal with the next. We may, for example, learn something new that makes what once seemed obviously true seem obviously false.

V

But what is the relationship between Popper's solution to the problem of induction and his solution to the problem of demarcation?

Popper solved the problem of induction seven years after he formulated and solved the problem of demarcation. Only then did he notice a relationship between the two. According to Popper, many philosophers believe that inductive arguments can justify their conclusions because they believe that induction is the method of science. In this way, a mistaken belief about the method of science - and hence about the demarcation between science and nonscience - provides psychological support for a mistaken belief about induction. 'Inductive inferences must somehow be valid, because science is impossible without them'. And in this way, Popper hoped to undermine belief in induction by showing that science does not require it after all.

I have no doubt that many philosophers believe in induction because they believe that science is impossible without it. But this is not the best way to explain the relationship between Popper's solution to the problem of demarcation and his solution to the problem of induction.

Falsifiability is the advice that we should be aware of our fallibility and critical of our theories. But we move from an awareness of our fallibility to criticism of our theories only if we are looking for truth.

This is where logic, or the science of truth,¹² enters the picture. *But logical arguments can assist us in criticising our theories only if those arguments are valid.*

Why is this?

Because the point of criticism is to force someone to question his assumptions, and because an argument can force someone to question his assumptions only if it is deductively valid - and even then only if he recognizes its validity, and only if he is looking for truth.

Compare, for example, the valid *Modus Tollens*:

$$\begin{array}{l} P \rightarrow Q \\ \sim Q \\ \therefore \sim P \end{array}$$

with the invalid *Affirmation of the Consequent*:

$$\begin{array}{l} P \rightarrow Q \\ Q \\ \therefore P \end{array}$$

Each of these arguments has a corresponding conditional, namely:

$$[(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q] \rightarrow \sim P$$

and

$$[(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q] \rightarrow P$$

respectively. It is well known that an argument is valid if and-only-if its corresponding conditional is a tautology. But $(P \rightarrow Q)$ is equivalent to $(\sim P \vee Q)$. So each of the above corresponding conditionals has an equivalent 'corresponding disjunction', namely:

$$\sim[(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q] \vee \sim P$$

and

$$\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q] \vee P.$$

By putting things in this way, we clarify the fact that an argument presents us with a *choice* instead of a justification. An argument asks us to choose between asserting its conclusion and denying (the conjunction of) its premises. The argument cannot make the choice for us. It is up to us to decide.

But the disjunctions that correspond to the valid *Modus Tollens* are tautologies, whereas the disjunctions that correspond to the invalid *Affirmation of the Consequent* are not. And this is crucial. For it means that we are free to deny both of the alternatives offered by the *Affirmation of the Consequent* - but that we are not free to deny both of the alternatives offered by the *Modus Tollens*.

What 'free to deny' means here is free to deny without contradicting ourselves. If we do not care about whether or not we contradict ourselves, then we are free to assert and deny anything we please.

Suppose that I want to deny the 'conclusion' of the *Modus Tollens* and assert that $\sim P$ is false. I will find, simply by looking at the truth table below, that in each of the cases in which $\sim P$ is false, the statement $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q]$ is true.

This means that I cannot assert that $\sim P$ is false without implying that $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q]$ is true.

Suppose, on the other hand, that I want to assert that $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q]$ is false. I will find, again by looking at the truth table below, that in the only case in which $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q]$ is false $\sim P$ is true.

P	Q	$\sim[(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q]$	$\sim P$
T	T	T	F
T	F	T	F

F	T	T	T
F	F	F	T

This means that there is a logical relationship between the alternatives that the *Modus Tollens* offers. We are free to assert both statements. But we are not free to deny both statements. For if we deny either of them, we imply that the other is true.

Things are different with the *Affirmation of the Consequent*.

Suppose that I want to assert that its 'conclusion' P is false.

-- $[(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q] \vee P$ is not a tautology. I find, simply by looking at the truth table below, that there is a case in which P is false and $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q]$ is true, and a case in which both statements are false.

Suppose, on the other hand, that I want to assert that $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q]$ is false. I can find, again by looking at the truth table below, that there is a case in which $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q]$ is false and P is true, and a case in which $\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& Q]$ is true and P is false.

P	Q	$\sim [(P \rightarrow Q) \& \sim Q]$	P
T	T	F	T
T	F	T	T
F	T	F	F
F	F	T	F

This means that, contrary to what we saw with the *Modus Tollens*, we are free to assert *and* deny both of the alternatives offered by the *Affirmation of the Consequent*.

What does it all mean?

It means that the *Affirmation of the Consequent* is as useless for criticism as it is for proof.

But if inductive arguments don't justify their conclusions and don't give us critical control, then what do they do? They give us the appearance of justification, and the appearance of critical control. They *induce* us to believe by giving us the appearance that our guesses are somehow better than guesses and that they are somehow sanctioned by logic - even though we know that the 'proofs' that sanction them do not entail their truth.

This, I suggest, is the real problem with inductive arguments, and the real connection between the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation.

VI

Here it is easy to see why the problem of induction has nothing whatsoever to do with a 'principle of induction'. Some people think that inductive inferences would be all right if we could only rely on a 'principle of causality' or on a 'principle of the uniformity of nature'. But the problem of induction is a problem regarding *inference*. It is not about what our premises are, or how we get them, or even whether or not they are true. It is about how they are related to our conclusions. The great difference between deductive and inductive inferences is that the conclusions of inductive inferences *may be false even if all of their premises are true*. This is why

Popper said that they are useless for justification. And it is why I say that they are useless for criticism.

I do not deny that things would be different if we could rely upon a principle of induction. But this is not because inductive inferences would then be valid. It is because our inferences would then not be inductive. They would, in that case, be deductive after all.

VII

Popper regarded a theory as scientific if it stands in contradiction to a singular statement that describes a state of affairs that is possible to observe. He called such theories 'falsifiable' because we cannot say that the singular statements that contradict them are true without implying that the theories themselves are false. Popper thought that falsifiability was best understood through the logic of *Modus Tollens*. But he repeatedly denied that it is possible to conclusively falsify a theory.

There are, however, widespread confusions regarding this¹³ and other aspects of falsifiability.¹⁴ And I believe that many of these confusions are due to the fact that most people believe that the purpose of a logical argument is to justify, or prove, its conclusion.

If the purpose of an argument is to prove its conclusion, then it is difficult to see the point of falsifiability. For deductive arguments cannot prove their conclusions any more than inductive ones can.

But if the purpose of the argument is to force us to choose, then the point of falsifiability becomes clear.

Deductive arguments force us to question, and to reexamine, and, ultimately, to deny their premises if we want to deny their conclusions. Inductive arguments simply do not.

This is the real meaning of Popper's *Logic of Discovery* - and it is the reason, perhaps, why so many readers have misunderstood its title and its intent. The logic of discovery is not the logic of discovering theories, and it is not the logic of discovering that they are true.

Neither deduction nor induction can serve as a logic for that.

The logic of discovery is the logic of discovering our errors.¹⁵ We simply cannot deny the conclusion of a deductive argument without discovering that we were in error about its premises. *Modus Tollens* can help us to do this if we use it to set problems for our theories. But while inductive arguments may persuade or induce us to believe things, they cannot help us to discover that we are in error about their premises.

VIII

Earlier I qualified my criticism that Popper's use of terms like 'justification' and 'refutation' tend to obscure his solutions to the problems of demarcation and induction. 'If this is what it

means to justify a conclusion' and 'If this is what is meant by 'refutation'.

But what else could be meant by 'justification' and 'refutation'?

I do not agree with the inductivists that we can justify our beliefs in the sense of showing that they are supported or confirmed by the evidence. But I do think that these words have senses that, while perhaps not as common as 'to show or prove to be true' and 'to show or prove to be false', are fully consistent with the way in which Popper uses them and with the way in which I have tried to explain his positions here. There are senses of 'refutation', for example, in which someone refutes a statement not by proving that it is false, but by contradicting it, or simply by denying that it is true. And there are senses of 'justification' in which someone justifies a statement not by proving that it is true, but by showing that it is a logical consequence of other things that he asserts.

Indeed, there is a sense in which to prove a statement is simply to test whether or not it is true.¹⁶

I say this, because I do not want to be misunderstood as saying that Popper's use of these terms was mistaken or wrong. I am saying only that it is easily misunderstood, and that it was in fact misunderstood in a way that obscured his solutions to the problems of induction and demarcation.

Modus tollens is another matter. Popper knew that *modus tollens* proceeded in the deductive direction. But he thought that it was better, for 'strategic reasons', to present things as he did. He thought, no doubt, that he might have a better chance of convincing inductivists and verificationists if he met them halfway.

It is difficult to know how Popper's views would have been received had he presented them in the way in which I have presented them here. It is very possible that many will regard what my attempt to clarify Popper's views as obscuring them further. But the fact that so many philosophers have misunderstood Popper views on induction and demarcation has convinced me it is worth the attempt to put strategy aside and to try to explain his views as I have.

IX

I have also said that the failure to distinguish between the conclusion of an argument and our belief in that conclusion is responsible for the widespread belief that inductive arguments justify their conclusions. I would now like to explain what I mean.

Most philosophers still believe that scientific knowledge is justified true belief, and that a belief is rational to the extent to which it has been justified as true. For this reason, most of the methodological debates in the philosophy of science ultimately concern the justification of belief and the nature of truth. But here, a good deal of confusion is generated by the fact that 'belief may refer either to our act of believing a statement or to the statement that we actually believe. There is nothing wrong with either of these meanings.

But conflating them is largely responsible for the belief that inductive arguments can justify their conclusions.

The ambiguity of 'belief has, in fact, led many philosophers to conflate two very different justified true belief theories of knowledge. The one, which I call 'objective', concerns itself with the justification of the statements, or objects, that we believe. The other, which I call 'subjective', concerns itself with the justification of the people, or subjects, who believe them.

How does this pertain to induction?

Most philosophers agree that a finite number of singular statements does not entail that a universal statement is true. But they also believe that they, themselves, would be justified by such 'evidence' in believing it. Since they fail to distinguish the conclusion of an argument from their belief in it, they tend to believe that the universal statement that they believe must somehow be justified by this 'evidence' too.

We cannot, so long as we present the problem of induction as a problem about justification (or proof, or certainty), as opposed to a problem about validity (or entailment, or implication), help but to encourage such misunderstandings.

X

But do Popper's solutions to the problems of induction and demarcation still have relevance today? I believe that they do, and that they are, in fact, more important today than ever. This is the reason why I have tried to clarify these problems and the ways in which Popper's views on induction and demarcation relate to each other. Simply put, I believe that contemporary philosophy has, by misunderstanding Popper's contribution ignored a possible solution to one of its most pressing problems. I also believe that the solution that it has adopted will, despite good intentions, end up by turning philosophy and science, once again, into an authoritarian and oppressive affair. But in order to explain all of this, I will need to return to the problem of rationality, and to put things in a broader context.

The fundamental epistemological fact of the twentieth century was the collapse of 'bedrock' foundationalism. The fundamental epistemological problem of the twentieth century has been how best to respond to it. Some philosophers have concluded that scientific knowledge is unjustified and hence irrational after all. But the most popular response, by far, has been to retain the idea that scientific knowledge is justified, but weaken either the idea that truth is correspondence to the facts or the idea that justification shows that a statement is true - and pretend that nothing else has changed. Each of these responses retains the foundationalist theory of rationality, according to which it is irrational to accept a belief that has not been justified. But I call the latter 'Floating Foundationalism', since it retains the foundationalist's belief that scientific knowledge is justified and his belief that this is what makes it rational, while leaving the 'justification' itself irrationally floating in midair.

Floating Foundationalism is a widespread phenomenon. It can be seen in Wittgenstein's idea that science is grounded in a form of life, in Carnap's idea that it is grounded in the external questions of a linguistic framework, in Kuhn's idea that it is grounded in the acceptance of a scientific paradigm, and in Rorty's idea that it is grounded in the solidarity of a community.

Each of these is a return to Hume's idea that our knowledge of matters of fact is ultimately grounded upon custom and habit. But the fundamental idea in each of these theories, and in many others as well, is that our knowledge nonetheless *is grounded*, and that it must be so if we are to regard it as rational.

In my view, Floating Foundationalism, in each of its forms, is but a pretence of rationalism. It pretends to 'justify' our knowledge with statements that are not themselves justified - so that our 'rational' knowledge, and the idea that it is justified, must ultimately be accepted on the basis of authority.¹⁷

But rationalism is the idea that we ought not regard our beliefs as rational if we can 'justify' them only by appealing to authority.

All of this would be sad enough. But the real problem with Floating Foundationalism is that it postulates a point beyond which rational discussion is no longer possible. We may allow our 'foundations' to float, but we must not subject them to criticism. In this way, Floating Foundationalism encourages us to relinquish critical control over our theories and beliefs - at least at the foundational level - and to accept our most basic philosophical beliefs, and the beliefs upon which everything else is supposedly based, without really thinking about them.

Is Popper's critical rationalism really any better?

I think that it is - if only because it does not pretend to do something it can not. Popper's suggestion was to acknowledge that justification is impossible and to focus upon criticism instead. If we think of criticism as conclusive disproof, as many philosophers have, then it will seem to be just the other side of the justificationist's coin. But if we regard it as I have tried to present it here, then we can recognize it as clarifying the alternatives between which we must choose.

Popper, like the Floating Foundationalists, says that science is rational. But unlike the Floating Foundationalists, he says that it has no rational authority. Like the irrationalists, Popper says that scientific knowledge cannot be justified. But unlike the irrationalists, he says that our choice between competing views can be influenced by logical arguments.

Like both the Floating Foundationalists and the irrationalists, Popper believed that we must, in science, ultimately make some sort of unjustified decision. And some have called him an 'irrational rationalist' for this fact. But unlike the Floating Foundationalists and the real irrationalists, Popper believed that we could always argue about our decisions; and that we could do so with deductive arguments; and that while these deductive arguments could not prove anything, they could present us with problems, and force us to choose between accepting their conclusions and denying their premises; and that we could use them, in this way, to exert some sort of critical control over our decisions and over science itself.

What we are left with is a consistent account of the rationality of science that involves neither its justification nor its rational authority.

This is the great significance that Popper's philosophy has for our time. It is that there are no authorities to whom we can look to for the truth. It is that we are, as fallible human beings, inherently subject to error; and, as rational human beings, each responsible for our own beliefs and for our own decisions. It is that we can, if we think they are bad, struggle against our customs and habits, against our forms of life, our linguistic frameworks, paradigms, communal solidarities, and the like. And it is that we can struggle against them, and also against the ruling scientific theories of our day, without having to feel that we are irrational for doing so. It is that we can, if we think it is best, continue to examine life in the way that Socrates thought made life worth living. And it is that our rationality and our responsibility for our own beliefs and for our own lives is something that we may each decide for ourselves to relinquish, but that no one else has the authority or power to take away from us.

All of this, and more, is contained in Popper's theory of rationality. It is, at a time when so many others are advising us to join up with the pack and to howl with the wolves, one of the very few philosophies that is still worthy of the name.

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NOTES

1. Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, p. 2.

2. Kant also made this mistake. He asked 'How is *a priori* synthetic knowledge possible?' instead of 'Is *a priori* synthetic knowledge possible?'

3. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p. 7.

4. Of course, 'justifying the conclusion' may mean something else. But we ultimately want to judge whether or not the statement that we are arguing about is true. And arguments alone cannot tell us this.

5. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p. 7.

6. Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (translation of *Logik der Forschung*, Vienna: Julius Springer, 1934) London: Hutchinson, 1959. Reprinted by Routledge, 1992, p. 41.

7. Popper told me, after I pointed this out (see my *Objectivity, Rationality, and the Third Realm*, p. 121, fn 25), I was be right about the logic, but that it was better strategically to characterize the *modus tollens* as proceeding in the inductive direction. Popper, of course, regards basic statements as singular existential generalizations.

8. This question nor its answer have anything whatsoever to do with justification. We are not, as in L_1 and L_2 , asking whether we can justify something on the strength of an assumption. And we are not, as in Popper's answer to L_2 , claiming that we can.

9. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p. 7.

10. Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, p. 7.

11. In his *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, for example, Popper writes:

A system such as classical mechanics may be 'scientific' to any degree you like, but those who uphold it dogmatically-believing, perhaps, that it is their business to defend such a successful system against criticism as long as it is not *conclusively disproved*-are adopting the very reverse of that critical attitude which in my view is the proper one for the scientist. In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable or that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of our understanding. If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are. (Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, p. 50.)

12. The term 'science of truth' comes from Frege. See his important paper 'The Thought: A Logical Inquiry'.

13 Thomas Kuhn, for example, expressed what many philosophers had in mind when he pointedly asked 'What is falsification if it is not conclusive disproof?' (Thomas Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?', in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 15.)

14. Many philosophers today understand that Popper did not intend falsifiability as a criterion of meaning, and that he was very critical of the positivists' idea that nonscientific statements are meaningless. And many of these no longer regard the fact that the falsifiability criterion is not itself falsifiable as a problem. There is, nonetheless, still a widespread belief that falsifiability means that *each and every* statement in a theory must be *individually* falsifiable in order for it to be scientific. This confusion is a holdover from the mistaken belief that falsifiability is a criterion of meaning. For Popper, it is a theory as a whole that is falsifiable. And the theory, as a whole, is falsifiable if, taken as a whole, it entails at least one observation statement that contradicts it.

15. That Popper had this in mind is clear from his motto, in which he quotes Lord Acton:

There is nothing more necessary to the man of science than its history, and the logic of discovery...: the way error is detected, the use of hypotheses, of imagination, the mode of testing. (Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, p. 14.)

16. There is a tradition that the verb 'to prove' originally - in the XIIth century - meant to try or to test. I do not object to the idea that a function of logic is to prove the truth of statements, so long as 'to prove' is understood in this original XIIth century sense. But this sense of the term was apparently short-lived, for already by the XIIIth century 'to prove' was being used in the sense of 'to demonstrate' or 'to show good', which is, apparently, the original sense of the term 'proof'. And I submit that today the sense of 'to prove' as to test or to try is all but forgotten. Today, when we say that something has been proved, we mean not that it has been tested, but that it has been shown to be true. And today, when we ask for a proof, we are asking for a demonstration that the item in question is true.

17. Bedrock Foundationalism was also an authoritarian epistemology. But the authorities that it appealed to - be it the authority of reason, or of the senses, or the Pope - were at least thought to guarantee the truth of our beliefs. What is distinctive about Floating Foundationalism is that it appeals to the authorities that it regards as fallible, but as authoritative nonetheless.

A PROPAEDEUTICS TO A NEW RATIONALISM IN LUCIAN BLAGA'S
PHILOSOPHY

Alexandru Petrescu

In his philosophy, L. Blaga has granted an exquisite importance to the exquisite of exceeding the overbid of the identity's principle, in the advantage of admission the propelling role of contradictions, thinking that outre time's requirements lied towards a reassessment of ration's resources, to a resignification of rationality towards a meaning which wouldn't exile the experience of scission and self negation of the logos. As Theodor Dima said: " The actual epistemology, without being accused of irrationalism has put in evidence too the fact that the union between rationality and noncontradiction is not as tight as the logic gives it's opinion", "The knowledge does not constitute and can't constitute a consistent whole in his totality." This new way of thinking, produced through the expansion of ration's resources and through the delimitation of the differences, is more and more put in evidence today at the cognition's theorists, but the romanian philosopher has been trying such a direction of thinking as early as 1924, at the same time with the paper *Style philosophy* in which L. Blaga has been analysing the symbolic structures, in their quality of elements which put in evidence antinomies of the existence which require "a logic of interpretation".

Lucian Blaga understands through ration, "the mind with his functional laws restored entirely to his one's own autonomy". "The mind with all his functional laws could sometimes be entirely subservient to some knowledge which organize themselves in accordance with other criteriae than the pure logic ones. In this condition, the mind has somehow a reduced role and his way is dictated for diverse nonces which don't belong to his nature. But when the mind takes back it's freedom no longer of slavery but to has autonomy, it can be called ration".² The ration, Blaga says, manifests a steady tendency to einger its structure to all cognitive contents, but as existance in its ultimate nature is not rationality this tendency of the ration remains a subjective assumption of knowledge, under whoes sign the "luciferic vanity" sits in. This, of course, in the conditions in with the Great Anonimus, The Absolute, definitely transcends any possibility of including through ration. As we know, for Blaga, man exists in mystery's offering and with a view to revealing it. At the same time, the mystery's offering constitutes a structure lasting and actively present in being's and human's conscionsnesse's constitution,

so as a condition of possibility, and as a perspective of existence roughly speaking. Under these circumstances, one mystery's revelation, when it takes place, is simultaneously a censored revelation, what makes impossible the mystery's transposition in non-mystery.

The rationality does not render an ontological structure of the existential mysteries; it is a structure lingered in individual cognition in the transcendental censorship's order. In this comprehension of rationality there is the presentation of the rationalization modalities from the *Experiment and Mathematical Spirit*, presentation through which the philosopher wants to show that although the identity postulate. It is about: the rationalization on the attenuated identity's line, the rationalization on mathematical equality's line (which belongs to a "constructive logic", where the spirit can afford to operate, in an alternative way, with numerical concepts) and the rationalization on contradictory identity line (the rationality adjustment to empiry's joint, liable becoming; the dialectic mood). Though these "moods of rationalization", man tries to assimilate to his consciousness the environing world, a world which requires in its structure the antinomic, too.

The view over antinomic thinking has been inaugurated by Blaga at the same time with the volume *The Dogmatic Aeon* (1931), where the philosopher promotes a theory of "environing intellectualism", "which knows that it can't escape from the fairy circle of the irrational", a new type of rationalism being brought to discussion, which he wants to be up to find all conclusions implied by "the emergence from itself of the rational". In this volume, the dogma is considered not by the content's aspect (which is one put by holy grace's sign in theology) but only as intellectual formula which postulates a transcendence over the logical. Formulating itself on a plan of intellectuality, it can be parted in abstract, like any metaphysical formula, and treated strictly intellectual point of view. The dogmatic belongs to reason-Blaga affirms-being one it's tries to find a formula for the irrational. When the material given by experience can not be completely assimilated by logical structures of the intellect, the intellect is forced to escape from itself (the ecstasy of the intellect). It's about these phenomena belonging to the world of experience, to which the antinomy is characteristic, namely the features which exclude reciprocal, although they coexist. The example of light as wave and as corpuscle is clear on this line. The dogma will be treated later in *Luciferic Knowledge* as a species of the luciferic knowledge in shape of "dogmatic antinomy". In the dogmatic antinomy-as intellectual formula-everything happens as if the notions would have another role beside their logical function, that of articulating a transcendent "something". With this signification, the philosopher speaks about an antinomy's transfiguration which assumes the scission of some united concepts, accompanied by the postulation of a solution in the transcendent. The antinomy transfigured is a "formula of minus-cognition", a knowledge required by the existence of some mysteries of a superior potency, a knowledge which "radicalizes the mystery". This radicalized mystery by minus-cognition belongs to the widest order of the nature. Although illogical with itself, once fixed in a formula it obeys, under rapport of possibilities to operate with it to all logical rules. As transcendence to its logical functions, the intellect, in its ecstasy, refers to something transcendent. At the same time it is considered here an actional meaning (sense) of the transcendent: it is a radical overfulfillment. What the transcendence has is the experience of the intellect, or the transcend as a distinct fact.

The object as a matter, as an "open mystery", an antinomy, requires a new logic of understanding, one who develops from description to constructive interpretation, which evolves in deepness, which solicitates a critic phenomenology of the object of knowledge, considered by the entire volume *Luciferic Knowledge*. The sphere of this knowledge will be circumscribed by the idea of mystery, on which the philosopher insists in *Transcendental Censorship*, a work where the entire knowledge appears as being marked in its essence by the supreme antinomy coming from the coexistence and competition of occultation and revealing. The individuated knowledge it is, in its nature, transcendentally censored by the Great Anonymus, which means it is not possible a positive cognitive inclusion of the Absolute, which cannot be bounded or conditioned by rationality. They reveal the existential mystery is always a censored one (For Blaga, "revelation" means "any positive showing of a mystery", a dissimilatorial revelation). Except these one, we have the "negative knowledge", through which we cannot but accept the mystery as mystery.

This relation, revealing-occultation, is emphasized especially in the case of accomplishment of theoretical structures. The condition of possibility for each cultural accomplishment is the categorial structure of the unconscious, which undergirded in its dynamic appears as a "stylistic field" which models and leads the spirit's attempts to reveal the mysteries through cultural creations. As they lied to the hidden intensity of the unconscious are called "abyssal" categories. Any scientific creation requires the unusual categories's collaboration with a determinant role, with these aware of the receptivity. The Kantian categories of the receptivity establishes the given world as "object of the knowledge", and the categories of stylistic field establish the world of creations as accomplishments. This is how Blaga comes to distinguish between the "knowledge of the objects" - which is reflection, and the "knowledge which orientates the action", which is construction, assumption of given object through constructive interpretation. The phenomena (natural, psycho-spiritual or historical ones) are susceptible of knowledge. But once identified these phenomena are useful to an intense knowledge, an explanatory one. This one is constructive. Any theoretical structure has the seal of a style (at it is accomplished one a determine stylistic field). Style, through its categories represents an essay of a leap in non-empiric, in to the mystery, but a bunch of brakes too. As the intelligence categories, the abyssal categories of the unconscious are constituent structures of an transcendent censorship. The Great Anonymus censors the human's possibility of creation, but only in the way of overruling the Absolute by creation. Along style, in any act that reveals the mystery, as well as in any scientific construction, the metaphor is present, whose role in science is to make accessible to the intuition hidden aspects of objects, through image-concepts. The metaphor is a "reality" polar-solidary with the stylistical pattern, being, itself, dependant of the human spirit's structural order. Concomitantly, the metaphor itself supposes paradoxical dialectics of revelation and occulting. In the so-called "revelatory metaphor", it is not only the analogy that intervenes, but the disanalogy, too. Therefore, in the act of putting in to metaphor, under the form of disanalogy, there is present the act of mystery's occultation and, through analogy, the act of its revelation. As Sergiu-Al George says, "in the antinomies from < The trilogy of knowledge > we are confronted, in fact, with these of the metaphoric."³

The application of "the cultural method" in the theory of knowledge, begun in his youth work *Culture and knowledge* (1922) and developed in *Horizont and style* and *The genesis of metaphor and the sense of culture*, where the philosopher had the fundamental intuition of cultural forms's unity, as his idea about the connection between the evolution of modern science and the changes in stylistic field, would find an application in his posthumous work *Experiment and mathematical spirit*, where the Romanian philosopher introduces the explaining concept of "overmethod", as patternicity which functions inside science just like the state of vitality inside an organism. The "overmethod" sends to a new methodological conscience, to a new strategy in knowledge, one that involves the transempirical and the organization of methods on the principle of mathematics. Through all these, we discover in Blaga not only a forerunner of some contemporary epistemological approaches, but also a thinker who has pronounced himself against methodological exclusivism and the optimism "without a reason" of old rationalism, which he has tried to replace with another kind of rationalism, one that supposes the mixture of scientific thinking and depth of mythical vision, and the engagement, therefore, of the intellect's ecstasy. In fact, this means admitting that the world supposes the irrational also, as difference that has to be assumed during an infinite rational process.

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2. Blaga, L., *Trilogia cunoasterii*, Editura Minerva, Bucuresti, 1983, p. 498.
3. Al-George Sergiu, "Structurile antinomice la Lucian Blaga si acceptia indiană a metaforicului", in *Arhaic si universal*, Editura Eminescu, Bucuresti, 1981, p.253.

LUCIAN BLAGA DANS SON DÉTACHEMENT D'IMMANUEL KANT

Alexandru Petrescu

Dans l'exégèse contemporaine concernant la philosophie de Lucian Blaga, on essaie, le plus souvent, de mettre en évidence les articulations décisives de l'oeuvre du philosophe roumain, presque exclusivement, par rapport à quelques programmes spécifiques à la philosophie occidentale, en s'agissant surtout de la philosophie kantienne et de la "Nouvelle philosophie de la science".

On essaie, plus précisément, de se "récupérer", de l'oeuvre de Blaga ce qu'on est conforme à quelques systèmes de pensée, reconnus dans la tradition philosophique occidentale. Tout ça est, bien sûr, méritoire, mais il ne faut pas oublier que, de cette manière, on peut négliger des points de vue comme: les éléments spécifiques de sa philosophie systématique, la manière originale dont Blaga s'est inséré dans les controverses de son temps, l'unité de ses compositions et, aussi, l'empreinte roumaine de sa pensée philosophique, exposée systématiquement.

En ce qui concerne la philosophie kantienne, Blaga en a senti toujours une provocation et a vécu constamment le besoin de la séparation du philosophe de Königsberg. Dans l'ouvrage *Science et création*, il écrivait: "On a parlé, parfois, d'une faute kantienne en ce qui nous concerne, c'est à dire, ce que nous nous nommons <<l'horizon du mystère>> ne serait que la région de la chose-en soi, dont, la philosophie de Kant nous entretient, aussi. Ce, n'est pas la première fois, quand nous nous sentons obligés d'insister sur les différences qui nous séparent de Kant".¹

Il y a, bien sûr, beaucoup d'éléments qui rapprochent le penseur roumain d'Immanuel Kant. Tout d'abord, Blaga ne refuse pas la philosophie transcendentale concernant les conditions de possibilité de la connaissance, donc, il ne refuse pas la fonction des formes de la sensibilité et des catégories de l'intellect présentées par Kant, mais il les double avec "un réseau catégoriel", dont, la présence fait plus intense la spontanéité de l'esprit humaine, qui fait être possible l'explication, la compréhension, la création. Mais, quand Blaga parle de la garniture des catégories de l'inconscient, il n'a pas en vue une déduction transcendentale préalable.

Ces deux penseurs ont en vue, aussi, un sens métaphysique de la connaissance. En ce qui concerne Kant, la philosophie transcendentale est imaginée comme une prémisse pour une nouvelle métaphysique; elle est, aussi, une interprétation de l'expérience humaine de l'être, où le sujet connaissant, la pensée, fonctionne comme un horizon préalable, comme une condition pour

l'explication de l'être, une condition pour le pouvoir du sujet de comprendre, en concept, l'illimité, sans le conditionner. Chez Blaga, l'entière oeuvre *Le censure transcendente*, débat le sens métaphysic de la connaissance. En outre il intégrera aux vues métaphisiques, sa théorie de culture et de style, et implicitement des constructions théoriques dans l'ouvrage *La genèse de la métaphore et le sens de la culture*. Nous rappelons que relatif à l'oeuvre de ces penseurs, on a exprimé l'accusation d'agnosticisme, ce que nous croyons qu'elle tient d'un préjugé. Il s'agit d'un agnosticisme méthodique, relatif à l'impossibilité de la connaissance en absolu. Chez Blaga, l'homme n'a pas la capacité de la connaissance positivement adéquate du Grand Anonyme, et pour Kant l'incognoscibilité de la chose-en soi dérive du fait d'être en soi-même, c'est à dire, de n'être pas compris cognitivement dans les formes de notre conscience. Mais, tous les deux affirment la possibilité et le progrès de la connaissance. Chez Blaga, en est révélé dans ces ouvrages du *La trilogie de la connaissance*. En ce qui concerne Kant, nous rappelons son affirmation de *Prolegomene*: "Nous disposons, donc, d'une connaissance large et tout à fait vérifiée, qui a déjà une extension digne de toute l'admiration et qui promet un élargissement illimité à l'avenir. C'est une connaissance qui se distingue par une certitude apodictique, c'est à dire par sa nécessité absolue, ce que signifie qu'elle ne s'appuie pas du tout sur l'expérience, étant, par conséquence, un produit pour de la raison, et, de plus, complètement synthétique".²

Mais ce qu'on sépare Blaga de Kant représente beaucoup plus que ce que l'approche. Comme, au cas des ressemblances, nous présentons seulement quelques éléments qui séparent le philosophe roumaine de celui allemand:

a) Le probleme des concepts cathégoriales et des jugements

En suivant Aristotele, Kant nomme les concepts pour de l'intellect, des cathégories. Répartis en quatre groupes, ces cathégories se reportent à la structure générale de l'esprit humain, en étant "des fonctions de synthèse de l'intellect, mais pas des connaissances"³ Elles ont non seulement apriorité, mais aussi nécessité et universalité, et leur valeur objective est donnée par le fait qu'elles sont des conditions de possibilité pour l'organisation de l'expérience-même, qu'elles sont des expressions de l'aperception transcendente, du principe unificateur original. Pour engendrer des connaissances, elles doivent être appliquées à un contenu, qui ne peut être provenu que de l'intellect et dont l'offre la sensibilité, pas ses intuitions. Entre concepts et intuitions, Kant introduit les schémas transcendants. Les concepts "envoient" à la spontanéité de l'intellect et les intuitions à la réceptivité de la sensibilité. Blaga se sépare du philosophe allemand quand il fait l'analyse des processus "de la connaissance luciferique". Tout d'abord, Blaga fait la distinction entre les cathégories de la conscience qu'il les appelle "de la réceptivité, et les cathégories de l'inconscient, nommé "les cathégories de la spontanéité". Les premières appartiennent à notre destin existentiel, et celles "abyssales", de l'inconscient, de notre destin créateur. Chez Kant, une théorie explique ce qu'on est donné; elle part d'intuitions vers concepts vers principes. Chez Blaga, les constructions théoriques sont des créations qui portent le sceau des cathégories de l'inconscient. Dans la connaissance peut être même en relation de cocontrariété avec l'élément intuitif du "fanique" (l'objet-ainsi comme il se montre). Puis, Blaga n'accepte aucun schématisme intermédiaire entre les concepts et les intuitions. Les cathégories de la conscience et celles de

l'inconscient sont, aussi, dans la philosophie de Blaga, des moyens d'une censure transcendante, elles sont des structures sensoriales. Le penseur roumain ne se prononce pas sur la subjectivité ou l'objectivité des catégories et il montre que l'analyse logique-épistémologique doit être complétée par une analyse métaphisique des concepts, comme des fonctions structurales de l'intelligence et en même temps, comme des structures sensoriales. Kant parlait aussi d'idées de la raison, des concepts de la raison pure qui visent le transcendant et qui fonctionnent comme principes avec une signification subjective, comme maximes et pas comme

principes constitutifs aux actes de connaissance. Elle prescrivent, en même temps, les limites de l'intellect. Chez Blaga, nous avons l'idée de mystère, qui n'est seulement un concept catégorial, mais cette idée circonscrit l'horizon d'une manière luciférique. Nous entrevoyons une fonction régulatrice de cette idée, même si Blaga n'a pas insisté sur ce point de vue.

Pour Kant, comme nous savons déjà, l'intellect est une faculté de la synthèse, l'intellect est celui qui fait la liaison entre diverses représentations, liaisons qui se réalisent par le jugement. En faisant des recherches sur les jugements, Kant arrive à une analyse de ceux mathématiques. En essayant de dépasser Descartes et Leibniz, qui voyaient dans les jugements mathématiques des applications particulières de la logique entre le sujet logique et le prédicat logique (S et P), ils étant représentés surtout, par les jugements mathématiques, à côté de l'aspect logique de la relation entre S et P, on tient compte aussi des contenus quantitatifs dont se rapportent les concepts numériques: "Nous croyons que les jugements mathématiques ne sont ni analytiques, ni synthétiques et qu'ils ne permettent pas une comparaison avec les jugements de signification purement logique."⁴

La pensée mathématique-dit Blaga- dépasse le logique en se constituant sur "le principe de l'égalité quantitative"; en fait, la logique intrinsèque des jugements mathématiques est une logique constructive.

Nous rappelons aussi, que pour Kant, les mathématiques représentent le critère-même de la science, pendant que pour Blaga, bien que les mathématiques aient une fonction importante dans la création "des couples méthodologiques" dirigés par "la surméthode", elles ne sont pas de seul critère de contrôle dans les systèmes théoriques scientifiques.

b) Les termes: "la vérité" et "l'expérience"

Lucian Blaga dit que "la vérité" présentée par la philosophie de la science de type kantienne est "la vérité naturelle", appréciée après des critères qui consistent dans l'application des catégories cognitives sur un matériel sensible. Excepté ce type de vérité on peut encore parler de tel-dit "vérité créée, celui de la connaissance luciférique, en fait un "équivalent de la vérité", car par ce type de connaissance, la vérité reste un postulat et un désir. Les jugements d'appréciation varieront de même que la variation "de la matrice stylistique" des hommes. Bien sûr-dit Blaga- dans cette relativité de la connaissance on ne doit pas voir un inconvénient, mais le résultat et le réflexe d'une disposition métaphisique. Chez le philosophe allemand, le résultat de la liaison entre les concepts et les données de la sensibilité (par les schémas de l'imagination) c'est l'expérience dans le plan objectif. L'expérience représente, donc, l'intuition organisée et organisable. "L'expérience est une connaissance empirique, c'est à dire une connaissance qui détermine un objet par des perceptions. Elle est, donc, une synthèse des perceptions, qui contient l'unité synthétique de leur divers dans une conscience".⁵

Lucian Blaga adoptera cette acception "de l'expérience", mais dans les conditions de la présentation aux types de connaissance paradisiaque et luciferique, il parle aussi du "paradoxe de l'expérience". Si dans la connaissance paradisiaque, "l'expérience" est une somme des objets connus, dans celle luciferique, elle représente déterminer l'intuitif à l'aide des concepts, pendant que chez Blaga, dans la connaissance luciferique, cette rationalisation suppose de produire une dislocation catégoriale, de faire les objets, de changer leurs déterminations conceptuelles.

c) La distinction intellect-raison

Comme on sait déjà, à Kant, cette distinction est mise en rapport avec la division de la *Logique transcendente* (comme théorie de la connaissance) en "Analytique" et "Dialectique transcendente". "L'Analytique transcendente" étudie l'intellect, c'est à dire, le fonctionnement de la pensée dans les limites d'une expérience possible et la "Dialectique transcendente" étudie la raison, c'est à dire, le fonctionnement de la pensée au-delà de ces limites.

L. Blaga n'utilise pas cette distinction. Il comprend par la raison, "l'intellect avec ses lois fonctionnelles, manifestées dans une manière autonome". La raison-en ce sens-manifeste une tendance constante de transmettre sa structure à tous les contenus cognitifs. Pour Kant, "la raison théorique" devait justifier tout, "se charger, à nouveau, avec la responsabilité la plus difficile, celle de la connaissance en soi-même, et instituer un tribunal

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICIT PRESUPPOSITIONS
OF QUESTIONS

Yury Petrov

A question contains explicit as well as implicit presuppositions. The analysis of implicit presuppositions plays an essential role in cases when attempts to solve a problem on the basis of only explicit presuppositions brings about a crisis situation. Such analysis can also be heuristic means of setting and solving new problems.

A question is a form of thinking in which some kind of information is requested while some other kind of information is considered as known. This known information is included in the presuppositions of question and it should be true to have a true answer to the question. So, a correct question, i.e. a question that has a true answer, should have only true presuppositions.

In interrogative theory the greatest difficulty is in defining the notion of the presupposition of question most effectively so as to have an effective method of exposing such presuppositions in practice. Natural languages do not have any effective methods of identifying the presupposition of questions. Formal interrogative languages known to us do have an effective definition of the notion of the presupposition of question and an effective method of identification of presuppositions as formulas of some kind but these are not of the necessary practical significance.

The essence of the problem of exposing presuppositions consists in the fact that practically important is exposing not so much the explicit presuppositions but rather the implicit presuppositions of a question which are difficult to identify intuitively and are not practically described in formal languages. The explicit presupposition of a question are statements about the existence of things and their signs which are immediately stipulated by the information that the question contains and are designated by the basic terms of the question. For example, if the question "What is the length of the pivot?" is correct, it supposes as true the information expressed in its terms that there exists a pivot and that it has the property of length. These are the very assertions that form the presupposition and that are perceived immediately from the contents of the basic terms of the question and are therefore its explicit presuppositions.

However we cannot say that there is no other information in the question and hence no other presupposition in it. Other presuppositions do exist, but they

are not perceived immediately and that is why they are implicit. The implicit presuppositions of a question are the assertions which carry the information not perceived immediately from the contents of the question. So, the term "length" which is a basic term of the question "What is the length of the pivot?" carries much implicit information. This information can be exposed by the theoretical analysis of the contents of the term "length". But such an analysis is impossible without presenting length as a physical property which is given by physical theories. It is only naturally that various theories will give different results of the analysis of the contents of the notion "length", hence different theories will expose different implicit presuppositions of the question about the length of the pivot. If, for example, the analysis carried out on the basis of Newton mechanics will imply the assertion of the absolute length of the pivot, i.e. its identity in all frames of reference. There may also be exposed some other implicit presuppositions such as the presuppositions about the existence of certain systems of reference in measuring different lengths, or whether these systems are inertial or noninertial depending on the theory considering the contents of the notion "length" and other factors.

The importance of exposing implicit presuppositions lies in the fact that there are certain problems in science which cannot be solved without considering their implicit presuppositions, while due to exposing and explicating the implicit presuppositions, i.e. converting them into explicit presuppositions, we can approach the solution of such problems. The exposition of the implicit presuppositions of the initial question having no answer makes it possible to formulate it in a more precise and concrete way and this derivative question may have a true answer. That is why it is necessary to distinguish between the initial and the derivative questions, the former being the question without its implicit presuppositions exposed, the latter being the question formulated on the basis of the exposed and explicated implicit presupposition. It should be also mentioned that there can be several levels of exposition of implicit presuppositions of a question as the analysis of the contents of the basic terms of the initial question may lead to new questions having their own implicit presuppositions.

Therefore we shall call the initial question a question of the zero level of exposition of the implicit presupposition, i.e. when they are not yet exposed. For short it will be called simply the question of the zero level while derivative questions will be questions of higher level, the notion of which needn't be explained. For example, if the question "What is the length of the pivot?" is the question of the zero level, then the question "What is the length of the pivot in relativistic mechanics?" which is formed on the basis of the exposition of its implicit presupposition will be the question of the first level. Of course, the levels of the questions are relative and depend on what the initial question is.

Reduction of the question of one level to the question of another level is made on the basis of the analysis of the contents of the basic terms of the question, i.e. the analysis of their sense and meaning. In doing so we use some logical operations on notions, those of defining and dividing notions in particular. In our example the analysis of the contents of the notion "length" makes it necessary to divide the notion into two narrower notions: "length in Newton mechanics" and "length in relativistic mechanics". As a result we reduce the initial question "What is the length of the pivot?" to two derivative questions: "What is the length of the pivot in Newton mechanics?" and "What is the length of the pivot in relativistic

mechanics?", and if there is no definite answer to the initial question, there are such answers to the derivative questions.

In scientific practice the method of reducing the initial question to the derivative ones is quite usual and is widely used even if one does not always realize it. In most cases this method is applied to make a scientific paper methodologically correct.

However in this paper we concentrate on particular cases of using the reduction method as an instrument for settling crisis situations in solving some scientific problems. In this case the analysis of the implicit presuppositions and the reduction of some questions to their derivatives is significant not only from the methodological point of view, but is important theoretically as it may give new theoretical results. We shall illustrate this below by solving some theoretical problems.

1. The problem of commensurability of ordinary and extraordinary theories

This problem has been discussed for a long time, has quite contrary and often wrong solutions. The reason of this lies in the absence of the analysis of the implicit presupposition of the initial question about the commensurability, i.e. about the very possibility of comparing the theories.

The volume of the article does not allow us to consider this problem in detail not only for theories of different sciences, but even for physical theories alone. So we shall restrict ourselves to the concrete case of comparing Newton mechanics and relativistic mechanics (the special theory of relativity). For the limits of the article we cannot make the comparison of all the correlative laws of both the mechanics, but as an example we shall compare the mass laws and the velocity addition laws. Other laws can be compared in analogy.

The initial question of this problem was formulated originally in the following way: "Are Newton and relativistic mechanics commensurable?". The explicit presupposition of the question are trivial while the implicit presuppositions have never been analysed. This stipulated not only contrary answers to the question, but different kinds of positive answers, i.e. various of commensurability, which means that this question has no definite answer. One of such conceptions maintains that both the mechanics can be considered as commensurable because there exist relations of logical contradiction between them. For example, in Newton mechanics the statement $m' = m$ (the mass law) is true, where m stands for mass of a body in the inertial frame of reference with regard to which the body is at rest, and m' stands for the mass of this body in the inertial frame of reference with regard to which the body is in motion. In relativistic mechanics the statement $m' \neq m$ is true as the law of the relativistic mass is expressed by $m' = m/(1-v^2/c^2)^{1/2}$. But this conception of commensurability is wrong as the logical contradiction " p and $\text{non-}p$ " (where p stands for a statement and $\text{non-}p$ is a logical negation of p) is defined for only one certain theory while Newton and relativistic mechanics are different theories. So, the positive solution of the initial question about the commensurability of these theories without exposing its implicit presuppositions brings about a crisis situation in its resolving.

Another conception of commensurability saying about the commensurability of physical theories in general means the commensurability of

their "mathematical apparatus". The latter is understood as a set of statements (equations) of physical theories irrespective of their physical semantics and regards them only as equations with mathematical semantics, i.e. having interpretation only in the domain of real numbers. We may really say that the "mathematical apparatus" of both the mechanics are quite commensurable and correlate with each other as in the logical relation of a particular theory to a general theory, which is a common knowledge. If this conception formulated the question about the commensurability of the theories from viewpoint of their "mathematical apparatus", the question would be correct (would have a true answer). But such a question could appear only as a result of exposition of the implicit presuppositions of the initial question, but the given conception does not do this explicitly.

The answer "theories are commensurable" contrary to the answer "theories are commensurable in their mathematical apparatus" brings about a crisis situation because as the answer to the initial question it is justified to the same extent as unjustified, like the answer "the theories are incommensurable". This will become evident from the explication below.

One more conception of commensurability deals with the asymptotic correlation between Newton and relativistic mechanics. Strictly speaking this answer is not correct either for many reasons. First, the asymptotic approximation is conditioned here by the tending of the constant speed of light to eternity ($c \rightarrow \infty$) which is nonsense as a constant cannot tend to anything. Secondly, the answer to the initial question is substituted here by the answer to another question about the correlation of not the theories themselves but only the domains of their applicability, hence a crisis situation appears again. The fact is that the asymptotic approximation is the relation not between theories as sets of propositions, but a relation between adequacies of reflection of the objective mechanical motion of a certain type by each of the theories.²

This conception of commensurability is opposed to the conception of incommensurability, the latter stating the impossibility of any logical correlation between Newton and relativistic mechanics as theories that can be considered on the whole because these theories have different semantics. For example, the terms "length", "time period", "simultaneousness" and "mass" have different senses in both the theories. This is also a common knowledge. But in this case the problem of commensurability of theories is substituted by the problem of adequacies in reflecting the objective reality by both the theory, that is by the problem of commensurability of these theories by their epistemological foundation, not the theories as they are. A question not to the point reveals a crisis situation too.

So, a general crisis situation is to arise at the attempt to answer the question formulated as "Are Newton and relativistic mechanics commensurable?". The analysis of the crisis situation mentioned above shows that it is necessary to reduce the initial incorrect question to correct derivative questions and this may be done by the method of exposition of implicit presuppositions. This follows from the fact that in justifying a certain answer to the initial question no attempts have ever been made to expose the implicit presupposition and to formulate on this basis correct questions about the commensurability of the theories in such a way as to take into account only certain aspects in comparing the theories. This was not done even in the reports dealing with the problem of commensurability of theories

at the VIII International Congress in logic, methodology and philosophy in August 1987.¹

Therefore we shall show briefly how an incorrect question on commensurability of Newton and relativistic mechanics can be reduced to correct question on their commensurability by certain aspects. It follows from the very problem that the key-word of the initial question is the word "commensurability". It also follows from the results of unsuccessful attempts to solve this problem that the implicit presupposition of the initial question is the statement that both the theories have certain aspects by which they can be compared. Taking this into consideration one can really give a true unambiguous answer to the question about the commensurability of the theories by some aspect. For this purpose one must expose the implicit presuppositions about the commensurability of the theories by some definite aspect, and to do so it is necessary to expose all possible aspects inherent to the theories and by which they can be compared.

The most general aspects for all informal (semantic) theories having epistemological interpretations i.e. reflecting the objective reality, are the semiotic (syntactic as well as semantic) and epistemological aspects. With regards to Newton and relativistic mechanics the semantic aspect can be divided into mathematical and physical parts for which either mathematical or physical interpretations are essential. Then the initial question about the commensurability of Newton and relativistic mechanics can be reduced to the derivative questions about their commensurability by the considered above aspects. As the result we shall have the following questions:

I.1. Are the theories commensurable by their syntactical aspects?

I.2a. Are the theories commensurable by their semantic mathematical aspects?

I.2b. Are the theories commensurable by their semantic physical aspects?

II. Are the theories commensurable by their epistemological aspects?

If all these questions are correct that is if they have true unambiguous answers (positive or negative), then the questions on commensurability of the theories by their aspects is also correct because for each aspect of the comparison there will be a true answer. We shall show that it is really so, but it should be taken into consideration that the comparison of theories by their semiotic foundation suppose a logical relation between them which is possible only if they both have the same epistemological presupposition (simplifications, idealizations, etc.). Then the answer (we shall denote them by the letter "A") to these questions will be as follows:

AI.1. The syntaxes, i.e. sets of formal sentences, of both the theories compared are commensurable as they both have the same empty sets of epistemological presuppositions. So the theories are in the logical relation of syntactical incompatibility. This means that the union of sets of formal sentences of the theories leads to logical contradiction though one of the theories themselves are not contradictory. And although one of the theories contains a sentence while the other contains its negation, they do not form any logical contradiction. In this case there exists only a syntactical incompatibility between them.

AI.2a. Sets of propositions (equations) in both the theories considered with the precision to their mathematical semantics are commensurable as the theories have in this case the same epistemological presuppositions inherent to the real numbers theory in the domain of which the equations of both the mechanics are interpreted. Then the question of Newton mechanics have a logical relation to the

equations of relativistic mechanics as particular to the general because the former form the latter by means of the operation of generalization. Such operation can be made on all equations, and the following example illustrates how it can be made. The equation of Newton mechanics $m' = m$, where m and m' are variables for real numbers, are transformed by means of the operation of generalization into the equation of relativistic mechanics $m' = m/(1-v^2/c^2)^{1/2}$, where v is a variable for real number and c is the number 300000. To make such a generalization it is necessary to make identical transformations $m' = m = m/(1-0)^{1/2}$. Then the number 0 is substituted by the variable v^2/c^2 as the number 0 is a particular case of this variable. The resultant is the corresponding equation of the relativistic mechanics. Other laws of Newton mechanics can be transformed into corresponding laws of relativistic mechanics by analogical generalization.

AI.2b. Physical laws of both the mechanics (i.e. equations having the corresponding physical semantics) are incommensurable as they have no logical correlation for they are based on different epistemological presuppositions and are therefore incomparable.

AI. The degree of adequacy of reflection of the dynamic mechanical motion (i.e. the motion of the body caused by physical interactions) by the laws of Newton mechanics approximate asymptotically to the degree of adequacy of such reflection by the laws of relativistic mechanics as the motion velocity tends to 0 . But this does not mean any asymptotical approximation of the laws of both the mechanics as such, and there cannot be any operations made on the laws themselves like those made on sentences. Neither there can be any limit transition of one law into the other. There can be only the comparison of the results of calculations done in accordance with this or that law. In this case the theories do not have any logical relation, but they do have an epistemological relation of asymptotical approximation of the precisions in reflecting the dynamic motion by both the mechanics as its velocity approaches 0 . Let us illustrate this by an example.

Let us take the velocity addition law in Newton mechanics (**LN**) expressed by $v = v^1 + v^2$ and the velocity addition law in relativistic mechanics (**LR**) expressed by $v = (v^1 + v^2) / 1 - v_1 v_2 / c^2$. If $v_1 = v_2 = c$, then we get $v = 2c$ by **LN** and $v = c$ by **LR**, which is easy to calculate. So the difference in velocity v calculated in accordance with this or that law will be great and will equal c . Now let us assume that $v_1 = v_2 = 0,5c$. Then in accordance with **LN** we get $v = c$, and in accordance with **LR** we get $v < c$. But if $v_1 = v_2 = 0$, then in both cases we get $v = 0$, i.e. any difference in calculations disappears. As for the magnitudes of velocities intermediate between c and 0 , the difference in calculations by **LN** and **LR** will tend to 0 , as the magnitude of v tends to 0 and the results of these calculations in accordance with both the laws will approximate asymptotically. The laws themselves will not be affected though. Quite a contrary thing can be observed if we compare **LN** and **LR** in their mathematical apparatus. In this case we really have a transformation of **LN** into **LR** by means of the generalization process. This happens after the identity transformation $v = v_1 + v_2 = (v_1 + v_2) / 1 - 0$ followed by the generalization operation when 0 is substituted by $v_1 v_2 / c^2$.

The existence of certain (positive or negative) true answers to questions I.1 - II proves the correctness of these questions about the commensurability of Newton and relativistic mechanics in their syntactic, semantic mathematical,

semantic physical and epistemic aspects. This shows the importance of the analysis of the implicit presuppositions so as to reduce incorrect initial question to correct derivative questions which enables us to formulate and solve the problem of comensurability correctly.

One may ask: why for years try to answer incorrect questions? Why not reduce them to correct questions from the very beginning? Theoretically it is quite possible. Therefore the method of reducing questions with implicit presuppositions to questions in which these presuppositions become explicit can serve as a heuristic method. This method is applicable to any questions, not only the incorrect ones. But in practice we do not use it if there arise no difficulties (crisis situations) in answering them. So, in everyday life the problem about the length of a pivot is solved by measuring it with the help of some instrument and does not require any exposition of its implicit presuppositions. And though the latter is quite possible there is no need for it if not for purely theoretical interest. But the whole matter changes radically when there appears a crisis situation in answering a question. Such crisis situations make one think if the initial question is correct. And then it is quite useful to connect the problem of correctness of the question with the problem of exposing its implicit presuppositions. This is the way to formulate and solve the problem correctly. The following is the example to this.

2. The problem of the domain of applicability of theory

It is impossible to consider here the problem as a whole, so we shall take its particular but a very characteristic case which can be expressed in two questions:

Q1: In what domain of mechanical motion is Newton mechanics applicable?

Q2: In what domain of mechanical motion is relativistic mechanics (special theory of relativity) applicable?

The usual answers to these questions are as follows:

A1: Newton mechanics is applicable in the domain of slow (much slower than the light velocity) mechanical motions.

A2: Relativistic mechanics is applicable in the domain of fast (equal to the light velocity or close to it) motions.

But such answers bring about crisis situations. To show this let us take for example the mentioned above Newton mechanics velocity addition law (**LN**) and relativistic mechanics velocity addition law (**LR**). Let us ask the question: Is **LN** really applicable only for slow motions? and Is **LR** applicable only for fast motions? If the answers to these questions are negative that is if we show that the answers are "not only...", then both A1 and A2 to Q1 and Q2 are not true, which will testify to a crisis situation in solving this problem. Then it will be evident that Q1 and Q2 are incorrect. Now we shall show that by exposing the implicit presuppositions of these questions it is possible to reduce them to correct questions.

Generally speaking the answer A1 as we shall see is incorrect, i.e. LN is applicable not only to slow motions. To show this we shall take the kind of mechanical motion which we shall call phase motion. An example of such motion is the shifting of the light spot of a searchlight on the screen. The characteristic peculiarity of such phase motion is that the objects involved in the process are not connected with one another by means of any physical interactions. Thus one

lightspot does not condition physically the appearance of another lightspot, but they all appear as a result of physical interaction of the beam of a searchlight and the screen. Therefore the velocity of the process in which the lightspots appear on the screen may exceed c . We shall name this process with superluminal velocity as superfast. But to add the velocities of phase motions we must use **LN**, not **LR**. So it turns out that in case of phase motions the application of **LN** does not depend on the velocity of the motion. Hence the statement that **LN** is applicable only for slow motions is not true and so A1 is not true either.

Neither is true A2, i.e. it is false that **LR** is applicable only for fast motions. In case of dynamic motions mentioned above **LR** is applicable in a wide range of velocities from 0 to c .

It follows from the said above that the answers Q1 and Q2 about the applicability of **LN** and **LR** for slow and fast motions correspondingly without a more accurate explication as to the particular kind of the motion are not true. Neither are correct the questions Q1 and Q2.

All the considered above material sets us to solve this crisis by means of exposing the implicit presuppositions of these questions. One of such presuppositions is the statement that there exist two kinds of mechanical motion - dynamic and phase motions. Taking this into consideration we can reduce the incorrect initial question about the domain of applicability of **LN** and **LR** to mechanical motions to the questions about the domains of applicability of these laws to dynamic and phase mechanical motions.

The true answer to Q2 will be that **LR** is applicable to velocities in a wide range (from 0 to c) possible for dynamic motion, and not only to fast velocities, while **LN** is applied only to dynamic motions. Q1 also has a true answer: **LN** is applicable to phase mechanical motions in a wide range from 0 to ∞ , not only slow motions, while **LR** is applied here only to slow phase motions. The latter though has no practical significance and there is no mention about it in literature, but this is the fact of science.

Thus the exposition of the implicit presuppositions of Q1 and Q2 makes it possible to give a substantiated solution of the problem as to the problem of applicability of **LN** and **LR**. The analysis of applicability of other laws of Newton and relativistic mechanics as well as their theories in general can be done in analogy.

3 The problem of truth

When we put a question "Is this or that proposition true?" we hardly give a thought to the fact that the question is not correct. And we could hardly ever answer it, if in practice we did not substitute it intuitively by another question, i. e. if we did not reduce it to the correct question like "Is this or that proposition true empirically?". This question will really have a true answer based on available empirical methods of establishing truth such as observation, measurement, experiment, etc.

However this intuitive approach to the problem of truth cannot be quite satisfactory in many cases. Therefore there arises a necessity to expose the implicit presuppositions of the question about truth and reduce the initial incorrect question about truth in general to some particular correct questions about some certain kind of truth. It is possible to make such reductions on various foundations and this will

determine the character of the answers. Let us take for example a very simple question: "Is any real number equal or not equal to 0 ?". Will the positive answer to this question be true or false? The solution of this problem will depend on what implicit presuppositions the question contains. These implicit presuppositions can be exposed by means of the analysis of the contents of the term "real number" and "equal". Then presuppositions can be "classical" or "constructive" depending on the fact in what mathematics - classical or constructive - they will be exposed. If the presuppositions are "classical" the answer will be: "Any real number is either equal or not equal to 0 ", and this will be true. If the presuppositions are constructive the positive answer will be wrong while the negative answer "not any real number..." will be true. This is again a crisis situation because the answer is ambiguous as the implicit presuppositions remain unexposed.

It follows that the incorrect initial question "Is any real number equal or not equal to 0 ?" should be reduced to other correct questions by exposing its implicit presuppositions. The resultant questions will be: "Is any classical real number equal or not equal to 0 " and "Is any constructive real number equal or not equal to 0 ?". Only then we can get quite unambiguous answers - positive to the first question and negative to the second.

On the whole the exposition of the implicit presuppositions of questions is of great significance in establishing the truth of scientific propositions. Without it many scientific discussions as a form of question-answer exchange would be fruitless and futile. But the exposing of the implicit presuppositions is no simple matter. It demands, first and foremost, quite a clear understanding of the foundation for classifying the type of truth and the presuppositions of truth inherent to each of the type. Without this any exposition of the implicit presuppositions of the questions about truth is doomed to failure.

It is necessary first of all to state clearly on what basis we shall determine the types of truth and therefore the presuppositions of truth of each type. The solutions of this problem in methodology of science are various. As the basis for our solution we shall take the qualitative specifics of epistemic presuppositions of the truth of presuppositions. This will determine, as it will be shown below, the method of establishing the truth of this or that type. Then any question of the type "Is the proposition true?" need be reduced to the question: "Does the proposition possess the truth of this certain kind?". If necessary this question will be reduced to the questions of still higher levels of reduction.

Any question consists of certain terms. They are known to be of two kinds - logical and descriptive. Then the true answer to the question can be given, if at all, either on the basis of sense or meaning of logical terms alone or on the basis of not only logical terms but also descriptive terms. Hence there are two ways of establishing truth: either on the basis of the logical terms contents analysis or not only this but the analysis of the contents of the descriptive terms too. The proposition the truth of which is established by means of only logical terms contents analysis is called a logically true proposition, and the truth of such proposition is called logical truth. If the truth of the proposition is established on the basis of not only logical terms but also descriptive terms, such proposition is called a factually true proposition, and the truth of the propositions of this kind is called the factual truth.

Taking all this into consideration the incorrect question "Is the proposition p true?" is reduced to correct questions "Is the proposition p logically true?" and "Is

the proposition p factually true?". So, the questions: "Is the proposition $2+2 = 4$ logically true?" and "Is the proposition <<Snow is whitw>> factually true?" are correct as they have quite definite negative or positive accordingly, answers. The first answer is negative because its truth cannot be established only on the basis of sense analysis of the logical terms, this is evident. The truth of the second answer can be established in this way. Now if we ask: "Is the proposition $2+2 = 4$ logically true or is it wrong that $2+2 = 4$?", the answer will be positive for not knowing the descriptive terms "2", "4", "+", "=" but knowing only the sense of the logical terms "proposition", "or", "not", "it is wrong that..." it is quite possible to establish the truth of the proposition. And since there is a true answer, the question is correct.

Thus exposing the implicit presuppositions characterizing the specific features of the truth the initial incorrect question "Is the proposition p true?" can be reduced to the first level correct question "Is the proposition p logically true?" and "Is the proposition p factually true?". The last question is reduced to the second level correct questions: "Is the proposition p true factually empirically?" and "Is the proposition p true factually analytically?". If in answering these questions there arise crisis situation again it will be necessary to analyse the implicit presuppositions of these questions again and to apply the reduction method to formulate the correct questions of still higher levels to solve the problem in question.

So, in our example of some scientific problems we have tried to show how necessary it is sometimes to analyse the implicit presuppositions of questions which present these problems to solve them successfully. In this we see the importance of the analysis of the implicit presuppositions of questions.

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HOW IS THE REFERENCE OF THE SPEECH POSSIBLE? A PROBLEM IN
PLATO'S *SOPHIST*.

Lucian Vesalon

We may read the *Sophist*¹ as an amount of distinct theories or as a part of so-called Plato's system. But there is also the alternative, this being the most relevant one, to see this dialogue as an *eristic piece*², namely a verbal combat (logomachia) with the sophistic movement. If it is so, it appears as a necessity to proceed to a very short describing of the "war-fields" and to expose Plato's tactics of facing the dextrous sophist.

The major charge against sophists, expressed by Plato and Aristotle at once, includes two meanings of the term "*pseudos*": the sophist is always wrong, his statements are false and spurious, because he says "what is not" (*objective-pseudos*); besides, these false statements are not the outcome of ignorance, but the means of a tantalising intention, that of lying (*subjective-pseudos*) – is not a lack of wit, but a cogent wielding of the resources of the *logos*.

The sophist possesses the suspect ability of knowing how, "not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things" (*Sph.*, 233d), by virtue of a single art. This is the "imitative kind" (*mimetikon*), which exhibits "spoken images" (*eidola legomena*) of all things and makes "imitations which have the same names as the real things" (*Sph.*, 234b-c). This image has something unhealthy in it. Being, the reality is now an *effect of speech*. We cannot signify an *outward thing* through names: talking by using words, we *talk about words* and not about entities across language³. The meaning determines the reference; *the word makes the thing*. Consequently, the receiver is deprived of extra-linguistic references⁴. That is why the sophist knows how to talk about everything, because he knows how to talk – he is the master of speech.

Aristotle, alike Plato, will equate *legein* with *semainein ti*: to speak about nothing is to not speak at all. And that's what sophist does, "who hold the theory for its own sake" (*Metaphysics*, IV, 5, 1009a). Against sophistry, Plato will try to regain the lost ground of referentiality of the discourse. From now on, the philosophy will be the endeavour of saying what it is and the sophistry of making whatever is said.

Before showing how is it possible to denote things with words, let us see what the *logos* is, according to Plato. "We have two kinds of vocal indication of being" (*Sph.*, 261e): nouns (*onomata*) and verbs (*rhemata*)⁵. *The verb* is "the indication which relates to action" and *the noun* is "the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question" (*Sph.*, 262a). Neither traditional formal logic

nor contemporary grammars can offer a proper understanding of these two genuine platonic notions. *Onoma* is not, strictly speaking, a noun, just as *rhema* is not (only) the verb. We deal here with logical / ontological notions, not with grammar subject matters. On the other side, to understand *onomata* and *rhema* as the logical subject and predicate is not a better view instead of the first one. The judgement, as Plato conceives it, does not consist in a link between two notions, mediated by copula, as traditional logic states it. We find a closer image in the ancient Greek grammars, with their two main chapters: *names* and *verbs*.

Generally speaking, words and sentences, as well, have to refer to something beyond them (an extra-linguistic *physis*): “a sentence (*logos*), if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject (*tinon*); without a subject it is impossible” (*Sph.*, 262e). Now, what is the reference of the names and that of the verbs? *Onoma* denotes sometimes an *individual (ti)*; things are named according to Forms. We have here the dreadful problem of the *orthotes ton onomaton*, the main line of reasoning in the *Cratylus*, which I don’t insist on. When a name like this (denoting an individual) takes part to a judgement, that judgement will get a *temporal determination*, being about “that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be” (*Sph.*, 262d). This temporal dimension of the sentence is a consequence of the fact that individuals are becoming, are part of the moving sensible world. The logical point here is that such sentences are only *accidentally true*: there can be no science (in Aristotelian sense) about them, but only a series of *doxai*. On the other hand, *onomata* may refer directly to a Form (*genos*). In this case, the judgement will not include a temporal aspect – it is a great theoretical advance to reveal the existence of such *apodeictical sentences*, necessarily true or false. It seems here that Plato attempts to define the logical necessity by *eluding the time-mark* of a sentence⁶.

Let us briefly survey now *the verb (rhema)*. Its major relevance is that *rhema* always refers to Forms⁷ (*genos*) – it is a stable stake for the defective human mind. It also has an *anamnesical value*, for it grants the link between mind and intelligible, it merges the Forms and the concepts. *Onomata* and *rhemata*, words in general, discriminates, separates what is to be re-unite, interweaved by the judgement (*logos*). A threading of names and verbs, unrelated between them, isn’t a judgement nor a speech yet: “discourse (*logos*) is never composed of nouns (*onomaton*) alone spoke in succession, nor of verbs (*rhematon*) spoken without nouns” (*Sph.*, 262a). It is natural being so, while *the speech (logos)* is a *mingling (legein)*; we see here a peculiar case of what may be called: *the etymology precedes the theory*. Between the borders of his language, Plato couldn’t think otherwise. Therefore, such a *succession of words* does not yet make a discourse: “for in neither case (i.e. a succession of names and verbs without mingling) do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exist or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns” (*Sph.*, 262c).

Plato names this mingling between *onomata* and *rhemata*, which gives birth to a *logos, symploke eidon*: “for our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas (*ten ton eidon symploken*) with one another” (*Sph.*, 259e). The most scholars found that here Plato only asserts, emphatically, that there has to be an intermingling of Forms; the translation used here pays tribute to such a view, too. On the contrary, I think that we are entitled to relate this fragment not to the precedent, but to the following ones, and to read it as an introductory theme to the discussion about *the nature of speech*. I’m indebted here

to Mr. Hackforth, who suggests that *koinonia genon* is different from *symploke eidon*, *eide* being here not the Forms, but *the parts* (i.e. *onoma* and *rhema*) of the *logos*, and also to Mr. G. Ryle, who considers that *symploke* means the mingling of words within the judgement or of those *noemata* into the truth or falsehood, alike Aristotle speaks about *symploke noematon* in *De Anima* (430 a28, 432 a12). If it is so, *symploke eidon* isn't the "interweaving of the classes or ideas", but *the interweaving* (or link) of the *names and verbs*, which gives birth to a judgement, although it may refer to a connection between mind's concepts, having told that "thought (*dianoia*) and speech (*logos*) are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of the thought" (Sph., 263 e).

So, any *logos* necessarily has, at least, three components: *onoma-symploke eidon* – *rhema*, this being the elementary one, namely a single name combined with a single verb. The result is a sentence, "the first and shortest form of discourse (*logos*)" (Sph., 262 c). Nevertheless, the sentence conceived as such is apparently unable to solve the problem of copula⁸. However, Plato gives it a brilliant solution, by applying a principle of translation, *avant-la-lettre*, although this point is not made clear enough in the dialogue. The Greek verb *einai* has something sophisticated in it, namely *ambiguity* of which Plato is highly concerned and worried. *Einai* may have at once an existential, identity or copulative sense. Therefore, Plato will translate all this meaning into his *language of participation*: a) for "X is" (existential "is") Plato uses "X participates to Being" (X *metechei tou ontos*); b) for "X is beautiful" ("is" – copula) stands "X participates to the Beauty" (X *metechei tou kalou*), and c) for "X is X" (identity) we have "X participates to the Same⁹ with reference to himself" (X *metechei tou tautou pros heautou*). Consequently, when a sentence includes a copula, we have to translate "is" into a "*metechei tou...*" to obtain the joint between a name and a verb (the verb is here just this "*metechei tou...*"). Otherwise, the sentence will remain ambiguous and propitious to sophistry.

Resuming, we saw that every sentence must have three components (*onomata, symploke and rhemata*) and I indicated previously what the references of the names and verbs are. What about the reference of a *logos* as a whole? The answer which I will make explicit immediately, is that *symploke* refers to the participation (*koinonia*) of Forms in one another (i.e. that gene which are the references of names and verbs, respectively). *Koinonia genon* is generally used to express all the relations that take place between the Forms. Briefly, Forms are no more a collection of isolated entities, but they do form a hiperarchized system, conducted by precise rules, according to their specific nature. *Analogy with letters*¹⁰ suggests that neither all Forms will mingle with one another, nor none will do so¹¹, but some will and others will not: "we are agreed that some of the classes (*genon*) will mingle (*koinonein*) with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many..." (Sph., 254 b-c).

It seems now that a strange thing happened: a sentence, by its *symploke*, refers to a mingling of Forms, but this mingling does not always take place! How this can be possible? The answer is that not all sentences are of the same type. Some of them states facts as they are (*ta onta*), these being the true ones, and others states things that are other than the facts (*hetera ton onton*), these being the false ones¹². They both have a subject (expressed by their names), only that the false sentences refer to a link which does not really take place between two

particular Forms - they assert a link where there is a separation or assert a separation where there is a link in reality, will say later on Aristotle¹³. The Relation is, from now on, the chief factor of knowledge, this being the departing point of any further discussion about truth and falsehood in Plato.

Returning to the problem of the reference of speech, we found that this restricted participation of Forms in one another (*koinonia genon*) provides the sentence with a steady reference and enables us to sever true sentences from the false ones. But what grants the interweaving of Forms itself, where as not all of them will do so, and consequently, what makes possible the reference of the speech? The answer that Plato gives is hard for us to acquaint entirely with, but isn't impossible to express it just: it is a combination of two elements, working together, which grants all these, namely *Difference* and *Philia*. For the Difference separates and dispels the Forms, and *Philia* makes them blending and remaining close related. This is the platonic sense of *interweaving of Forms*, the thing that allows us to think and speak meaningfully. And for that, the absolute being (*pantelos on*) has to be provided with *motion* and *life* and *soul* and *mind*. Following a logical clue, we finally arrived at the metaphysics, this being the natural way of thinking everywhere in Plato's dialogues.

NOTES:

¹ I used here Plato, *The Sophist*, edited by E.H.Warmington, with an English translation by Harold North Fowler, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1957.

² For the eristic value of dialectic and conventional rules of debating, see G. Ryle, *Plato's Progress*, pp. 102-131, 196-204, Cambridge, At The University Press, 1966.

³ See Gorgias, *Peri tou me ontos e peri physeos*, apud. Sext. Adv. math., VII, 84-86, and Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia*, C.6, 980b (21 D.K.). Plato observes too, as sophists did, that a name may be free from its reference and may pass from a consciousness to another without being related to "things". But the name has to be forced to reveal its *eidos*: "For as yet you and I have nothing in common about it but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument" (*Sph.*, 218 b-c, my italics). And that's why "it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest..." (*Sph.*, 227c).

⁴ See Barbara Cassin, *Du faux ou du mensonge a la fiction (de pseudos a plasma)* and Alonso Tordessilas, *L'instance temporelle dans l'argumentation de la premiere et la seconde sophistique : la notion de kairos*, in Barbara Cassin, *Le plaisir de parler. Etudes de sophistique comparee*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1986, where the mere

falsehood displayed by sophists' speech countervails the powers of their fictional discourse.

⁵ *Onoma* means, in general, the proper name, the name, the word, the noun and the subject of predication, and also the noun and the adjective, as different from *rhema*, which denotes the other parts of speech. *Rhema* is also used non-technically, in the previous dialogues, with the meaning of "phrase" or "expression", e.g. in the *Protagoras* (341 e, 343b), where it is used for sayings of Simonides and Pittacos. *Rhema* is also used, with the same meanings, in such expressions as "*rhema kai logon*" (*R.*, 473 e) or "*rhema kai dogma*" (*R.*, 464 a, *Lg.*, 797 c). In other cases, however, *rhema* means a single word (e.g. *R.*, 462 c, *Tht.*, 165 a, *Ti.*, 49e) or textual expression (*Euthd.*, 305 a, *Grg.*, 450 e, *Phd.*, 102 b, *Tht.*, 166 d).

⁶ We may point-out as examples every particular judgement which states or defines the interweaving of Forms, e.g. "Being can mingle both of them" (to *on mikton amphoin*, *Sph.*, 254 d, i.e. motion and rest), or "motion is other than the same" (he *kinesis heteron tautou estin*, *Sph.*, 256 a).

⁷ That there are Forms for actions we are told in *Cratylus*, 387 and *Epistles*, VII, 342 d.

⁸ For a detailed discussion about copula see L. L. Ackrill, "Plato and the copula: *Sophist* 251 – 259, *The Journal of Hellenic studies*, vol. LXXVII, part 1, 1957.

⁹ The Form of Identity (The Same) was previously established in the dialogue: see *Sph.*, 254 e – 255 d.

¹⁰ "Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do" (*Sph.*, 253 a).

¹¹ See *Sph.*, 252 e, 253 c.

¹² See *Sph.*, 263 b.

¹³ See *De Int.*, 1, 16 a, where Aristotle says explicitly that synthesis and separation (*synthesin kai diairesin*) are the truth and the false. Also in *Met.*, 1051 b there is a more explicit passage: the truth belongs to the one who considers the separation where there is a separation and the unity where there is a unity as is into the error the one who thinks the opposite.